Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Proximate Causation

12 questions · exam conditions

0:00

Proximate CausationQuestion 1 of 12

City Ordinance § 22-4 requires owners of parking garages to keep the premises illuminated from dusk to dawn "for the purpose of deterring theft and property crime." The ordinance's preamble repeats that its purpose is to reduce theft from vehicles. Dade, who owns a garage, failed to replace a burned-out light on the fourth floor. One night, Nix was sexually assaulted on the fourth floor by an unknown assailant who used the darkness to hide. Nix sued Dade, arguing that the ordinance made the broken light negligence per se.

The state supreme court in Marsh v. Block Properties held: "A violation of a safety statute is a proximate cause only when the injury is of the kind the statute was intended to prevent. A plaintiff's injury that is outside the statutory purpose is not within the scope of the defendant's liability, even if the statutory violation facilitated the injury."

Which of the following best describes Dade's liability to Nix?

Dade is not liable because the ordinance was intended to deter theft and property crime, not sexual assault, so the broken light was not a proximate cause of Nix's injuries.

Dade is not liable because an unknown assailant's criminal act is always a superseding cause of harm.

Dade is liable because the ordinance was intended to deter crime generally, and a sexual assault in a dark garage is a foreseeable crime.

Dade is liable because the broken light was a substantial factor in allowing the assailant to attack Nix without being seen.

← Back to quizzes

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Proximate Causation

Practice Proximate Causation in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Proximate Causation, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

Which of the following best describes Dade's liability to Nix?

Dade is not liable because the ordinance was intended to deter theft and property crime, not sexual assault, so the broken light was not a proximate cause of Nix's injuries. (correct answer)
Dade is not liable because an unknown assailant's criminal act is always a superseding cause of harm.
Dade is liable because the ordinance was intended to deter crime generally, and a sexual assault in a dark garage is a foreseeable crime.
Dade is liable because the broken light was a substantial factor in allowing the assailant to attack Nix without being seen.

Explanation: This question tests the intersection of negligence per se and proximate cause. When a statute or ordinance is used to supply the standard of care, you must always ask two questions: was the plaintiff in the protected class, and was the injury the statute intended to prevent? The state supreme court's holding in Marsh v. Block Properties makes the second question decisive. Dade's failure to keep the garage lit violated § 22-4, but the ordinance's text and preamble repeatedly say its purpose is to deter theft and property crime. A sexual assault is not that kind of injury. Even though the darkness may have made the attack easier, the statutory violation did not proximately cause Nix's harm as a matter of law, because the harm falls outside the scope of the duty created by the statute. The answer suggesting an unknown assailant's criminal act is always a superseding cause is wrong: criminal acts are not automatically superseding, and this case is resolved by statutory purpose, not broad intervening-cause rules. The answer saying the ordinance deters crime generally is also wrong: it ignores the specific limiting language in the ordinance and treats general foreseeability as broader than the statutory purpose. Finally, the answer focusing on the broken light as a substantial factor confuses factual cause with proximate cause; being a substantial factor is not enough when the injury is outside the statute's protective purpose. On the bar exam, when a negligence per se claim fails, look to the statute's specific purpose first—not general foreseeability—and remember that substantial factor only answers factual cause.

Question 2

Pruitt owned a wooded lot adjoining Keller's home. Pruitt negligently allowed a large, diseased oak tree to remain standing. During a severe windstorm with wind speeds far above the historic record, the tree fell on Keller's house. An expert testified that the tree was so diseased that it would have fallen in a moderate breeze, and that a healthy tree would not have fallen even in the extreme windstorm. Pruitt argued that the unprecedented windstorm was an unforeseeable act of God.

The applicable rule, from Hsu v. Delta Levee District, provides: "An act of God is a superseding cause only if it is unforeseeable and the defendant's negligence did not substantially contribute to the harm. A defendant whose negligence created a risk that a natural force would cause the very harm that occurred remains liable when that force brings about the harm, even if the force is extraordinary in degree."

Which of the following best describes Pruitt's liability to Keller?

Pruitt is not liable because the windstorm was an unforeseeable act of God and was the direct cause of the tree's fall.
Pruitt is not liable unless the windstorm was a foreseeable risk in the community, because the extent of the harm must be foreseeable.
Pruitt is liable because his negligence substantially contributed to the tree's fall and created the risk that wind would cause the harm, even though the storm was extraordinary. (correct answer)
Pruitt is liable only if a healthy tree would also have fallen in the windstorm, because the defendant's negligence must be a but-for cause of the harm.

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about an "act of God" in a negligence case, remember that the defense rarely succeeds when the defendant's negligence created the precise risk that the natural force brought about. Here, the rule from Hsu makes that explicit: an act of God is a superseding cause only if it is unforeseeable and the defendant's negligence did not substantially contribute to the harm. Pruitt negligently left a diseased tree that would fall in a moderate breeze—his negligence directly created the risk that wind would topple it onto Keller's house. Even though the storm was extraordinary, his negligence substantially contributed, so he remains liable. That is why the correct choice is the one stating he is liable because his negligence substantially contributed and created the risk of wind causing the harm. The first wrong answer ("not liable because the windstorm was an unforeseeable act of God") misreads the rule—unforeseeability alone is insufficient when negligence contributed. The second ("not liable unless the windstorm was a foreseeable risk in the community") wrongly demands foreseeability of the extent of the storm, but the rule only requires that the harm type (wind causing the tree to fall) be foreseeable. The fourth ("liable only if a healthy tree would also have fallen") confuses but-for causation with substantial contribution—here the diseased tree made the fall inevitable even in a moderate breeze, so negligence is a but-for cause regardless of what a healthy tree would do. Study tip: when you see "act of God," check whether the defendant's negligence increased the specific vulnerability to the natural force—that is the key to liability.

Question 3

While boarding a train, a railroad employee negligently jostled a passenger who was carrying a package. The package fell to the platform and exploded, causing a heavy metal scale some distance away to topple onto a woman who was waiting to board. The employee did not know the package contained fireworks. The woman sued the railroad.

In Central Terminal Co. v. Larkin, the court held: "A defendant is liable only for harms that result from the risks that made the defendant's conduct negligent. A plaintiff injured by an unforeseeable chain of events may not recover, even if the defendant was negligent toward another. But if the specific risk that materialized was foreseeable, the defendant may be liable even if the precise manner of the injury was not."

Which of the following, if true, would best support the woman's claim against the railroad?

The package was large and bulky, so a fall was more likely to strike someone standing near the passenger.
The woman was standing at the far end of the platform, outside the area where a falling package could reach.
The metal scale was old, rusty, and poorly secured, and the railroad knew it was likely to topple if disturbed.
The employee saw the words "DANGEROUS—EXPLOSIVES" printed on the package before jostling the passenger. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests proximate cause and the "scope of the risk" rule. Whenever you see a Palsgraf-style holding like this, ask: Was the plaintiff's harm within the risks that made the defendant's conduct negligent—not whether the exact chain of events was foreseeable? Here, the employee's negligence was jostlinga passenger carrying a package. That ordinary negligence risked the package falling and hitting someone nearby. But the woman's injury came from an explosion that toppled a scale. To make the railroad liable, you need evidence that the explosion risk was foreseeable to the employee. The employee seeing "DANGEROUS—EXPLOSIVES" printed on the package supplies that: he knew jostling could cause a dangerous explosive package to go off, so a blast injury to someone on the platform—even via a toppling scale—was within the risk. The precise manner need not be foreseeable. The large, bulky package choice only makes a dropped-package injury to a nearby person more likely; it says nothing about an explosion or an injury to a woman farther away. The woman standing outside the falling-package zone actually cuts off duty: she was beyond the reach of the package's ordinary risk, so it does not help. The poorly secured scale shows a possible separate negligence by the railroad, but it still does not connect the employee's jostling to an explosion; the scale's instability is not the risk that made jostling the passenger negligent. So the best support is the employee's actual knowledge of the danger label.

Question 4

While driving home from work, a sales representative ran a red light and struck a motorcycle, fracturing the rider's leg. At the hospital, an orthopedic surgeon misread the X-ray and placed a cast that allowed the bones to heal at an incorrect angle. The rider later needed a second surgery to re-break and realign the leg. The rider sued the sales representative for the medical expenses and pain associated with the second surgery.

Which issue is most significant in determining whether the sales representative is liable for the injuries from the second surgery?

Whether the orthopedic surgeon's misreading of the X-ray was a departure from the standard of care.
Whether the rider would have required the second surgery if he had sought a second opinion before the first cast was applied.
Whether the sales representative's running of the red light was the but-for cause of the rider's fractured leg.
Whether the surgeon's error was an intervening cause that relieves the sales representative of liability for the second surgery. (correct answer)

Explanation: When you see a torts question about liability for harm that occurs after an initial injury, your mind should immediately go to proximate cause and the concept of intervening causes. The key question is whether the chain of causation was broken by something that is unforeseeable or superseding. Here, the sales rep's running the red light clearly caused the rider's fractured leg—that's the initial harm. But the second surgery arises from the surgeon's misread X-ray. That medical error is the critical issue: is it an intervening cause that severs the sales rep's liability? Generally, negligent medical treatment of an injury is a foreseeable consequence of causing the injury, so it does not relieve the original tortfeasor. However, if the surgeon's error was grossly negligent or extraordinary, it could be a superseding cause. The question asks what is most significant in determining liability—so you must evaluate whether the surgeon's error qualifies as a superseding cause. That is exactly what the correct choice asks. The other options miss the mark. The surgeon's departure from the standard of care (A) is relevant to the surgeon's own liability, but it doesn't directly answer whether the rep is liable—even a negligent error may not be superseding. The rider's failure to get a second opinion (B) could be comparative negligence or failure to mitigate, but it's not the central issue for the rep's liability for the second surgery. The but-for cause of the fractured leg (C) is already established—running the red light clearly caused the fracture; the issue is about the second surgery, not the initial break. Finally, the surgeon's error being an intervening cause (the correct answer) is the precise legal test for breaking the chain. Study tip: On torts questions involving multiple harms, always separate the initial injury from subsequent complications. Ask: Was the subsequent harm a foreseeable result of the original tort? If yes, the original actor remains liable. Look for language about "intervening" or "superseding" causes—those are your signal to apply this analysis.

Question 5

A bus driver closed the doors of a crowded bus while a passenger was still stepping on. The passenger was carrying a box of ceremonial fireworks. The door caught the box and knocked it from the passenger's hands; the fireworks fell to the ground and exploded. The explosion startled a woman standing on the sidewalk about half a block away, and she stumbled off the curb and broke her ankle. The woman sued the bus company.

Which issue is most significant in determining whether the bus company is liable to the woman for her broken ankle?

Whether the bus driver's closing of the door was negligent toward the passenger with the fireworks.
Whether the explosion was a direct cause of the woman's fall from the curb.
Whether the woman's injury was too remote a consequence of the bus driver's action to support liability. (correct answer)
Whether the passenger was negligent in carrying fireworks onto the crowded bus.

Explanation: This question tests proximate cause in negligence, specifically whether an unusual chain of events makes a harm too remote to support liability. When you see a bizarre or attenuated fact pattern, your immediate question should be whether the harm was foreseeable and within the scope of risk created by the defendant's conduct. Here, the most significant issue is whether the woman's injury was too remote a consequence. The bus driver negligently closed the door on the passenger, but the woman was standing half a block away. The explosion of ceremonial fireworks is an extraordinary intervening event. The risk of injuring a pedestrian so far removed from the scene through this startling chain is not a foreseeable consequence of closing a bus door, so proximate cause likely fails. The choice about whether the closing was negligent toward the passenger is a trap because it focuses on duty to a different plaintiff. Even if the driver breached a duty to the passenger, that does not establish liability to the woman. The choice about the explosion being a direct cause addresses actual cause—yes, it factually caused the fall—but that is not the legal issue; remoteness is. The choice about the passenger's negligence in carrying fireworks is also wrong; the passenger's own negligence does not resolve whether the bus company's actions were the proximate cause of the woman's injury. The core issue remains the remoteness of her harm. Strategy: Distinguish factual cause ("but for") from proximate cause (foreseeability). When a freakish accident occurs, the answer usually hinges on remoteness.

Question 6

A contractor parked a bulldozer on a city street overnight and left the keys in the ignition. An 18-year-old got into the bulldozer, drove it several blocks, and struck a pedestrian who was crossing at a crosswalk. The pedestrian sued the contractor.

Which additional fact would be most important in determining whether the contractor is liable for the pedestrian's injuries?

The 18-year-old had a learner's permit but had never operated a bulldozer.
The pedestrian was looking straight ahead and was using the crosswalk.
The contractor had parked the bulldozer on that street for the previous three nights.
Several construction vehicles had been stolen from nearby streets during the previous year. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests negligence, specifically whether a contractor can be liable when a third party's criminal act—the theft of the bulldozer—causes injury. The key issue is foreseeability: did the contractor have enough warning that leaving keys in a bulldozer on a city street created a foreseeable risk of harm? The most important fact is that several construction vehicles had been stolen from nearby streets during the previous year. That prior similar happening gives the contractor notice that theft of unattended construction equipment in that area was foreseeable, which makes it more likely a jury would find the contractor breached a duty and that the theft was not a superseding cause. The learner's permit fact is a distractor: the 18-year-old's inexperience explains how he crashed, but it does not show what the contractor should have anticipated. The pedestrian looking straight ahead and using the crosswalk might show the pedestrian was careful, but it does not establish the contractor's duty or breach. The fact that the contractor parked there the previous three nights shows only a habit, not notice of danger. Prior thefts, by contrast, are exactly the kind of evidence that makes the injury foreseeable. Study tip: whenever a question involves criminal or intentional conduct by a third party, look for facts showing the defendant knew or should have known of that risk—prior similar incidents are the strongest clue.

Question 7

A fire started in the kitchen of an apartment building because of faulty wiring that the building owner had ignored. A resident was treated for smoke inhalation and released. Over the following months, the resident experienced severe anxiety and insomnia. The resident later died by suicide. The resident's family sued the building owner for wrongful death.

Which issue is most significant in determining whether the building owner is liable for the resident's death?

Whether the resident's suicide was a foreseeable consequence of the fire or a superseding cause. (correct answer)
Whether the faulty wiring created an unreasonable risk of fire in the apartment building.
Whether the resident had a prior diagnosis of depression or anxiety before the fire.
Whether the smoke inhalation was a but-for cause of the resident's later emotional distress.

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about a defendant's liability for a plaintiff's suicide, your focus should be on proximate causation—specifically whether the suicide is a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence or a superseding cause that breaks the chain. Here, the building owner negligently ignored faulty wiring, causing a fire and the resident's smoke inhalation. The resident later died by suicide after months of anxiety and insomnia. The central issue is whether that suicide was a foreseeable result of the fire (making the owner liable for wrongful death) or an independent, unforeseeable act that supersedes the owner's negligence. That is why the correct choice is the one asking about foreseeability versus superseding cause. The faulty wiring's unreasonable risk (choice about unreasonable risk) speaks to breach of duty, but the fire already happened; the dispute is about the death, not the fire itself. A prior diagnosis of depression or anxiety (choice about prior diagnosis) is relevant only as evidence bearing on foreseeability, not the determinative legal test. And whether smoke inhalation was a but‑for cause of emotional distress (choice about but‑for cause) ignores that but‑for causation alone does not establish proximate cause—and the harm here is the death, not mere distress. On exam day, remember: when a plaintiff's suicide follows negligence, ask whether the defendant could have foreseen that reaction. If yes, the chain holds; if no, the suicide is a superseding cause. That question always outweighs subsidiary issues.

Question 8

At a busy intersection, a taxi driver rear-ended a sedan that was stopped at a red light. No one in either car was hurt, but the impact pushed the sedan partway into the crosswalk. A bystander ran into the crosswalk to help the sedan's driver and was struck by a delivery truck that had the green light. The bystander sued the taxi driver.

Which issue is most significant in determining whether the taxi driver is liable for the bystander's injuries?

Whether the bystander acted reasonably in running into the crosswalk to help the sedan's driver.
Whether the bystander's injury was within the scope of the risk created by the taxi driver's negligence. (correct answer)
Whether the delivery truck driver had time to stop after the taxi driver's collision.
Whether the taxi driver's rear-end collision was a breach of the duty of care owed to the sedan's driver.

Explanation: When you see a chain of events that begins with an initial collision and ends with a remote or unexpected injury, your first thought should be proximate cause: was the harm within the foreseeable scope of risk created by the defendant's negligence? Here, the taxi driver negligently rear-ended the sedan at a busy intersection, creating a situation likely to draw aid from others. That matters because of the rescue doctrine: "danger invites rescue." A negligent defendant can be liable to a rescuer injured during the rescue if the rescue attempt was a foreseeable response to the danger he created. So the most significant issue is whetherthe bystander's injury was within the scope of the risk created by the taxi driver's negligence. That inquiry determines duty and proximate cause, not merely whether one event followed another. Whetherthe bystander acted reasonablyin running into the crosswalkis not the decisive issue: a rescuer may have to act quickly, and even an imprudent rescue can be foreseeable; at most, unreasonableness might affect comparative fault or become a superseding cause if extreme. Whetherthe delivery truck driver had time to stop also misses the point: the truck had the green light, but the taxi driver's liability depends on whether the rescue injury was within the risk he created, not on whether a separate driver could have braked. And whetherthe taxi driver's rear-end collision was a breach of duty to the sedan's driver is too narrow: a defendant owes a duty to foreseeable plaintiffs, including rescuers, so breach to the original victim is necessary but does not resolve the scope of liability to this bystander. Study takeaway: whenever an intervening person or event appears, ask whether the result fell within the risks that made the original conduct negligent. That is the heart of proximate cause on this exam.

Question 9

Nash was stopped at a red light when Vega negligently rear-ended him. The impact was minor, but Nash, who had a previously undiagnosed arteriovenous malformation (AVM) in his brain, developed a severe headache and was taken to the hospital. An MRI revealed the AVM and also a small, benign pituitary tumor unrelated to the collision. While undergoing an endovascular procedure to treat the AVM, Nash suffered a stroke caused by the surgeon's negligent placement of a catheter, leaving Nash permanently paralyzed. Nash sued Vega.

In Bailey v. Crescent Transit, the court stated: "The eggshell-plaintiff rule extends liability to unforeseeable consequences that flow from a pre-existing vulnerability when the defendant's tortious conduct sets that vulnerability in motion. A defendant remains liable for additional harm caused by ordinary negligence in the medical treatment of the injury. The defendant is not liable for a wholly independent condition that is merely discovered during treatment, or for harm caused by an intervening act entirely unrelated to the medical treatment of the injury."

Which of the following best describes Vega's liability for Nash's paralysis?

Vega is liable because the eggshell-plaintiff rule makes a defendant liable for all consequences of the tortious conduct, including the surgeon's negligent catheter placement.
Vega is liable because the collision set the pre-existing AVM in motion, and the surgeon's negligent treatment of that aggravated condition was ordinary negligence in the medical treatment of the injury. (correct answer)
Vega is not liable because the paralysis resulted from medical treatment of a pre-existing condition, and the eggshell-plaintiff rule does not apply to conditions that existed before the collision.
Vega is not liable because the surgeon's negligent catheter placement was an independent intervening cause that was unforeseeable.

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about the eggshell-plaintiff rule, remember that a defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him—but the rule has limits. Liability extends to consequences of the injury, including harm from negligent medical treatment of that injury, but not to independent conditions merely discovered during treatment or wholly unrelated intervening acts. Here, the collision aggravated Nash's pre-existing AVM, setting it in motion. That is a tortious injury, and the surgeon's negligent catheter placement occurred while treating that aggravated condition. Under Bailey, the defendant remains liable for additional harm caused by ordinary negligence in the medical treatment of the injury. Therefore, Vega is liable for the paralysis. Now the wrong answers. The choice saying Vega is liable because the eggshell rule makes a defendant liable for "all consequences" overstates the doctrine—it does not cover independent conditions discovered during treatment, and the surgeon's negligence is only within scope because it treated the aggravated AVM, not because the rule is absolute. The choice saying Vega is not liable because the paralysis resulted from treatment of a pre-existing condition misses that the AVM was not merely pre-existing—the collision aggravated it, making it an injury. Finally, the choice calling the surgeon's negligence an "independent intervening cause" is incorrect: negligent medical care of the injury is a foreseeable consequence, not an unrelated act that breaks causation. On exam day, when you see a defendant's negligence followed by medical malpractice, ask: was the malpractice treating the injury the defendant caused? If yes, the original tortfeasor is liable.

Question 10

A delivery van ran a stop sign and struck a car. The car's driver had a preexisting spinal condition that made her unusually vulnerable to disc injuries. After the collision, she developed a herniated disc and required surgery. A person with a normal spine would have suffered only minor soft-tissue injuries from the impact. She sued the van driver.

Which issue is most significant in determining whether the van driver is liable for the herniated disc?

Whether the van driver's failure to stop at the stop sign was a breach of the duty of care.
Whether the preexisting spinal condition was a superseding cause of the herniated disc.
Whether the collision, rather than the preexisting spinal condition, caused the herniated disc. (correct answer)
Whether the van driver reasonably could have foreseen the severity of the disc injury.

Explanation: Any time you see a torts question involving a plaintiff with a preexisting condition, separate factual cause from legal cause. The defendant is liable for all harm her negligence actually causes, even if the plaintiff was unusually vulnerable. That is the eggshell-plaintiff rule: the driver takes the victim as she finds her. The decisive issue here is whether the collision, rather than the preexisting spinal condition, caused the herniated disc. If the collision was a substantial factor in producing it, the driver pays for the full injury even though a normal spine would have suffered only minor soft-tissue damage. The van driver's failure to stop at the stop sign is likely a breach of duty, but breach alone is not enough; if the impact did not actually cause the disc injury, there is no liability for it. The preexisting condition is not a superseding cause—a vulnerability does not break the causal chain. And while foreseeability matters in negligence, the driver does not need to foresee the severity of the injury; foreseeing some physical harm is enough. The trap is treating the eggshell plaintiff as a causation problem instead of a damages problem. On exam day, ask: "But for the collision, would this herniated disc have occurred?" If yes, causation is satisfied; the preexisting condition goes to vulnerability, not liability.

Question 11

Damon negligently broke Vance's leg. While recuperating, Vance attempted to carry a heavy television down a flight of stairs on crutches, despite his doctor's explicit warning to stay on the first floor and not to carry objects while using crutches. He lost his balance, fell, and suffered a head injury. Vance sued Damon for the head injury.

The applicable rule, from Stern v. Alden, provides: "A defendant is liable for a subsequent injury suffered during a reasonable course of convalescence if the subsequent injury is a foreseeable consequence of the weakened condition caused by the original injury. A subsequent injury is a superseding cause if it results from the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct or from an independent unforeseeable force."

Which of the following best describes Damon's liability for the head injury?

Damon is liable because the head injury was a foreseeable consequence of the weakened condition caused by the broken leg.
Damon is liable because a defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him, and a plaintiff's own negligence does not supersede the original negligence.
Damon is not liable because Vance's conduct in carrying a heavy television downstairs despite a doctor's warning was unreasonable and was a superseding cause of the head injury. (correct answer)
Damon is not liable because a fall on stairs is an independent unforeseeable force that breaks the chain of causation.

Explanation: When you see a subsequent injury during convalescence, apply the Stern rule strictly: the original defendant is liable only if the subsequent injury is foreseeable and the plaintiff's conduct was reasonable. The key is whether the plaintiff's actions were a reasonable response to the weakened condition or an unreasonable departure from it. Here, the plaintiff's conduct is decisive. Carrying a heavy television down stairs on crutches, directly against the doctor's explicit warning, is plainly unreasonable. Under the rule, such unreasonable conduct is a superseding cause, so Damon is not liable for the head injury. Now, the wrong answers. The choice stating Damon is liable because the head injury was a foreseeable consequence of the weakened condition misses the critical exception—the rule explicitly cuts off liability for unreasonable plaintiff conduct, even if the injury type is arguably foreseeable. The choice relying on "defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him" and "plaintiff's own negligence does not supersede" misstates the law; that thin-skull principle applies to pre-existing vulnerabilities, not to unreasonable intervening conduct, which the rule here expressly makes a superseding cause. Finally, the choice that the fall on stairs is an independent unforeseeable force is incorrect—a fall caused by the plaintiff's own carrying heavy objects is not an independent force; it's a direct consequence of his unreasonable act, not an external event like a lightning strike or a third party's behavior. For your study: anytime a fact pattern includes a plaintiff ignoring a doctor's explicit warning or engaging in blatantly unsafe activity during recovery, circle "superseding cause." The exam loves to test this exception to the foreseeable-consequence rule—so identify the reasonableness of the plaintiff's convalescence conduct first, and you'll quickly find the correct answer.

Question 12

Delgado negligently caused a gasoline tanker to overturn and catch fire. Firefighter Brandt was dispatched to extinguish the blaze. While advancing a hose line near the burning tanker, Brandt was struck by a car driven by a fleeing robbery suspect who had run through a police roadblock three blocks away and lost control at the fire scene. Brandt sued Delgado for his injuries.

The applicable rule, from Ortiz v. City of Mesa, provides: "A defendant who negligently creates a peril is liable for injuries to a rescuer if the rescuer acts reasonably in response to the peril. This liability extends to professional rescuers except when the injury is caused by the very condition that is the normal subject of the rescuer's job. An intervening act of a third person is superseding if it was not a foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant's negligence."

Which of the following best describes Delgado's liability to Brandt?

Delgado is not liable because a firefighter may not recover for injuries sustained while responding to a fire caused by the defendant's negligence.
Delgado is liable because the suspect's criminal act, though independent, was a foreseeable consequence of the chaos created by the tanker fire.
Delgado is liable because a rescuer's injuries are foreseeable whenever the defendant negligently creates an emergency, and the firefighter was acting reasonably.
Delgado is not liable because the fleeing suspect's loss of control was an unforeseeable intervening act that was not a consequence of the fire. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a rescuer-injury question with an intervening third-party act, your decisive move is to test that act for superseding causation. Here, Delgado created a peril, and Brandt acted reasonably, so the rescue doctrine's first prong is satisfied. However, the rule from Ortiz states that an intervening act is superseding if it was not a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence. Brandt's injury came not from the fire, but from a car driven by a robbery suspect who ran a roadblock three blocks away. That independent criminal act has no causal or foreseeable link to a tanker fire – it was a random, freak occurrence. Thus, the suspect's loss of control is superseding, and Delgado is not liable. Now, consider the wrong choices. The choice stating a firefighter may not recover for injuries while responding to a fire misstates the professional rescuer exception – that exception only bars recovery when the injury is caused by the very condition that is the job's normal subject (e.g., burns), not by a third party's car. The choice that deems the suspect's act foreseeable because of "chaos" is flawed: a robbery suspect fleeing a roadblock three blocks away has no nexus to the fire; foreseeability requires a connection, not just an emergency scene. Finally, the choice that liability attaches "whenever" a defendant creates an emergency is too broad – it ignores the superseding cause analysis that the rule explicitly requires. Your takeaway: always separate the rescuer's own injury from a third party's intervention. If the third party's act is independent and unforeseeable, it cuts off liability, even for a professional rescuer.