Philosophy Quiz: Revising Arguments

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Revising ArgumentsQuestion 1 of 20

Argument: (1) A scientific theory should be considered superior to its rivals if it explains more phenomena. (2) The theory of intelligent design explains phenomena that evolutionary theory cannot, such as the irreducible complexity of the bacterial flagellum and the fine-tuning of the universe for life. (3) Therefore, intelligent design should be considered a superior scientific theory to evolution.

A philosopher of science objects that 'explanation' in science requires making testable predictions, not just positing an entity (a designer) that could account for anything. The 'explanations' offered by intelligent design are untestable. How should premise (1) of the argument be strengthened to rule out such pseudo-explanations?

Revise (1) to: A scientific theory is superior if it explains more phenomena and is more widely accepted by the scientific community.

Revise (1) to: A scientific theory is superior if it explains more phenomena using the fewest possible theoretical entities (parsimony).

Revise (1) to: A scientific theory is superior if it explains more phenomena and makes novel, falsifiable predictions.

Revise (1) to: A scientific theory is superior if it explains more phenomena and is consistent with established background knowledge.

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Philosophy Quiz

Philosophy Quiz: Revising Arguments

Practice Revising Arguments in Philosophy with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Revising Arguments, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Philosophy.

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Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

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Question 1

Revise (1) to: A scientific theory is superior if it explains more phenomena and is more widely accepted by the scientific community.
Revise (1) to: A scientific theory is superior if it explains more phenomena using the fewest possible theoretical entities (parsimony).
Revise (1) to: A scientific theory is superior if it explains more phenomena and makes novel, falsifiable predictions. (correct answer)
Revise (1) to: A scientific theory is superior if it explains more phenomena and is consistent with established background knowledge.

Explanation: The objection targets the vague notion of 'explanation'. The most effective way to strengthen the criterion for a good scientific theory is to incorporate the principles of falsifiability and predictive power, as stated in (C). This is a core concept from the philosophy of Karl Popper and others. It directly addresses the objection by providing a standard that intelligent design fails to meet, as its claims are generally not structured to be testable or falsifiable. (A) appeals to authority, which is a weak philosophical criterion for theory choice. (B) invokes Occam's Razor (parsimony), which is a relevant scientific virtue, but it doesn't address the core problem of testability raised by the objection. (D) brings in consistency, which is important, but a revolutionary theory might overturn background knowledge, so this is not as fundamental as testability.

Question 2

Argument: (1) All truths are known either through reason alone (a priori) or through experience (a posteriori). (2) The claim that 'every event has a cause' cannot be known a priori, as its denial is not a logical contradiction. (3) It cannot be known a posteriori, as we only experience a succession of events, not a necessary connection. (4) Therefore, the claim that 'every event has a cause' is not a truth we can know.

An objector argues that causality is a fundamental principle of science and reason, and that this skeptical conclusion must be wrong. They propose that we should treat the causal principle not as a description of the world we discover, but as a presupposition we must make in order to investigate the world at all. This response is best understood as a revision of which part of the argument?

It refines premise (1) by introducing a third category: 'transcendental' claims that are preconditions for experience. (correct answer)
It rejects premise (2) by arguing that the concept of an 'uncaused event' is, in fact, a hidden logical contradiction.
It rejects premise (3) by positing a special faculty of rational intuition that can directly perceive causal connections.
It refines the conclusion (4) to say that while we cannot know causality with certainty, we can have a very high degree of justified belief in it.

Explanation: This is a classic Kantian response to Humean skepticism. The original argument forces a choice between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. The objection, following Kant, revises the initial premise (1) by rejecting this dichotomy as exhaustive. It introduces a new category of knowledge—transcendental or synthetic a priori—for principles like causality. These are not learned from experience but are necessary structures the mind imposes to make sense of experience. Thus, causality is not a claim to be proven but a necessary presupposition for knowledge. (B) and (C) are rationalist responses, not the specific transcendental move described. (D) is a fallibilist or probabilistic response, which accepts the basic framework of the argument but weakens the conclusion, whereas the objection challenges the framework itself.

Question 3

Argument: (1) All human knowledge is derived from sensory experience (empiricism). (2) We have no sensory experience of causal necessity, only of the constant conjunction of events (e.g., we see one billiard ball strike another, and then the second one moves; we don't 'see' the necessity of this connection). (3) Therefore, we have no knowledge of causal necessity.

Immanuel Kant responded to this Humean skeptical argument. He agreed with premise (2) but wanted to save our knowledge of causality. Which of the following represents Kant's strategy of revising the philosophical framework in which the argument operates?

He rejects premise (1), arguing instead that knowledge of causal necessity is innate and stamped into our minds by God.
He refines premise (1), proposing that knowledge arises from sensory experience structured by innate categories of the mind, such as causality. (correct answer)
He rejects premise (2), arguing that we do have a direct, intuitive experience of causal power when we act as agents in the world.
He accepts the conclusion (3) but argues that we can still have justified beliefs about causality, even if it does not count as knowledge.

Explanation: Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' in philosophy was to synthesize empiricism and rationalism. He did not reject empiricism outright but revised its foundational premise. (B) accurately captures this synthesis: he argued that the raw data of sensory experience is structured and made intelligible by a priori concepts of the understanding, one of which is causality. This way, causality is not found 'in' experience but is a precondition for having intelligible experience. (A) describes a form of classical rationalism (like Descartes), not Kant's synthesis. (C) is a different response to Hume, associated with philosophers like Thomas Reid, which posits a direct experience of causation. (D) is a skeptical or pragmatic move, whereas Kant's goal was to establish the objective validity of our knowledge of causality.

Question 4

Argument: (1) Personal identity over time is constituted by bodily continuity. (2) As long as there is a continuous physical path from a body at time t1 to a body at time t2, they are the same person. (3) A person's brain is transplanted into a new body. The original body is destroyed. (4) The resulting person has the original brain but a new body. (5) Therefore, based on premise (2), the resulting person is not the same person as the original.

An objector claims that our intuition strongly suggests the resulting person is the same as the original, because that's where their consciousness and memories are. This challenges the bodily continuity theory. How could the proponent of the theory revise premise (2) to accommodate this intuition?

Revise (2) to state that bodily continuity is sufficient for identity, but not necessary.
Revise (2) to specify that the relevant part of the body for continuity is the brain, as it is the seat of consciousness. (correct answer)
Revise (2) to require that a majority of the body's cells must remain the same for identity to be preserved.
Abandon premise (2) and switch to a theory based on psychological continuity instead.

Explanation: The brain transplant case is a classic counterexample to a simple 'whole body' continuity theory. The most effective revision for the theory is not to abandon it, but to refine it. Option (B) does this by specifying that the brain is the crucial part of the body for personal identity. This 'brain theory' is still a form of physical/bodily continuity, but it correctly locates identity with the source of psychological life, thus accommodating the objection's intuition. (A) weakens the theory to the point of being uninformative. (C) is arbitrary and would lead to strange conclusions (e.g., someone losing identity after massive cell replacement over years). (D) is not a revision but a complete abandonment of the original theory in favor of its main rival.

Question 5

Argument: (1) If one can prevent something bad from happening at little cost to oneself, one is morally obligated to do so. (2) Poverty, famine, and preventable disease in developing nations are bad. (3) People in affluent nations can prevent some of this suffering by donating to effective charities, at a cost that is not morally significant to them (e.g., forgoing a luxury). (4) Therefore, people in affluent nations are morally obligated to donate a significant portion of their income to effective charities.

An objector points out that this argument seems to have no logical stopping point. If one must give until the cost becomes 'morally significant,' that could mean giving until one is nearly as poor as those one is helping. This seems too demanding. How could the argument's proponent best refine premise (4) to make the conclusion less extreme while preserving its moral force?

Revise (4) to state that people in affluent nations are morally permitted, but not obligated, to donate.
Revise (4) to state that people are obligated to donate enough to feel they have 'done their part,' regardless of the actual impact.
Revise (4) to state that while the obligation is very demanding, it is a valid conclusion and we should strive to meet it.
Revise (4) to state that the obligation is to donate a modest, fixed percentage of one's income, such as a 10% tithe. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests your understanding of how philosophical arguments can be refined to avoid problematic implications while preserving their core insight. The original argument follows a valid logical structure but leads to an extremely demanding conclusion that critics argue is unrealistic and potentially self-defeating. Answer choice D correctly identifies the best refinement because it addresses the "no stopping point" problem by establishing a clear, reasonable limit while maintaining the argument's moral force. A fixed percentage like 10% provides a definitive boundary that prevents the obligation from expanding until donors become impoverished themselves. This modification preserves the key insight that affluent people have genuine moral obligations to help others, but makes those obligations manageable and sustainable. Answer A is wrong because it completely abandons the argument's central claim about moral obligation, reducing it to mere permission. This eliminates rather than refines the argument's moral force. Answer B fails because basing obligations on subjective feelings ("done their part") rather than objective impact undermines the argument's logical foundation and could justify trivial contributions. Answer C is incorrect because it doesn't actually refine premise (4) at all—it simply reasserts the problematic conclusion while acknowledging its extreme nature. When you encounter questions about refining philosophical arguments, look for solutions that address specific logical problems while preserving the argument's essential moral or logical insight. The best refinements typically involve adding reasonable constraints or qualifications rather than abandoning the core claim entirely.

Question 6

Argument: (1) A just society is one that maximizes overall happiness. (2) A policy of open borders would allow millions of people from impoverished nations to move to wealthier ones, vastly increasing their happiness. (3) While this might slightly decrease the happiness of some citizens in the host countries, the net gain in global happiness would be immense. (4) Therefore, a just society must have a policy of open borders.

An objector argues that a society also has a primary duty to protect the well-being and established way of life of its own citizens, and that unrestricted immigration could strain social services and erode cultural cohesion, thus violating this duty. How could the utilitarian proponent of the argument best revise it to address this concern?

Refine the conclusion (4) to state that a just society must implement a controlled immigration policy that maximizes happiness without creating significant social instability. (correct answer)
Strengthen premise (3) by arguing that any decrease in happiness for existing citizens is based on irrational prejudice and should be disregarded in the utility calculation.
Replace premise (1) with the principle that a just society must protect the individual rights of all people, regardless of citizenship.
Add a premise that the economic benefits of immigration always outweigh the costs to social services, thus increasing happiness for everyone in the long run.

Explanation: The correct answer (A) is a classic revision strategy: refining the claim. It acknowledges the force of the objection by qualifying the conclusion. Instead of advocating for completely open borders, it proposes a more nuanced policy that still aims to maximize happiness but takes into account the potential negative consequences raised by the objector. This makes the argument more robust and plausible. (B) does not revise the argument but rather dismisses the objection by attacking the motives of those who might be unhappy, which is an aggressive and often ineffective strategy. (C) abandons the utilitarian framework of the original argument in favor of a rights-based one. (D) attempts to strengthen a premise with a very strong empirical claim that may be false and is certainly contestable, potentially making the argument weaker, not stronger.

Question 7

Argument: (1) All art is a form of representation. (2) The paintings of Mark Rothko, which consist of large, hazy rectangles of color, do not represent any object, person, or landscape. (3) Therefore, the paintings of Mark Rothko are not art.

An art critic objects, insisting that Rothko's works are major achievements of 20th-century art. To defend Rothko's status as an artist, which is the most effective revision to the argument?

Strengthen premise (2) by arguing that Rothko's rectangles secretly represent microscopic organisms.
Refine the definition in premise (1) to state that art is a form of representation or expression of emotion. (correct answer)
Deny the conclusion (3) by asserting that art is subjective and anything can be art if someone calls it art.
Revise premise (1) to state that all good art is a form of representation, allowing Rothko's work to be art, but not good art.

Explanation: The most effective revision is (B). The objection challenges the argument's conclusion by providing a strong counterexample. The weakest point in the argument is the narrow definition of art in premise (1). By refining this premise to include expression (the expressive theory of art), the argument can now accommodate abstract works like Rothko's, which are often interpreted as expressing profound emotions. (A) is a weak factual claim that is hard to support and misses the philosophical point. (C) is a very radical and unhelpful revision; it abandons the attempt to define art altogether, rather than improving the existing definition. (D) is a poor revision because it concedes that Rothko's work is art but then makes a contentious value judgment against it, which doesn't resolve the core definitional problem.

Question 8

Argument: (1) The universe is a complex system of interlocking parts that function together to achieve a purpose (e.g., supporting life). (2) Such complexity and apparent purpose are the hallmarks of a designed object. (3) Therefore, it is highly probable that the universe was created by an intelligent designer.

David Hume objects that the analogy between the universe and a human-made machine is weak. The universe is a unique case, and we have no experience of other universes being designed to compare it to. We cannot generalize from parts (machines) to the whole (the universe). How could the proponent of the argument best strengthen it against this specific objection?

Strengthen premise (1) by pointing to modern scientific discoveries like the fine-tuning of physical constants, which make the universe seem even more purposeful.
Revise the conclusion (3) to state that the designer is not necessarily the omnipotent God of traditional theology, but could be a committee of designers or a flawed one.
Replace the analogy in premise (2) with a deductive argument that any complex system logically requires a designer.
Refine premise (2) by shifting the argument from an analogy to an inference to the best explanation, claiming design is a better explanation for complexity than random chance. (correct answer)

Explanation: Hume's objection powerfully targets the argument's form as a weak analogy. The best way to revise the argument is to change its logical structure. (D) accomplishes this by reframing it as an 'inference to the best explanation' (IBE). This revised argument no longer relies on a direct comparison between the universe and artifacts. Instead, it posits 'design' and 'chance' as competing hypotheses and argues that design provides a better explanation for the observed complexity. This structure is less vulnerable to Hume's specific critique about weak analogies. (A) strengthens a premise but doesn't fix the underlying logical problem of the analogy. (B) is a common move to weaken the conclusion to avoid other objections, but it doesn't address Hume's core problem with the reasoning. (C) is a very strong move that is difficult to defend; it's not clear how one could make such a deductive argument work.

Question 9

Argument: (1) All events, including human actions, are determined by antecedent causes. (2) If an action is determined by antecedent causes, then the agent could not have done otherwise. (3) An agent is morally responsible for an action only if they could have done otherwise. (4) Therefore, no agent is ever morally responsible for their actions.

A compatibilist philosopher objects to this argument. They accept that all actions are determined (Premise 1) but want to preserve moral responsibility. To achieve this, which premise must they reinterpret or revise, and what is the most effective revision?

Revise premise (3) by redefining 'could have done otherwise' to mean that the agent would have done otherwise if they had chosen to, even if that choice itself was determined. (correct answer)
Revise premise (2) to state that even if an action is determined, the complexity of the causal chain means the agent could have done otherwise.
Revise premise (1) to claim that quantum indeterminacy at the micro-level allows for freedom at the macro-level of human action.
Revise the conclusion (4) to state that agents are not responsible, but they should be treated as if they were for the good of society.

Explanation: The core of compatibilism is to argue that determinism and free will (and thus moral responsibility) are compatible. The standard compatibilist strategy, represented by (A), is to challenge the incompatibilist's definition of freedom. They attack premise (3) by arguing that 'could have done otherwise' doesn't mean the ability to violate the laws of physics, but something like acting without coercion, in line with one's desires. (B) is a confused revision; it doesn't make sense to say an action is determined but the agent could have done otherwise in the libertarian sense. (C) rejects determinism (Premise 1), which is a libertarian strategy, not a compatibilist one. (D) is a form of consequentialist pragmatism about punishment, not a revision of the argument about whether responsibility actually exists.

Question 10

Argument: (1) Knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). (2) Smith has a justified belief that Jones will get the job and that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. (3) Smith therefore justifiably believes that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. (4) Unbeknownst to Smith, he himself will get the job, and he also has ten coins in his pocket. (5) Therefore, Smith has a justified true belief that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, but he does not know it.

This is a classic Gettier problem, which serves as a powerful objection to the JTB theory of knowledge. In response, how might a philosopher best strengthen premise (1) to rule out such cases of accidental justification?

Revise (1) to: Knowledge is justified true belief that is the result of a reliable cognitive process.
Revise (1) to: Knowledge is justified true belief where the justification is not based on any false lemmas (false assumptions). (correct answer)
Revise (1) to: Knowledge is a true belief for which the believer can provide an irrefutable, logical proof.
Revise (1) to: Knowledge is a true belief that the majority of experts in a relevant field would also hold.

Explanation: The correct response is (B), known as the 'no false lemmas' condition. The crucial flaw in Smith's justification is that it relies on a false belief—that Jones will get the job. By adding the condition that the justification cannot proceed through a false step, the definition of knowledge is strengthened to exclude Gettier cases like this one. (A) proposes a reliabilist condition; while this is another major response to Gettier, it doesn't address the specific logical structure of this problem as directly as (B) does. (C) sets the bar for justification far too high, making knowledge almost impossible to attain and leading to radical skepticism. (D) defines knowledge by consensus, which is problematic; experts can be wrong, and this makes knowledge relative to a community.

Question 11

Argument: (1) It is always wrong to treat a person merely as a means to an end. (2) In a commercial transaction, such as buying coffee, the customer treats the barista merely as a means to get coffee, and the barista treats the customer merely as a means to get paid. (3) Therefore, all commercial transactions are morally wrong.

An objector argues that this conclusion is absurd, as everyday commerce seems perfectly permissible. The argument must have gone wrong somewhere. To correct the argument's misapplication of the moral principle, which revision is most appropriate?

Refine premise (1) by adding that it is only wrong to treat a person merely as a means if doing so causes them significant harm.
Strengthen premise (2) by clarifying that because the interaction is impersonal, the participants' humanity is necessarily ignored.
Refine the interpretation of premise (2), arguing that as long as the transaction is consensual and respectful, the participants are treating each other as ends in themselves as well. (correct answer)
Revise the conclusion (3) to state that commercial transactions are not wrong, but they are morally neutral and without positive worth.

Explanation: The key to resolving this apparent paradox lies in the subtlety of the phrase 'merely as a means'. The most accurate revision, (C), clarifies the application of the principle. In a normal, consensual transaction, both parties are respected as autonomous agents who agree to the exchange for their own reasons. Thus, they are not treated merely as means. This revision corrects the flawed reasoning in premise (2) without altering the core principle in (1). (A) incorrectly introduces a consequentialist element (harm) into a deontological principle. (B) strengthens the flawed premise, leading more strongly to the absurd conclusion. (D) revises the conclusion without explaining why the premises fail to support the original conclusion, which is the main task.

Question 12

Argument: (1) A right to life is the right not to be killed. (2) A fetus is an innocent being with a right to life. (3) A woman has a right to bodily autonomy. (4) In the case of an unwanted pregnancy, the fetus's right to life outweighs the mother's right to bodily autonomy. (5) Therefore, abortion is impermissible.

Judith Jarvis Thomson famously objects by analogy: Imagine you are kidnapped and surgically connected to a famous violinist who needs your kidneys to survive for nine months. Unplugging him would kill him. It seems permissible to unplug yourself. This suggests that the right to life does not entail the right to use another person's body against their will. How does this objection force a revision of the original argument?

It forces a refinement of premise (1) to specify that the right to life is the right not to be killed unjustly, which opens the question of what constitutes unjust killing. (correct answer)
It forces a rejection of premise (2), suggesting a fetus does not have a full right to life because it is not a person.
It forces a strengthening of premise (4) by adding that the fetus's potential for a future life of value makes its claim stronger than the violinist's.
It forces a revision of premise (3) to state that the right to bodily autonomy is not absolute and can be overridden by a duty to aid others.

Explanation: Thomson's analogy is designed to show that even if we grant the fetus a full right to life (accepting premise 2), the conclusion doesn't follow. The objection's power comes from distinguishing between killing and letting die, or more precisely, between killing unjustly and withholding support one is not obligated to give. Therefore, the best way to revise the argument in response is to refine premise (1). By changing 'right not to be killed' to 'right not to be killed unjustly', the argument must now include a sub-argument about why abortion constitutes an unjust killing, directly engaging Thomson's point. (B) is a common way to argue against the conclusion, but it's not the revision forced by this specific objection, which grants personhood for the sake of argument. (C) and (D) miss the core of Thomson's analogy, which is about the limits of the right to life itself, not about weighing it against other factors.

Question 13

Argument: (1) A statement is meaningful only if it is either an analytic truth (true by definition) or empirically verifiable. (2) Ethical statements like 'murder is wrong' are not analytic truths, nor are they empirically verifiable. (3) Therefore, ethical statements are meaningless.

An objector argues that this conclusion is too strong. While 'murder is wrong' may not be a factual statement, it certainly isn't meaningless; it serves to express disapproval and influence behavior. In light of this, how could a proponent of the original argument's verificationist principle revise the conclusion (3) to be more nuanced and defensible?

Revise (3) to: Therefore, ethical statements are false.
Revise (3) to: Therefore, ethical statements lack cognitive meaning (i.e., they are not truth-apt), but they possess emotive or prescriptive meaning. (correct answer)
Revise premise (1) to include a third category of meaningful statements: self-evident moral truths.
Revise premise (2) by arguing that 'wrong' can be empirically verified by observing the negative consequences of murder.

Explanation: This argument reflects the logical positivist view. The objection pushes for a more sophisticated account of meaning. The best revision is (B), which represents the shift from early positivism to later non-cognitivist theories like emotivism (A.J. Ayer) or prescriptivism (R.M. Hare). This revision refines the conclusion by distinguishing between types of meaning. It concedes the objector's point that ethical statements have a function (expressing emotion, commanding) while still denying them factual, truth-functional content, thus preserving the spirit of the verificationist principle. (A) is a different view (error theory), not a direct refinement of the meaninglessness claim. (C) rejects the core of verificationism by introducing non-empirical truths. (D) attempts to make ethics empirical, a form of naturalism, which is a different approach and contradicts the spirit of premise (2).

Question 14

Argument: (1) What makes an action right or wrong are its consequences and nothing else. (2) Action A (e.g., lying to a murderer to save a friend's life) produces the best overall consequences. (3) Therefore, Action A is the morally right action.

A deontologist objects that some actions are intrinsically wrong regardless of their consequences. Lying is a classic example. The argument's conclusion violates a fundamental moral rule. To defend the conclusion, how could the consequentialist best revise premise (1) to account for the force of such moral rules?

Revise (1) to state that the consequences for the agent's own character are the most important factor in determining right and wrong.
Revise (1) to: The consequences of an action are the primary, but not the only, determinant of its moral status; intrinsic duties also play a role.
Revise (1) to: What makes an action right or wrong are its consequences, but only as intended by the agent, not the actual outcomes.
Revise (1) to: The rightness of an action is determined by whether it conforms to a set of rules that, if generally followed, would produce the best consequences (Rule Consequentialism). (correct answer)

Explanation: When you encounter questions about philosophical debates between ethical theories, focus on how each theory can adapt while maintaining its core commitments. This question tests whether you understand how consequentialism can respond to deontological objections without abandoning its fundamental principle that consequences matter most. The key insight is that Rule Consequentialism (answer D) offers the most sophisticated defense. Instead of evaluating individual acts by their consequences, it evaluates moral rules by asking: "If everyone followed this rule, would the overall consequences be best?" This allows the consequentialist to say lying is generally wrong because widespread lying would produce terrible consequences, while still maintaining that consequences are what ultimately determine morality. The rule against lying becomes justified on consequentialist grounds, not because lying is intrinsically wrong. Answer A focuses only on character consequences for the individual agent, which is too narrow and doesn't address the broader moral rules deontologists care about. Answer B essentially abandons pure consequentialism by accepting that some duties are intrinsically binding regardless of consequences—this concedes too much to the deontologist. Answer C shifts focus to intended versus actual consequences, but this doesn't resolve the fundamental disagreement about whether certain actions (like lying) are inherently wrong. Remember that in ethics questions, look for responses that allow a theory to address objections while preserving its core principles. Rule Consequentialism is consequentialism's most powerful response to deontological challenges because it explains why moral rules matter without abandoning the primacy of consequences.

Question 15

Refine the conclusion (4) to state that a just society must implement a controlled immigration policy that maximizes happiness without creating significant social instability. (correct answer)
Strengthen premise (3) by arguing that any decrease in happiness for existing citizens is based on irrational prejudice and should be disregarded in the utility calculation.
Replace premise (1) with the principle that a just society must protect the individual rights of all people, regardless of citizenship.
Add a premise that the economic benefits of immigration always outweigh the costs to social services, thus increasing happiness for everyone in the long run.

Question 16

Revise premise (3) by redefining 'could have done otherwise' to mean that the agent would have done otherwise if they had chosen to, even if that choice itself was determined. (correct answer)
Revise premise (2) to state that even if an action is determined, the complexity of the causal chain means the agent could have done otherwise.
Revise premise (1) to claim that quantum indeterminacy at the micro-level allows for freedom at the macro-level of human action.
Revise the conclusion (4) to state that agents are not responsible, but they should be treated as if they were for the good of society.

Question 17

An art critic objects, insisting that Rothko's works are major achievements of 20th-century art. To defend Rothko's status as an artist, which is the most effective revision to the argument?

Strengthen premise (2) by arguing that Rothko's rectangles secretly represent microscopic organisms.
Refine the definition in premise (1) to state that art is a form of representation or expression of emotion. (correct answer)
Deny the conclusion (3) by asserting that art is subjective and anything can be art if someone calls it art.
Revise premise (1) to state that all good art is a form of representation, allowing Rothko's work to be art, but not good art.

Question 18

Revise (1) to: A scientific theory is superior if it explains more phenomena and is more widely accepted by the scientific community.
Revise (1) to: A scientific theory is superior if it explains more phenomena using the fewest possible theoretical entities (parsimony).
Revise (1) to: A scientific theory is superior if it explains more phenomena and makes novel, falsifiable predictions. (correct answer)
Revise (1) to: A scientific theory is superior if it explains more phenomena and is consistent with established background knowledge.

Question 19

Argument: (1) Any 'being than which nothing greater can be conceived' must exist in reality. (2) If such a being existed only in the mind, then a greater being could be conceived—namely, one that exists in reality as well. (3) Therefore, a being than which nothing greater can be conceived (i.e., God) must exist in reality.

The monk Gaunilo famously objected to this ontological argument with a parody: One can conceive of a 'perfect island,' than which no greater island can be conceived. By the same logic, this perfect island must exist in reality, which is absurd. What is the most effective way for a proponent of the ontological argument to revise their claim to counter Gaunilo's objection?

Strengthen premise (2) by arguing that existence is not a property that can be added or subtracted to make something 'greater'.
Refine the scope of premise (1) by arguing that the logic applies only to a being with necessary existence, a property which an island, by its nature, cannot have. (correct answer)
Deny the analogy by arguing that the concept of a 'perfect island' is incoherent because one can always add another beach or palm tree to make it 'greater'.
Weaken the conclusion (3) to state that the existence of God is merely possible, not necessary.

Explanation: The most powerful response to Gaunilo is to distinguish between contingent beings (like islands) and necessary beings. The revision in (B) does this by refining the argument's scope. The claim is that necessary existence is part of the concept of a maximally great being, but not part of the concept of a maximally great island. An island is by definition a contingent thing, so it cannot have the property of necessary existence. This revision blocks Gaunilo's parody without undermining the original argument's logic for God. (A) is actually Kant's objection to the argument, which would destroy the argument, not revise it in its favor. (C) is a plausible response, but it's considered weaker because it gets into a debate about the coherence of 'perfect island' rather than the logical structure of the argument itself. (D) weakens the conclusion so much that it loses the entire point of the ontological argument, which is to prove necessary existence.

Question 20

Strengthen premise (1) by pointing to modern scientific discoveries like the fine-tuning of physical constants, which make the universe seem even more purposeful.
Revise the conclusion (3) to state that the designer is not necessarily the omnipotent God of traditional theology, but could be a committee of designers or a flawed one.
Replace the analogy in premise (2) with a deductive argument that any complex system logically requires a designer.
Refine premise (2) by shifting the argument from an analogy to an inference to the best explanation, claiming design is a better explanation for complexity than random chance. (correct answer)