All questions
Question 1
A homeowners association's declaration includes a covenant providing that no lot in the subdivision may be sold to any nonwhite person. A homeowner lists her house for sale and accepts an offer from a Black buyer. The association obtains a state court injunction prohibiting the sale. The Black buyer sues, claiming that the injunction violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Which of the following actions is most clearly state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment?
- The association's adoption of the restrictive covenant in the declaration.
- The homeowner's listing of the house for sale to all prospective buyers.
- The state court's issuance of the injunction enforcing the covenant. (correct answer)
- The title company's policy of refusing to close any sale that would violate the covenant.
Explanation: Whenever you see a Fourteenth Amendment question, your first move is to ask: who is acting? The Equal Protection Clause restricts only state action—private discrimination, no matter how offensive, is generally outside its reach. Here, the critical distinction is between the covenant itself and the government's role in enforcing it.
The state court's issuance of the injunction enforcing the covenant is the clearest state action. When a court orders someone not to sell based on race, that is the state itself using its power to effectuate discrimination. This is the classic lesson of Shelley v. Kraemer: judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant violates the Equal Protection Clause, even though the covenant is a private agreement.
Now consider each private actor. The association's adoption of the restrictive covenant in the declaration is private—homeowners and their association may hold discriminatory views and make private agreements. The homeowner's listing of the house for sale is also private conduct, and offering to sell to all buyers is not discriminatory at all. Finally, the title company's policy of refusing to close any sale that would violate the covenant is a private company's business decision, not state action. The trap is assuming that because the covenant was written into a declaration, it is somehow governmental—but a private document only becomes state action when a court or other government official actively enforces it.
Study tip: when you see private discrimination, scan for a government actor—especially a judge issuing an order. If a court is enforcing a discriminatory private agreement, that enforcement is the state action.
Question 2
A state's interscholastic athletic association is a private nonprofit whose members are public and private high schools. The association establishes eligibility rules for student athletes. Its governing board is elected by member schools, and about 80 percent of the voting members are public school officials. State law requires all public high schools to belong to the association, and the association regularly uses public school buildings and staff time for its activities. The association prohibited a public high school student from playing baseball after he transferred schools, and the student sued, claiming that the rule violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Which of the following facts is most important in establishing that the association's actions are state action?
- The association is a nonprofit corporation with both public and private school members.
- State law requires public schools to join the association, and public school officials control its governing board. (correct answer)
- The association uses public school buildings and receives substantial public support.
- The association's eligibility rules are binding on student athletes at all member schools.
Explanation: Whenever you see a private entity sued under the Fourteenth Amendment, the threshold issue is state action: a private actor can be held to constitutional standards only if its conduct is fairly attributable to the state. Here the strongest evidence is that state law compels every public high school to join the association, and public school officials control its governing board. That combination shows the state has both forced the association into a public role and retained control over how that role is exercised. When state power is so entwined with a private group, enforcing its eligibility rule qualifies as state action.
The fact that the association is a nonprofit with public and private members is not enough; many voluntary organizations have mixed memberships. Using public school buildings and receiving substantial public support is suggestive, but support alone, without coercion or control, generally will not turn every action into state action. Finally, the fact that the eligibility rules are binding on student athletes simply proves the rule affects the plaintiff; it does not prove the rule's source is governmental.
On bar questions, look for "state compulsion plus state control" as the key to state action. A private entity's actions trigger constitutional scrutiny only when the state has compelled, controlled, or deeply entwined itself with the entity.
Question 3
A state does not hold a separate primary election for one major political party. Instead, the party's county committee, a private organization, holds a candidate selection event. State law provides that the winner of the event is automatically placed on the general election ballot as the party's nominee, and no other candidate may appear under that party's label. The committee's rules limit participation in the selection event to white voters. A Black voter who is registered to vote in the general election is denied the right to participate and sues the committee.
Which of the following is the best basis for concluding that the committee's exclusion is state action?
- The committee controls access to the general election ballot, a function traditionally reserved exclusively to the state, and state law gives legal effect to the committee's choice. (correct answer)
- The committee is a political party, and political parties are state actors whenever they determine their nominees for public office.
- The committee's selection event has a substantial influence on the outcome of the general election, making its choices governmental choices.
- The state has failed to regulate the committee's membership rules, and state inaction in the face of discriminatory private conduct is state action.
Explanation: This question tests the state action doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment: private discrimination violates equal protection only when the state is sufficiently involved. When you see a private group excluding voters, ask whether the group performed a function traditionally reserved exclusively to the state, or whether the state authorized or encouraged the discrimination.
Here, the committee's exclusion is state action because state law automatically places the committee's winner on the general election ballot and forbids anyone else from appearing under that party's label. That gives the committee control over access to the ballot—a power classically reserved to the state. This is the same logic as the "white primary" cases, where a private party's nomination process became state action because it effectively selected the public election outcome.
The choice saying the committee controls access to the general election ballot, a function traditionally reserved exclusively to the state, and that state law gives legal effect to its choice is therefore the best basis.
The claim that political parties are state actors whenever they determine nominees is overbroad; parties can act privately in many settings, and only their state-integrated or public-function conduct is attributable to the state. The "substantial influence" choice also misses the mark: private influence over elections is not enough without a delegation of governmental power. Finally, the "state inaction" choice fails because mere failure to regulate private discrimination is generally not state action; here the state did far more—it endorsed and enforced the committee's choice.
On exam day, spot state action by looking for state compulsion, state delegation, or a public function. Private prejudice plus state enforcement equals constitutional violation.
Question 4
A city owns the studio and transmission equipment for its public access television station. By ordinance, the city designated Community Media, Inc. (CMI), a private nonprofit corporation, to operate the station. CMI receives most of its operating funds from the city, is subject to detailed city rules about access and programming, and uses the city-owned equipment. CMI's board is chosen by CMI's existing members, not by the city. CMI refuses to air a local citizen's program. The citizen sues CMI, claiming that the refusal violated the First Amendment.
Which of the following is the most accurate statement about whether CMI's refusal is state action?
- CMI is a state actor because the city has delegated the operation of a public forum to CMI, and public forums are traditionally operated by the government.
- CMI is a state actor because the city owns the equipment, provides most of CMI's funding, and extensively regulates CMI's programming.
- CMI is not a state actor because it is a private nonprofit, and the city's ownership of equipment, funding, and regulation are irrelevant to state action.
- CMI is not a state actor because operating a public access station is not a traditional, exclusive public function, and the city's involvement does not control CMI's editorial decision. (correct answer)
Explanation: When you see a state action question, your first instinct should be to apply the public function test (is the function traditionally and exclusively performed by the government?) and the entanglement test (does the government control the specific decision or the entity's operations?). Here, the city owns equipment, funds CMI, and regulates it, but the key fact is that CMI's board is chosen by its own members, not the city, meaning the city does not control the editorial decision.
The correct answer correctly recognizes that operating a public access station is not a traditional, exclusive public function—unlike running a prison or elections. Even though the city delegated operation to CMI, that doesn't automatically make CMI a state actor. The Supreme Court's Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck (2019) directly supports this: a private nonprofit operating a public access channel is not a state actor absent government control over the specific decision.
Now, the wrong answers. The first claims CMI is a state actor because the city delegated a public forum, and public forums are traditionally operated by the government. That's a misconception—public forums are places like streets and parks, not a function exclusively governmental. The second claims the city's ownership, funding, and regulation are enough to create state action. This is the "entanglement" trap—mere funding and regulation aren't enough; the government must control the specific decision, which it doesn't. The third claims the city's involvement is irrelevant. That's an overstatement—it's a factor to consider, but just not sufficient here.
Study tip: Always ask who made the specific decision. If a private board made the call, and the function isn't exclusively governmental (like running a prison or election), it's likely not state action. Remember Halleck for public access cases.
Question 5
A real estate corporation owns all property in a small, unincorporated community. The community has about 2,000 year-round residents, residential streets and sidewalks, a water and sewer system, a park, and a small commercial district. No city or county government operates within the community; the corporation maintains the streets and sewer system and hires a private security patrol to enforce its rules. The corporation ordered the security patrol to remove a resident who was handing out political leaflets on a sidewalk in the community.
If the resident sues the corporation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the removal violated her First Amendment rights, which of the following is the strongest argument that the corporation's conduct is state action?
- The corporation performs the full range of municipal functions over a residential community, making its operation of the community the functional equivalent of a town government. (correct answer)
- The corporation's security patrol performs law enforcement functions, and the provision of police services is a traditional exclusive government function.
- Because the community's sidewalks and streets are open to public use, the property is a public forum and any restriction on speech is state action.
- Because the state has permitted the corporation to own the entire community, the state has delegated its governing authority to the corporation.
Explanation: When you see a §1983 claim, the threshold question is always whether the defendant's conduct constitutes "state action." A private actor's conduct can be attributable to the state under the public function doctrine when the private party exercises powers traditionally and exclusively reserved to the government. Here, the corporation's control over the entire community—streets, sewer, park, security, and rule enforcement—makes it the functional equivalent of a town. That is the strongest argument because, under Marsh v. Alabama, a private company that operates a full-fledged town is held to the same constitutional standards as a municipal government. The resident was on a public sidewalk, which is a traditional public forum, and the corporation's removal was effectively censorship by the town's operator.
The second choice—the security patrol's law enforcement role—is a tempting but incomplete trap. Police services are a traditional exclusive government function, but the patrol here merely enforces the corporation's rules; the state action arises from the totality of municipal functions, not just security. The third choice confuses forum analysis with state action: public forum status does not make a private owner a state actor; you need the public function test first. The fourth choice misreads the law—mere ownership or permission from the state does not constitute delegation of governing authority; there must be an affirmative grant of power, which is not present here. Remember the test: does the private entity exercise powers that are "traditionally and exclusively" governmental? A single function may not suffice, but a full suite of municipal services—the "company town"—does. On the exam, look for a private entity running an entire community; that is your cue for state action under Marsh.
Question 6
A privately owned electric utility is the only provider of electricity in a region. The utility is regulated by the state public utility commission, which has approved its billing and termination procedures. The utility terminated service to a customer without a prior hearing after the customer disputed her bill. The customer sued the utility, claiming that the termination deprived her of property without due process.
Which of the following facts, if true, would most strongly support a finding that the utility's termination was state action?
- The state has granted the utility an exclusive franchise, and no other company may sell electricity in the region.
- A state utility commissioner reviewed the customer's account and directed the utility to disconnect service because the bill was unpaid. (correct answer)
- The state utility commission's rules permit, but do not require, termination of service when a bill is unpaid for 30 days.
- The state utility commission approved the utility's termination procedures as fair, reasonable, and in the public interest.
Explanation: Whenever you see a due process claim against a private company, the threshold question is whether the company's conduct counts as "state action." The Fourteenth Amendment protects only against government deprivation, so you must look for the state's involvement in the specific act—not just in the general industry.
Here, the strongest state action is the fact that a state utility commissioner reviewed the customer's account and directed the utility to disconnect service. That is direct, individualized government involvement in the deprivation: the state did not merely allow termination; it ordered it. When a state official specifically steers the coercive act, the utility is effectively acting as the state's agent.
The exclusive franchise fact is a tempting trap, but a state-created monopoly alone does not make every utility decision governmental. Similarly, commission rules that permit termination for unpaid bills are permissive, not compulsory—the utility still makes the choice, so no state action arises. And the commission's approval of the utility's procedures as fair and reasonable is ordinary regulation, not entanglement in this particular termination. All three show state presence in the background, but none show the state directing the challenged conduct.
For your study strategy: distinguish "state regulates the industry" from "state commands the specific act." Look for the words "directed," "ordered," or "required" to find the government hand. On the bar exam, a fact pattern with a regulator approving or permitting behavior is usually not enough; you want a state official making the actual decision to deprive.