Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Subsequent Remedial Measures
12 questions · exam conditions
0:00
Subsequent Remedial MeasuresQuestion 1 of 12

A truck driver was severely burned when the fuel tank of his pickup truck ruptured in a rear-end collision. He sued the truck manufacturer, alleging that the fuel tank was defectively designed because it was placed too close to the rear bumper. After the accident, the manufacturer issued a recall to install a protective shield around the fuel tanks on all trucks of the same model. The driver offers the recall notice to prove the design was defective. The manufacturer objects under Rule 407.

Should the court admit the recall notice?

Yes, because the recall notice is the manufacturer's own statement and is therefore an admission.
No, because a product recall is a subsequent remedial measure, and Rule 407 bars its use to prove a product defect.
Yes, because the evidence is offered to prove causation, not negligence.
No, because recall notices are admissible only if the manufacturer has been cited for a safety violation.
← Back to quizzes

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Subsequent Remedial Measures

Practice Subsequent Remedial Measures in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Subsequent Remedial Measures, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

A truck driver was severely burned when the fuel tank of his pickup truck ruptured in a rear-end collision. He sued the truck manufacturer, alleging that the fuel tank was defectively designed because it was placed too close to the rear bumper. After the accident, the manufacturer issued a recall to install a protective shield around the fuel tanks on all trucks of the same model. The driver offers the recall notice to prove the design was defective. The manufacturer objects under Rule 407.

Should the court admit the recall notice?

  1. Yes, because the recall notice is the manufacturer's own statement and is therefore an admission.
  2. No, because a product recall is a subsequent remedial measure, and Rule 407 bars its use to prove a product defect. (correct answer)
  3. Yes, because the evidence is offered to prove causation, not negligence.
  4. No, because recall notices are admissible only if the manufacturer has been cited for a safety violation.
Explanation: Whenever you see a post-accident repair, recall, or design change, your mind should jump to Rule 407 (Subsequent Remedial Measures). This rule bars evidence of measures taken after an injury to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect, or a need for a warning. The policy reason is to encourage safety fixes without fear of litigation. Here, the manufacturer issued a recall to install a protective shield after the accident—a textbook subsequent remedial measure. The driver offers the recall notice "to prove the design was defective," which is exactly the purpose Rule 407 prohibits. So the court should not admit it. Now consider the wrong answers. The choice claiming the notice is admissible because it is "the manufacturer's own statement and is therefore an admission" is a trap. While party-opponent admissions are exceptions to hearsay, Rule 407 specifically overrides that exception for post-accident measures—you cannot use a recall as an admission of defect. The choice saying the evidence is offered "to prove causation, not negligence" misses the point; proving a defect caused the injury still requires proving the defect, which is barred. The choice stating recall notices are admissible "only if the manufacturer has been cited for a safety violation" invents a requirement that doesn't exist in Rule 407. Your strategy: when you see a recall or repair, ask why it's offered. If it's to show the product was defective or the conduct was negligent, it's inadmissible. If it's for impeachment or to prove ownership/control, it may come in.

Question 2

A consumer was injured when a glass bottle of soda exploded in her hand. She sued the bottler in strict products liability, alleging that the bottle was defectively manufactured. At trial, she offers evidence that, after her injury, the bottler changed its manufacturing process to use thicker glass. The bottler objects under Federal Rule of Evidence 407.

Should the court admit the evidence?

  1. No, because Rule 407 bars evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove a product defect, even in a strict liability case. (correct answer)
  2. Yes, because the claim is in strict liability, and Rule 407 applies only to claims for negligence.
  3. Yes, because changing a manufacturing process is an improvement, not a repair, and therefore is not a remedial measure.
  4. No, because the bottler's change in manufacturing process is not relevant to the bottle that injured the consumer.
Explanation: Whenever you see a question about subsequent remedial measures, always start by asking: what purpose is this evidence offered for? Federal Rule of Evidence 407 excludes evidence of measures taken after an injury that would have made the injury less likely to occur, when offered to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect, or a need for a warning. Crucially, this rule applies to strict liability claims, not just negligence. Here, the consumer offers the bottler's switch to thicker glass to prove the bottle was defectively manufactured. That is the exact prohibited purpose—proving a defect—so the evidence is barred. The choice stating Rule 407 bars this evidence even in a strict liability case correctly captures this rule. Now, the wrong choices: the choice claiming strict liability exempts you from the rule is a common trap—Rule 407's text and policy explicitly cover product defects, so it applies to strict liability. The choice claiming an improvement is not a remedial measure is also flawed; "subsequent remedial measures" includes any change, repair, or improvement, not just literal repairs. Finally, the choice claiming the evidence is irrelevant misunderstands the basis for exclusion—the evidence is highly relevant (it suggests the old process was defective), but it is excluded by the policy of encouraging post-accident safety improvements, not for lack of probative value. Remember: when you see Rule 407, check the purpose. If it's to prove defect or negligence, it's out. If it's for impeachment or proving ownership/control, it's in. And never assume strict liability bypasses the rule.

Question 3

A patient developed a severe allergic reaction to a prescription medication and sued the manufacturer for failure to warn. The medication's original label did not mention the allergic reaction. After the patient's injury, the manufacturer revised the label to include a prominent warning about the reaction. At trial, the patient offers the revised label to prove that the original label was inadequate. The manufacturer objects under Rule 407.

Should the court admit the revised label?

  1. Yes, because the revised label is offered to show the manufacturer's knowledge of the risk, not to prove negligence.
  2. Yes, because adding a warning label is not a repair or design change and therefore is not a remedial measure.
  3. No, because the revised label is hearsay not within any exception.
  4. No, because a subsequent warning is a remedial measure, and Rule 407 bars evidence of it to prove a need for a warning. (correct answer)
Explanation: When a party points to a post-injury change—a new warning, a redesigned part, a new procedure—your first instinct should be Rule 407. The rule bars subsequent remedial measures when offered to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect, or the need for a warning. That is precisely what is happening here: the patient wants the revised label to show the original label was inadequate. Even though a label revision is a warning rather than a physical repair, it is still a remedial measure because it would have made the earlier harm less likely. So the court should exclude it. The "knowledge of the risk" argument is a trap: the patient has not framed the evidence as proof of knowledge; the stated purpose is to prove the original label was inadequate, which is the classic forbidden purpose. The claim that adding a warning is not a repair or design change is too narrow—Rule 407 covers any measure that would have reduced the risk of harm, including warnings. And hearsay is not the issue; the label is offered for its effect as a remedial measure, not for the truth of the warning it contains, so Rule 407 independently excludes it. Study tip: if the purpose is to show "this should have been done before the injury," Rule 407 blocks it; if the purpose is something else, like impeachment or proving feasibility, it may be admitted.

Question 4

A driver was injured when her car's brakes failed and she rear-ended another vehicle. She sued the manufacturer for defective brakes. At trial, she offers evidence that, one month after the accident, the manufacturer changed the color of the dashboard illumination from blue to amber. She says this shows the manufacturer knew the car was defective. The manufacturer objects under Rule 407.

Should the court sustain the manufacturer's objection under Rule 407?

  1. No, because changing the dashboard light color would not have made the brake failure less likely, so it is not a subsequent remedial measure within Rule 407. (correct answer)
  2. Yes, because the color change occurred after the accident and is therefore a subsequent remedial measure.
  3. Yes, because the color change is irrelevant to the condition of the brakes and must be excluded.
  4. No, because Rule 407 bars only evidence offered to prove negligence, not evidence offered to prove a product defect.
Explanation: Whenever you see a Rule 407 objection, don't just ask whether the change happened after the injury. Ask the threshold question: would the post-accident change, if made before the accident, have made the injury less likely? A dashboard color change from blue to amber has nothing to do with brake failure. Changing the color of the illumination could not prevent or reduce the risk of rear-ending another vehicle due to failed brakes. Therefore, it is not a subsequent remedial measure within Rule 407, and the manufacturer's objection fails. The answer that states this — "No, because changing the dashboard light color would not have made the brake failure less likely" — is correct. The answer that says "Yes, because the color change occurred after the accident" is too mechanical: timing alone is not enough; the measure must relate to the hazard that caused the injury. The answer that says the evidence is irrelevant to the brakes and must be excluded confuses Rule 407 with general relevance. The evidence may indeed lack relevance, but that would be a Rule 401/402 or 403 objection, not a successful Rule 407 objection. The answer that says Rule 407 bars only negligence is wrong because Rule 407 also expressly bars evidence offered to prove a product defect, culpable conduct, or need for warning; in fact, a true subsequent remedial measure could be excluded here if the plaintiff's purpose were to prove the brake defect. Study tip: on a Rule 407 question, first determine whether the change would have reduced the risk of the accident. Then assess the purpose: negligence/defect/warning = excluded; impeachment/ownership/control = allowed.

Question 5

A homeowner was injured by debris thrown from a string trimmer. She sued the manufacturer in federal court for failure to warn, claiming the trimmer should have carried a warning to wear eye protection. The manufacturer's only defense was that the instruction manual already contained such a warning and no additional warning was necessary. After the accident, the manufacturer placed a large warning label directly on the trimmer. The homeowner offered the label to prove that the original warnings were inadequate and that an additional warning was needed.

Should the court admit the evidence of the later warning label?

  1. Yes, because the later label is an admission by the manufacturer that the original warning was inadequate.
  2. Yes, because the label was placed on the product after the injury and is direct evidence that the product was dangerous.
  3. No, because the label is hearsay and does not fall within a hearsay exception.
  4. No, because a subsequent remedial measure may not be used to prove the need for a warning. (correct answer)
Explanation: Whenever you see a question involving a product that was changed or improved after an injury, your mind should immediately jump to the rule against subsequent remedial measures (Federal Rule of Evidence 407). This rule excludes evidence of later repairs, design changes, or added warnings when offered to prove negligence, a defect, or the need for a warning. The policy behind it is simple: we don't want to punish manufacturers for making safety improvements by using those improvements against them in court. Here, the manufacturer added a large warning label after the accident. The homeowner is offering that label specifically to prove the original warnings were inadequate and that a warning was needed. That is the exact purpose Rule 407 forbids. The court should exclude the evidence because a subsequent remedial measure may not be used to prove the need for a warning. Now, let's look at the traps in the wrong answers. The first option suggests the label is an "admission by the manufacturer" that the original warning was inadequate. While a post-accident fix might seem like an admission, Rule 407 specifically bars its use to prove culpable conduct or the need for a warning—so it cannot come in on that theory. The second option claims the label is "direct evidence that the product was dangerous." That is the same misconception; the rule excludes it precisely because it is being used to prove danger or defect. The third option argues the label is "hearsay" without an exception. This is a red herring—the label is an out-of-court statement, but the specific exclusion under Rule 407 takes precedence, and even if it were an opposing party's statement, Rule 407 would still bar it for the offered purpose. Your study tip: remember that subsequent remedial measures are never admissible to prove negligence, defect, or the need for a warning, but they can be admitted for other genuine purposes, like proving ownership or control, or for impeachment. When you see a safety fix after an injury, check the purpose it's offered for—if it's to prove the fix was needed, exclude it.

Question 6

A visitor was injured when a ceiling fan fell in a hotel lobby. She sued the hotel in federal court. The hotel admitted that it owned the building, but denied that it controlled the maintenance of the ceiling fans, claiming an independent service company had exclusive responsibility. Two days after the accident, the hotel's maintenance supervisor replaced the fan's mounting bracket. The visitor offered the replacement to prove that the hotel had retained control over the fan's maintenance.

Should the court admit the evidence of the replacement bracket?

  1. No, because the hotel's admission of ownership makes evidence of control irrelevant.
  2. No, because evidence of a post-accident repair may not be used to prove negligence.
  3. Yes, because a post-accident repair is an admission that the hotel knew the fan was dangerous.
  4. Yes, because Rule 407 permits a subsequent remedial measure to prove control when control is disputed. (correct answer)
Explanation: Whenever you see a question about evidence of post-accident repairs, your first instinct should be to recall Federal Rule of Evidence 407. That rule generally bars subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence, culpable conduct, or a defect—because the law wants to encourage safety improvements. However, Rule 407 contains a crucial carve-out: such evidence is admissible when offered to prove ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures, if those facts are disputed. Here, the hotel admitted ownership but hotly disputed control over the fan's maintenance, claiming an independent company had exclusive responsibility. The replacement bracket is a classic subsequent remedial measure, but the visitor isn't offering it to prove negligence. She's offering it to prove the hotel retained control—a fact that is directly at issue. Because control is disputed, the exception applies, and the evidence is admissible. Now, consider the distractors. The first "no" choice—that the admission of ownership makes control irrelevant—is wrong because ownership and control are distinct legal concepts; a landowner can delegate control, which is exactly why the hotel's denial creates a live issue. The second "no" choice—that post-accident repairs may not prove negligence—states the general rule correctly, but it's a trap: the question asks about control, not negligence, so the exception defeats that objection. The third choice—that the repair is an admission the hotel knew the fan was dangerous—is also wrong; Rule 407 specifically prevents using the repair to show knowledge or fault, and the exception only permits it for control, not for consciousness of danger. Your study tip: when you see a repair, immediately ask "what is it being offered to prove?" If it's negligence—barred. If it's control or feasibility—admissible.

Question 7

A motorcyclist was injured when his helmet liner failed to absorb the force of an impact. He sued the manufacturer in federal court for defective design. The manufacturer's expert testified that a more energy-absorbent liner was not feasible because it would make helmets too heavy and stiff. Six weeks after the accident, the manufacturer began selling the same model helmet with a more energy-absorbent liner. The motorcyclist offered this later design solely to rebut the expert's feasibility testimony.

Should the court admit the evidence of the later helmet design?

  1. No, because evidence of a subsequent remedial measure may not be used to prove a design defect.
  2. No, because the later helmet is not identical to the helmet worn by the motorcyclist and is therefore irrelevant.
  3. Yes, because a subsequent remedial measure may be admitted to prove the feasibility of a precautionary measure when feasibility is disputed. (correct answer)
  4. Yes, because a manufacturer's later design change is an admission that the earlier design was defective.
Explanation: Whenever you see a question about a manufacturer's post-accident design change, your mind should immediately jump to Federal Rule of Evidence 407. That rule generally excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect, or a need for a warning. However, the rule has crucial exceptions: such evidence is admissible to prove ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures if those are disputed. Here, the manufacturer's own expert opened the door by testifying that a more energy-absorbent liner was not feasible because it would be too heavy and stiff. Because the motorcyclist offered the later design solely to rebut that specific feasibility claim—not to prove the original design was defective—the evidence falls squarely within the exception. The court should admit it, making the "Yes, because a subsequent remedial measure may be admitted to prove the feasibility of a precautionary measure when feasibility is disputed" choice correct. Now, examine the traps. The first "No" choice correctly states the general rule of exclusion, but it fails to account for the feasibility exception, which is exactly what the plaintiff invoked. The second "No" choice claims the later helmet is irrelevant because it isn't identical—this misses the point; the later design is relevant not to show the original was defective, but to show that a safer design was possible, so exact identity isn't required. Finally, the other "Yes" choice, claiming the design change is an admission of a defect, is precisely the forbidden inference that Rule 407 exists to prevent—it would discourage manufacturers from making safety improvements. For your exam, remember the exceptions to Rule 407: FIC—Feasibility, Impeachment, and Control. If the defendant disputes any of those, a subsequent remedial measure becomes admissible.

Question 8

An automobile manufacturer changed the sensor design in newly manufactured cars after internal testing showed the old sensor could malfunction. Six months later, the plaintiff's car, which had been built before the change, malfunctioned and caused a crash. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer in federal court for defective design and offered the sensor change to prove that the old sensor was defective. The change was made after the car was built but before the plaintiff's injury.

Should the court admit the evidence of the sensor design change?

  1. No, because the change is a subsequent remedial measure made after the plaintiff's car was manufactured.
  2. No, because a post-manufacture design change cannot be used to prove that the earlier design was defective.
  3. Yes, because the change was made before the plaintiff's injury and is not barred by Rule 407. (correct answer)
  4. Yes, because any later safety improvement by a manufacturer is admissible to prove that a product was defective.
Explanation: This question tests Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which governs subsequent remedial measures. The key is to identify what the measure must be "subsequent" to: the injury, not the product's manufacture. Whenever a design change appears, anchor on the timing of the plaintiff's injury. The evidence should be admitted because the sensor change occurred before the plaintiff's crash. Rule 407 bars evidence of measures taken after an injury that would have made the injury less likely, when offered to prove defect. Here, the change was made after the car was built but before the injury, so it is not a "subsequent" remedial measure under the rule. Therefore, the plaintiff may use it to argue the old sensor design was defective. "No, because the change is a subsequent remedial measure made after the plaintiff's car was manufactured" is wrong because it uses the wrong reference point. Post-manufacture is not the same as post-injury. Similarly, "a post-manufacture design change cannot be used to prove that the earlier design was defective" is too absolute and incorrectly assumes Rule 407 bars all pre-injury changes. It does not. Finally, "any later safety improvement by a manufacturer is admissible" is overbroad: if the improvement came after the injury, Rule 407 would exclude it when used to prove defect. Remember the trap: "subsequent" means after the plaintiff's harm, not after the product left the factory. When reviewing evidence of a design change, first ask: before or after the injury? That timing decides whether Rule 407 applies.

Question 9

A customer slipped on a puddle in a grocery store aisle and sued the store in federal court for negligence. The customer claimed the store's practice of inspecting the aisles only once every 30 minutes was unreasonable. Two days after the accident, the store changed its practice to require an inspection every 10 minutes. At trial, the customer offered evidence of the new practice to prove that the old practice was unreasonable.

Should the court admit the evidence of the store's changed inspection practice?

  1. Yes, because the evidence is offered to show that the store had notice of the puddle and is not offered to prove negligence.
  2. Yes, because a business's changed internal policy is an ordinary business record and is not excluded by the subsequent-remedial-measures rule.
  3. No, because evidence of measures taken after an injury may not be used to prove negligence. (correct answer)
  4. No, because an internal inspection schedule is not the type of remedial measure covered by the subsequent-remedial-measures rule.
Explanation: Whenever you see evidence of a post-accident change, your first thought should be Federal Rule of Evidence 407: subsequent remedial measures are inadmissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, defect, or need for warning. Here, the customer expressly wants the new 10-minute inspection schedule to prove the old 30-minute schedule was unreasonable—in other words, to prove negligence. The court should exclude it. Rule 407 permits such evidence for other purposes, such as disputed ownership/control, feasibility of precautionary measures, or impeachment, but none is raised here. The "yes, to show notice" answer mischaracterizes the offer: the passage says the evidence is offered to prove the old practice unreasonable, and "notice" is not a way around Rule 407 on these facts. The "ordinary business record" answer confuses the hearsay business-records exception with Rule 407; a changed internal policy can be an ordinary business record and still be barred as a subsequent remedial measure. The "not the type of remedial measure" answer is wrong because an inspection schedule is exactly a measure that would make future injury less likely. The choice saying measures taken after an injury may not be used to prove negligence correctly applies the rule. On exam day, when you see "after the injury, defendant changed…" and the plaintiff offers it to prove negligence, mark it inadmissible unless an exception like impeachment or disputed feasibility is present.

Question 10

A customer slipped on a puddle of cooking oil in a supermarket aisle and injured her back. She sued the supermarket for negligence. In its answer, the supermarket denied that it owned, operated, or controlled the aisle, asserting that an independent cleaning company had exclusive responsibility for floor maintenance. At trial, the customer offers evidence that two days after her fall the supermarket installed non-slip mats in the aisle. The supermarket objects, relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 407.

Should the court admit the evidence of the non-slip mats?

  1. No, because evidence of measures taken after an injury is never admissible against the party who took them.
  2. No, because the mats are a subsequent remedial measure offered to prove negligence, and no exception applies.
  3. Yes, because the evidence is offered to prove the supermarket's ownership or control of the aisle, and the supermarket has disputed that fact. (correct answer)
  4. Yes, because the mats show that the supermarket was aware of the danger before the customer's fall.
Explanation: When you see a question about Federal Rule of Evidence 407, remember its core: evidence of measures taken after an injury is inadmissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect, or a need for a warning. However, the rule explicitly permits such evidence when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures—if those facts are disputed. Here, the supermarket's answer disputed control, claiming an independent cleaning company had exclusive responsibility for the aisle. The customer's offer of the non-slip mats is not aimed at showing negligence, but at showing the supermarket exercised control over that aisle. Since control is a contested issue, the evidence falls squarely within the exception and should be admitted. The choice saying "evidence of measures taken after an injury is never admissible" is wrong because the rule has exceptions; "never" is too absolute. The choice claiming the mats are offered to prove negligence with no exception applies is incorrect because the actual purpose is control, and the control exception applies. The choice saying the mats show awareness of danger before the fall is also wrong—FRE 407 specifically prohibits using subsequent measures to prove prior knowledge; that is a classic prohibited purpose. Study tip: whenever you see a subsequent remedial measure, ask two questions: what is the purpose of the evidence, and is that purpose disputed? If the purpose is an excepted one like control or feasibility, and it is disputed, the evidence comes in.

Question 11

A tenant was injured when a stair tread gave way in an apartment building. She sued the landlord in federal court for negligence. The landlord's maintenance supervisor testified: 'I inspected the stairs after the fall. The tread was stable, and no work was done on the stairs after the accident.' The tenant offered evidence that one week after the fall the landlord hired a contractor to replace the stair tread and stringer, and stated that the evidence was offered only to impeach the supervisor.

Should the court admit the evidence of the stair replacement?

  1. No, because Rule 407 excludes subsequent remedial measures for all purposes.
  2. Yes, because it contradicts the supervisor's specific testimony that no work was done and is offered for impeachment, not to prove negligence. (correct answer)
  3. Yes, because the landlord's post-accident repair is an admission that the stairs were defective.
  4. No, because the supervisor was not the person who hired the contractor and cannot be impeached by that evidence.
Explanation: This question tests the distinction between Rule 407's exclusion of subsequent remedial measures and using evidence for an allowable purpose like impeachment. Remember: post-accident repairs are inadmissible to prove negligence, but they may be admitted to show ownership, control, feasibility, or—as here—impeachment. The court should admit the stair replacement evidence because it directly contradicts the maintenance supervisor's specific testimony that "no work was done on the stairs after the accident." When evidence is offered solely to impeach a witness who has opened the door by testifying about post-accident conduct, Rule 407 does not bar it. The jury is not being asked to infer negligence from the repair; it is being asked to evaluate the supervisor's credibility. The choice saying Rule 407 excludes subsequent remedial measures for all purposes is wrong because the rule has exceptions, including impeachment. The choice claiming the repair is an admission that the stairs were defective is also wrong: that is the classic prohibited use—repairs as proof of negligence. Finally, the choice saying the supervisor cannot be impeached because he did not hire the contractor misses the point: his own testimony about no work having been done is what makes the repair evidence relevant to his credibility, regardless of who hired the contractor. Strategy tip: When you see a post-accident repair, immediately ask, "What is the purpose?" If the purpose is proving negligence, exclude. If it's impeachment or another non-negligence purpose, it may come in.

Question 12

A carpenter was injured when the blade guard on a power saw failed to return to its protective position. He sued the manufacturer in federal court, asserting only strict products liability for defective design. The manufacturer did not dispute that a spring-loaded blade guard was feasible, but it denied that the absence of the guard made the saw defective. The carpenter offered evidence that, after his accident, the manufacturer added a spring-loaded blade guard to newly manufactured saws, arguing that this proved the original design was defective.

Should the court admit the evidence of the later design change?

  1. Yes, because the exclusion for subsequent remedial measures does not apply in strict products liability actions.
  2. Yes, because a manufacturer's post-accident design change is an admission that the earlier design was defective.
  3. No, because the evidence is a subsequent remedial measure offered to prove a design defect and no exception applies. (correct answer)
  4. No, because the redesigned saw is not substantially similar to the saw that injured the carpenter.
Explanation: Whenever you see evidence of something a defendant did after an injury, think Federal Rule of Evidence 407 first. That rule bars subsequent remedial measures when offered to prove negligence, a product defect, or a need for a warning. It applies even in strict products-liability cases in federal court, so don't assume the liability theory lets the evidence in. Here, the manufacturer's later addition of a spring-loaded blade guard is a classic subsequent remedial measure. The carpenter wants to use it as proof that the original design was defective, which is exactly the purpose Rule 407 prohibits. The manufacturer already conceded feasibility, so the normal exception—impeachment or proving feasibility—does not apply. Thus the court should exclude the evidence, and the correct answer is the choice saying itis a subsequent remedial measure offered to prove design defect with no exception applyings. Why are the others wrong? The choice saying the exclusion "does not apply in strict products liability" is backwards: Rule 407 was amended to cover product defects and design-defect claims. The choice calling the change design "an admission that the earlier design was defective" ignores Rule 407's policy: we want manufacturers to fix dangers without fearing that their safety improvements will be used against them in court. The choice arguing the redesigned saw is "not substantially similar" confuses subsequent remedial measures with evidence of other accidents; that testis for different-accident evidence, not for evidence of a design change, which is excluded under Rule 407 regardless.ofthe similarity of the redesigned saw. Study tip: when you see "post-accident fix," immediately ask "what is it offered to prove?" If the answer is fault or defect, exclude under 407; only admit if it genuinely proves something else, like ownership or feasibility—and here feasibility was already undisputed.