Philosophy Quiz: Abortion And Personhood
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Abortion And PersonhoodQuestion 1 of 20

The 'argument from marginal cases' challenges theories of personhood that rely on cognitive capacities like rationality. It points out that some humans (e.g., infants, the severely cognitively disabled) lack these capacities, yet we grant them a right to life. The argument claims that for such theories to be consistent, they must either deny rights to these 'marginal' humans or grant rights to non-human animals with similar or greater capacities. This argument functions primarily as a...

proof that personhood is determined by possession of a soul, not cognitive abilities.
reductio ad absurdum, aiming to show the unacceptable consequences of a purely cognitive definition of personhood.
utilitarian calculation, weighing the suffering of marginal humans against that of non-human animals.
defense of speciesism, arguing that membership in the human species is the only relevant moral criterion.
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Philosophy Quiz

Philosophy Quiz: Abortion And Personhood

Practice Abortion And Personhood in Philosophy with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

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Question 1

The 'argument from marginal cases' challenges theories of personhood that rely on cognitive capacities like rationality. It points out that some humans (e.g., infants, the severely cognitively disabled) lack these capacities, yet we grant them a right to life. The argument claims that for such theories to be consistent, they must either deny rights to these 'marginal' humans or grant rights to non-human animals with similar or greater capacities. This argument functions primarily as a...

  1. proof that personhood is determined by possession of a soul, not cognitive abilities.
  2. reductio ad absurdum, aiming to show the unacceptable consequences of a purely cognitive definition of personhood. (correct answer)
  3. utilitarian calculation, weighing the suffering of marginal humans against that of non-human animals.
  4. defense of speciesism, arguing that membership in the human species is the only relevant moral criterion.
Explanation: The argument from marginal cases is a form of reductio ad absurdum. It takes the premise ('personhood depends on high-level cognitive capacity') and tries to show that it leads to an absurd or morally unacceptable conclusion (that we should either deny rights to disabled humans or grant them to many animals). The goal is to force a rejection of the initial premise. (A) proposes a specific alternative but doesn't describe the function of the argument itself. (C) misidentifies the argument's structure as utilitarian. (D) describes the position the argument is often used to attack, not what the argument itself is.

Question 2

A patient in a hospital requires a unique blood type for a life-saving, one-hour transfusion, and you are the only match. You are involuntarily connected to the patient. According to the central argument of Judith Jarvis Thomson's violinist analogy, which statement best describes your moral obligation?

  1. You are obligated to remain connected, as the patient's right to life outweighs your right to bodily autonomy for this limited duration.
  2. You are not strictly obligated to remain connected, but doing so would be a morally praiseworthy, supererogatory act. (correct answer)
  3. You are obligated to disconnect, because the involuntary connection constitutes a violation of your fundamental rights that must be actively rectified.
  4. You are not obligated to remain connected, because the patient has no right to life unless they can sustain it through their own biological functions.
Explanation: Thomson's analogy is designed to show that even if a fetus has a right to life, this does not entail a right to use another's body. Thus, you are not obligated to stay connected. However, she distinguishes between what one is obligated to do and what would be a 'Minimally Decent Samaritan' act. Staying for a short period is not required by justice, but it would be morally admirable (supererogatory). (A) represents the position Thomson argues against. (C) is too strong; Thomson argues for the permissibility of disconnecting, not an obligation to do so. (D) misstates the conclusion; the argument is about the limits of the right to life concerning the use of another's body, not a claim that dependency negates the right to life itself.

Question 3

Don Marquis argues that what makes killing wrong is that it deprives the victim of a 'future like ours.' Which of the following is a direct implication of his theory for the moral status of non-human animals?

  1. Killing animals is not wrong, because they are not human and therefore cannot have a future 'like ours'.
  2. The theory is inconclusive on this point, as it was designed exclusively to address the morality of abortion.
  3. Killing animals is always permissible, as only rational beings can have a future of value in the relevant sense.
  4. Killing animals may be wrong if their future contains experiences and projects that are valuable to them. (correct answer)
Explanation: When examining philosophical arguments about the wrongness of killing, you need to carefully trace how the core principle applies beyond its original context. Marquis's "future like ours" (FLO) theory holds that killing is wrong because it deprives victims of their valuable future experiences, projects, and possibilities. The key insight is that Marquis's argument doesn't depend on being human per se, but on having a future containing valuable experiences. If we apply this principle consistently to non-human animals, the theory suggests that killing animals could be wrong when they possess futures filled with experiences that matter to them—things like social bonds, sensory pleasures, or species-specific activities they would naturally pursue. Option A incorrectly assumes the theory requires being literally human, when Marquis's focus is on the type of valuable future, not species membership. Option B wrongly suggests the theory only applies to abortion; while Marquis developed it for that debate, philosophical principles must be evaluated for their broader logical implications. Option C makes an unjustified leap by claiming only rational beings can have valuable futures—Marquis never restricts valuable futures to rational capacities alone. Option D correctly captures how the FLO theory would extend to animals: their moral status depends on whether their individual futures contain experiences and activities that are valuable from their perspective, not ours. Remember that strong philosophical arguments often have implications beyond their original purpose. When analyzing any ethical theory, always ask: "If I accept this principle, what else logically follows?" This helps you trace arguments to their full conclusions.

Question 4

Imagine a technology that allows a zygote to be removed from the uterus and grown to maturity in an 'artificial womb' with a near-100% success rate. How would the existence of this technology most significantly impact the arguments of Judith Jarvis Thomson?

  1. It would strengthen her arguments by showing that pregnancy is an unnecessary burden.
  2. It would prove her arguments correct, as the choice to use an artificial womb would still rest with the pregnant person.
  3. It would have no impact, as her arguments are based on the fetus being a person from conception, regardless of technology.
  4. It would weaken her central argument by making it possible to end a pregnancy without terminating the fetus's life. (correct answer)
Explanation: When analyzing how technological advances might affect philosophical arguments about abortion, you need to understand the core structure of the argument being challenged. Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous "violinist" argument doesn't rely on whether the fetus is a person—in fact, she grants that assumption for the sake of argument. Instead, her central claim is that even if the fetus is a person with a right to life, no person has the right to use another person's body without consent, even to preserve their own life. The artificial womb technology would significantly weaken Thomson's argument because it eliminates the key conflict she identifies. If a pregnancy can be ended without killing the fetus, then the pregnant person's right to bodily autonomy can be respected while simultaneously preserving the fetus's right to life. This removes the either/or dilemma that makes Thomson's argument compelling. Answer choice A incorrectly suggests Thomson's argument is primarily about pregnancy being burdensome, when it's actually about competing rights. Choice B misses the point entirely—the technology doesn't validate her argument but rather provides an alternative that sidesteps it. Choice C fundamentally misunderstands Thomson's position; she explicitly grants that the fetus is a person and builds her argument from there, so this technology's impact isn't about personhood status. For philosophy exam success, always identify the precise logical structure of an argument before evaluating how external factors might affect it. Don't be distracted by surface-level themes—focus on the underlying reasoning and what assumptions or conflicts drive the argument's force.

Question 5

A person is seven months pregnant with a healthy fetus and decides to have an abortion solely because continuing the pregnancy would prevent them from taking a planned, non-refundable vacation. According to Judith Jarvis Thomson's ethical framework, how would this action most likely be characterized?

  1. As morally permissible, because a person's right to control their own body is absolute and overrides all other considerations.
  2. As morally impermissible, because the fetus is viable at seven months and therefore has a full right to life that must be protected.
  3. As morally indecent or callous, even if it is an act that the person has a legal or moral right to perform. (correct answer)
  4. As morally obligatory, because carrying an unwanted child would violate a duty to only bring children into optimal conditions.
Explanation: Thomson introduces the concept of the 'Minimally Decent Samaritan' to distinguish between what one has a right to do and what is morally decent. She argues that while a person may have a right to an abortion (i.e., it's not unjust), exercising that right for a trivial reason, especially late in the pregnancy, would be morally indecent or callous. (A) is a misreading; Thomson does not argue for an absolute right. (B) states the action is impermissible, but Thomson's framework separates the question of rights/justice from the question of decency. (D) is an unrelated and implausible ethical argument.

Question 6

Opponents of abortion often argue that because it is wrong to kill a newborn infant, and there is no morally significant difference between a newborn and a late-term fetus, it is therefore wrong to kill a late-term fetus. Which of the following pro-choice arguments most directly attacks the premise that there is 'no morally significant difference'?

  1. A newborn is a person with full rights, while a fetus is merely a potential person with no rights.
  2. The bodily autonomy of the pregnant person is a right that outweighs the fetus's right to life, regardless of its status.
  3. The location of the entity—inside versus outside the womb—is morally crucial because it determines dependence on a specific person's body. (correct answer)
  4. Killing a newborn brings more grief and suffering to the family and society than performing an abortion.
Explanation: This argument, most associated with Thomson, directly targets the claim of 'no morally significant difference' by pointing to a specific difference: location and its implication for bodily autonomy. A newborn, while perhaps cognitively similar to a late-term fetus, is no longer physically dependent on the body of one specific person. Its right to life, therefore, no longer entails a right to use the mother's body. (A) asserts a difference in personhood but doesn't explain why birth creates that difference. (B) is a general claim about rights that doesn't engage with the comparison to the newborn. (D) is a utilitarian argument about consequences, not a direct rebuttal of the claimed similarity in intrinsic status.

Question 7

In her 'people-seeds' analogy, Judith Jarvis Thomson asks you to imagine that people-seeds drift in the air and can take root in your carpet, despite your best efforts to keep them out by installing fine mesh screens on your windows. This analogy is specifically designed to address which type of pregnancy?

  1. Pregnancies that endanger the mother's life.
  2. Pregnancies where the fetus is known to have a severe congenital defect.
  3. Pregnancies that result from rape.
  4. Pregnancies that result from voluntary, but protected, intercourse where contraception fails. (correct answer)
Explanation: Thomson's "people-seeds" analogy is part of her famous argument about abortion rights and moral responsibility. When analyzing philosophical analogies, focus on mapping each element of the analogy to the real-world situation it represents. In the people-seeds scenario, you take reasonable precautions (installing fine mesh screens) but seeds still occasionally drift through and take root in your carpet. The key elements here are: (1) you took preventive measures, (2) you engaged in an activity that could lead to the outcome (opening your windows), and (3) despite precautions, the unwanted outcome occurred anyway. This directly parallels situations where people use contraception during consensual sex but pregnancy occurs despite these protective measures. Answer D captures this perfectly—pregnancies resulting from voluntary but protected intercourse where contraception fails. The "voluntary but protected" aspect mirrors opening windows with screens installed, while contraceptive failure parallels the mesh not being 100% effective. Answer A (life-threatening pregnancies) is incorrect because the analogy doesn't address situations where the pregnancy itself poses danger. Answer B (fetal defects) is wrong because the people-seeds scenario isn't about the nature or health of what takes root, but about responsibility given preventive efforts. Answer C (rape) fails because rape involves no voluntary action by the victim—there's no parallel to choosing to open windows. When studying Thomson's work, remember that her analogies are precisely crafted. Each detail serves a specific philosophical purpose, so map every element of the scenario to understand which real-world situation is being illuminated.

Question 8

The development of a fetus from zygote to newborn is a gradual process with no single, non-arbitrary point at which personhood is definitively acquired. This gradualness presents a problem analogous to the Sorites Paradox (the paradox of the heap). Which ethical framework is most challenged by this problem of gradual development?

  1. Deontological frameworks that rely on a sharp distinction between persons and non-persons to assign rights. (correct answer)
  2. Virtue ethics, which focuses on the character of the decision-maker rather than the status of the fetus.
  3. Act-utilitarianism, which can accommodate gradual increases in moral status corresponding to increases in sentience.
  4. The 'future like ours' account, which applies its criterion consistently from a very early stage of development.
Explanation: Deontological and rights-based theories typically operate with a binary distinction: either an entity is a person with a full right to life, or it is not. The gradual, continuous nature of fetal development makes it very difficult to draw a clear, non-arbitrary line where this status is acquired. This mirrors the Sorites Paradox, where one cannot identify the single grain of sand that turns a non-heap into a heap. Utilitarianism (C) can more easily handle this by allowing moral weight to increase gradually with developing capacities (like sentience). Virtue ethics (B) sidesteps the problem by focusing on the agent. Marquis's theory (D) also avoids this specific problem by applying its criterion (possession of a valuable future) very early on.

Question 9

One objection to Mary Anne Warren's personhood criteria is that they could also apply to newborns, potentially justifying infanticide, since infants lack self-awareness and advanced rationality. How would a defender of Warren's view most likely respond to this objection?

  1. By arguing that newborns are not persons, and therefore infanticide is in fact morally permissible in certain situations.
  2. By insisting that genetic humanity is sufficient for a right to life, even if the criteria for personhood are not met.
  3. By arguing that while newborns are not yet persons, there are powerful pragmatic and emotional reasons to protect them that don't apply to fetuses. (correct answer)
  4. By conceding that the theory does justify infanticide, but that this is a consistent and acceptable conclusion of the premises.
Explanation: Warren herself addresses this objection. She argues that there are reasons to protect infants that do not apply to fetuses in utero. Specifically, once born, an infant is no longer in conflict with the mother's bodily autonomy, and others in society are typically willing and able to care for it. These extrinsic factors provide strong reasons to grant infants rights, even if they don't meet the intrinsic criteria for personhood. (A) and (D) are logically possible but represent an extreme view ('biting the bullet') that most defenders, including Warren, avoid. (B) would be a direct contradiction of the core of her argument, which is that genetic humanity is not sufficient for personhood.

Question 10

A philosopher argues that active euthanasia for a patient with a terminal illness, who is in constant, untreatable pain with no hope of future positive experiences, is morally permissible. How would Don Marquis's 'future like ours' (FLO) theory most likely evaluate this argument?

  1. It would tend to agree, because the patient's future is not one of value that they are being deprived of; it consists only of suffering. (correct answer)
  2. It would disagree, because any act of killing deprives a human being of a future, and the value of that future is irrelevant to the act's wrongness.
  3. It would agree, because the patient's explicit consent to euthanasia is the primary factor that negates the wrongness of being deprived of a future.
  4. It would disagree, because the FLO account is a specific argument against abortion and does not apply to other ethical issues like euthanasia.
Explanation: Marquis's theory posits that killing is wrong because it deprives the victim of a valuable future. In the case of a terminally ill patient whose future contains only suffering, the core reason for the wrongness of killing, according to this theory, does not apply. The deprivation is not of a future 'like ours.' (B) is incorrect because the value of the future is central to Marquis's account. (C) introduces consent, which is important to euthanasia debates but is not the central mechanism of the FLO theory itself. (D) is incorrect because Marquis explicitly states that his theory is a general account of the wrongness of killing, not one limited to abortion.

Question 11

A philosopher argues that active euthanasia for a patient with a terminal illness, who is in constant, untreatable pain with no hope of future positive experiences, is morally permissible. How would Don Marquis's 'future like ours' (FLO) theory most likely evaluate this argument?

  1. It would tend to agree, because the patient's future is not one of value that they are being deprived of; it consists only of suffering. (correct answer)
  2. It would disagree, because any act of killing deprives a human being of a future, and the value of that future is irrelevant to the act's wrongness.
  3. It would agree, because the patient's explicit consent to euthanasia is the primary factor that negates the wrongness of being deprived of a future.
  4. It would disagree, because the FLO account is a specific argument against abortion and does not apply to other ethical issues like euthanasia.
Explanation: Marquis's theory posits that killing is wrong because it deprives the victim of a valuable future. In the case of a terminally ill patient whose future contains only suffering, the core reason for the wrongness of killing, according to this theory, does not apply. The deprivation is not of a future 'like ours.' (B) is incorrect because the value of the future is central to Marquis's account. (C) introduces consent, which is important to euthanasia debates but is not the central mechanism of the FLO theory itself. (D) is incorrect because Marquis explicitly states that his theory is a general account of the wrongness of killing, not one limited to abortion.

Question 12

A highly advanced AI is developed that can compose original music, express a wide range of emotions, solve complex moral dilemmas, and communicate using sophisticated language. It lacks, however, a biological human body. According to Mary Anne Warren's cognitive criteria for personhood, what is the most likely moral status of this AI?

  1. It is not a person because personhood is intrinsically linked to being a biological member of the species Homo sapiens.
  2. It is likely a person, or close to it, because it exhibits several of the key cognitive capacities sufficient for personhood. (correct answer)
  3. It cannot be a person because its emotional expressions are necessarily simulated and not genuine subjective experiences.
  4. Its moral status is indeterminate until it can be proven that it possesses a soul, which is a necessary condition for personhood.
Explanation: Warren's criteria for personhood are functional and cognitive (consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, communication, self-awareness). They are not tied to biology. The AI in the scenario exhibits several of these traits, so within her framework, it would likely qualify for personhood status. (A) is incorrect because Warren explicitly decouples personhood from genetic humanity. (C) makes an empirical claim about the AI's internal state that may be unknowable; Warren's criteria are based on exhibited capacities. (D) introduces a metaphysical concept (the soul) that is not part of Warren's secular, philosophical criteria.

Question 13

A patient in a hospital requires a unique blood type for a life-saving, one-hour transfusion, and you are the only match. You are involuntarily connected to the patient. According to the central argument of Judith Jarvis Thomson's violinist analogy, which statement best describes your moral obligation?

  1. You are obligated to remain connected, as the patient's right to life outweighs your right to bodily autonomy for this limited duration.
  2. You are not strictly obligated to remain connected, but doing so would be a morally praiseworthy, supererogatory act. (correct answer)
  3. You are obligated to disconnect, because the involuntary connection constitutes a violation of your fundamental rights that must be actively rectified.
  4. You are not obligated to remain connected, because the patient has no right to life unless they can sustain it through their own biological functions.
Explanation: Thomson's analogy is designed to show that even if a fetus has a right to life, this does not entail a right to use another's body. Thus, you are not obligated to stay connected. However, she distinguishes between what one is obligated to do and what would be a 'Minimally Decent Samaritan' act. Staying for a short period is not required by justice, but it would be morally admirable (supererogatory). (A) represents the position Thomson argues against. (C) is too strong; Thomson argues for the permissibility of disconnecting, not an obligation to do so. (D) misstates the conclusion; the argument is about the limits of the right to life concerning the use of another's body, not a claim that dependency negates the right to life itself.

Question 14

A highly advanced AI is developed that can compose original music, express a wide range of emotions, solve complex moral dilemmas, and communicate using sophisticated language. It lacks, however, a biological human body. According to Mary Anne Warren's cognitive criteria for personhood, what is the most likely moral status of this AI?

  1. It is not a person because personhood is intrinsically linked to being a biological member of the species Homo sapiens.
  2. It is likely a person, or close to it, because it exhibits several of the key cognitive capacities sufficient for personhood. (correct answer)
  3. It cannot be a person because its emotional expressions are necessarily simulated and not genuine subjective experiences.
  4. Its moral status is indeterminate until it can be proven that it possesses a soul, which is a necessary condition for personhood.
Explanation: Warren's criteria for personhood are functional and cognitive (consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, communication, self-awareness). They are not tied to biology. The AI in the scenario exhibits several of these traits, so within her framework, it would likely qualify for personhood status. (A) is incorrect because Warren explicitly decouples personhood from genetic humanity. (C) makes an empirical claim about the AI's internal state that may be unknowable; Warren's criteria are based on exhibited capacities. (D) introduces a metaphysical concept (the soul) that is not part of Warren's secular, philosophical criteria.

Question 15

Consider the argument: 'A fetus is a potential person, and because potential persons have a right to life, abortion is wrong.' Which of the following statements poses the most direct challenge to the logical step in this argument?

  1. A fetus is not a potential person, but is already a person from the moment of conception.
  2. An acorn is a potential oak tree, but it does not have the same rights or moral status as an actual oak tree. (correct answer)
  3. The potential of the fetus to become a person is entirely dependent on the pregnant woman's body, which she has rights over.
  4. Many fetuses are not potential persons because they spontaneously miscarry before they can be born.
Explanation: This is a classic counter-analogy that directly attacks the inference from 'X is a potential Y' to 'X has the rights of Y.' By showing a case where this inference clearly fails (acorn/oak tree), it challenges the logical structure of the potentiality argument. (A) rejects the premise ('a fetus is a potential person') rather than challenging the logical step. (C) introduces a competing right (bodily autonomy) but does not directly refute the logic of the potentiality argument itself. (D) raises an empirical point about likelihood but does not challenge the core philosophical claim about the status of potentiality.

Question 16

In her 'people-seeds' analogy, Judith Jarvis Thomson asks you to imagine that people-seeds drift in the air and can take root in your carpet, despite your best efforts to keep them out by installing fine mesh screens on your windows. This analogy is specifically designed to address which type of pregnancy?

  1. Pregnancies that endanger the mother's life.
  2. Pregnancies where the fetus is known to have a severe congenital defect.
  3. Pregnancies that result from rape.
  4. Pregnancies that result from voluntary, but protected, intercourse where contraception fails. (correct answer)
Explanation: Thomson's "people-seeds" analogy is part of her famous argument about abortion rights and moral responsibility. When analyzing philosophical analogies, focus on mapping each element of the analogy to the real-world situation it represents. In the people-seeds scenario, you take reasonable precautions (installing fine mesh screens) but seeds still occasionally drift through and take root in your carpet. The key elements here are: (1) you took preventive measures, (2) you engaged in an activity that could lead to the outcome (opening your windows), and (3) despite precautions, the unwanted outcome occurred anyway. This directly parallels situations where people use contraception during consensual sex but pregnancy occurs despite these protective measures. Answer D captures this perfectly—pregnancies resulting from voluntary but protected intercourse where contraception fails. The "voluntary but protected" aspect mirrors opening windows with screens installed, while contraceptive failure parallels the mesh not being 100% effective. Answer A (life-threatening pregnancies) is incorrect because the analogy doesn't address situations where the pregnancy itself poses danger. Answer B (fetal defects) is wrong because the people-seeds scenario isn't about the nature or health of what takes root, but about responsibility given preventive efforts. Answer C (rape) fails because rape involves no voluntary action by the victim—there's no parallel to choosing to open windows. When studying Thomson's work, remember that her analogies are precisely crafted. Each detail serves a specific philosophical purpose, so map every element of the scenario to understand which real-world situation is being illuminated.

Question 17

In a legal dispute, Party A argues that abortion should be prohibited because allowing it creates a society with less overall respect for life, leading to negative long-term social consequences. Party B counters that an individual's fundamental right to bodily autonomy is a sacrosanct principle that cannot be violated for the sake of predicted social outcomes. The conflict between Party A and Party B is best understood as a clash between which two ethical frameworks?

  1. Rule Utilitarianism and Rights-Based Ethics (correct answer)
  2. Act Utilitarianism and Rights-Based Ethics
  3. Virtue Ethics and Kantian Deontology
  4. Virtue Ethics and Act Utilitarianism
Explanation: When you encounter questions about ethical arguments in legal or policy contexts, focus on identifying the underlying moral reasoning each party uses to justify their position. Party A's argument exemplifies rule utilitarianism - they're concerned with establishing a general rule (prohibiting abortion) because following this rule will produce better overall consequences for society (greater respect for life). Rule utilitarians focus on which rules, if universally followed, would maximize general welfare. Party B's position represents rights-based ethics - they argue that bodily autonomy is a fundamental right that must be respected regardless of consequences. Rights-based theorists believe certain principles are inviolable, even if violating them might produce better outcomes. Answer A correctly identifies this clash between rule utilitarianism and rights-based ethics. Answer B is wrong because Party A isn't making an act utilitarian argument - they're not calculating consequences for this specific case, but rather arguing about which general rule produces better social outcomes. Answer C is incorrect because neither party appeals to virtue ethics (focusing on character traits) or Kantian deontology (emphasizing duty and categorical imperatives). Answer D fails because Party A isn't using act utilitarianism and Party B isn't making virtue-based arguments. Study tip: When analyzing ethical arguments, ask yourself: "Is this person focused on consequences (utilitarian), rights and principles (deontological/rights-based), or character traits (virtue ethics)?" Then determine if consequentialist arguments are about specific acts or general rules.

Question 18

A pregnant woman in a developing country is offered a prestigious scholarship to study medicine abroad, which would enable her to lift her entire family out of poverty and serve her community as a doctor. However, she would have to terminate her early-stage pregnancy to accept. An act-utilitarian analysis of her decision would primarily focus on which of the following?

  1. The violation of the fetus's inherent right to life, which is a fundamental principle that cannot be outweighed by consequences.
  2. The character of the woman and whether the act of terminating the pregnancy aligns with virtues such as compassion or selfishness.
  3. The sum total of expected happiness and suffering for the woman, her family, her future patients, and the fetus. (correct answer)
  4. Whether the maxim 'one may terminate a pregnancy to pursue a career' could be willed as a universal law for all rational beings.
Explanation: Act utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory that judges the morality of an individual act based on its ability to produce the greatest good (happiness or well-being) for the greatest number of people involved. Therefore, the analysis would require weighing the expected positive and negative outcomes for all affected parties. (A) describes a deontological or rights-based concern, not a utilitarian one. (B) describes a virtue ethics approach. (D) describes the central test of Kantian deontology (the Categorical Imperative), not act utilitarianism.

Question 19

A key tenet of Kantian ethics is the Formula of Humanity, which states one should 'act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.' Which of the following questions represents the most significant conceptual hurdle when applying this principle to the issue of abortion?

  1. Does a society that permits abortion produce more overall happiness than one that does not?
  2. What virtues or character traits does the choice to have an abortion reflect in the moral agent?
  3. Does a fetus possess rationality and autonomy, thus qualifying as 'humanity' in the sense required by the formula? (correct answer)
  4. Would the pregnant person be using their own body merely as a means to gestate the fetus, violating a duty to themselves?
Explanation: The central challenge for applying the Formula of Humanity is determining the moral status of the entity in question. For Kant, 'humanity' is tied to rational nature and the capacity to set one's own ends. Therefore, the core philosophical question is whether a fetus qualifies as an end-in-itself. If it does, abortion is likely impermissible; if it does not, the prohibition may not apply. (A) is a utilitarian question. (B) is a virtue ethics question. (D) is a possible but secondary Kantian consideration, while the status of the fetus is the primary and most debated hurdle.

Question 20

Imagine a technology that allows a zygote to be removed from the uterus and grown to maturity in an 'artificial womb' with a near-100% success rate. How would the existence of this technology most significantly impact the arguments of Judith Jarvis Thomson?

  1. It would strengthen her arguments by showing that pregnancy is an unnecessary burden.
  2. It would prove her arguments correct, as the choice to use an artificial womb would still rest with the pregnant person.
  3. It would have no impact, as her arguments are based on the fetus being a person from conception, regardless of technology.
  4. It would weaken her central argument by making it possible to end a pregnancy without terminating the fetus's life. (correct answer)
Explanation: When analyzing how technological advances might affect philosophical arguments about abortion, you need to understand the core structure of the argument being challenged. Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous "violinist" argument doesn't rely on whether the fetus is a person—in fact, she grants that assumption for the sake of argument. Instead, her central claim is that even if the fetus is a person with a right to life, no person has the right to use another person's body without consent, even to preserve their own life. The artificial womb technology would significantly weaken Thomson's argument because it eliminates the key conflict she identifies. If a pregnancy can be ended without killing the fetus, then the pregnant person's right to bodily autonomy can be respected while simultaneously preserving the fetus's right to life. This removes the either/or dilemma that makes Thomson's argument compelling. Answer choice A incorrectly suggests Thomson's argument is primarily about pregnancy being burdensome, when it's actually about competing rights. Choice B misses the point entirely—the technology doesn't validate her argument but rather provides an alternative that sidesteps it. Choice C fundamentally misunderstands Thomson's position; she explicitly grants that the fetus is a person and builds her argument from there, so this technology's impact isn't about personhood status. For philosophy exam success, always identify the precise logical structure of an argument before evaluating how external factors might affect it. Don't be distracted by surface-level themes—focus on the underlying reasoning and what assumptions or conflicts drive the argument's force.