Sir William Johnson, Indian Superintendent: Colonial ...
The Role of Sir William Johnson In the Colonial Development of America and His Involvement in the Expansionist Policies of the British Imperial Government.AS THE TITLE STATES, this essay will look closely at Johnson's role in the colonial development of America, and particularly the key concern over westward expansion. This became fundamentally linked with the differing views the British government and the colonial authorities held, over how this expansion should be managed, and in particular the financial cost of such a policy. This led, inexorably it seems, to the wider issues that then escalated into the Revolution and the fight for independence. Although Johnson died before the Revolution actually started, he was a key participant in the events that led up to this break with Britain, and as such the motives and actions of this man can give a picture of how the colonies and Britain viewed the future of America. This essay will look briefly at his early life in America, and then in more detail at the military and political career of Johnson, and particularly his involvement with the Indians, in his capacity as Superintendent of Indian Affairs, which was central to the British concerns over colonial expansion, and how that was to be managed. The military career of Johnson naturally evolved around his relationship with the Indians, especially the Six Nations, and earned him great success and wealth, after his victories at Lake George and Niagara. His political career progressed alongside his military one, and again was linked to his relationship with the Indians, through his appointment as Indian Superintendent. His relationship with the authorities in London, the colonial authorities, the settlers and traders, and with the Indians themselves, will be examined to form a portrait of Johnson, and how he saw the situation regarding westward expansion and all its implications for Britain and his adopted country, America. Finally some conclusions will be given based on Johnson's handling of his difficult task, and how this affected subsequent events. 1 IT WAS THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR that made Johnson's name - and in particular the disastrous year 1755, which was relieved by the only success, when Johnson fought off an attack by the French, under von Dieskau, and in the process captured the Baron. Braddock's defeat on the Monongahela River, showed how important it was to instil loyalty in the Indians; by sheer tactlessness Braddock had alienated the one hundred Delawares that Johnson's deputy George Croghan had managed to get him for his campaign. They left him and returned to their own lands, leaving only a few Iroquois scouts. Being ignorant of the ways of backwoods fighting, Braddock attacked a smaller force in a frontal assault that was doomed to fail. In this battle he was killed and so the role of Commander - in - Chief was taken by Governor Shirley. His expedition to Niagara was itself doomed after Braddock's defeat; he still interfered with Johnson's campaign, by taking away both colonial militia and Indians from his force. He also tried to interfere with Johnson's role as Colonel of the Six Nations by appointing one of his agents, Lydius, as Colonel over the Six Nations also. Johnson, although recognising Shirley's right to assume the command of the forces, did not accept the usurpation of his role in managing Indian affairs. The campaign to Lake George showed Johnson at his best; he ensured his men were disciplined and ready to fight by using persuasion rather than force. Although Johnson lost more than 220 men and both his deputy commander, Colonel Williams, and his friend Hendrik, the French lost their commander von Dieskau and three hundred to four hundred men; just as importantly, they were halted in their advance on British territory. Johnson's action was seen as a welcome change after all the disaster's of the campaign so far, so welcome in fact that Johnson received a baronetcy from the King and £5,000 from the government. Equally importantly Johnson's political prospects rose accordingly. Influential friends such as Watts, De Lancey and Thomas Pownall gathered in New York to assist him in his career. In February 1756 he received his appointment as Sole Agent and Superintendent of Indians and their Affairs, and the instructions he received gave him greater control than had applied hitherto. He was to ensure that no independent transactions were allowed with the Indians, and was only subordinate to the instructions from London, not the colonial governors, through the Commander - in - Chief. The following year saw further disasters for the British. The loss of Oswego with sixteen hundred men, was a considerable blow to the British. The fur trade was lost, with the Indians taking their pelts to Niagara and Frontenac rather than Oswego, and just as seriously the confidence of the Indians in the British suffered as well. In July of the same year further disaster struck. Montcalm attacked and took Fort William Henry, after a heroic defence by Colonel Monro. The Indian allies of the French, though, showed how unstable they could be as allies - they massacred the garrison while Montcalm vainly tried to limit the atrocities committed. In 1758 Abercromby took over from Lord Loudon as Commander - in - Chief but seemed to be made of the same stock as the previous incumbents. In a drive on Ticonderoga he took on Montcalm, who had three thousand six hundred men, with a force of sixteen thousand men - and lost!. By attempting a frontal assault, without the support of artillery, he lost two thousand men in a vain attempt to dislodge the French. He then panicked and retreated, still with about twelve thousand men. The Indians again had seen a British collapse, which left Johnson with a lot of work to try and persaude them that this was not a mortal blow to the British campaign against the French. Before too long Johnson had something tangible he could use to sway the Indians over to the British side. Bradstreet led a campaign in 1758 to attack Fort Frontenac, which not only succeeded, but had devestating results on the French plan of attack. He not only cut their supply lines, but captured two supply ships, which he loaded with stores and took across to the American side of Lake Ontario. The French were therefore forced back on Niagara, having to abandon Fort Duquesne. A further change of Commander - in - Chief brought to the fore the man who was to finally drive the French out of North America. Jeffrey Amherst was a good soldier, well liked by his men and the colonial governments, but had one trait that gave Johnson many problems. He thought the Indians beneath consideration and therefore not worthy of special treatment. Their worth was proved by Johnson when he took part in the Niagara campaign. He raised seven hundred Iroquois and 244 other Indians for this attack, a force that was to play a decisive part in the defeat of the French. After a lengthy siege the fort was close to being taken, but then on the 21 July 1759 the commander of the British forces, Brigadier General Prideaux, was killed by one of his own cannon, leaving Johnson in command. The question of whether he was technically the senior ranking officer, Lt. Colonel Haldimand in Oswego possibly being senior, since he was a regular, as opposed to a colonial, soldier, was debatable. Johnson was in the right place at the right time: Haldimand arrived on the 28 July to dispute the command, but by then the fort had been taken. The French had tried to mount an attack to reinforce it, but thanks to his Iroquois scouts, Johnson was ready for them. In sharp contrast to the earlier events at Fort William Henry, Johnson ensured that his captives were well treated, even giving them shoes, stockings and blankets for the long journey to New York and then England. The following year was to see the final defeat of the French. Again, Johnson raised a force of six hundred Indians to take part in the campaign to take Montreal. On the 8 September 1760 Vaudreiul the Governor General of Canada surrendered all claims to the North American territories held, including Detroit, Michillimackinac, Sault Ste. Marie, St. Joseph and Green Bay. JOHNSON'S PART IN THIS WAR, and the succeeding years in which he played such a decisive part, were primarily due to his position as Indian Superintendent. The events that led up to this post being created reveal some of the ministry's thinking on American colonial expansion, and therefore are worth looking at in finer detail. Alden in his article on the creation of the Indian Superintendencies, mentions that as early as 1721 the Board of Trade devised a plan to invest the conduct of Indian relations in a governor-general.2 By the time Clinton was Governor of New York in 1746 the Indian Commissioners in Albany were proving inadequate for the task; Johnson was therefore asked, since he had a good relationship with the Indians, to regulate the trade with them. Clinton also wrote to Newcastle stating he should be given, as Governor, powers to handle all such matters, when other duties permitted. Both he and Shirley, the Governor of Massachusetts, wrote to the Board of Trade on 18 August 1748 stating that Johnson was the ideal candidate to handle Indian affairs.
'one or more suitable persons to inform themselves of everything which may be useful (either by gaining or preserving the Friendship of those [Six] Nations) for promoting trade among them and for preventing their being abused & cheated in their Trade'.3Three years later the term 'Superintendant (sic) of Indian Affairs' was used by Archibald Kennedy, a member of the New York Council; in an article entitled 'The importance of Gaining and Preserving the Friendship of the Indians to the British Interest, Considered' he urged confederation of the colonies, establishment of a barrier colony against the French and a unified Indian policy.4 This plan would be financed by duties levied in England on Indian trade goods sent to America and on furs imported from the colonies. His plan was sent to Cadwallader Colden, the Lieutenant Governor of New York, who prepared a report for the Board of Trade. It was necessary for such a plan since the Indians were becoming increasingly vocal in their complaints against land seizures and excessive sale of rum to get them to sign away their lands. This was a real threat since rum was seen as a food by the Indians; Hendrik and Abraham Peters, while drunk on rum, had signed the deed to the Connecticut Purchase at the Albany Congress, and although this was repudiated later, since an individual could not sign away tribal land, it being held on a communal basis, the damage to Indian/colonial relations was great.5 THE ALBANY CONGRESS WAS HELD in June 1754 as a result of the Board of Trade calling for such a meeting to rectify abuses in the administration of Indian affairs. Thomas Pownall gave a brief talk, mentioning the fact that the Iroquois were coalescing into a nation, and ready to concentrate their affections on some 'agent' or 'stateholder'.6 Johnson also spoke at this meeting, on measures necessary to be taken with the Six Nations, and other matters relating to defeating the designs of the French, in respect of which he stressed the importance of securing the aid of the Six Nations, a statement that showed how strongly he identified with them.
'The Eyes of all the Western Tribes of Indians are upon the behaviour of the Six Nations, whose fame of power, may in some measure exceed the reality, while they act a timid and neutral part'.7He went on to outline how the designs of the French could be thwarted:
'Now to hinder the incursions of the French, and to revive the Spirits of the Six Nations and their allies, nothing can conduce more to those desirable ends, than first, establishing Garrisons in the most commodious places among them'.8Johnson's long term aims can be seen by the further suggestions he put forward:
'There should be some English continually residing in every Nation, whether Military Officers, or others, to keep up a continued correspondence'.9 ' . . . the Indians must think there can be no union in our Councils, when it has been known more than once, that the Six Nations have been invited to a conference by different colonies at the same time. This looks among the Indians, as tho' our Measures were not mutual, and occasions them to be divided in their Councils also, being doubtful of our acting with vigour and unanimity ettc. (sic) against the French'.10On the 2nd of July Chief Abraham of the Mohawks made a plea for Johnson to be made agent to the Six Nations. Another spokesman told the Congress 'If he [Johnson] fails us, we die',stressed the affection for him, and hinted that the French were plotting to assasinate or abduct him.11 Alden mentions here the suggestion (but not who actually suggests it) that Johnson himself inspired these praises from the Indians to get the appointment as Superintendent. Whatever the truth of this, the Journal of Congress, Pownall's papers and Johnson's report were sent to the Board of Trade on 22 July, arriving there on 24 October. In London, Halifax, in April of the same year, was preparing a report on the Indian/French situation. This report, stipulating the need for forts to be built, and a change in the handling of Indian relations, was sent to Sir Thomas Robinson, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department. By 29 October the Board of Trade was urging that a royal official be chosen to manage Indian affairs, with Johnson specifically named as the candidate best suited for the task. The importance of the Albany Congress can be seen as a deciding factor in changing the views of the Board of Trade. On 9 August they had been thinking of having a military commander, with the powers of a commissary-general for Indian affairs, sent to the colonies. The receipt of the Congress documents altered their perception of the problem and made them decide instead to choose a civilian official - Johnson. As Alden states in his explanation, 'impending war meant that centralization of Indian affairs was indispensable',12 and therefore the Board of Trade, backed by the request of the Six Nations, and the recommendations of Clinton and Shirley, chose a single agent to manage the Northern and Southern Department's of Indian Affairs. THIS ENCOURAGEMENT OF JOHNSON'S VIEWS was not to last however. The Proclamation of 1763 was an attempt by the imperial government to overcome the problems the administration of such a vast territory posed for the government. Problems with the Indians (the Cherokee Indian War had ended two years earlier) and the French Canadians, meant the government in London had to assume responsibility for maintaining a regular army in the trans Appalachian region, since the colonial governments were not willing to accept this themselves.13 Building on the promises of the Treaty of Easton in 1758, the Proclamation of 1763 laid down that all the lands and territories 'lying to the westward of the Sources of the Rivers which fall into the Sea from the West and North West' should be reserved for the use of Indians. Also pledges made to the Indians at subsequent treaties would be respected, the advantages of the Indian trade would be spread among all the colonies and those that had served in the War would be given land, but in such a way as to honour pledges given to the Indians.14 This Proclamation, accepted by the King and approved on 8 October can be seen as the first major development that led up to the administration of Indian affairs being returned to the control of the colonies. Although the two Superintendents were empowered to control trade between the Indians and the white traders, the abuses of the system were still considerable. The Proclamation had set up a temporary boundary; this was flouted either by those genuinely wishing to settle further west, or by illegal traders and speculators hoping to make a fortune from the Indian lands. Johnson's views sent to the Board of Trade for their consideration, and expressed in the plan of 1764, included the suggestion that the Indians should continue to be subsidised by presents, and that the Superintendent's, through their respective Departments, should have more control of Indian affairs. However this raised two concerns; Sosin mentions these in his work on British colonial policy towards the Middle West. Firstly, would the ministry be able to raise the revenue necessary to finance the imperial establishment?, and secondly, would the colonists accept this imperial regulation?15 Regarding this question of cost Johnson (and Stuart in the Southern Department) advocated a tax on furs: the Commisssioners of the Board of Trade thought this would be difficult to collect and would hinder trade, whilst Governor Murray of Quebec also objected to the plan, especially the tariffs of prices and the proposed tax, but carried out his instructions to adher to the policy that was laid down. The traders in Canada were so alarmed about this plan that they agitated strongly for its abandonment. In 1766 Murray was recalled to London, by which time the plan had lost official support in England.16 Governor Bernard of Massachusetts argued for a distinction between control of Indians inside and outside provincial boundaries, and did not wish to see Johnson as 'a governor within my government'.17 The Board of Trade themselves took a considerable length of time to come to any firm conclusions about the plans for managing Indian affairs. On the 11 May 1764 Croghan, Johnson's deputy, sent Johnson a letter from London explaining this delay:
'I have been here three Months this Day and no Doubt you will be surprised to hear that thire Lordshipes have Neaver Taken under Thire Consideration Indian affairs Nor Even has the State of yr. Department wh. you sent by Me been Read att ye. Board'.18As mentioned earlier the main stumbling block was the question of finance; Johnson was continually being pressed to keep expenses to the minimum. In a letter written to Johnson from New York in March 1765 Gage, the Commander-in-Chief, stated:
'I don't know whether you received a Minute of the Treasury dated the 28th of Novr. last from the Board of Trade or any other office. But I have received orders to incur no Expence, till first approved by the King. Your Department is not yet fixed by King or Parliament'.19Later on in the month Gage wrote to Johnson to express concern over a draught of £2643 8s 3d from Croghan, and stating that the Treasury expected authentic vouchers and detailed accounts of presents purchased for the Indians.20 Johnson's insistence on the need to continue these gifts of presents was very much concerned with the situation should the Indians' goodwill be lost. He argued that only by proper and regular trade with the Indians could they be kept loyal to the Crown; illegal French traders were always ready to win back the Indians by undermining the authority of the British. Also the question of settlers west of the line set by the Proclamation of 1763 was causing friction. Some grants of land had been made by Virginia before the outbreak of the French and Indian War, but the Proclamation made these illegal. In 1766, though, the Auditor-General for the Plantations, Robert Cholmondely, was insisting the settlers pay quit-rents for the same lands.21 Attacks by settlers on the Indians added to the considerable problems both Gage and Johnson had to surmount. The ministry in London reacted differently to these issues. Barrington, the Secretary-at-War, put forward a plan to do away with forts in the interior; the Indians would have to travel to the seaboard colonies to trade, and control of their affairs would be returned to the colonial governments.22 Shelburne had a more ambiguous position; he upheld the Proclamation of 1763 but also attempted to alter the imperial program for the interior. He saw the solution in terms of keeping a few of the interior forts, and establishing new colonies, which, when self sufficient, would help defray the costs of the original settlements. Also less troops would be needed, four battalions instead of fifteen. Whatever plan was adopted the central point about the cost of such a policy was always uppermost. Barrington estimated in January 1767 that for the coming year the costs of the American garrisons would be £400,000; income, since the repeal of the Stamp Act and reduction of import duties, would be no more than £80,000.23 As mentioned above Johnson saw clearly the problems of regulating the Indian trade, and as a consequence, the settlers and traders themselves. He consistently advocated a control over the business of dealing with the Indians. In September 1761 he had written to all the officers at western posts instructing them on how the Indian affairs were to be controlled.
'The officer to keep up a good understanding with all Inds who live near his Post, and wth. those who may resort thither on Business, and see no Injustice is done them in Trade or Otherwise'.24In May 1762 he wrote to Amherst, the Commander-in-Chief, mentioning the problems of the settlers (of the Susquehanna Company), and of his meeting with the Six Nations in April of that year.
'Your Excellency will observe in these Transactions the great Jealousy of the Indians with regard to their Lands, & particularly their uneasiness concerning the designs of some Connecticut people . . . gone to Settle on a large tract of country on the Susquehanna River'.25JOHNSON'S CONCERNS were seen to be correct when in 1763 Pontiac's rebellion threatened to do what the French had failed to achieve. The Indians rising resentment that their lands were being taken, and the lack of presents and other more essential goods, such as food, implements and ammunition, led Pontiac, an Ottawa chief, to persaude Chippewas, Delawares, Shawnees and Senecas to attack Detroit and other forts in the area. Not all of the Western Tribes were involved, the Huron for example remaining neutral in the conflict, nor was it a simultaneous rising. However, many forts were taken, with their inhabitants either killed, often brutally, or captured. Johnson, being notified of the rising on the 5 June 1763 wrote to Amherst on the 6th and also wrote to the Lords of Trade and Plantations mentioning the underlying state of affairs he thought was responsible for this rebellion. In July he held a meeting with the Six Nations at German Flats to try and negotiate with the Indians a peace settlement. In September a conference was held at Johnson Hall, with Johnson throwing down the hatchet to get the Indians to stay loyal to the Crown. In 1764 a peace conference was held at Niagara with fourteen hundred Indians present. Writing to Colden in August Johnson described his dealings with the Western Nations; he strengthened the Covenant Chain with them and won agreement, not only for the return of all prisoners taken but restitution for the traders losses.26 He then went on to talk about the renewal of trade:
'I told them repeatedly their loss of Trade must be charged upon the Enemy, . . . , however I know nothing will contribute more to keep them at peace, than the letting them have a Trade carried on by Honest Men'.27Johnson's concerns over the boundary line as it affected trade were therefore of continuing concern to ensure that the situation did not revert to that of 1763. The Board of Trade plan of 1764 that Johnson favoured would ensure this full regulation of Indian affairs, but at a cost. The plan provided for the appointment of deputies, commissaries, interpreters and smiths, and the traders restricted to designated posts. This though posed a dilemma for Gage; he did not have enough men to police the western forts and keep troops in the east. As Marshall states in his article 'Colonial Protest and Imperial Retrenchment', Pontiac's rising had shown that small detachments were vulnerable: little wonder then that Gage wished to pull out of as many western forts as possible. Marshall describes the situation in the colonies when he states, 'By the close of 1765 imperial authority had been denied in the east and remained undefined in the west: on both counts Indian policy suffered, its deficiencies in status and efficacy only too apparent'.28 The situation in London, with Barrington and Shelburne both appearing to favour different solutions to the problems of the West, gave Gage the excuse for not wholeheartedly endorsing Johnson's views on full regulation of Indian affairs. The events of 1765, when the Stamp Act crisis came to a head, ensured that the Board of Trade plan would never be fully implemented. The ministry knew that it would be impossible to increase the tax burden by having such a regulated plan: the Commander-in-Chief had therefore to include the running of the Indian Department out of his military expenditure. In 1766 Shelburne, now Secretary of State, after a change of ministry brought about by the Stamp Act crisis, put both the 1764 plan and Barrington's ideas to his adviser Richard Jackson for comment. He found them both impracticable to operate. Shelburne wrote to Johnson on 11 December 1766, referring to Johnson's plan for the management of Indian affairs, a letter that seems to sum up his feelings on the subject:
'The Importance of the subject demands, that it should be extremely well weighed & digested before adopted . . . The Plan which you refer to, for the better Management of Indian Affairs requires nice Examination, being of a very dubious Nature in many of it's most essential points'.29This examination was obviously still under consideration, when Shelburne wrote to Johnson on 20 June 1767 mentioning the King's 'entire Approbation of your conduct, and His Reliance on your Prudence and Ability to prevent the growth of Abuses in your Department, till the system of Regulations which I mentioned to you in my former letters can be finally settled'.30 Johnson continued to press the Board of Trade and Shelburne for any sign of being able to prevent the abuses the Indians were complaining of, and specifically with regard to the boundary line, it being only temporary. In October 1767 he wrote to Shelburne:
'The Indians with whom I met in Congress were very desirous to know whether I had received any satisfactory accounts from court respecting the intended boundary line, the summary process for justice, the grievances concerning lands, Murders and intrusions of the frontier inhabitants, and other matters whenever they were promised relief . . . I cannot promise myself much from my answer to them, or any other steps I have been able to take in consequence hereof, having hitherto made use of all the arguments in my power to prevail upon them to wait patiently the arrangement of these affairs'.31A further blow to Johnson's hopes of London supporting his ideas also came in 1767 when Townshend, the Chancellor, threatened to resign if troops were not returned to the east and the management of Indian affairs returned to the control of the colonies themselves. Given this expression of concern, Shelburne had to admit that the costs of running the service were high and still rising. As examples of this high cost of the Indian Departments, Marshall mentions one Edward Cole, appointed commissary at the Illinois by Johnson in July 1766. In the summer of that year he submitted an account for £1,568 for presents, a house and personal needs, and then put in a further claim of £3,000. Gage refused to pay this second sum, so Cole replied by submitting a further claim for £7,020!32 Little wonder that in March 1768 the Board of Trade review (started in October 1767) concluded that regulation of Indian affairs be returned to the colonies. In 1768 Johnson was notified of the change in policy. The final plan was evolved by the Board of Trade and drawn up when Hillsborough replaced Shelburne, and a new American department created. This plan returned the government of Indian affairs to the individual colonies; other matters, such as land purchases, holding Congresses, making treaties and laying down boundaries, would continue to be handled by the Superintendents. This last reference about the boundaries became the key point when Johnson signed the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 to permanently fix a boundary line. THIS TREATY WAS LATER seen as evidence that Johnson had used his immense prestige with the Indians to get a settlement that was different from that which he was empowered to seek. It has been suggested by Marshall that because he knew in 1768 his authority over the Indians was going to be restricted to a nominally diplomatic role, Johnson could go into the treaty with a freer hand and make the best possible deal, not only for the settlers and traders, but, by extension, for himself. For many years Johnson had been seeking to get approval for several land grants: in 1751 he was hoping to get 130,000 acres on the Charlotte River, and in 1760 he had an interest in 80,000 acres on the Mohawk River, in partnership with thirty-nine other people. Others were actively involved in this land speculation; Sir Henry Moore, the Governor of New York, was one such interested party, and between 1766 and 1768 a steady flow of petitions for land came before the New York Council. Johnson's deputy George Croghan was also involved in land deals, having lost heavily in the French and Indian War and later, in 1763, due to Pontiac's rebellion. In 1765 Johnson had held a meeting with the Indians to try and fix a permanent line: they suggested a route that he did not accept, primarily since it did not extend across the colony of New York. Also he was not empowered to officially fix a permanent boundary. When in December 1767 the Board of Trade finally agreed to recommend the settlement of the line proposed by the Indians in 1765, and transmitted this to Johnson in January 1768, their ideas on the whole question of American policy were still uncertain. The boundary conference was due to be held in May 1768, but due to Johnson's illness was postponed till September. The Board of Trade finished its report in March 1768 and recommended the central change of the management of Indian affairs: the return to colonial, rather than imperial, administration, with the activities of the Indian Departments to be therefore sharply reduced. Johnson received this news in July and therefore had time to contemplate the failure of his attempts to continue to regulate Indian affairs under a central imperial authority. When the Treaty of Fort Stanwix came to be signed Johnson insisted on the boundary line being taken across New York, and notified Hillsborough of this fact, even though he had written to Johnson on 5 January 1768 to confirm that the line described in the Board of Trade report should be ratified and confirmed in every part.33 The conference opened on the 24 October with 3,102 Indians present. By the 31 October the details had been agreed: the Cherokee River being the western limit, and the line extended northward to Canada Creek (near Lake Oneida) in upper New York. Johnson stated that the Indians themselves wished this settlement to make certain the separation of Indian and white areas. 34 However various land grants, to Croghan, the traders and to the colony of Pennsylvannia, were also agreed, which incensed Hillsborough and the Board of Trade when they were notified. Hillsborough thought that the agreement Johnson had reached would threaten those Stuart, the Superintendent for the Southern Department, had concluded. The land grants to the traders, although criticised by the Board of Trade, were a consequence of the vociferous complaints by the traders against the losses they had incurred as a result of the late War and Pontiac's rebellion. Johnson defended this deal by stating that only by placating the traders and allowing room for expansion could a friendly and workable relationship, for the mutual benefit of whites and Indians, be maintained. Not all claims had been allowed; John Coxe of Philadelphia had wanted compensation for losses incurred in 1754 and 1763, but eventually agreed to base his claim on 1763 only, since the French had been involved in the earlier dispute, and this would have been more difficult to decide. This treaty was the culmination of Johnson's career - afterwards he concentrated on his own business, building up his interests in the Mohawk Valley area, and developing Johnstown by providing settlers with the necessary supplies to establish themselves. Sosin also sees this treaty as the greatest boon to stimulating expansion: the removal of the French had allowed expansion west along the Mohawk and its tributaries to the headwaters of the Susquehanna and Delaware rivers. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 now cleared the area between the Mohawk and the Pennsylvannia line. In the following months speculators took out patents for land along the upper Susquehanna and Delaware rivers, and many migrated from New York to Pennsylvannia since they received land on better terms from the Proprietary government. 35 Johnson himself saw the Treaty as a good one in that the settlement had been honestly worked out with the Indians in such a way as to clearly show the respective areas of interest. From the very beginning of his career as Indian Superintendent, Johnson saw this demarcation of interests as essential, if proper trade, settlement and the retention of the Indian s own identity, was to continue. One illustration that showed this to be easier to identify than to put into operation, was the affair over the Oneida and their christianisation. Johnson had allowed the Presbyterian ministers, Eleazar Wheelock and Samuel Kirkland, into their territory, in order to combat the influence of the Jesuits. However the ministers and Johnson saw the Indians in two distinct ways: Wheelock and Kirkland saw them as fulfilling God's aim of cultivating the land, whereas Johnson saw them in a traditional light, as semi-sedentary, with the men as nomadic hunters and the women as agriculturists. He recognised that trade (and especially the fur trade) depended on the Indian being able to hunt. Guzzardo, in his article on this episode, calls this the two-zone theory of colonization - distinct Indian lands and areas of white settlement. 36 Between 1766 - 1768 Wheelock campaigned to get an Indian academy established among the Oneida, and even tried to interfere in the Fort Stanwix negotiations to get his way. In 1766 Kirkland set up a mission in Kanowarohare, living among the Indians and building up a following. However the relationship between Kirkland and Johnson got worse, with the Oneida themselves split, so that it 'created division and destroyed tribal unity'. 37 Guzzardo states that this feud continued right up to Johnson's death in 1774, and eventually caused social polarisation, with the Oneida losing their warrior spirit and becoming like silly women and children. He concludes that when the Revolution came the split was deepened, with many of the tribe staying loyal to the British and going to Canada. 38 JOHNSON'S ROLE OF SUPERINTENDENT then had profound affects on Indian affairs long after his death. The Board of Trade had long recognised the necessity of preserving the friendship of the Five Nations of Indians, 'which are a barrier between his Majesty's plantations and Canada', and had similarly recognised the importance of the province of New York, reporting to the House of Commons in 1702, that it was 'esteemed as the centre of his Majesty's plantations on the continent'. 39 Johnson's appointment was certainly made in order to preserve both these views, since the problems of administering any imperial affairs were fraught with difficulties. The problems the British ministries had in formulating sound policies for the new West, as Gipson points out, were complicated by factors of distance and time, with a variety of reports coming from the colonies, disputes with the seaboard colonies in the 1760's and 1770's, and the other problems of Empire, adding to the delays before decisions could be taken. 40 Alden in his work on the southern department, run by John Stuart, states that the aims of British western policy between 1763 - 1775 were maintenance of peace on the frontier, and winning and holding of the loyalty of Indians east of the Mississippi. 41 He goes on to state that there were three ways to achieve these aims: firstly, through prevention of encroachment on the lands of the red man; secondly, through establishment of order in Indian trade; and thirdly, through Indian diplomacy. Stuart is shown to have pursued these objectives with varying success, but with complete loyalty to the programme as a whole. Alden contrasts him with Johnson when he states, 'He was also viewed with cordial dislike by some land speculators because, unlike Johnson, he fought their schemes . . .'. 42 Johnson, though, also attempted, often with much success, to meet these objectives, and often at a high cost, both personally and financially, to himself. It was Johnson who continually pressed for full recognition of the problems of administering the policy of trade and westward expansion. He argued, until the decision went against him, for central control of managing Indian affairs. In the preface to Volume XII of the Johnson Papers, Albert B. Corey, State Historian and Director, Division of Archives and History, for the State of New York, states ' . . . had he lived, yet he might well have so modified policies and so influenced both Indians and government as to have profoundly affected the course of history'. 43 Perhaps the last words should belong to Johnson himself. Seven days before his death, fittingly whilst holding an Indian Congress with the Six Nations, he wrote to Gage, on 4 July 1774, about the decline of Indian relations.
'It is a very critical period, . . . , and I must avail myself of Everry thing at such a Juncture, which requires the utmost exertion of my Influence . . .'. 44He finishes his letter to Gage with the prophetic words:
'. . . I found it necessary to give You a Sketch of the late & present State of Indian Affairs, . . . , So much trouble & attention has greatly effected my Health . . . , but I must make a Sacrifice to the Urgency of the times'. 45
REFERENCES1 - Milton W. Hamilton, Sir William Johnson: colonial American, 1715-1763 (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1976), 54. 2 - John R. Alden, The Albany Congress and the creation of the Indian Superintendencies. Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXVII, no. 2 (September 1940): 194. 3 - Ibid, 195. 4 - Ibid, 195-196. 5 - Arthur Pound, Johnson of the Mohawks: a biography of Sir William Johnson, Irish Immigrant, Mohawk War Chief, American soldier, Empire Builder (Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 296. 6 - Alden, The Albany Congress, 198. 7 - E. B. O'Callaghan, Documents relative to the colonial history of the State of New York (hereafter referred to as DRCHSNY). VI, (Albany, 1855), 897. 8 - Ibid. 9 - Ibid, 898. 10 - Ibid. 11 - Alden, The Albany Congress, 198. 12 - Ibid, 206. 13 - L. H. Gipson, The British Empire before the American Revolution Vol. IX The Triumphant Empire: New Responsibilities within the enlarged Empire 1763-1766 (N. Y.: Knopf, 1956), 42. 14 - Ibid, 52. 15 - Jack M. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness: the Middle West in British colonial policy, 1760 - 1775 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 77. 16 - R. A. Humphreys, ed. Governor Murray's views on the plan of 1764 for the management of Indian affairs, Canadian Historical Review 16 (1935): 164-165. 17 - Ibid, 163. 18 - Alexander C. Flick,The papers of Sir William Johnson, (hereafter referred to Johnson Papers), Vol. IV, (Albany: University of State of New York, 1925), 419. 19 - Ibid, 667. 20 - Ibid, 702-703. 21 - Sosin, Whitehall and the wilderness, 107. 22 - Ibid, 120. 23 - Ibid, 130. 24 - James Sullivan, Johnson Papers, Vol. III, (Albany: University of State of New York, 1921), 527. 25 - Ibid, 742-743. 26 - Johnson Papers, Vol. IV, 512. 27 - Ibid, 513. 28 - Peter Marshall, Colonial Protest and Imperial Retrenchment: Indian Policy, 1764-1768, Journal of American Studies 5 (1971): 5. 29 - Johnson Papers, Vol. V, (Albany: University of State of New York, 1927), 448. 30 - Ibid, 566. 31 - Ibid, 762-763. 32 - Marshall, Colonial Protest, 5. 33 - O'Callaghan, DRCHSNY, Vol. VIII, (Albany, 1857),2. 34 - Ibid, 110. 35 - Jack M. Sosin, The revolutionary frontier 1763 - 1783 (University of New Mexico Press, 1967), 42 - 53. 36 - John C. Guzzardo, The Superintendent and the Ministers: the battle for Oneida allegiances, 1761 - 75, New York History 57 (July, 1976): 263 - 264. 37 - Ibid, 270. 38 - Ibid, 282 - 283. 39 - Francis Jennings, The ambiguous Iroquois Empire: the covenant chain confederation of Indian tribes with english colonies from its beginning to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744, (W. W. Norton, 1984), 370. 40 - Gipson, The British Empire before the American Revolution Vol. XI The Triumphant Empire: the rumbling of the coming storm, 1766 - 1770 (N. Y.: Knopf, 1956), 418 - 419. 41 - John R. Alden, John Stuart and the southern colonial frontier: a study of Indian relations, war , trade, and land problems in the southern wilderness 1754 - 1775, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1944), 335. 42 - Ibid, 335 - 336. 43 - Hamilton, Johnson Papers, Vol. XII, viii. 44 - Ibid, 1116. 45 - Ibid.
Alden, John R. John Stuart and the southern colonial frontier: a study of Indian relations, war , trade, and land problems in the southern wilderness 1754 - 1775, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1944). ----. The Albany Congress and the creation of the Indian Superintendencies. Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXVII, no. 2 (September 1940): 193 -210. Flick, Alexander C. The papers of Sir William Johnson, Vol. IV, (hereafter referred to as Johnson Papers), (Albany: University of State of New York, 1925). ----. Johnson Papers, Vol. V, (Albany: University of State of New York, 1927). Gipson, Lawrence H. The British Empire before the American Revolution Vol. IX The Triumphant Empire: New Responsibilities within the enlarged Empire 1763-1766 (N. Y.: Knopf, 1956). ----. The British Empire before the American Revolution Vol. XI The Triumphant Empire: The rumbling of the coming storm, 1766 - 1770 (N. Y.: Knopf, 1956). Guzzardo, John C. The Superintendent and the Ministers: the battle for Oneida allegiances, 1761 - 75, New York History 57 (July, 1976): 255 - 283. Hamilton, Milton W. Sir William Johnson: colonial American, 1715-1763 (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1976). ----. ed. Johnson Papers, Vol. XII (Albany: University of State of New York, 1957). Humphreys, R. A. ed. Governor Murray's views on the plan of 1764 for the management of Indian affairs, Canadian Historical Review 16 (1935): 162 -169. Jennings, Francis.The ambiguous Iroquois Empire: the covenant chain confederation of Indian tribes with english colonies from its beginning to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744, (London: Norton, 1984). Marshall, Peter. Colonial Protest and Imperial Retrenchment: Indian Policy, 1764-1768, Journal of American Studies 5 (1971): 1 - 17. ----. Sir William Johnson and the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, 1768, Journal of American Studies 1 (1967): 149 - 179. O'Callaghan, E. B. Documents relative to the colonial history of the State of New York (hereafter referred to as DRCHSNY). VI, (Albany, 1855). ----. DRCHSNY, VIII, (Albany, 1855). Pound, Arthur. Johnson of the Mohawks: a biography of Sir William Johnson, Irish Immigrant, Mohawk War Chief, American soldier, Empire Builder (Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1971). Sosin, Jack M. The revolutionary frontier 1763 - 1783 (University of New Mexico Press, 1967). ----. Whitehall and the Wilderness: the Middle West in British colonial policy, 1760 - 1775 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961). Sullivan, James. ed. Johnson Papers, Vol. V (Albany: University of State of New York, 1921).