Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Transfer By Deed

12 questions · exam conditions

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Transfer By DeedQuestion 1 of 12

Needing cash, Owner executed and delivered a deed conveying her house to Lender. The deed was absolute on its face and contained no reconveyance provision. Lender orally promised to reconvey the house to Owner when Owner repaid a $50,000 loan. Owner repaid the loan in full, but Lender refused to reconvey. Owner sued, offering evidence of the oral agreement.

Under the majority rule, what should the court do?

Refuse the evidence because the deed is absolute on its face and parol evidence may not vary a written instrument.

Admit the evidence only if Owner first proves fraud, duress, or mistake by clear and convincing evidence.

Admit the parol evidence and treat the deed as an equitable mortgage, requiring reconveyance upon repayment.

Set aside the deed as void because the parties' oral agreement shows they intended no present conveyance.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Transfer By Deed

Practice Transfer By Deed in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Transfer By Deed, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

Under the majority rule, what should the court do?

Refuse the evidence because the deed is absolute on its face and parol evidence may not vary a written instrument.
Admit the evidence only if Owner first proves fraud, duress, or mistake by clear and convincing evidence.
Admit the parol evidence and treat the deed as an equitable mortgage, requiring reconveyance upon repayment. (correct answer)
Set aside the deed as void because the parties' oral agreement shows they intended no present conveyance.

Explanation: Whenever you see a deed that is absolute on its face but paired with an oral promise to reconvey, your mind should jump to the doctrine of equitable mortgages. The central question is whether the parties intended a sale or a security interest. Here, Lender loaned Owner money, and Owner gave a deed as security, with an oral promise to reconvey upon repayment. Under the majority rule, courts allow parol evidence to show this true intent, treating the deed as an equitable mortgage. Because Owner repaid the $50,000 in full, the court will order reconveyance—this reflects the maxim "once a mortgage, always a mortgage." The first wrong answer, refusing the evidence because the deed is absolute on its face and parol evidence may not vary a written instrument, misunderstands the parol evidence rule. That rule applies to integrated contracts, not to deeds, and it cannot bar evidence showing the true nature of a transaction as a mortgage. The second wrong answer, admitting the evidence only if Owner first proves fraud, duress, or mistake, is too narrow—the equitable mortgage doctrine does not require a showing of fraud or mistake, just that the parties intended the deed as security. The third wrong answer, setting aside the deed as void, is incorrect because the deed is not void; it is a valid conveyance, but it operates as a mortgage rather than an absolute transfer. Your study tip: when you see "absolute on its face" and "oral agreement to reconvey," immediately think "equitable mortgage." Remember that parol evidence is admissible to prove the true intent, and the remedy is reconveyance—not voiding the deed.

Question 2

Seller and Buyer signed a contract for the sale of Blackacre. At closing, Seller signed and delivered a warranty deed to Buyer. The deed stated: 'Buyer assumes and agrees to pay the existing first mortgage on Blackacre.' Buyer did not sign the deed but accepted it and recorded it. Buyer later defaulted, and the mortgagee sued Buyer on the assumption clause. Buyer raised the lack of his signature as a defense.

Is Buyer liable to the mortgagee?

Yes, because the recorded deed was a signed writing satisfying the Statute of Frauds.
Yes, because Buyer accepted the deed and is bound by its terms even though he did not sign it. (correct answer)
No, because the Statute of Frauds requires the buyer's assumption agreement to be in writing and signed by the buyer.
No, because a deed cannot impose obligations on a grantee who did not sign it.

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about a deed's assumption clause, remember that a deed is not only a conveyance—it can also contain promises that bind a grantee who accepts it. The central issue here is whether acceptance can substitute for the buyer's signature. The buyer is liable because accepting a deed is more than just taking title; it is assent to the deed's terms. The deed said the buyer assumed and agreed to pay the existing mortgage, and by accepting and recording it, the buyer became bound on that promise. The mortgagee, as an intended third-party beneficiary of the assumption clause, can enforce it directly against the buyer. Lack of signature does not defeat that obligation. The wrong answers each miss this key rule. The claim that the recorded deed was a signed writing satisfying the Statute of Frauds is flawed because the deed was signed by the seller, not the buyer, and recording alone does not create liability. The claim that the Statute of Frauds requires the buyer's assumption agreement to be signed by the buyer is also incorrect here: acceptance of the deed is the buyer's assent, and courts treat that as sufficient to bind the buyer. Finally, the idea that a deed cannot impose obligations on a grantee who did not sign it is simply false—acceptance makes the grantee a party to the deed's covenants. Study tip: on the bar exam, whenever a grantee accepts a deed, ask what obligations came with it. Acceptance can create liability even without a signature.

Question 3

The written contract for the sale of a house provided: 'Seller shall replace the roof before closing.' At closing, Seller delivered a warranty deed to Buyer. Buyer accepted the deed, which made no mention of the roof. Buyer later discovered that Seller had not replaced the roof and sued Seller for breach of contract.

Will Buyer prevail?

Yes, because a warranty deed warrants that the premises comply with the sales contract.
Yes, because the roof-replacement promise is collateral to the deed and survives merger. (correct answer)
No, because the deed merged the contract into itself and extinguished the roof promise.
No, because Buyer's acceptance of the deed without inspecting the roof was a waiver.

Explanation: Whenever you see a deed and a prior sales contract, think about the merger doctrine: accepting the deed generally merges the contract into the deed, extinguishing promises that were meant to be finalized by the conveyance. But that merger only applies to promises related to title and the conveyance itself—not to collateral promises. Here, the contract's roof-replacement promise is collateral to the deed because the deed says nothing about the roof and the promise is not a title covenant. A warranty deed warrants title—for example, that the seller owns the property and has the right to convey it—but it does not warrant that the physical premises comply with every contract term. Therefore, the roof promise survives merger, and Buyer may sue Seller for breach of contract. Buyer will prevail. The wrong answers each misapply a distinct idea. Saying the warranty deed warrants that the premises comply with the sales contract confuses title warranties with physical-condition promises. Saying the deed merged and extinguished the roof promise overstates merger, which does not swallow collateral agreements. Saying Buyer waived by accepting the deed without inspecting is also wrong: accepting a deed does not waive a known contractual breach unless the buyer intentionally relinquishes that claim, and failure to inspect is not a waiver. On exam day, when a contract promise is missing from the deed, ask: is it about title/conveyance or is it collateral? Collateral promises survive merger.

Question 4

Oliver executed and signed a warranty deed conveying his farm to his niece, Nina. Oliver handed the deed to his lawyer, Lara, and said: 'Hold this deed. I want Nina to have the farm when I die, but I reserve the right to revoke this arrangement at any time.' Oliver died six months later without revoking. After Oliver's death, Lara delivered the deed to Nina, who recorded it. Oliver's son, Sam, claims the farm under Oliver's will.

Who owns the farm?

Nina, because Lara's delivery to Nina after Oliver's death completed the gift.
Nina, because Oliver's delivery of the deed to Lara was a delivery to a third party for Nina's benefit.
Sam, because Oliver's retained right to revoke prevented a present transfer and the deed was an invalid testamentary disposition. (correct answer)
Sam, because a deed cannot be accepted by a grantee after the grantor has died.

Explanation: Whenever you see a deed delivered to a third party, the critical issue is whether the grantor intended a present transfer of title or was merely attempting to create a will substitute. A deed must pass title immediately to be valid; if it takes effect only upon death, it is a testamentary disposition requiring will formalities. Here, Oliver's retained right to revoke is dispositive. Because he kept the power to revoke, he did not intend to pass title to Nina now. The delivery to Lara was conditional and revocable, so it failed as an inter vivos gift. Since the deed was intended to operate only at death, it is an invalid testamentary disposition—it lacks the required formalities of a will (witnesses, etc.). Consequently, the farm passes through Oliver's will to Sam. Now, examine the wrong answers. The choice stating that Lara's delivery after death completed the gift is incorrect because a later delivery cannot validate an instrument that was not a present transfer at its inception. Similarly, the choice claiming that delivery to a third party for Nina's benefit is valid overlooks that such delivery only works if the grantor unconditionally parts with control—which Oliver did not. Finally, the assertion that a deed cannot be accepted after the grantor's death is a red herring; acceptance can occur posthumously, but the underlying gift must be valid. Here, it fails for lack of present intent. Study tip: Remember the rule: a deed must be a present transfer. If the grantor retains any right to revoke or control, it is not a deed—it is a will without formalities. Always check for retained control.

Question 5

O conveyed Blackacre to A by a warranty deed. At the time of delivery, there was an outstanding mortgage on Blackacre that O had failed to discharge. A did not assume the mortgage. Six months later, A paid the mortgage to prevent foreclosure. A sued O for breach of the covenant against encumbrances.

What is A's measure of recovery?

The amount A paid to discharge the mortgage, but not more than the purchase price A paid for Blackacre. (correct answer)
Nothing, because A was not evicted from Blackacre.
The fair market value of Blackacre at the time of the foreclosure.
The full purchase price A paid for Blackacre, because the covenant was breached at delivery.

Explanation: When you see a question about covenants of title in a deed, the first step is to classify the covenant as either present (breached, if at all, at delivery) or future (breached only upon interference with possession). The covenant against encumbrances is a present covenant: a mortgage is an encumbrance, so it was breached the moment the deed was delivered. Because the breach occurs at delivery, A does not need to show an eviction—the mere existence of the mortgage is enough to recover. Here, the correct measure is the amount A actually paid to discharge the mortgage, but capped at the purchase price A paid for Blackacre. This reflects the principle that damages for breach of a present covenant are the cost to remove the encumbrance, not a windfall beyond what A invested in the property. A paid the mortgage to protect her interest, and that payment is her direct loss. The wrong answers each miss a key point. "Nothing, because A was not evicted" confuses the covenant against encumbrances with the covenant of quiet enjoyment or warranty against eviction—those are future covenants requiring actual disturbance. "The fair market value at foreclosure" is irrelevant because no foreclosure occurred; A prevented it, and market value is not the standard for an encumbrance claim. "The full purchase price" would be appropriate only if the title failed entirely (e.g., no title at all), not for a removable mortgage. The purchase price is a ceiling, not the automatic amount. Study tip: On the bar exam, always ask—was the covenant present or future? If present, breach at delivery and damages are cost to cure, limited to the contract price. If future, wait for eviction or disturbance.

Question 6

Raymond, the owner of Greenacre, signed and acknowledged a warranty deed conveying Greenacre to Paula. He then placed the deed in the possession of his lawyer, Laura, with instructions: 'If I die without revoking this deed, deliver it to Paula. I reserve the right to revoke.' Raymond later died without revoking, and Laura delivered the deed to Paula, who recorded it. Who owns Greenacre?

Paula, because placing the deed with Laura was a constructive delivery to Paula, and the condition of Raymond's death was satisfied before Paula recorded.
Paula, because Laura's later delivery to Paula related back to the date of execution and delivery to Laura, making the deed effective.
Raymond's estate, because Laura held the deed as Raymond's agent while Raymond retained the right to revoke, so no effective delivery occurred before Raymond died. (correct answer)
Raymond's estate, because a deed delivered to a third party for the grantor's death is always an invalid testamentary disposition and cannot be enforced.

Explanation: Whenever you see a deed question, test delivery first: a deed is ineffective unless the grantor currently intends to transfer title; retaining control defeats delivery. Here Raymond gave the deed to his lawyer but reserved the right to revoke. Laura was his agent, not an escrow holder with irrevocable instructions. Raymond's death did not cure the lack of delivery, because delivery must occur during life with present intent. Therefore Greenacre remains estate property. "Placing the deed with Laura was a constructive delivery" is wrong: constructive delivery can satisfy the physical transfer requirement, but it still requires a present intent to transfer. Raymond's retained revocation right conclusively shows no such intent. Laura's later delivery "relates back" to the date of execution and delivery to Laura is also wrong: relation back is an equitable doctrine used when a deed has been irrevocably delivered to a third party; it cannot validate a delivery that never legally occurred. The claim that a deed delivered to a third person for the grantor's death is "always an invalid testamentary disposition" is overbroad: such an arrangement can be valid if the grantor irrevocably parts with control, but here the deed was merely an ambulatory will substitute and also lacked will formalities. Study tip: whenever a question describes the grantor "reserving the right to revoke," answer delivery — no transfer. A deed must operate immediately, not as a will.

Question 7

Dana executed a deed conveying her house to her neighbor, Paul, as a gift. She personally handed the deed to Paul, saying, 'This is yours.' Paul, who had recently quarreled with Dana, replied, 'I don't want your house,' and immediately tore the deed in half. A week later, Paul reconsidered and told Dana that he accepted the gift. Dana refused. Paul then recorded a photocopy of the torn deed.

Who owns the house?

Dana, because Paul's rejection was effective and he could not later accept the gift. (correct answer)
Dana, because a deed conveying a gift must be accepted in writing.
Paul, because Dana's delivery of the deed was complete when she handed it to him.
Paul, because recording a photocopy of the deed put the world on notice of his title.

Explanation: When you see a question about a gift of real property, the core issue is whether there was a valid delivery and acceptance of the deed. For a gift deed to be effective, the grantor must deliver it with intent to transfer, and the grantee must accept it—but acceptance can be implied by conduct, and rejection is equally effective. Here, Dana handed Paul the deed and said it was his—delivery was complete. But Paul immediately tore the deed and said, "I don't want your house." That is an unequivocal rejection. A donee who rejects a gift cannot later change his mind and force acceptance; the gift fails permanently. Paul's later "acceptance" a week later is too late, and Dana's refusal is proper. The wrong answer that "delivery was complete when she handed it to him" is a trap—delivery is necessary but not sufficient if the donee rejects. The answer claiming "a deed conveying a gift must be accepted in writing" is also wrong: acceptance need not be in writing, especially for a gift deed—oral or conduct acceptance suffices. Finally, recording a photocopy of a torn deed cannot cure the defective transfer; recording only gives notice of a valid instrument, and here there was no valid acceptance. Remember: in gift law, rejection kills the gift—once refused, the offer is gone. On the bar, always check for acceptance in gift transfers, even if delivery was perfect.

Question 8

Owner owned only a life estate in Greenacre. By a warranty deed, Owner purported to convey 'Greenacre in fee simple' to Alice. Alice did not record. Owner later inherited the fee in Greenacre. Before Alice recorded, Owner conveyed Greenacre to Ben, who paid value and had no notice of Alice's deed. Ben recorded. This is a notice recording jurisdiction.

Who owns Greenacre?

Alice, because the warranty deed, together with Owner's later acquisition, vested title in Alice by estoppel.
Alice, because Alice's deed was the first deed executed and a later deed cannot convey title the grantor no longer has.
Ben, because Alice's unrecorded deed is void against a subsequent bona fide purchaser under the recording act. (correct answer)
Ben, because Owner's deed to Alice conveyed only a life estate and was therefore not within the recording act.

Explanation: Whenever a property question involves a deed that precedes a later sale, the two competing ideas are estoppel by deed and recording acts. Estoppel by deed can give Alice the after-acquired title Owner later inherited, but recording statutes override that in favor of a bona fide purchaser who lacks notice. Here, Owner's warranty deed to Alice is a classic "after-acquired title" situation: Owner had only a life estate, purported to convey a fee simple, then later inherited the fee. That later title would ordinarily feed the estoppel and vest in Alice. But Alice never recorded, and Ben later bought for value with no notice of Alice's deed and recorded first. In a notice jurisdiction, an unrecorded conveyance is void against a subsequent bona fide purchaser, so Ben owns Greenacre. The distractor "Alice, because the warranty deed, together with Owner's later acquisition, vested title in Alice by estoppel" is tempting because the estoppel doctrine is real, but it fails against a protected BFP. "Alice, because Alice's deed was the first deed executed" ignores the entire purpose of recording acts. "Ben, because Owner's deed to Alice conveyed only a life estate and was therefore not within the recording act" is wrong too: the recording act applies to conveyances generally, and Alice's deed purported to convey more than a life estate, triggering estoppel. On bar-exam questions, spot the recording statute first: if an earlier deed is unrecorded and a later buyer has no notice, the later buyer wins—even if the earlier grantee had a plausible equitable claim.

Question 9

Ann owned Blackacre. Without Ann's knowledge or consent, her son forged a deed purporting to convey Blackacre from Ann to himself. The son then delivered the forged deed to Buyer, who paid value and had no notice of the forgery. Buyer recorded. Ann now seeks to quiet title against Buyer.

Who owns Blackacre?

Ann, unless Buyer can show that Ann was negligent in safeguarding her deed.
Buyer, because he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
Buyer, because recording the deed gave constructive notice and cut off Ann's claim.
Ann, because a forged deed is void and passes no title, even to a bona fide purchaser. (correct answer)

Explanation: When you see a forged deed in a property question, your first job is to distinguish a void instrument from a voidable one. A forged deed is void—it passes no title whatsoever. Here, Ann's son forged her signature, so he had no title to convey to Buyer. Buyer's status as a bona fide purchaser (BFP) for value and without notice does not change this outcome. The recording act protects a BFP against prior unrecorded interests, but it cannot cure a void deed because the forger never held title. Thus, Ann retains ownership. The choice suggesting Ann owns unless Buyer proves she was negligent in safeguarding her deed is wrong—negligence is irrelevant to forgery. Even a careless owner defeats a forged deed. The choice favoring Buyer simply because he was a BFP misstates the rule; BFP protection applies to prior interests, not to a void instrument. The choice claiming Buyer wins because recording gave constructive notice and cut off Ann's claim also fails—recording only provides notice to subsequent purchasers and cannot validate a forged deed. On the exam, remember: a forged deed is void, while a deed obtained by fraud is voidable. A BFP can sometimes prevail over a voidable deed but never over a void one. Always ask whether the transferor actually had title to pass.

Question 10

Grantor owned Lot 1 and Lot 2, adjoining lots in a subdivision. Grantor executed and delivered a deed conveying 'my lot on the corner of First and Main' to Grantee. Lot 1 is the corner lot; Lot 2 is behind Lot 1 and touches Main but not First. The deed contained no metes-and-bounds description. Grantor's estate now claims the deed is void for insufficient description.

Who prevails?

Grantee, because any ambiguity in a deed is construed against the grantor, and the grantor chose the description.
Estate, because the description is patently ambiguous and parol evidence cannot be used to cure an insufficient property description.
Estate, because a deed conveying real property must contain a metes-and-bounds description or it is void for indefiniteness.
Grantee, because the description identifies the property with reasonable certainty and parol evidence may be used to apply the deed to Lot 1. (correct answer)

Explanation: When a deed's property description is challenged, your first task is to assess whether the description identifies the land with reasonable certainty. Here, the deed says "my lot on the corner of First and Main." That description is sufficient on its face—it points to a specific, identifiable parcel (Lot 1), because Lot 2 touches Main but not First. The problem is not a missing description; it's a latent ambiguity about which lot is meant. Parol evidence (e.g., the grantor's intent, the surrounding circumstances) is admissible to apply the deed to the correct parcel. Since the description can be applied to Lot 1 with reasonable certainty, the deed is valid, and Grantee prevails. Why are the other choices wrong? The choice stating that "any ambiguity in a deed is construed against the grantor" misstates the rule—that doctrine is a tie-breaker for unresolved ambiguities, not a substitute for identifying the property. The estate's argument that the description is "patently ambiguous" is incorrect; a patent ambiguity is one apparent on the face of the deed (like a blank space), whereas this is latent. And parol evidence can be used to cure a latent ambiguity. Finally, there is no requirement that a deed contain a metes-and-bounds description; any description that provides a means of identification—such as a lot number or a street address—is valid. For the exam, remember: a deed is void only if the description is so indefinite that no property can be identified. Look for whether the ambiguity is patent (fatal) or latent (curable with parol evidence). If the description clearly points to a single parcel, parol evidence will resolve the rest.

Question 11

O conveyed Blackacre to A by a general warranty deed containing all six traditional covenants of title. A later conveyed Blackacre to B by quitclaim deed. X then evicted B by establishing a title that was superior to O's at the time O conveyed to A. B sued O on O's deed.

Which claim by B against O is most likely to fail?

Breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
Breach of the covenant of seisin. (correct answer)
Breach of the covenant of warranty.
Breach of the covenant of further assurances.

Explanation: Whenever you see covenants of title, immediately separate them into present and future covenants. Present covenants—seisin, right to convey, and against encumbrances—are breached, if at all, at the moment of delivery and are personal to the original grantee. Future covenants—quiet enjoyment, warranty, and further assurances—run with the land and are enforceable by subsequent grantees. Here, O conveyed to A with all six covenants, but A then conveyed to B via quitclaim. When X evicts B, B is a remote grantee seeking to enforce O's original deed. The claim for breach of the covenant of seisin will fail because seisin is a present covenant—it was either breached or not at the time O delivered the deed to A. Only A, the original grantee, has standing to sue on it; B did not receive that right through the quitclaim deed because present covenants do not run with the land. In contrast, the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the covenant of warranty, and the covenant of further assurances are all future covenants. They run with the land, so B, as the current holder, can enforce them upon eviction. The trap here is assuming all covenants transfer to B. Remember the mnemonic: present covenants are "P-R-A" (Seisin, Right to convey, Against encumbrances) and are personal; future covenants are "Q-W-F" (Quiet enjoyment, Warranty, Further assurances) and follow the land.

Question 12

Seller had owned Blackacre for two years. Seller then conveyed Blackacre to Buyer by a special warranty deed, in which Seller warranted title 'only against defects arising during Seller's ownership.' Unbeknownst to Seller, a neighbor had acquired a prescriptive easement across Blackacre ten years before Seller bought it. Buyer later discovered the easement and sued Seller on the deed.

Is Seller liable to Buyer?

No, because a special warranty deed contains no covenants of title and cannot be the basis for a damages action.
Yes, because an easement is an encumbrance and the covenant against encumbrances is a present covenant.
Yes, because a special warranty deed warrants that the grantor has good title.
No, because the easement arose before Seller's ownership, and a special warranty deed covers only defects arising during Seller's ownership. (correct answer)

Explanation: When you see a deed question, first isolate two things: what covenants the deed creates, and when the defect arose. A special warranty deed is not a "no warranties" deed; it does contain title covenants, but every covenant is limited to defects caused or arising during the grantor's period of ownership. Here the prescriptive easement matured ten years before Seller even bought Blackacre, so it is a pre-existing encumbrance, not a defect arising during Seller's ownership. Therefore Buyer cannot recover, because the special warranty simply does not reach back before Seller's title. The first wrong answer confuses a special warranty deed with a quitclaim—it claims such a deed has no covenants and cannot support damages. In fact, it has covenants, just time-limited. The second wrong answer correctly notes that an easement is an encumbrance, but it ignores that the covenant against encumbrances in a special warranty deed is also limited to defects arising during Seller's ownership. The third wrong answer overstates the protection: a special warranty deed does not broadly warrant good title; that is the hallmark of a general warranty deed. Your takeaway: when you see "special warranty deed," connect it to the timing of the defect. If the defect predates the seller's ownership, the special warranty does not cover it; a general warranty would.