Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Service Of Process And Notice

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Service Of Process And NoticeQuestion 1 of 11

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) provides: 'An individual may be served in a judicial district of the United States by: (1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made; or (2) doing either of the following: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; or (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there.' Illinois law provides: 'A natural person may be served by leaving a copy of the summons, complaint, and other pleadings with a person of the age of 13 years or older at the person's workplace, place of business, or usual place of abode.' Parsons, an Illinois resident, is sued in federal court for the Northern District of Illinois. A process server went to Parsons's office and left copies of the summons and complaint with Maya, a 19-year-old summer intern at the reception desk. The server did not attempt personal delivery or service at Parsons's home. Parsons moves to dismiss for insufficient service of process. Should the court grant the motion?

Under the supplied rules, should the court grant Parsons's motion to dismiss?

No, because Rule 4(e)(2)(B) treats a defendant's regular workplace as the equivalent of a dwelling when process is left with an employee during business hours.

No, because Rule 4(e)(1) authorizes service by the law of the state in which the district court sits, and that law allows leaving a copy with a person aged 13 or older at the person's workplace.

No, because Rule 4(e)(2)(A) permits service by delivery to any person whom the defendant has designated, even implicitly, to receive papers at the defendant's office.

Yes, because Rule 4(e)(2)(B) permits substituted service only at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode, and an office is not a dwelling or usual place of abode.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Service Of Process And Notice

Practice Service Of Process And Notice in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Service Of Process And Notice, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

Under the supplied rules, should the court grant Parsons's motion to dismiss?

No, because Rule 4(e)(2)(B) treats a defendant's regular workplace as the equivalent of a dwelling when process is left with an employee during business hours.
No, because Rule 4(e)(1) authorizes service by the law of the state in which the district court sits, and that law allows leaving a copy with a person aged 13 or older at the person's workplace. (correct answer)
No, because Rule 4(e)(2)(A) permits service by delivery to any person whom the defendant has designated, even implicitly, to receive papers at the defendant's office.
Yes, because Rule 4(e)(2)(B) permits substituted service only at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode, and an office is not a dwelling or usual place of abode.

Explanation: When you see a service-of-process question, always check both federal and state avenues—Rule 4(e)(1) lets you piggyback on state law, while Rule 4(e)(2) provides independent federal methods. Here, the process server did not comply with Rule 4(e)(2)(B) because an office is not a dwelling or usual place of abode, but that doesn't end the inquiry. Rule 4(e)(1) explicitly authorizes service by the law of the state where the district court sits. Illinois law permits leaving a copy with any person aged 13 or older at the defendant's workplace, and the 19-year-old intern qualifies. Therefore, service was valid, and the motion should be denied. The first wrong answer ("Rule 4(e)(2)(B) treats a regular workplace as equivalent to a dwelling") misreads the rule—it only applies to a dwelling or usual place of abode, not an office. The third ("delivery to any person designated, even implicitly") invents a rule; federal substituted service requires residence, not workplace designation. The fourth ("Yes, because an office is not a dwelling") incorrectly assumes Rule 4(e)(2)(B) is the only option, ignoring Rule 4(e)(1)'s state-law hook. Study tip: Always check whether state law expands service options. Federal rules set a floor, not a ceiling—state law may be broader, and (e)(1) incorporates it fully.

Question 2

A developer filed an action to quiet title to a commercial lot and named Cora as a defendant because a recorded deed from 1985 lists her as the last grantee. The developer's lawyer signed an affidavit stating that after a diligent search Cora's whereabouts were unknown. The court authorized service by publication, and notice was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the lot is located. Cora did not appear, and a default judgment was entered. Eight months later, Cora learned of the judgment and moved to set it aside, asserting that she was never notified of the suit. The following facts were developed at the hearing.

Which fact, if true, would most strongly support Cora's claim that the notice she received was insufficient?

At the time of publication, Cora was registered to vote at a stable address in another state and regularly received mail there. (correct answer)
Cora had not visited the county where the lot is located for more than fifteen years before the suit began.
The newspaper in which the notice was published also had a small number of subscribers in the state where Cora currently lives.
Cora's deed was recorded in the county where the lot is located, making her name available to the developer.

Explanation: This question tests the constitutional limits on substitute service. When service by publication is used, due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise the defendant. Publication is a last resort; if a plaintiff could have located a current address through a diligent search, publication alone is usually insufficient. The fact that Cora was registered to vote at a stable address in another state and regularly received mail there most strongly supports her claim. Voter registration is a public record; reasonably diligent search could have uncovered that address, and the developer could have mailed notice or attempted service there. By relying only on publication after swearing Cora could not be found, the developer did not use the notice most reasonably calculated to reach her. The other facts do not carry that weight. Cora's not having visited the county for fifteen years says little about whether her current out-of-state address was discoverable; absence from the county does not make publication adequate. The newspaper's small subscriber base in her current home state does not show insufficiency — when no better address is known, publication in the county newspaper can satisfy due process even though actual notice is unlikely. And the recorded deed simply made her name available; it disclosed no current address, so it explains why she was named the defendant, not why more direct notice was possible. Study takeaway: whenever you see service by publication, ask whether plaintiff actually knew or could readily discover a current address. If checking public records like voter registration would have found one, publication alone may violate due process.

Question 3

A Washington state resident sued a Brazilian company in federal court in Washington. The plaintiff's lawyer arranged for a private courier to deliver the summons and complaint to the company's office in São Paulo, and the courier obtained a signed receipt from a receptionist. Brazil is a party to the Hague Service Convention and has not objected to service by postal channels, but Brazilian law does not list private couriers as an authorized means of service from abroad. The company did not appear, and the plaintiff moved for a default judgment.

Which issue is most significant in deciding whether the default judgment is proper?

Whether the signed receipt proves that the Brazilian company received actual notice of the suit.
Whether delivery by a private courier complied with the applicable international service treaty. (correct answer)
Whether the Brazilian company's contacts with Washington are sufficient to support personal jurisdiction.
Whether the receptionist who signed the receipt was an officer or managing agent of the company.

Explanation: Whenever a plaintiff serves process on a foreign defendant, first ask whether the Hague Service Convention applies. It does here: Brazil is a party and the service occurred in Brazil. This makes treaty compliance the critical route to valid service. The proposed private-courier delivery fails because the Convention directs service primarily through the country's designated Central Authority; although Brazil allowed postal channels, a private courier is not postal mail, and Brazilian law did not authorize private couriers as a method from abroad. Therefore service was invalid, and the default judgment cannot be proper. The signed receipt showing actual notice is not enough: actual receipt never cures service that fails to comply with the treaty. The Brazilian company's contacts with Washington matter for personal jurisdiction, but that is a separate structural requirement—and the fact pattern specifically places treaty service at issue. The receptionist's status as an officer or managing agent would matter under domestic corporate-service rules, but it is not the decisive question; the method of delivery itself was noncompliant, so who signed is beside the point. Study tip: in international service questions, check the treaty first. Even valid actual notice and sufficient contacts will not save an improperly served defendant.

Question 4

A nonprofit organization sued the Secretary of the Interior in federal court, challenging the approval of a mining project. The organization sent the summons and complaint by certified mail to the Secretary's office in Washington, D.C. It did not send a copy to the United States Attorney for the district or to the Attorney General of the United States. The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the organization failed to effect service of process.

Which issue is most likely to determine the government's motion?

Whether certified mail is an acceptable method of service on a federal officer.
Whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges to the Secretary's decision.
Whether the Secretary's decision to approve the mining project was arbitrary and capricious.
Whether the organization was required to serve the United States as well as the Secretary. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests service of process in civil actions against federal officers. Whenever you see a suit against the federal government or its officers, remember that the Federal Rules require more than just notifying the individual official. Here, the organization mailed the summons and complaint only to the Secretary's office. Under Rule 4(i), to sue a federal officer in an official capacity, you must serve both the officer and the United States: deliver a copy to the United States Attorney for the district, send a copy by certified or registered mail to the Attorney General, and serve the officer. Because the organization never served the U.S. Attorney or the Attorney General, the government's motion should succeed for that reason. The choice about whether certified mail is an acceptable method is a trap. Certified mail is actually used for service on the Attorney General, but the decisive defect is not the mail method—it is the failure to serve the United States at all. Subject-matter jurisdiction is also a distractor; service of process is about notice and personal jurisdiction, not the court's power to hear the case. And whether the Secretary's decision was arbitrary and capricious is a merits question that would not be reached if service is defective. Study tip: in any federal-officer suit, mentally check three boxes—U.S. Attorney, Attorney General, and the officer. Missing any one can doom the case.

Question 5

A patient sued Northside Medical Group, a professional corporation, for medical malpractice. A process server went to Northside's administrative offices and asked to speak with the person responsible for the office. An employee named Dana appeared and identified herself as the office manager. Dana's duties included supervising the reception staff, ordering office supplies, and maintaining patient files. She did not sit on the board of directors, was not an officer, and had no express authority to accept legal papers. The process server handed the summons and complaint to Dana. Northside moved to dismiss for insufficient service of process.

Which issue is most likely to determine whether service on Northside was valid?

Whether the process server was at least eighteen years old and not a party to the action.
Whether Dana's supervisory and administrative duties made her a managing agent of Northside. (correct answer)
Whether the summons and complaint were left at Northside's principal place of business.
Whether Northside received actual notice of the lawsuit from Dana's receipt of the papers.

Explanation: Service on a corporation is a strict-compliance area of civil procedure: the plaintiff must deliver process to someone the law authorizes to receive it—typically an officer, the registered agent, or a "managing agent." So when a question gives you a job title and duties, your first instinct should be: does this person qualify as a managing agent? That is exactly what this question tests. Dana's title and duties matter because a managing agent must have sufficient responsibility and discretion to act representatively for the corporation in matters affecting the litigation or business. Merely supervising reception, ordering supplies, and maintaining files may make Dana an office manager, but those duties are clerical/administrative. The key dispute is whether they elevate her to managing-agent status; if they do, service is valid, and if not, it is invalid. The wrong answers miss the central issue. Whether the process server was at least eighteen and not a party is a general eligibility requirement for any process server, but nothing in the facts suggests a defect there, so it would not determine validity. Whether the papers were left at Northside's principal place of business is also not enough, because serving a corporation requires delivery to an authorized person, not merely leaving papers at the office. Finally, whether Northside received actual notice is tempting but legally insufficient—actual notice cannot cure defective service of process. Study tip: for service of process on entities, focus on the category of person served, not on location or notice. Memorize the list: officer, registered agent, or managing agent.

Question 6

Lena sued Vector Freight Co. in federal court. Her attorney mailed Vector's registered agent a package containing a copy of the complaint, two copies of a waiver-of-service form, a prepaid return envelope, and a letter explaining that Vector could return the waiver form within 30 days. Vector received the package but did not return the waiver. Lena then had a process server personally serve Vector's registered agent. Vector later filed an answer and asked the court to order Lena to pay the cost of personal service.

Which issue is most likely to determine whether Vector must pay that cost?

Whether Lena's package was sent by first-class mail or another reliable means.
Whether Vector's registered agent was authorized to accept service of process for the company.
Whether Vector had good cause for refusing to sign and return the waiver form. (correct answer)
Whether the personal service was completed before the deadline for Vector's answer.

Explanation: When you see a waiver-of-service question, focus on Rule 4(d) and the distinction between requesting a waiver and perfecting service. The cost-shifting rule exists to reward plaintiffs who try to avoid unnecessary personal service and to penalize defendants who refuse without a good reason. Here, Lena did exactly what the rule encourages: she mailed the complaint, waiver form, return envelope, and explanation to Vector's registered agent. Vector received the package but stayed silent, forcing Lena to pay a process server. Under Rule 4(d)(2), a defendant who fails to sign and return a waiver without good cause must pay the plaintiff the costs later incurred for personal service. That makes the central issue whether Vector had a legitimate justification for refusing. The wrong answers miss that issue. Whether the package was sent by first-class mail or another reliable means matters only for whether the waiver request was proper, not for whether refusal was excused. Whether Vector's registered agent was authorized to accept service goes to the validity of the personal service itself, not to shifting its cost. And whether personal service occurred before the answer deadline is irrelevant to fee-shifting; the answer deadline is triggered by service, not by the waiver request. Your takeaway: on waiver-of-service questions, ask why the defendant did not return the waiver. If the only reason was refusal or delay, the defendant likely pays the later service costs.

Question 7

In Johnson v. Taylor, the United States Court of Appeals held: 'Rule 4(e)(2)(B) permits substituted service only when process is left at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode. A place where an individual is staying temporarily, even for a month or more, is not a dwelling or usual place of abode unless the individual has manifested an intent to make that place his or her home for the indefinite future. The fact that mail and belongings are present at the temporary location does not, by itself, establish that intent.' Defendant Rivera left her apartment in Tucson and moved into her sister's house in Phoenix for two months to help care for her niece after surgery. Rivera kept her Tucson apartment lease, paid rent, maintained her voter registration, and planned to return after her niece recovered. Her sister's house had her clothes, toiletries, and a stack of mail. A process server left the summons and complaint with Rivera's sister at the Phoenix house. Rivera moves to dismiss for insufficient service of process.

Under Johnson, should the court grant Rivera's motion to dismiss?

No, because Rivera's sister is a person of suitable age and discretion who resides at the Phoenix house, and that makes substituted service proper there even if Rivera was only visiting.
No, because Rivera had brought clothing, toiletries, and mail to the Phoenix house and had no current Tucson address, satisfying Johnson's intent requirement.
No, because Rule 4(e)(2)(B) permits substituted service wherever the defendant is physically present, including at a relative's home, as long as papers are given to a household member.
Yes, because Rivera's stay at her sister's house was temporary and she retained her Tucson apartment and planned to return, so the Phoenix house was not her dwelling or usual place of abode. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests substituted service under Rule 4(e)(2)(B) and how courts define an individual's "dwelling or usual place of abode." When you see a service-of-process question, focus on whose abode matters and whether the defendant objectively treated the place as home, not just where mail happens to arrive. Here, Rivera's Phoenix stay was temporary in nature: she planned to return to Tucson, kept her Tucson lease, paid rent, and maintained her voter registration there. Under Johnson, a temporary stay—even one lasting months—does not become a dwelling or usual place of abode unless the person manifested an intent to make it home for the indefinite futurehurHer clothes, toiletries, and mail in Phoenix do not by themselves establish that intent. Thereforeervice at her sister's house did not comply with Rule 4the motion to dismiss should be granted. The answer that says substituted service is proper because Rivera's sister is a suitable-age resident confuses the relevant person: Rule 4 requires process be left at Rivera's dwelling or usual abode, not merely at a household where a capable person happens to live imply visiting by yourself is insufficienthurst The claim that Rivera brought belongings and had "no current Tucson address" fails both factually and legally: she still had her Tucson apartment, and Johnson explicitly holds that mail and belongings at a temporary location do not prove intent to remain indefinitelyhur The suggestion that Rule 4 allows substituted service wherever the defendant is physically present misstates the rule: physical presence alone is not enough; the location must be the defendant's dwelling or usual place of abode. For exam day, remember: temporary residence plus retained old home equals no substituted service at the temporary address unless the defendant's objective actions show an intent to make the new place home for the foreseeable future.

Question 8

Excerpt from Bennett v. Meridian Trust Co.: 'An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. But if with due regard for practicalities and particularities, such notice is not possible, then publication may be sufficient. This Court has recognized that in case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits.' A federal court approved a class action settlement against a life insurer. The settlement class included approximately 150,000 policyholders. The insurer's records contained names and last known mailing addresses for 140,000 class members; addresses for the remaining 10,000 were outdated or missing. The parties gave notice only by posting the settlement on the insurer's website and publishing a summary in three national newspapers. No individual notice was mailed to any class member. Objectors claimed that the notice violated due process.

Under the supplied excerpt, which statement is most accurate?

The notice was constitutionally sufficient because the class was large and the cost of mailing individual notices to 140,000 members would be prohibitive.
The notice was constitutionally sufficient as to all class members because a website and national newspaper publication were reasonably calculated to reach policyholders.
The notice was constitutionally insufficient as to the identifiable class members with known addresses because individual notice was practicable; publication may suffice only for the unknown or missing members. (correct answer)
The notice was constitutionally insufficient as to every class member because due process always requires mailed individual notice, even when addresses are unknown.

Explanation: Whenever you see a due-process notice challenge, ask two questions: Are the affected persons identifiable? And is individual notice practicable? The excerpt from Bennett restates the classic rule: notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties, but if a person is missing or unknown, publication may be enough. Here, the insurer knew the names and last known addresses of 140,000 class members. Because those people were identifiable and individual mailing was practicable, due process required sending them notice by mail. The failure to do so made the notice constitutionally insufficient for those class members. Publication and website posting could be acceptable only for the 10,000 members whose addresses were outdated or missing, since for them more direct notice was impossible. The answer claiming the notice was sufficient because the class was large and mailing costs would be prohibitive is wrong: a large class does not eliminate the duty to notify known members; costs may be considered, but they do not justify abandoning mailed notice when addresses exist. The answer claiming website and newspaper publication were reasonably calculated to reach all policyholders is wrong because direct notice is far more reliable for known addresses. The answer claiming due process always requires mailed notice even for unknown members is wrong; the excerpt explicitly permits publication when persons are missing or unknown. On the exam, draw the known-versus-unknown line first: known addresses demand individual notice if practicable; only genuinely unknown or missing members may receive notice by publication.

Question 9

Rule 4(d)(1) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide: '(1) A plaintiff may request that a defendant waive service of a summons. The request must be in writing, be sent by first-class mail or other reliable means, be accompanied by a copy of the complaint, and give the defendant at least 30 days after the request is sent to return the waiver. (3) A defendant who, before being served with process, timely returns a waiver is not required to serve an answer until 60 days after the plaintiff sent the request for waiver of service.' Rule 6(a)(1) provides: 'When computing a period stated in days, count every day, including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; include the last day of the period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.' On May 1, plaintiff sent a written waiver request to defendant by first-class mail, accompanied by the complaint and waiver form. The defendant received it on May 3, signed the waiver on May 15, and plaintiff filed it on May 18. The 60th day after May 1 is June 30, which is a Saturday.

When must the defendant serve its answer?

June 30, because the answer deadline is 60 days after the request was sent, and intermediate weekends do not extend the period.
July 2, because the 60th day after the request was sent falls on a Saturday, so the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. (correct answer)
July 14, because the answer deadline is 60 days after the date the defendant returned the signed waiver to the plaintiff.
June 2, because the answer deadline is 30 days after the defendant received the waiver request, not 60 days after it was sent.

Explanation: Whenever you see a service-of-process deadline, first identify which triggering event the rule actually uses. Here, Rule 4(d)(3) says that a defendant who timely returns a waiver is not required to answer until 60 days after the plaintiff sent the request — not after the waiver was signed, filed, or received. Because the request was sent on May 1, the 60-day period begins that day, making the 60th day June 30. Now apply Rule 6(a)(1): when the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the next day that is not one of those. June 30 is a Saturday, so the deadline moves to Monday, July 2. That is why the answer is due July 2. The choice saying June 30 correctly counts 60 days from May 1 but forgets the weekend extension rule. The choice saying July 14 wrongly uses the date the defendant returned the signed waiver — the rule keys the deadline to when the request was sent, not returned. The choice saying June 2 wrongly treats the deadline as 30 days after receipt; 30 days is the time a defendant has to decide whether to waive, not the answer deadline once the waiver is returned. The fact that the defendant received the request on May 3 or filed it on May 18 is irrelevant to computing the answer period. For the bar exam, remember: in federal civil procedure, deadlines under Rule 4(d)(3) run from "sent," and whenever the final day falls on a weekend or holiday, automatically push to the next business day.

Question 10

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(1) provides that an individual may be served in a foreign country 'by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents.' Rule 4(h)(2) provides that a foreign corporation must be served by 'any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) for serving an individual.' Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention states: 'Provided the State of destination does not object, the Convention shall not interfere with the freedom to send judicial documents by postal channels directly to persons abroad.' Japan has objected to Article 10(a) and requires that requests for service be sent to its designated Central Authority. A Japanese corporation with its principal place of business in Tokyo is a defendant in a federal action in the Northern District of California. Plaintiff mailed a copy of the summons and complaint by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the corporation's registered office in Tokyo. Plaintiff did not send documents to Japan's Central Authority, and no waiver was signed. The corporation moved to dismiss for insufficient service of process.

Under the supplied rules, how should the court rule on the corporation's motion?

Grant, because Japan's objection to Article 10(a) means direct postal service is not an internationally agreed means, and plaintiff did not use the Convention's Central Authority channel. (correct answer)
Deny, because Article 10(a) permits postal service unless the State of origin objects, and the United States has not objected.
Grant, because service on a Japanese corporation could be made only through Japan's Central Authority, and Rule 4(h)(2) forecloses all other methods.
Deny, because Rule 4(f) permits any means reasonably calculated to give notice, and certified mail with return receipt requested met that standard.

Explanation: Whenever service on a foreign defendant is challenged, start with Rule 4(f) and any international convention. The Hague Convention is an internationally agreed means under Rule 4(f)(1), but only as the destination state permits. Japan objected to Article 10(a), the provision allowing documents to be sent by postal channels directly abroad. Because Japan is the destination state and has objected, certified-mail service was not an internationally agreed means; plaintiff also did not use Japan's Central Authority or obtain a waiver. Thus the motion should be granted. The argument that service was valid because the United States did not object misreads Article 10(a): it conditions on the State of destination, so Japan's objection controls. The argument that Rule 4(f) permits any reasonably calculated method is too broad: Rule 4(f)(1) requires an internationally agreed means, and reasonable notice cannot override a treaty objection. The argument that service could be made only through Japan's Central Authority gets the result but for the wrong reason: Rule 4(h)(2) incorporates Rule 4(f), and other treaty-authorized or court-ordered methods could exist; here, plaintiff used a route Japan blocked. Study tip: for cross-border service, identify the destination country's treaty reservations before applying general reasonableness.

Question 11

Pablo filed a federal complaint against Tessa on March 1. On March 10, Pablo's attorney sent Tessa an email with a copy of the complaint attached and wrote, 'I will arrange service.' Tessa read the email. No summons was served on Tessa until July 5, when a process server personally delivered the summons and complaint to her. Tessa moved to dismiss, arguing that service was untimely.

Which issue is most likely to determine the outcome of Tessa's motion?

Whether Tessa's receipt of the emailed complaint gave the court personal jurisdiction over her.
Whether Pablo's failure to serve Tessa within the time allowed should be excused. (correct answer)
Whether the emailed complaint was sufficient to satisfy the applicable statute of limitations.
Whether Tessa's receipt of the complaint before formal service deprived her of the right to challenge venue.

Explanation: Whenever you see a service-of-process question, focus on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m): a plaintiff generally must serve the summons and complaint within 90 days after filing. Here Pablo filed March 1, but Tessa was not personally served until July 5—well past the deadline. The March 10 email attaching the complaint did not constitute service, because Tessa received a copy, not a summons served in a manner authorized by Rule 4. So the motion to dismiss turns on whether Pablo's failure to serve Tessa within the time allowed should be excused—that is, whether he can show good cause for an extension or whether dismissal without prejudice is appropriate. The suggestion that Tessa's receipt of the emailed complaint gave the court personal jurisdiction over her misunderstands jurisdiction: actual service of process, not mere notice by email, is what gives the court power over a defendant. The statute-of-limitations option is also a trap; Pablo's timely filing of the complaint on March 1 satisfies the limitations period, independent of later service. Finally, receiving the complaint before formal service does not deprive Tessa of her right to challenge venue; venue objections must be raised in a responsive pleading or motion, but they are not waived merely by reading the complaint. Practice tip: whenever a question involves delay between filing and service, calculate Rule 4(m)'s 90-day window and then ask whether the plaintiff's failure should be excused.