Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Right To Trial By Jury

12 questions · exam conditions

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Right To Trial By JuryQuestion 1 of 12

Deon was charged in state court with violating a municipal recycling ordinance. The ordinance authorized a maximum penalty of 30 days' imprisonment and a fine of $10,000. The prosecutor announced that the State would seek only a fine. Deon demanded a jury; the court denied, citing the petty-offense exception. After a bench trial, he was fined $8,000.

Did the denial violate Deon's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury?

Yes, because the $10,000 fine, when combined with possible incarceration, exposes Deon to sufficiently serious penalties.

Yes, because when the government seeks any penalty exceeding $5,000, the offense ceases to be petty.

No, because an offense punishable by no more than six months' imprisonment is presumptively petty, and a $10,000 fine is not so severe as to make this one serious.

No, because violations of municipal ordinances are not criminal prosecutions within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Right To Trial By Jury

Practice Right To Trial By Jury in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Right To Trial By Jury, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

Did the denial violate Deon's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury?

Yes, because the $10,000 fine, when combined with possible incarceration, exposes Deon to sufficiently serious penalties.
Yes, because when the government seeks any penalty exceeding $5,000, the offense ceases to be petty.
No, because an offense punishable by no more than six months' imprisonment is presumptively petty, and a $10,000 fine is not so severe as to make this one serious. (correct answer)
No, because violations of municipal ordinances are not criminal prosecutions within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.

Explanation: Whenever a Sixth Amendment jury-trial question appears, your first move is to classify the offense as serious or petty: the jury right attaches only to serious offenses. The Supreme Court presumes an offense is petty if its maximum imprisonment is six months or less, and that presumption can be overcome only if additional statutory penalties are so severe that the offense is nevertheless serious. Here, the ordinance capped imprisonment at 30 days, well below six months, so the offense is presumptively petty. The $10,000 fine does not rebut that presumption: fines alone rarely make an offense serious, and this fine, though substantial, is not the kind of extraordinary penalty that would push the offense over the line. Thus the court properly denied a jury, and the $8,000 fine imposed did not change the analysis. The argument that the $10,000 fine, combined with possible incarceration, exposes Deon to sufficiently serious penalties misses the point: the possible incarceration is only 30 days, and the combination still fits the petty-offense category. The suggestion that any penalty above $5,000 automatically makes an offense serious is not the law; no bright-line monetary rule governs the Sixth Amendment inquiry. Finally, the claim that municipal ordinance violations are not criminal prosecutions is wrong: local ordinances can be criminal prosecutions, and the reason no jury was required here is that the offense was petty, not that it was noncriminal. Strategy: in jury-trial questions, anchor on the maximum jail time first. If it is six months or less, treat the offense as petty unless the added penalties are extraordinary.

Question 2

A state charged Dana with second-degree burglary, punishable by up to 15 years. The state's rules provided for a six-person jury in noncapital felony cases. Dana requested a 12-person jury; the court denied. A six-person jury unanimously convicted Dana.

Is Dana entitled to reversal on the ground that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a 12-person jury?

Yes, because a prison sentence of more than six months is a serious offense requiring the traditional 12-person jury.
Yes, because only a 12-person jury can satisfy the Sixth Amendment's unanimity requirement.
No, because Dana's request for a 12-person jury came too late to preserve the objection.
No, because juries of six persons are constitutionally permissible in state criminal trials, so long as no fewer than six are used. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests a classic Sixth Amendment nuance: the right to a jury trial does not guarantee any particular jury size in state court. When you see a jury question involving a state defendant, separate two concepts: entitlement to a jury trial and required jury composition. Serious offenses—those punishable by more than six months—do require a jury trial. But the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states, does not require the traditional 12-person jury. In fact, the Court has upheld six-person juries as constitutional, while ruling that five-person juries are too small. So a six-person jury is permissible, and if it is unanimous, the defendant has received a constitutionally adequate jury trial. Dana was convicted unanimously by a six-person jury, so there is no Sixth Amendment violation. The choice saying a prison sentence of more than six months requires a traditional 12-person jury is wrong because it confuses the right to a jury with the required size of the jury. The choice claiming only a 12-person jury can satisfy the unanimity requirement is also wrong: unanimity concerns whether all jurors agree, not how many jurors there are. And the choice saying Dana's request came too late misstates the record; there is no timing issue, and even a timely request would not compel a 12-person jury. The correct answer is that juries of six persons are constitutionally permissible in state criminal trials, as long as no fewer than six are used. Remember the floor: for state juries, six is the magic minimum. Fewer than six is unconstitutional; six or more, if unanimous, is generally fine.

Question 3

In a state criminal case, the jury pool was selected from voter rolls and included many Latino jurors. After the parties exercised peremptory strikes, the seated jury contained no Latino jurors, although Latinos made up about30% of the community. The defendant, who is Latino, moved for a new trial, arguing that the actual jury's lack of Latino members violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair cross-section of the community.

Is he entitled to relief?

Yes, because a criminal defendant is entitled to a petit jury that reflects the racial and ethnic composition of the community.
No, because the fair-cross-section requirement applies to the venire, not to the composition of the actual jury after peremptory strikes. (correct answer)
Yes, because the underrepresentation on the seated jury demonstrates that the selection process systematically excluded Latinos.
No, because Latinos are not a cognizable group for fair-cross-section analysis.

Explanation: When you see a fair-cross-section claim, remember the constitutional requirement attaches at the venire stage—the pool from which jurors are drawn—not to the final jury after peremptory strikes. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that the venire represents a fair cross-section of the community, but it does not guarantee that any particular petit jury mirrors the community's demographics. Because the defendant's claim rests solely on the seated jury having no Latino jurors, he is not entitled to relief. The "yes" choices misunderstand the doctrine. A criminal defendant is not entitled to a petit jury that reflects the racial and ethnic composition of the community; that would improperly require proportional representation in every jury. And the seated jury's underrepresentation alone cannot demonstrate that the selection process systematically excluded Latinos—there is no evidence that the voter-roll source or the peremptory process operated to exclude them. Finally, Latinos are absolutely a cognizable group for fair-cross-section analysis, so that distractor is simply wrong. Your strategy: separate the venire from the petit jury. If the facts complain only about the final jury's makeup after peremptory strikes, the fair-cross-section claim fails unless you can identify systematic exclusion in how the venire itself was selected.

Question 4

A state constitution permits six-person juries in felony trials and allows a conviction if five of the six jurors agree. The defendant was tried by a six-person jury for aggravated battery, an offense punishable by up to ten years in prison. The jury voted five to one to convict, and the judge entered judgment on the verdict. The defendant appeals, claiming his federal constitutional right to trial by jury was violated.

Which of the following best supports the defendant's claim?

The jury was too small because a felony prosecution requires a twelve-person jury.
The verdict was not unanimous, and a non-unanimous verdict from a six-person jury is unconstitutional. (correct answer)
The jury was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the community because six jurors cannot represent the community.
The use of a six-person jury for a serious offense violates the Due Process Clause.

Explanation: Whenever you see a jury-trial question, separate three strands: jury size, unanimity, and fair cross-section. Here, thethe size of the jury is not the problem; the Six Amendment permits state criminal juries of six, even for serious offenses punishable by imprisonment. The decisive flaw is the vote: five to one. Under Burch v. Louisiana——and current law after Ramos v. Louisiana——a conviction by non-unanimous verdict from a six-person jury violates the federal constitutional right to trial by jury. A jury reduced to six must still return a unanimous verdict. The choice claiming a felony prosecution requires a twelve-person jury ignores Williams v. Florida, which held that six-person juriesare constitutional in state felony cases; so thats not a valid ground for appeal. The fair cross-section claim confuses the jury pool with the petit jury itself: the requirement applies to how venire members are selected, not whether six actual jurors can "represent" the community. Finally, the due process argument misses the doctrinal source: the right at issue is bottomed on Sixth Amendment incorporated through Fourteenth Amendment, not substantive due process, and the use of a six-person jury for a serious offense does not itself violate due process. The takeaway: when a state chooses a six-person jury, unanimity remains constitutionally required; "six-person jury" does not mean "five-to-one is fine."

Question 5

During a trial, the defendant repeatedly interrupted the proceedings. After warnings, the judge summarily held him in criminal contempt and sentenced him to twelve months in jail. The state's criminal-contempt statute sets no maximum punishment. The defendant was not given a jury trial on the contempt charge. He appeals, claiming his federal constitutional right to trial by jury was violated.

Should the appellate court rule in the defendant's favor?

No, because a judge may summarily punish contempt committed in the courtroom without a jury trial.
No, because criminal contempt is not considered a crime for purposes of the jury trial right.
Yes, because every criminal contempt is a serious offense requiring a jury trial.
Yes, because the sentence actually imposed was twelve months, which made the contempt a serious offense requiring a jury. (correct answer)

Explanation: When you see criminal contempt and the jury trial right, think about the petty-versus-serious offense framework. Criminal contempt is a crime for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, but not every contempt requires a jury. The critical twist in contempt cases is that many contempt statutes, like this one, set no maximum punishment, so courts decide seriousness by the sentence actually imposed rather than the potential statutory maximum. Because the judge actually sentenced the defendant to twelve months—more than the six-month threshold separating petty from serious offenses—the contempt was serious. The defendant therefore had a constitutional right to a jury trial, and the appellate court should rule in his favor. The statement that a judge may summarily punish courtroom contempt without a jury is too broad: summary punishment is allowed only for petty contempt, not for a serious sentence like one year. Likewise, the claim that criminal contempt is not considered a crime for jury purposes is simply wrong after Bloom v. Illinois. The opposite overstatement—that every criminal contempt is a serious offense requiring a jury—also fails, because contempt sentences of six months or less are petty and generally require no jury. What matters here is the actual twelve-month sentence imposed, which made the contempt serious. On exam day, remember: for criminal contempt with no statutory maximum, look to the sentence actually imposed. If it exceeds six months, the jury trial right attaches.

Question 6

During jury selection in a state felony prosecution, the prosecutor used all seven peremptory strikes to remove African American prospective jurors. The defendant, who is white, objected under Batson. The trial court overruled the objection, stating that a white defendant cannot complain about strikes of African American jurors. The all-white jury convicted.

Did the trial court err?

Yes, because a defendant of any race may assert that the prosecution used peremptory strikes to exclude jurors on account of race. (correct answer)
Yes, because the removal of all members of a racial group from a jury automatically violates Batson regardless of the prosecutor's reasons.
No, because Batson claims are limited to defendants who share the racial identity of the excluded jurors.
No, because a single party's use of seven strikes was not enough to establish a pattern of discrimination.

Explanation: Whenever you see a Batson question, focus on the constitutional principle: peremptory strikes may not be used to exclude jurors based on race. The key is that the harm is to the defendant's right to an impartial jury and the excluded juror's right to equal participation, so the defendant's own race does not matter. Here, the trial court erred by telling the white defendant he could not object to striking African American jurors. Under Batson and later cases, a defendant of any race may challenge race-based peremptory strikes. The defendant need not share the race of the excluded jurors because discrimination in jury selection violates equal protection regardless of who raises it. The prosecutor's use of all seven strikes against African American jurors established a strong pattern supporting an inference of discrimination, so the court was required to evaluate the prosecution's reasons for the strikes. The answer claiming the defendant must share the excluded jurors' racial identity is the exact misconception the trial court made. The answer saying removal of all members of a racial group automatically violates Batson is also wrong: Batson requires a prima facie showing, then an opportunity for the prosecutor to give race-neutral reasons; automatic violation is not the rule. Finally, the answer suggesting seven strikes cannot establish a pattern is incorrect—striking every member of a racial group is a classic pattern that can support a Batson challenge. For the exam, remember: Batson protects against racial discrimination in jury selection, not just "same-race" claims. If a question involves race-based strikes, look for whether the court gave the prosecutor a chance to explain—that is the procedural heart of Batson.

Question 7

In a federal prosecution for wire fraud, Alex asked the court to allow him to waive his right to a jury and be tried by the judge, explaining that he feared jurors would be biased by evidence of his prior convictions. The prosecutor objected, and the judge refused Alex's request. Alex was tried by a jury and convicted.

Did the court err in refusing Alex's waiver request?

Yes, because the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial belongs to Alex, and he may knowingly relinquish it even over the prosecutor's objection.
Yes, because forcing Alex to a jury trial denied him the right to a fair trial before an impartial judge.
No, because a defendant has no constitutional right to a bench trial; the government and the court may require a jury when the defendant asks for a judge alone. (correct answer)
No, because Alex's fear of juror bias was speculative and not a sufficient basis for waiver.

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about a defendant requesting a bench trial, start with one key distinction: the Sixth Amendment gives a defendant a right to a jury trial, not a right to a judge trial. It protects defendants from being forced into a bench trial, but it does not give them the power to demand one. In federal court, a jury waiver is valid only if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives in writing, the government consents, and the judge approves. Here, the prosecutor objected and the judge refused, so the jury trial was proper. The court did not err. The "Yes, because the Sixth Amendment right belongs to Alex" choice is a trap. The right is personal, and Alex could knowingly offer to waive it, but the government and court must accept that waiver before a bench trial can occur. The "Yes, because forcing Alex to a jury trial denied him a fair trial before an impartial judge" choice misstates the constitutional guarantee: Alex was entitled to an impartial jury, not an impartial judge, and there was no actual denial of fairness. The "No, because Alex's fear of juror bias was speculative" choice reaches the right bottom line but for the wrong reason. Even a well-founded fear would not create a constitutional right to bench trial. Remember the checklist: defendant's waiver, government consent, and court approval are all required for a bench trial in federal court. If any one is missing, the jury trial stands.

Question 8

A 14-year-old was charged in a juvenile delinquency petition with conduct that would be armed robbery if committed by an adult. If adjudicated delinquent, he could be committed to a juvenile facility until age21. Hen demanded a jury trial. The juvenile court denied, and after a bench adjudication committed him for18 months.

On appeal, did denial violate his Sixth Amendment jury-trial right?

Yes, because the potential confinement exceeded six months, making the proceeding serious.
Yes, because delinquency proceedings are criminal prosecutions when the juvenile is charged with a felony-grade offense.
No, because juvenile delinquency adjudications are not criminal prosecutions for Sixth Amendment purposes, even though they may result in loss of liberty. (correct answer)
No, because a juvenile's parent or guardian may waive jury right without the juvenile's consent.

Explanation: Whenever you see a jury-trial question involving juveniles, remember the pivotal distinction: the Sixth Amendment jury right attaches only to criminal prosecutions. Juvenile delinquency adjudications—even for felony-grade conduct—are treated as civil, not criminal, proceedings. That is why the answer here is no: juvenile delinquency adjudications are not criminal prosecutions for Sixth Amendment purposes, even though they may result in loss of liberty. The Supreme Court has extended certain due-process protections to juveniles, but it declined to require jury trials, reasoning that the informal, rehabilitative character of juvenile court would be destroyed by full adversarial jury machinery. Now look at the distractors. The choice claiming that potential confinement exceeded six months makes the proceeding serious confuses an adult-criminal rule dealing with petty offenses with the juvenile context; that six-month threshold only triggers jury rights after the proceeding is otherwise a criminal prosecution. Likewise, the choice saying delinquency proceedings become criminal prosecutions whenever the juvenile is charged with a felony-grade offense misunderstands McKeiver: even serious conduct does not transform juvenile adjudication intosa criminal prosecution for jury purposes. Finally, the choice asserting that a parent or guardian may waive jury right without consent is off the mark because no jury right exists in juvenile adjudications to begin with, so there is nothing to waive; it also ignores that constitutional rights generally belong to the individual, not merely to a parent. Study tip: whenever you see a juvenile-justice question, ask first whether the right at issue is one the Supreme Court explicitly incorporated into juvenile proceedings—like notice, counsel, confrontation, and privilege against self-incrimination—or one like jury trial that it expressly declined to require. That contrast is a favorite exam theme.

Question 9

Jordan was charged in a single complaint with 45 counts of failing to secure a construction site, one count for each day. Each count carried a maximum of 30 days in jail. The counts were to be tried together, and the court stated that it would impose consecutive sentences if Jordan were convicted. Jordan demanded a jury. The court denied, reasoning that no single offense carried more than six months' imprisonment. Jordan was convicted and sentenced to a total of 30 months.

Did the denial violate Jordan's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury?

Yes, because the aggregate possible and actual sentence exceeded six months, making the prosecution serious.
Yes, because trying 45 counts together transformed the petty charges into a single serious prosecution.
No, because each count was separately punishable by no more than 30 days, and aggregation across counts does not create a right to a jury trial. (correct answer)
No, because Jordan could have received a jury trial by requesting that each count be tried separately.

Explanation: Whenever you see multiple petty offenses charged together, remember that the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right depends on the penalty authorized for each individual offense, not on the total sentence you might face by stacking consecutive sentences. A "serious" offense—one carrying more than six months' imprisonment—triggers the jury right; a "petty" offense punishable by six months or less does not. Under Lewis v. United States, aggregation across multiple petty counts does not turn them into a serious offense for jury purposes. Here, each offense was punishable by at most 30 days—well under six months—so each count was petty. The judge's denial was therefore correct. The 30-month total resulted solely from consecutively stacking 45 petty sentences, but stacking penalties cannot manufacture a jury right that no single charge independently triggers. Why are the wrong answers wrong? The "aggregate possible and actual sentence" answer applies the exact aggregation theory the Supreme Court rejected; the actually imposed sentence does not reclassify petty offenses as serious. The "trying 45 counts together transformed the petty charges" answer is similarly flawed: joinder does not change the authorized penalty per offense, and a prosecutor's charging decision cannot create a constitutional right. The "separate trial" answer is also backwards: each separate count would still carry no more than30 days, so Jordan would still have no jury right; defendant cannot avoid or create jury rights by demanding severance. Strategy: In any jury-trial question, first ask: what is the maximum jail time authorized for a single offense? If it is six months or less, presume petty, no jury. Ignore the cumulative sentence created by consecutive counts.

Question 10

In federal court, Marcus was held in criminal contempt for violating a protective order. The district court found him guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced him to 18 months in prison, without affording him a jury trial. Marcus appealed, arguing that the sentence made the contempt a serious offense requiring a jury.

Is Marcus entitled to reversal?

Yes, because criminal contempt is a crime and the actual 18-month sentence makes the offense serious. (correct answer)
Yes, because all criminal contempt proceedings carry the right to a jury, regardless of sentence.
No, because criminal contempt is not a criminal prosecution within the Sixth Amendment.
No, because the lack of a statutory maximum penalty means there is no presumptively serious sentence.

Explanation: Whenever you see a criminal contempt question, remember that the Sixth Amendment jury right depends on whether the offense is "serious" or "petty." The general rule is that any crime punishable by more than six months' imprisonment is serious, but for criminal contempt there is often no statutory maximum penalty. In that situation, the actual sentence imposed controls the classification. Here, Marcus received an actual 18-month sentence. Because that sentence exceeds six months, his contempt is a serious offense, and the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. That is why reversal is required. The choice saying "all criminal contempt proceedings carry the right to a jury" goes too far—petty contempt, with a sentence of six months or less, carries no jury right. The choice claiming "criminal contempt is not a criminal prosecution within the Sixth Amendment" is also wrong: criminal contempt is a crime, and the Sixth Amendment applies once the punishment rises to serious level. Finally, the statement that "lack of a statutory maximum penalty means there is no presumptively serious sentence" misunderstands the rule—the absence of a maximum is precisely why courts look to the actual sentence, and an 18-month term is clearly serious. Your study takeaway: for criminal contempt, focus on the actual punishment imposed, not a hypothetical maximum, to determine whether a jury is required.

Question 11

In a state prosecution for aggravated robbery, the jury returned a guilty verdict by a vote of 10 to 2. State law expressly permitted guilty verdicts by ten jurors in noncapital felony cases. The defendant, who faced 25 years, moved for a new trial, arguing that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimity. The trial court denied.

On appeal, what result?

Affirmed, because nonunanimous guilty verdicts are permitted in state court when the jury has twelve members.
Affirmed, because the right to trial by jury does not require unanimous verdicts for noncapital offenses.
Reversed, because the defendant did not waive his right to a unanimous verdict in writing.
Reversed, because the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous guilty verdict for serious offenses in state as well as federal court. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a state-court conviction based on a nonunanimous jury verdict, your first thought should be the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee. The right to jury trial applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court has made clear that for a serious offense—like aggravated robbery with a 25-year sentence—a guilty verdict must be unanimous. So the trial court's denial must be reversed. ecause the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous guilty verdict for serious offenses in state as well as federal court. The choice saying "nonunanimous guilty verdicts are permitted in state court when the jury has twelve members" is outdated—before "Ramos v. Louisiana," some states allowed 10-2 verdicts, but no longer: a twelve-person jury returning 10-to-2 cannot convict. Similarly, the choice saying "the right to trial by jury does not require unanimous verdicts for noncapital offenses" mistakes the scope of the right: noncapital does not lower the unanimity requirement; the defendant faces a serious felony, so full jury protections apply. The choice saying "the defendant did not waive his right to a unanimous verdict in writing" gets the result wrong in rationale. A defendant can waive jury trialif done personally and intelligently, but here there was no waiver—the state statute simply authorized nonunanimous verdicts. The constitutional violation is the state's allowance of conviction by 10-2, not a missing paperwork form. On the bar exam, anytime you see a serious state or federal conviction by less than unanimous jury, focus on "Ramos" and choose reversal. If the facts instead show a defendant personally stipulating to a nonunanimous verdict or fewer jurors, waiver might matter; but absent waiver, unanimity is mandatory.

Question 12

In a federal drug prosecution, during deliberations, one juror told the judge that she believed the defendant had committed the charged acts but that she would never convict anyone under the drug laws, which she considered immoral. The judge removed her and replaced her with an alternate, after confirming that she was unwilling to follow the court's instructions on the law. The reconstituted jury convicted. The defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the removal violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.

Should the motion be granted?

Yes, because a sitting juror may not be removed once deliberations have begun absent a showing of inability to deliberate.
No, because the defendant has no right to jury nullification, and a juror who refuses to apply the law may be removed. (correct answer)
Yes, because the defendant was entitled to have the original jury, including a juror with scruples against the drug laws, decide his case.
No, because a defendant cannot challenge a juror's removal once an alternate has been seated.

Explanation: When you see a question about replacing a deliberating juror, focus on the distinction between a juror who cannot deliberate and one who will not follow the law. A criminal defendant has a right to an impartial jury, but he has no right to a jury that nullifies the law. Here, the juror announced she would never convict under the drug laws because she found them immoral. That is not a permissible exercise of discretion; it is a refusal to apply the court's instructions. The judge verified her unwillingness and had cause to remove her. The Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury that follows the law, not one that disregards it. Therefore, the motion for a new trial should be denied. The wrong answer claiming a sitting juror may never be removed once deliberations begin is too rigid—removal is proper for inability to deliberate or refusal to follow the law. Similarly, the suggestion that the defendant was entitled to keep the original juror with scruples confuses a protected viewpoint with a disqualifying refusal to perform the juror's duty. Finally, the answer saying a defendant cannot challenge a removal once an alternate is seated is false; the defendant may challenge a removal, but here the removal was valid. Study tip: distinguish "inability to deliberate" from "unwillingness to apply the law"—both are valid grounds for removal, but only the second addresses jury nullification.