Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Specific Performance And Injunction

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Specific Performance And InjunctionQuestion 1 of 12

In March, Seller contracted to sell a specific waterfront lot to Buyer for $800,000. Buyer paid a $20,000 deposit, and closing was set for July 1. Before closing, a third party offered Seller $950,000 for the same lot. Seller refused to close but tendered Buyer $150,000 to represent the difference between the contract price and the lot's current market value, plus return of the deposit. Buyer rejected the tender and sued for specific performance. Seller has marketable title, and no equitable defense applies.

Is Buyer entitled to specific performance?

No, because Seller has offered Buyer the full benefit of the bargain in cash, so money damages are adequate and specific performance is unnecessary.

No, because Buyer rejected Seller's cash tender of the market-value differential, and a buyer cannot reject an adequate legal remedy and demand equity.

Yes, because each parcel of real property is considered unique, and a seller cannot defeat the buyer's right to specific performance merely by offering money damages.

Yes, but only if Buyer proves that no reasonably equivalent waterfront lot is available on the market at the contract price.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Specific Performance And Injunction

Practice Specific Performance And Injunction in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Specific Performance And Injunction, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

Is Buyer entitled to specific performance?

No, because Seller has offered Buyer the full benefit of the bargain in cash, so money damages are adequate and specific performance is unnecessary.
No, because Buyer rejected Seller's cash tender of the market-value differential, and a buyer cannot reject an adequate legal remedy and demand equity.
Yes, because each parcel of real property is considered unique, and a seller cannot defeat the buyer's right to specific performance merely by offering money damages. (correct answer)
Yes, but only if Buyer proves that no reasonably equivalent waterfront lot is available on the market at the contract price.

Explanation: When a question asks about specific performance, remember that it is an equitable remedy—available only when money damages are inadequate. But for real property, the law starts from a different presumption: land is unique. That uniqueness is the key here. Because the lot is a specific waterfront parcel, no two pieces of real estate are truly interchangeable, so Buyer's remedy at law is not considered adequate. Seller cannot unilaterally convert Buyer's contractual right to the land into a cash payment, even if that cash equals the market-value difference. Buyer is therefore entitled to specific performance. The choice saying "Seller has offered the full benefit of the bargain in cash, so money damages are adequate" fails because uniqueness is not about the amount of money—it is about the irreplaceable nature of the specific property. Similarly, the claim that "Buyer rejected the cash tender, and a buyer cannot reject an adequate legal remedy" misstates the rule: a buyer may reject a tender of damages when the contract promises land, because equity will not force the buyer to accept a substitute. The choice conditioning relief on proving "no reasonably equivalent waterfront lot is available" imposes an extra burden the law does not require—uniqueness is presumed, not something the buyer must prove. Study tip: On the bar exam, whenever a contract involves the sale of specific real property, assume specific performance is available to the buyer unless there is an equitable defense. Money damages rarely defeat that presumption.

Question 2

Buyer, a regional grocery chain, contracted with Seller, the sole shareholder of a family-owned supermarket company, to purchase all 1,000 shares of the company for $8 million. The stock is not traded on any exchange. Seller refused to close after receiving a higher offer. Buyer sues for specific performance. Seller argues that an investment banker can value the shares accurately.

Who is likely to prevail?

Buyer, because the shares are not publicly traded and the sale conveys a unique control block whose value depends on future synergies that are difficult to prove in damages. (correct answer)
Seller, because granting specific performance would require the court to supervise the future operation of the family-owned supermarket business.
Seller, because shares of stock are fungible personal property and any loss in value can be measured by an appraisal and compensated in damages.
Buyer, but only if Buyer proves that Seller's refusal was motivated by bad faith rather than by a legitimate higher offer.

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about specific performance for the sale of shares, your first instinct should be to ask whether money damages are an adequate remedy. That is the core equitable test here. Because this is a closely held company with a 100% control block, the shares are not the fungible commodities you'd find on an exchange—they represent the power to run a business, and their value is heavily tied to future synergies that a jury would struggle to quantify. That inherent difficulty in proving damages is precisely why the buyer is likely to prevail: equity will step in because a legal remedy would be speculative and incomplete. The wrong answers each misapply a different doctrine. The choice arguing that the court would have to supervise the supermarket's future operations confuses the contract—a simple transfer of shares—with a long-term services agreement; the court's role ends once title transfers. The choice claiming that shares are fungible personal property measurable by appraisal ignores the uniqueness of a control block, which is the very exception to that general rule. And the choice requiring the buyer to prove bad faith on the seller's part is wrong because specific performance depends on the adequacy of the remedy, not on the breaching party's motive—even a legitimate higher offer does not defeat the buyer's equitable right if damages are inadequate. Your takeaway: whenever you see a contract for unique assets—real estate, heirlooms, or closely held stock—default to specific performance. If the asset is generic or the damages are easily calculable, damages win; if the value is subjective or future-looking, equity steps in.

Question 3

Owner, for $5,000, granted Tenant an option to buy a specified parcel of land at a price to be agreed upon by the parties. Tenant attempted to exercise the option and proposed a price. Owner refused, and Tenant sued for specific performance. No price was ever agreed upon.

Will a court grant specific performance?

Yes, because the option identifies the property and parties, and a court can supply a reasonable price to make the remedy effective.
Yes, because Tenant paid consideration for the option and attempted to exercise it before any revocation by Owner.
No, because the price term was left for future agreement, and a contract so indefinite in an essential term cannot be specifically enforced. (correct answer)
No, because an option is revocable until the optionee communicates an acceptance, and Owner had not accepted Tenant's proposed price.

Explanation: When you see an option contract with a missing essential term, remember that an option is only enforceable if it creates a binding contract upon exercise. The key here is indefiniteness: a contract for the sale of land must specify the price, or a method for determining it, to be enforceable. Specific performance is an equitable remedy that requires a sufficiently definite contract—courts will not supply a price when the parties expressly left it for future agreement, because that would rewrite the parties' bargain. Here, the option granted Tenant the right to buy at "a price to be agreed upon." No price was ever set, and the parties did not provide an objective standard (like fair market value) for a court to apply. Thus, the essential term is missing, making the contract too indefinite to enforce. That is why the court will deny specific performance. Why the other choices fail: "Yes, because the option identifies the property and parties, and a court can supply a reasonable price" misstates the rule—courts supply a price only when the contract fails to state one but implies a standard, not when the parties explicitly defer agreement. "Yes, because Tenant paid consideration and attempted to exercise" ignores the fact that consideration makes the option irrevocable, but it cannot cure a fatal indefiniteness in the underlying sale contract. "No, because an option is revocable until acceptance" is wrong because an option supported by consideration is irrevocable for the stated period; revocation is not the issue. The problem is the missing price, not revocability. Study tip: For real estate contracts, always check whether every essential term (parties, property, price) is definite or determinable. If the parties say "price to be agreed," that is a red flag for unenforceability—unless they provide a formula or mechanism.

Question 4

A renowned chef contracted with a hotel to serve as its executive chef for two years, agreeing to be present and personally supervise all banquet meals. Seven months into the term, the chef resigned to host a television show. The hotel seeks an order compelling the chef to return and perform the contract. The hotel asserts that no other chef can provide the same quality and that damages are difficult to prove.

Will a court grant the requested order?

Yes, because the chef's services are unique and the hotel cannot prove its lost profits with reasonable certainty.
Yes, because the contract has a definite two-year term and the chef's departure was a breach rather than a permitted termination.
No, because by voluntarily resigning, the chef discharged the contract and left the hotel to its remedy at law.
No, because courts will not order a person to perform continuing personal services, even if the services are unique and damages are inadequate. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a request for specific performance, especially involving employment or personal services, ask whether the court can practically supervise the obligation and whether forcing someone to work offends public policy. Here, the hotel is not asking for money damages; it wants an order commanding the chef to return and perform the contract. Even assuming the chef's services are truly unique and lost profits are hard to prove, courts will not order a person to render continuing personal services. That is why the correct answer is the choice stating that courts will not compel performance of continuing personal services even when services are unique and damages are inadequate. The "unique services and difficult damages" choice is tempting because those facts normally support specific performance for goods or unique chattels, but they do not overcome the personal-services bar. The "definite two-year term and breach" choice correctly identifies a breach, but a breach alone does not entitle the hotel to equitable relief; the law typically gives damages instead. The "voluntary resignation discharged the contract" choice misunderstands the doctrine: resigning is a breach, not a discharge that wipes out liability, so the hotel retains a damages remedy. Remember the key distinction: a court may prohibit a departing chef from competing or working for someone else, but it will not force the chef back into the kitchen. On the bar exam, when a question asks about compelling personal services, the likely correct answer is "No," regardless of uniqueness or inadequacy of damages.

Question 5

Seller, a competent but financially unsophisticated owner, signed a contract to sell a beachfront lot worth $1.4 million to Buyer for $70,000. Buyer, an investor, knew the value, initiated the transaction, and made no misrepresentation. Seller later refused to convey. Buyer sues for specific performance.

Which of the following is the strongest basis for a court to refuse specific performance?

The consideration is so grossly inadequate and the resulting enforcement would be so unfair that specific performance should be denied in equity. (correct answer)
The consideration is insufficient to form an enforceable contract because Seller received far less than the lot's fair market value.
The contract lacks mutuality of remedy because Seller's duty is to convey unique land while Buyer's duty is only to pay money.
Buyer, as a real estate investor, knowingly exploited Seller's lack of sophistication and thereby committed constructive fraud.

Explanation: This question tests specific performance as an equitable remedy, not an absolute one. When a buyer asks a court to force a sale of land, remember that land is unique, but equity still has discretion. A court can refuse specific performance if enforcing the contract would be unconscionable or grossly unfair. Here, Seller contracted to sell a $1.4 million lot for $70,000, about 5% of value. That dramatic disparity is exactly the kind of grossly inadequate consideration that shocks conscience. Even though Buyer made no misrepresentation, requiring Seller to surrender a beachfront lot for a fraction of its value would be unjust, so a court may deny specific performance in equity. That is why the strongest basis is that the consideration is grossly inadequate and enforcement would be unfair. The "insufficient consideration" choice misses the distinction: $70,000 is legally valid consideration, so the contract is enforceable at law, though Seller may be liable in damages. Courts generally do not invalidate contracts merely for a bad bargain. The "lack of mutuality" choice is outdated; modern law does not require both parties have identical equitable remedies, and here Buyer is the one who needs specific performance because land is unique, while Seller can recover money. The "constructive fraud" choice fails because Buyer made no misrepresentation and there was no fiduciary or confidential relationship; mere knowledge of the value and initiation of a hard bargain is not constructive fraud. Remember: inadequate consideration is a defense to specific performance, not necessarily a defense to contract formation.

Question 6

A famous artist contracted with a museum to create an original installation for its summer exhibition. The contract stated that the artist would not create or install any other large-scale installation for any other museum before the exhibition opening. The artist later signed a contract with a rival museum to create a large installation for a show opening earlier. The first museum sues to enjoin the artist from creating or installing the rival work. The artist has other income from smaller commissions and teaching.

Should the court grant the injunction?

No, because personal-service contracts are not specifically enforceable, and an injunction here would only be an indirect way to compel the artist's performance.
No, because the museum can be compensated by damages for any delay or for the cost of commissioning a substitute installation.
Yes, because any breach of an express contractual promise supports an injunction whenever the promisee shows the contract was validly formed.
Yes, because the artist expressly assumed a negative covenant, and the injunction enforces that promise without compelling work for the museum. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see an injunction request involving a personal-service contract, distinguish affirmative duties from negative covenants. Courts usually will not specifically enforce a promise to perform personal services, but they will enforce an express promise not to do something if the injunction doesn't indirectly force affirmative performance. Here, the artist expressly promised not to create or install another large-scale installation for another museum before the first exhibition opened. That negative covenant is direct and specific. An injunction blocking the rival installation doesn't order the artist to build anything for the first museum; it only stops a competing installation. Since a famous artist's original installation is unique, damages cannot readily capture lost exclusivity and prestige of the summer exhibition, so equitable relief is appropriate. Grant the injunction. The first wrong answer—that personal-service contracts cannot be specifically enforced and this would indirectly compel performance—confuses negative with affirmative: enforcing "you will not work for another museum" leaves the artist free to do nothing for the first museum. The second wrong answer assumes money damages are adequate, but substitution damages for a unique artistic installation and the lost value of exclusivity are speculative, not "compensable" in any practical sense. The third wrong answer—that any breach of a valid express promise supports an injunction—is overbroad: valid formation alone is not enough; the plaintiff must show irreparable harm and inadequate legal remedy. The artist's other income is irrelevant to whether the negative covenant should be enforced against him.

Question 7

Dentist sold her dental practice and its goodwill to Buyer for $400,000. The sale agreement included a covenant that Dentist would not engage in the practice of dentistry within a 15-mile radius of the former office for three years. One year later, Dentist opened a new dental office 12 miles away. Buyer sues for an injunction.

Is Buyer entitled to an injunction?

No, because a court will not enjoin a professional from practicing her profession, even under a covenant ancillary to a sale.
No, because lost profits from the diverted patients can be calculated with reasonable certainty from the practice's past records.
Yes, because the covenant is ancillary to a business sale, reasonable in time and area, and the injury to purchased goodwill is hard to quantify. (correct answer)
Yes, but the injunction must be limited to preventing the Dentist from owning a practice; it cannot bar her from accepting employment at another dental office.

Explanation: When you see a noncompete covenant, first classify its context: covenants ancillary to the sale of a business are treated more favorably than employment noncompetes, because the buyer paid for the seller's goodwill and needs protection to realize that investment. Here, the three-year, 15-mile restriction is likely reasonable—it tracks the former practice's likely patient base and the sale's value. Because the purchased goodwill is intangible and patient diversion is difficult to quantify precisely, an injunction is the appropriate remedy, so the correct answer is that the covenant is enforceable and Buyer is entitled to an injunction. The first wrong answer—that courts will never enjoin a professional—is too absolute; courts will enforce professional noncompetes when they are ancillary to a business sale and reasonable. The second wrong answer misses the point: even if past records could estimate lost profits, that makes damages possible, not complete, and injunctive relief is still proper to protect the ongoing value of the purchased goodwill. The final wrong answer invents a limitation not in the covenant; the agreement restricts "engaging in the practice of dentistry," not merely owning a practice, so employment at another office would still violate it. Study tip: on bar exam questions, ask two questions—was the noncompete tied to the sale of a business? and is it reasonable in time and geography? If both are yes, injunctions are usually available.

Question 8

Buyer, a newly formed corporation with limited assets, contracted to purchase Seller's patented manufacturing process for $1 million, payable $200,000 at closing and the balance in four annual installments secured only by Buyer's promise. Seller refused to assign the patent, asserting that Buyer could not obtain specific performance because the remedy would lack mutuality. Buyer sues for specific performance and offers to pay the entire price into court at closing.

Which of the following is most accurate?

The court will deny specific performance because mutuality of remedy is required and Buyer is unable to pay future installments.
The court may grant specific performance if Buyer provides adequate security or full payment; lack of mutuality alone is not a bar. (correct answer)
The court will grant specific performance automatically because the patent is unique and Buyer has made a valid contract.
The court will deny specific performance because a promise to pay money can be remedied only by damages.

Explanation: When a question asks about specific performance, first ask whether the subject matter is unique and whether damages are inadequate. A patented manufacturing process is unique, so Seller's duty to transfer the patent is exactly the kind of obligation a court may enforce in equity. Seller's "lack of mutuality" defense is the historical idea that because Buyer's remaining obligation was only to pay money—not specifically enforceable—Buyer should not be able to force Seller into equity. Modern courts reject mutuality as a rigid requirement; they instead balance fairness and can condition relief on protecting the other party. Because Buyer offered to pay the entire price into court at closing, the court may grant specific performance if Buyer provides adequate security or full payment; lack of mutuality alone is not a bar. The statement that the court will deny specific performance because mutuality is required and Buyer is unable to pay future installments is wrong because mutuality is no longer absolute, and Buyer's offer of full payment removes the future-installment concern. The statement that the court will grant automatically because the patent is unique and the contract valid is too absolute: uniqueness supports equity, but the court still has discretion to impose conditions or consider defenses. The statement that the court will deny because a promise to pay money can be remedied only by damages confuses the situation—Buyer is seeking the patent, not enforcement of Seller's debt, and Buyer's own payment obligation can be secured. Study tip: whenever you see "mutuality of remedy" on the bar exam, remember that it is no longer a strict bar—look for tender, security, or other equitable conditions that make relief fair.

Question 9

Theo agreed in writing to buy a rare first edition of Paradise Lost from Lena, a dealer, for $80,000. The contract stated: “If Seller fails to deliver the book, Seller shall pay Buyer $10,000 as liquidated damages, and this payment shall be Buyer's sole and exclusive remedy." The clause was a reasonable pre-estimate of loss. Lena later repudiated, kept the book, and told Theo she intended to sell it to another collector for $95,000. She tendered $10,000. Theo sued for specific performance.

Which of the following is the most accurate statement regarding Theo's claim for specific performance?

Theo may obtain specific performance because the book is unique, and a liquidated-damages clause bars equitable relief only if the court finds the clause unconscionable.
Theo may not obtain specific performance because the contract expressly made the liquidated-damages payment the buyer's sole and exclusive remedy for nondelivery. (correct answer)
Theo may not obtain specific performance because Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code limits a buyer's remedy for nondelivery of goods to money damages.
Theo may obtain specific performance because Lena's repudiation and proposed resale at a higher price show that the liquidated-damages clause operates as an unenforceable penalty.

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about remedies for breach of a contract for the sale of goods, you must consider the UCC's default rules, but first look at what the parties' contract itself says. Here, the contract includes a valid liquidated damages clause (it was a reasonable pre-estimate of loss) that explicitly states the $10,000 payment is the buyer’s “sole and exclusive remedy” for nondelivery. Under the UCC, a buyer may generally seek specific performance for unique goods, but parties are free to contract around that default. Since Lena tendered the agreed-upon $10,000, the contract's exclusive remedy clause has been satisfied, and Theo cannot disregard that agreement to demand equitable relief. Specific performance is only available if the exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose, which it does not here. Now examine the wrong answers. The first choice argues Theo can get specific performance because the book is unique and a liquidated damages clause only bars equity if it is unconscionable—but this misstates the law. A valid, non-unconscionable exclusive remedy clause still bars other remedies by contract. The third choice incorrectly claims Article 2 limits nondelivery remedies to money damages; UCC §2-716 expressly allows specific performance for unique goods. The final choice suggests the clause is a penalty because Lena resold at a higher price—but the clause is a reasonable pre-estimate of Theo's loss, not a penalty, and the higher resale price does not affect its validity. Study tip: always distinguish between default UCC remedies and contractual modifications. An exclusive remedy clause is powerful—it only fails if it deprives the buyer of the substantial value of the bargain.

Question 10

Buyer operates a national restaurant chain. Buyer and Seller signed a five-year contract under which Seller agreed to produce and sell, and Buyer agreed to buy, all of Buyer's needs for a custom seasoning blended from Seller's secret formula. The seasoning has no commercially available substitute. After one year, Seller stopped all deliveries because the contract had become unprofitable. Buyer cannot cover and sues for specific performance.

Which of the following best describes Buyer's right to specific performance?

No, because a requirements contract does not involve goods already identified to the contract, so specific performance is unavailable as a matter of law.
No, because specific performance for goods is limited to unique goods, and this seasoning is not unique even though its formula is secret.
Yes, because this long-term requirements contract involves no available cover and speculative damages, placing it within the other-proper-circumstances exception. (correct answer)
Yes, but only if Buyer first obtains a judicial determination that the contract price is commercially reasonable at the time of delivery.

Explanation: When you see a specific performance question for goods, your mind should jump to UCC § 2-716. Specific performance is an equitable remedy, so damages must be inadequate. The statute allows it for unique goods or in "other proper circumstances." This five-year requirements contract for a custom seasoning with no substitute has two critical features: Buyer cannot cover, and damages over five years are highly speculative. This fits the "other proper circumstances" exception perfectly, which is why the answer citing that exception is correct. Now, the distractors. The choice saying specific performance is barred because the goods are not "already identified" confuses this remedy with replevin (which requires identification for recovering goods in the seller's possession). Identification is not a prerequisite for 2-716. The choice limiting specific performance to "unique goods" and arguing this seasoning isn't unique ignores the second, independent prong of the statute—"other proper circumstances." Even if the seasoning weren't unique, the impossibility of cover and speculative damages satisfy that prong. Finally, the answer requiring a prior "judicial determination that the contract price is commercially reasonable" is a fabricated condition. That concept relates to open-price terms under § 2-305, not equitable relief. Strategy tip: When you see "specific performance" for goods, ask: Can the buyer cover? Are damages speculative? If either answer points to inadequacy, the "other proper circumstances" exception likely applies. Don't fall for the "identified goods" trap—that's for replevin, not for enforcing a contract.

Question 11

Seller contracted to sell a commercial building to Buyer for $2.5 million. Before closing, the building's market value fell to $1.9 million, and Buyer refused to close. Seller remains ready, willing, and able to convey marketable title and brings an action for specific performance, asking the court to order Buyer to pay the contract price and accept the deed. No defense is asserted.

Will Seller obtain specific performance?

Yes, because a land-sale contract is specifically enforceable by either party, and Seller remains ready, willing, and able to convey title. (correct answer)
No, because a court will not compel Buyer to accept title to real property that Buyer no longer wants; Seller's only remedy is damages.
No, because Seller can resell the building and recover the difference between the contract price and the resale price as damages.
Yes, but only if Seller first attempts to resell the building and demonstrates that the resale market cannot provide an adequate remedy.

Explanation: Whenever you see a contract for the sale of real property, remember the bedrock rule: land is unique. Because no two parcels are identical, courts generally presume money damages are inadequate and allow specific performance—not just for buyers, but for sellers too. Here, Seller remains ready, willing, and able to convey marketable title, and Buyer simply changed its mind after the market value fell. That drop in value does not give Buyer a defense; the contract still binds both parties. Therefore, Seller may compel Buyer to pay the $2.5 million contract price and accept the deed. The choice saying a court will not compel Buyer to accept unwanted title is backwards: the uniqueness of land justifies compelling acceptance, and mutuality means either party can seek equitable relief. The choice saying Seller can resell and recover the difference is true as one possible remedy, but it misunderstands that damages need not be the seller's only route; specific performance remains available. Finally, the choice saying Seller may get specific performance only after first attempting resale and showing inadequate remedies is wrong—there is no exhaustion requirement, and the inadequacy of damages is presumed because the land itself is unique. On the bar exam, when you see a land-sale contract, immediately think "unique land → specific performance available to either party." Then check only for defenses like hardship, unconscionability, or lack of clean hands before granting the remedy.

Question 12

Seller contracted to convey a specific house to Buyer by warranty deed, free and clear of all encumbrances. At closing, it is discovered that Seller does not own the house because a prior deed reserved title to Seller's sibling, who refuses to convey. Buyer sues for specific performance to compel Seller to convey the house.

What is the likely result?

Specific performance will be granted because the house is unique and damages are not an adequate substitute for title to that particular house.
Specific performance will be granted if Buyer deposits the purchase price with the court because that satisfies the tender requirement.
Specific performance will be denied because Buyer's remedy after a failed real-estate closing is limited to return of any deposit paid.
Specific performance will be denied because the court cannot compel Seller to convey a title Seller does not have; Buyer may recover damages. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about specific performance, remember it is an equitable remedy: courts order it only when damages are inadequate, but they will never order a party to do something that is actually impossible. Real estate is unique, so buyers often can force a seller to close, but the key limit is that the seller must have the title to give. Here, Buyer's request fails because Seller simply does not own the house. A prior deed reserved title to Seller's sibling, and the sibling refuses to convey. A court cannot compel Seller to transfer a title Seller does not have; doing so would be impossible, not merely inconvenient. Buyer is not without relief: Buyer can sue Seller for breach of contract and recover damages, such as the difference between contract price and market value, plus consequential losses, along with return of any deposit. Thus specific performance is denied, but Buyer may recover damages. Why are the other answers wrong? The choice saying specific performance will be granted because the house is unique ignores the impossibility barrier: uniqueness makes specific performance normally appropriate, but it cannot manufacture title the seller lacks. The choice saying performance will be granted if Buyer deposits purchase price with the court confuses tender with capacity: depositing money cannot cure Seller's lack of ownership or make the sibling's deed disappear. And the choice saying Buyer's remedy is limited to return of any deposit is too narrow: restitution of deposit is only one possible remedy; Buyer may also seek expectation damages for the lost bargain. Study takeaway: on remedies questions, always check whether the defendant can actually perform before choosing specific performance; impossibility is a complete defense to equitable relief, though it does not bar damages.