Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Products Liability

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Products LiabilityQuestion 1 of 12

Under Columbia's Product Liability Act:

"Product" means the tangible personal property sold or leased to the plaintiff, including all component parts integrated into it. In an action involving a defective component part, the finished product sold to the plaintiff is the product, and the component part is a part of that product. "Harm" means physical injury to a person or damage to property other than the product itself. Damage to the product itself—including damage caused by one component part to another component part of the same product—is not recoverable in tort.

Delia bought a new motorboat from Bay Marine. The boat contained a fuel pump manufactured by Pumps Inc. Six months later, the fuel pump's impeller shattered. Metal fragments from the impeller were drawn into the engine, destroying the engine, and other fragments punctured the boat's hull, causing the boat to sink. Delia lost the boat and its engine. It is undisputed that the impeller was defective when it left Pumps Inc. and that the defect was a substantial factor in the damage. Delia sued Pumps Inc. in strict product liability.

Under the Act, what may Delia recover from Pumps Inc.?

Damage to the boat hull only, because the hull was not the defective component and was damaged by the defective pump.

Nothing, because the boat was the product sold to Delia and the fuel pump, engine, and hull were all component parts of that product.

Damage to the engine and hull, because the defective component was only the fuel pump and the engine and hull were other property.

Damage to the engine only, because the engine was not the component containing the defect and the hull was part of the boat's structure.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Products Liability

Practice Products Liability in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Products Liability, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

Under Columbia's Product Liability Act:

Under the Act, what may Delia recover from Pumps Inc.?

Damage to the boat hull only, because the hull was not the defective component and was damaged by the defective pump.
Nothing, because the boat was the product sold to Delia and the fuel pump, engine, and hull were all component parts of that product. (correct answer)
Damage to the engine and hull, because the defective component was only the fuel pump and the engine and hull were other property.
Damage to the engine only, because the engine was not the component containing the defect and the hull was part of the boat's structure.

Explanation: When you see a strict product liability question, the first step is to identify the exact "product" sold. Here, the Act defines "product" as the tangible personal property sold to the plaintiff, including all component parts integrated into it. Since Delia bought the motorboat, the boat is the product; the fuel pump, engine, and hull are all component parts of that boat. The Act defines "harm" as physical injury or damage to property other than the product itself. It explicitly excludes damage to the product itself, including damage caused by one component part to another component part of the same product. The defective impeller in the fuel pump destroyed the engine and punctured the hull—both are components of the same boat. Thus, all damage is to the product itself, not "other property." No physical injury occurred, so Delia recovers nothing in tort. The option claiming recovery for the boat hull only is wrong because the hull is a component part, not other property, and the engine damage is also excluded. The option claiming recovery for the engine and hull is wrong for the same reason—both are parts of the product, and component-to-component damage is barred. The option claiming recovery for the engine only is wrong because the engine is a component part; its damage is to the product itself, even though it wasn't the defective component. Your study tip: whenever a statute defines "product" to include components, ask whether the damaged item is part of that same finished product. If yes, the economic loss rule bars tort recovery—you must look to contract or warranty law instead.

Question 2

Cade bought a forklift. The operator's manual stated, in bold type on the first page: "WARNING: Do not remove the overhead guard. Removing the guard creates a risk of death or serious injury from falling loads." Cade's employee Vera removed the overhead guard so the forklift could fit into a trailer. The guard was attached by four ordinary bolts. While Vera drove the forklift without the guard, a pallet fell from the forks and struck her, injuring her seriously. Vera sued the manufacturer, claiming the forklift was defectively designed because the guard should have required a special tool for removal. The manufacturer knew that some purchasers removed overhead guards, and it was feasible to design a guard that could not be removed without a special tool.

In Martinez v. Liftco, the Columbia Supreme Court held: "Misuse or alteration of a product is an affirmative defense to a products liability claim when the misuse or alteration was a substantial factor in causing the harm. The defense is not available when the misuse or alteration was reasonably foreseeable and the product was defective because it lacked an adequate warning regarding that misuse or alteration. A warning is adequate if it is conspicuous, communicates the specific risk, and is reasonably calculated to reach the user."

Under Martinez, which is correct?

The manufacturer is liable because the removal was reasonably foreseeable and a feasible special-tool design would have prevented it.
The manufacturer is liable because the warning appeared only in the manual, not on the guard itself, so it was not reasonably calculated to reach the user.
The manufacturer is not liable because Vera's removal of the guard was an unforeseeable misuse that broke the causal connection.
The manufacturer is not liable because Vera's removal of the guard was a substantial factor and the manufacturer's warning was conspicuous, specific, and adequate. (correct answer)

Explanation: When a question presents a product-defect claim alongside a fact pattern of user modification, your first instinct should be to apply the affirmative defense of misuse or alteration. Under Martinez, the defense fails only if the misuse was reasonably foreseeable and the product lacked an adequate warning about that specific misuse. Here, the key is whether the warning satisfies Martinez's three-prong test. The manufacturer prevails because the warning was adequate. It was conspicuous (bold type on the first page), it communicated the specific risk (death or injury from falling loads if the guard is removed), and it was reasonably calculated to reach the user—a manual delivered with the forklift is a standard channel. Because the warning is adequate, the product is not defective for failing to warn, even though the removal was foreseeable. Vera's removal was a substantial factor in her injury, so the affirmative defense applies, and the manufacturer is not liable. The choice claiming the manufacturer is liable because a feasible special-tool design would have prevented the harm misreads Martinez: a feasible alternative design is irrelevant when the warning is adequate, because the defect alleged (lack of adequate warning) is cured. The choice saying liability follows because the warning was only in the manual, not on the guard, is too strict—Martinez does not mandate on-product labels; it requires that the warning be reasonably calculated to reach the user, which a manual satisfies. Finally, the choice asserting the removal was an unforeseeable misuse is factually wrong—the manufacturer knew purchasers removed guards, making it foreseeable. Study tip: For misuse defenses, always evaluate the warning's adequacy before discussing foreseeability. If the warning is adequate, the defense stands regardless of foreseeability. If not, the defense collapses.

Question 3

A pharmaceutical company manufactured a prescription drug for treating epilepsy. The label warned that the drug could cause aplastic anemia, a severe blood disorder, and instructed physicians to perform weekly blood tests. The company provided this label to all physicians, but did not provide patient-directed warnings. A physician prescribed the drug to a patient after reading the label, but did not order the weekly blood tests because she thought the risk was too rare to justify the cost. The patient developed aplastic anemia and sued the company for failure to warn.

Which issue is most likely to determine whether the company is liable to the patient?

Whether the patient would have read a direct warning if one had been included with the prescription.
Whether the warning given to the physician adequately alerted the physician to the need for blood monitoring. (correct answer)
Whether the physician's decision not to order blood tests because of cost was medically unreasonable.
Whether the manufacturer knew that the patient suffered from epilepsy before the drug was prescribed.

Explanation: Whenever you see a prescription-drug failure-to-warn question, think of the learned intermediary doctrine: the manufacturer's duty runs to the physician, not directly to the patient. So the key question is whether the warning the company gave the physician was adequate. Here, the company did warn physicians that the drug could cause aplastic anemia and instructed weekly blood tests. The physician read the label but chose not to order tests because she thought the risk did not justify the cost. The company's liability therefore turns on whether that label warning adequately alerted the physician to the need for blood monitoring. If the warning was sufficient, the company fulfilled its duty; if it was not—say, if it understated the risk or buried the monitoring instruction—the company could be liable. The distractor about whether the patient would have read a direct warning misses the point: under the learned intermediary doctrine, the manufacturer is not required to warn the patient directly, so the patient's hypothetical reading is not the decisive issue. The physician's cost-based decision not to order blood tests is about the physician's own medical judgment, not the adequacy of the company's warning. And whether the manufacturer knew this particular patient had epilepsy is irrelevant; the duty is to warn physicians generally about known risks of the drug, not to individualize warnings. On the exam, when you see a drug warning question, immediately ask: Was the warning to the physician adequate? Then watch for answer choices that shift blame to the doctor or demand patient-directed warnings.

Question 4

A chemical manufacturer sold a degreasing solvent in bulk to a metal-plating company. The manufacturer sent the company's owner a safety data sheet stating that breathing the solvent's fumes could cause lung damage and that the solvent should be used only with ventilation. The owner did not tell employees about the sheet and did not post warnings. A plater who worked near the solvent without respiratory protection developed lung disease and sued the manufacturer for failing to warn her directly.

Which fact, if true, would most weaken the manufacturer's defense that it reasonably relied on the plating company to warn its employees?

The manufacturer knew that the plating company's owner had previously failed to pass on safety information to employees. (correct answer)
The plater had not received any training about solvents at the plating company.
The solvent was delivered in unlabeled drums rather than in containers with the manufacturer's warning.
The plater continued to work after experiencing breathing problems.

Explanation: This question tests the duty to warn in products liability, specifically the "sophisticated intermediary" doctrine. When a manufacturer sells a dangerous product to an employer, it can satisfy its duty to warn by providing the warning to the employer, relying on the employer to pass it on to employees. That reliance, however, is only reasonable if the manufacturer has no reason to doubt the intermediary's reliability. Here, the fact that the manufacturer knew the plating company's owner had previously failed to pass on safety information directly destroys that reasonableness. If the manufacturer knows the employer is an unreliable conduit for warnings, it cannot simply hand over a safety data sheet and claim it fulfilled its duty to the plater. This knowledge shifts the duty back to the manufacturer to warn the ultimate users directly or take other precautions. Now, the wrong choices. The fact that the plater had not received any training about solvents shows the employer's negligence, but it does not attack the reasonableness of the manufacturer's reliance unless the manufacturer knew about that training gap — so it's insufficient. The solvent being delivered in unlabeled drums is a separate potential warning defect, but it does not address the specific defense of relying on the employer to warn employees. Finally, the plater continuing to work after experiencing breathing problems suggests comparative negligence or assumption of risk on the plater's part, which would actually strengthen the manufacturer's defense, not weaken it. For your study, remember: the sophisticated intermediary defense fails when the manufacturer knows or should know that the intermediary is unreliable. On exam day, look for facts establishing the manufacturer's actual knowledge of the intermediary's track record.

Question 5

A worker was injured when a circular saw kicked back while he was making a plunge cut. The worker had removed the saw's blade guard the day before because it made plunge cuts more difficult. The saw's manual warned that the guard should not be removed and that the saw was not designed for plunge cutting. The worker sued the saw manufacturer for defective design. The manufacturer raised the defense that the worker's removal of the guard was a substantial alteration.

Which fact is most important in determining whether the alteration defense will succeed?

Whether the worker had read the warning in the manual before removing the guard.
Whether the saw could be used for plunge cuts with the guard in place.
Whether the worker's employer had instructed him to remove the guard for this type of cut.
Whether the manufacturer knew or should have known that some users removed the guard to make plunge cuts. (correct answer)

Explanation: When you see a products liability question raising the substantial alteration defense, your immediate focus should be on foreseeability. A manufacturer is not liable for injuries caused by a user's modification if that modification was unforeseeable. The key fact here is whether the manufacturer knew or should have known that some users removed the guard to make plunge cuts. If that practice was reasonably foreseeable, the alteration defense fails, because the manufacturer had a duty to design a product that could withstand foreseeable misuse—even if the manual prohibited it. The choice about whether the worker had read the warning in the manual addresses his own comparative negligence or assumption of risk, but that does not negate the manufacturer's liability for a foreseeable alteration. Similarly, whether the saw could be used for plunge cuts with the guard in place speaks to the product's overall utility or whether the design was defective, but it does not directly answer whether the removal itself was a foreseeable event. Finally, whether the worker's employer had instructed him to remove the guard might shift blame to the employer or raise issues of workplace negligence, but it still does not resolve the core issue of the manufacturer's knowledge of common user behavior. For your study: whenever you see "substantial alteration" or "product misuse," immediately ask, "Was this alteration reasonably foreseeable?" That single question often decides the case, because a manufacturer must anticipate and guard against foreseeable alterations, even those contrary to warnings.

Question 6

A military pilot was killed when the flight-control computer in a fighter jet malfunctioned during a training mission. The pilot's estate sued the computer manufacturer for defective design. The computer was built to detailed specifications approved by the military. The manufacturer followed those specifications exactly and had informed the military of a potential failure mode in the computer. The military accepted the risk for cost reasons. The manufacturer did not warn the pilot directly.

Which defense is the manufacturer most likely to assert successfully?

Federal preemption, because the military's acceptance of the computer for its fleet displaces state tort law.
Assumption of risk, because the pilot voluntarily served in the military and knew of the dangers of flying.
The government contractor defense, because the military approved reasonably precise specifications and the manufacturer conformed to them. (correct answer)
Comparative fault, because the military's decision to accept the known risk caused the pilot's death.

Explanation: Whenever you see a product-defect claim against a manufacturer of military equipment, immediately think of the government contractor defense. That doctrine shields contractors when the military approved reasonably precise specifications, the equipment conformed to those specs, and the contractor warned the military of known dangers. Here all three elements are satisfied: the computer was built to detailed military-approved specifications, the manufacturer followed them exactly, and it informed the military of the potential failure mode while the military accepted the risk for cost reasons. That makes this defense the strongest one. Federal preemption is too broad: military acceptance of equipment does not by itself displace state tort law; preemption requires an actual conflict with federal law or policy, which is what the government contractor defense specifically addresses. Assumption of risk fails because the pilot's general knowledge of military flying dangers is not the same as knowingly encountering this specific computer defect. Comparative fault is also not the best defense: the military's cost-driven acceptance might affect responsibility, but it does not eliminate the manufacturer's liability the way the government contractor defense does. Remember: on the bar exam, "military equipment + government specs + warning to the military" is a trigger phrase for the government contractor defense. Separate that specific doctrine from general preemption and fault defenses.

Question 7

Under Columbia's Products Liability Act:

(a) A "product seller" includes a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer engaged in the business of selling the product.

(b) A "manufacturer" includes a person who designs or produces a product or a component part of a product.

(c) A component-part seller is not liable for harm caused by a finished product into which the component is integrated unless (i) the component itself was defective at the time it left the seller's control, or (ii) the seller substantially participated in the design of the finished product and that design caused the harm. A component seller does not substantially participate merely by manufacturing the component to specifications supplied by the finished-product manufacturer.

Precision Machining manufactured a steel bracket to the exact dimensions specified by LadderCo. The bracket met all of LadderCo's specifications and was not itself defective. LadderCo incorporated the bracket into an extension ladder. The ladder's design placed excessive stress on the bracket, causing it to bend and the ladder to collapse under a load far below the ladder's stated capacity. Ramon, a user, was injured. Ramon sued LadderCo and Precision Machining, alleging that the ladder was defectively designed and that Precision was liable because it made the bracket that failed.

Under the Act, is Precision Machining liable to Ramon?

Yes, because Precision manufactured a component part and the component failed, causing Ramon's injury.
Yes, because Precision manufactured the bracket to LadderCo's specifications and therefore is a manufacturer of the finished ladder.
No, because the bracket was not defective and Precision did not substantially participate in the ladder's design. (correct answer)
No, because only the seller of the finished product to Ramon can be liable, and Precision did not sell the ladder.

Explanation: When you see a component-part seller in a products liability question, your first move is to check the two exceptions to the general rule of no liability: was the component itself defective, or did the seller substantially participate in the finished product's design? Here, Precision made the bracket to LadderCo's exact specifications, and the bracket was not defective on its own—it met all specs and functioned as intended. The harm came from the ladder's design, which placed excessive stress on the bracket. Because Precision merely manufactured a non-defective component to the finished-product manufacturer's specs, that does not constitute substantial participation. The Act explicitly says manufacturing to specifications is not enough. So Precision is not liable. The choice that says "No, because the bracket was not defective and Precision did not substantially participate in the ladder's design" correctly captures both elements. The answer claiming "Yes, because Precision manufactured a component part and the component failed" ignores the key exceptions—a component can fail due to the finished product's design without the component itself being defective. The answer saying "Yes, because Precision manufactured the bracket to LadderCo's specifications and therefore is a manufacturer of the finished ladder" confuses making a part with designing the whole product; the Act defines a manufacturer as one who designs or produces a product or component, but that doesn't make Precision the ladder's manufacturer for liability purposes. Finally, "No, because only the seller of the finished product to Ramon can be liable" is too broad—component sellers can be liable under the exceptions, but here they aren't, so the reason is wrong. Study tip: On component-part questions, always ask two questions: (1) Was the component itself defective? (2) Did the seller participate in the finished product's design beyond following specs? If both are no, no liability.

Question 8

A consumer was injured when a ceramic mug shattered while she was filling it with hot water. The mug was one of a batch produced on a night when a kiln overheated. The mug's bottom was thin. The consumer sued the manufacturer. The manufacturer's quality engineer testified that the same thin bottom occurs in mugs from other batches even when kiln temperature is normal, because the mold used to form the mugs was designed to produce that bottom.

Which fact is most important in determining whether the consumer's claim is for a manufacturing defect or a design defect?

The kiln overheated on the night the mug was produced.
Other mugs from the same batch also had thin bottoms.
The mold produces the same thin bottom even when production conditions are normal. (correct answer)
The mug shattered when filled with hot water rather than when dropped.

Explanation: Whenever you see a products-liability question asking whether a flaw is a manufacturing defect or a design defect, focus on one idea: did the product depart from its intended design, or did it conform to an unsafe design? A manufacturing defect means something went wrong in making the particular item; a design defect meanstheimproperconditionis baked into the product itself. Here, the thin bottom is the most telling fact because even under normal production conditions, the mold produces the same thin bottom. That evidence shows the bottom was not an accidental deviation from spec—it was part of the product's intended design. Therefore the claim sounds in design defect, not manufacturing defect. The fact that the kiln overheated on the night in question sounds relevant, but it is not dispositiveifo the same bottom occurs consistently from other batches, then overheating did not cause the defect—the mold did. Likewise, other mugs from the same batch also having thin bottoms shows the problem affected multiple items, but a batch-wide manufacturing defect could also produce that pattern; it does not distinguish manufacturing from design. Finally, how the mug shattered—hot water versus a drop—relates to causation or the defect's dangerousness, not to whether the defect was manufacturing or design in origin. Remember: conformity to design points to design defect; nonconformity points to manufacturing defect.

Question 9

Under Columbia's Products Liability Act:

(a) A product has a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even if all possible care was exercised in its manufacture.

(b) In a manufacturing-defect action, the plaintiff must prove that the product was defective when it left the defendant's control. The plaintiff may prove this by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence showing that the product malfunctioned during normal use and that other reasonable causes were eliminated.

(c) It is an affirmative defense that the product was materially altered after it left the defendant's control and the alteration caused the harm. The defendant has the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

Baxter bought a new "Comfort" space heater. Eighteen months later, while Baxter was using the heater on a normal setting, it burst into flames and damaged his home. Baxter sued the manufacturer. Baxter's expert testified that an electrical connection inside the heater had loosened, but could not determine whether the connection was loose when the heater left the factory or became loose through ordinary vibration during normal use. The manufacturer's expert testified that the connection could have loosened through normal use. There was no evidence that the heater had been altered. Both experts agreed that a loosened connection could cause a fire.

Under the Act, which party is entitled to judgment?

Baxter, because the heater malfunctioned during normal use and the manufacturer did not prove a post-sale material alteration.
The manufacturer, because Baxter did not prove that the loosened connection existed when the heater left the manufacturer's control and did not eliminate ordinary wear as a reasonable cause. (correct answer)
Baxter, because once a malfunction during normal use is shown, the burden shifts to the manufacturer to prove that the product was not defective when it left its control.
The manufacturer, because a manufacturing-defect claim requires direct evidence of a deviation from design specifications, and Baxter offered only circumstantial evidence.

Explanation: This question tests manufacturing-defect liability under Columbia's Products Liability Act. The key is burden allocation: the plaintiff must prove the product was defective when it left the defendant's control, though that proof may be direct or circumstantial. Circumstantial proof can work by showing the product malfunctioned during normal use and that other reasonable causes were eliminated. Here, Baxter showed the heater malfunctioned and both experts agreed a loosened connection could cause a fire. But his own expert could not say whether the connection was loose at the factory or loosened through ordinary vibration. The manufacturer's expert said ordinary use could explain it, and Baxter offered no evidence eliminating that reasonable cause. Since ordinary vibration during normal use is exactly the kind of alternative explanation the Act requires a plaintiff to rule out, Baxter did not carry his burden. Therefore judgment goes to the manufacturer. The answer choice saying "Baxter, because the heater malfunctioned and the manufacturer did not prove post-sale alteration" misses the point: the absence of alteration only defeats an affirmative defense; it does not prove the defect existed when the product left the manufacturer's control. The choice claiming the burden shifts to the manufacturer after a malfunction is also wrong—the Act keeps the burden on the plaintiff. Finally, the choice demanding direct evidence is wrong because the Act expressly allows circumstantial evidence; Baxter's problem is not that his evidence was circumstantial, but that it failed to eliminate ordinary wear. On exam day, remember: "malfunction during normal use" is only half the test—eliminating other reasonable causes is the other half.

Question 10

Columbia's Products Liability Act provides:

Section 1. A product is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous if (a) it is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer, or (b) a reasonable alternative design existed at the time of manufacture and the defendant's failure to adopt the design rendered the product unreasonably dangerous.

Section 2. In a design-defect action, evidence that the product conformed to the generally recognized state of the art at the time of manufacture creates a rebuttable presumption that the product was not defective. The presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that (i) a reasonable alternative design existed and was feasible and (ii) the defendant's failure to adopt that design was willful or wanton.

Marta bought a table saw with no blade guard. While using it, her hand contacted the blade and she was injured. She sued the manufacturer. At trial, Marta proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a feasible blade guard was available and that one competitor's saw included a guard. The manufacturer proved that the saw conformed to all voluntary industry standards in effect when it was made and that blade guards were not generally used in the industry at that time. The judge instructed the jury under both sections. The jury found that Marta proved a feasible alternative design by a preponderance, but did not find that the manufacturer's failure to adopt a guard was willful or wanton.

Under the Act, which outcome is correct?

The manufacturer wins because the Section 2 presumption was not overcome: Marta needed clear and convincing evidence of both a feasible alternative design and a willful or wanton failure, and she did not. (correct answer)
The manufacturer wins because its proof that the saw conformed to industry standards at the time of manufacture is conclusive on the issue of defective design.
Marta wins because she proved a feasible alternative design by a preponderance of the evidence, which satisfies Section 1(b), and the manufacturer's state-of-the-art evidence is merely advisory.
Marta wins because the saw's lack of a guard made it dangerous beyond the expectations of the ordinary consumer, so Section 1(a) controls and Section 2 does not apply.

Explanation: This question tests how a state statute can impose a heightened burden of proof once a defendant shows compliance with industry standards. When you see a "state of the art" presumption in a products-liability statute, focus immediately on what the plaintiff must prove to overcome it and by what standard. Here, the manufacturer proved the saw conformed to voluntary industry standards and that blade guards were not generally used, which triggers Section 2's rebuttable presumption that the product was not defective. Marta proved a feasible alternative design by a preponderance of the evidence, but that is only the normal Section 1(b) showing. Section 2 then raises the bar: the presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of both a feasible alternative design and a willful or wanton failure to adopt it. Since the jury did not find willful or wanton conduct, the presumption stands, so the manufacturer wins. The other choices each miss this structure. The claim that industry standards are "conclusive" is wrong because Section 2 makes them the basis for a rebuttable presumption, not an absolute shield. The argument that Marta wins merely by proving a feasible design by a preponderance ignores Section 2's heightened standard. And the consumer-expectation argument fails because Section 1(a) does not automatically control; Section 2 expressly applies to design-defect actions and a blade guard's absence does not necessarily defeat ordinary expectations. Study tip: whenever a statute creates a rebuttable presumption, track the burden-shifting precisely — what triggers it, what rebuts it, and with what degree of proof.

Question 11

A contractor purchased a new crane from a manufacturer. Because of a defective weld in the boom, the boom collapsed while lifting a load of steel. The boom struck a forklift owned by the contractor, then the crane fell to the ground and was destroyed. No one was injured. The contractor sued the manufacturer in negligence and strict liability for the cost of repairing the crane, the cost of repairing the forklift, and lost profits during the repair period.

Which fact, if true, is most important in allowing the contractor's tort claims to proceed?

The defective weld was caused by the manufacturer's failure to follow its own welding specifications.
The crane's collapse damaged the contractor's forklift, which was property other than the crane itself. (correct answer)
The contractor had not yet paid the full purchase price for the crane when the collapse occurred.
The manufacturer had advertised the crane as safe for heavy lifting in its sales brochures.

Explanation: Whenever you see a defective product case, ask first: did the defect injure only the product itself, or did it also damage people or other property? In tort, a manufacturer can be liable for harm caused by its defective product—but the cost of repairing or replacing the defective product itself is an economic loss that belongs in contract, not negligence or strict liability. . The critical fact here is that the crane's collapse damaged the contractor's forklift, which was property other than the crane itself. That "other property" damage creates the kind of harm tort law protects, so it allows the negligence and strict liability claims to proceed—at least for the forklift and consequential damages, even though the crane's own repair cost remains largely a contract remedy. The other facts do not overcome this threshold. A defective weld caused by the manufacturer's failure to follow its own welding specifications tends to prove breach of duty, but no amount of fault can save a tort claim if the only loss is to the defective product itself. Not having paid the full purchase price might affect contract remedies or title, but it has no bearing on whether tort duties apply. Advertising the crane as safe for heavy lifting could support a warranty or misrepresentation argument, but it cannot manufacture tort liability where only economic loss to the product itself exists. The lesson: in products liability questions, isolate the injury. Damage to "other property" or people opens the tort door; damage only to the product itself keeps the case in contract.

Question 12

Rosa was admitted to Columbia General Hospital for surgery. Under a standing protocol written by Dr. Chen, the hospital's chief of surgery, all post-operative patients were to receive one dose of Nordal to prevent nausea unless a listed contraindication appeared in the patient's chart. The protocol gave Nurse Patel no discretion to vary the dose or withhold the drug except for the listed contraindications. Nurse Patel checked Rosa's chart, found no contraindication, and administered Nordal. Rosa suffered a stroke caused by a rare interaction between Nordal and another medication she was taking. The manufacturer of Nordal had sent Dr. Chen and the hospital pharmacy a detailed warning describing the interaction, but had not warned Nurse Patel or other nurses who administer Nordal. Rosa sued the manufacturer for failure to warn.

In Diaz v. Northwind Pharmaceuticals, the Columbia Supreme Court held: "A prescription-drug manufacturer discharges its duty to warn by providing an adequate warning to the learned intermediary. The learned intermediary is the health-care provider who makes an individualized decision to prescribe or administer the drug to a particular patient. When a drug is administered without an individualized medical judgment—for example, pursuant to a standing order or protocol—the manufacturer must warn the provider who actually administers the drug. A warning to a physician who drafted the protocol, but who does not see the patient, is not sufficient."

Under Diaz, which is correct?

The manufacturer is not liable because it warned Dr. Chen, the physician who wrote the protocol, and Dr. Chen was therefore the learned intermediary for all patients treated under the protocol.
The manufacturer is not liable because the hospital pharmacy received the warning and pharmacy staff are the learned intermediaries for drugs dispensed through the hospital.
The manufacturer is liable because no provider made an individualized medical judgment to administer Nordal to Rosa and the manufacturer did not warn the provider who actually administered the drug. (correct answer)
The manufacturer is liable only if Rosa proves that Dr. Chen would have changed the protocol had he personally read the warning.

Explanation: Whenever you see a failure-to-warn question, start with the learned intermediary doctrine: a manufacturer only needs to warn the prescribing physician. But Diaz creates a crucial carve-out—this protection exists only when a provider makes an individualized decision. Here, Dr. Chen wrote a standing protocol giving Nurse Patel zero discretion. Because no individualized medical judgment was made for Rosa, Dr. Chen was not the learned intermediary. The manufacturer warned Dr. Chen and the pharmacy, but not Nurse Patel, who actually administered the drug. That failure to warn the actual administrator is the breach, so the manufacturer is liable. Now test the distractors. The choice saying the manufacturer is not liable because it warned Dr. Chen, the physician who wrote the protocol, is the classic trap—Diaz explicitly rejects that a physician who drafts a protocol but doesn't see the patient is sufficient. The choice about the hospital pharmacy receiving the warning is also wrong; pharmacy staff are not the learned intermediary because they neither make an individualized decision nor administer the drug. Finally, the choice requiring Rosa to prove Dr. Chen would have changed the protocol misplaces causation—Diaz imposes a strict rule that the manufacturer must warn the actual administering provider when no individualized judgment is made, so the plaintiff need not show what the physician would have done. Your takeaway: whenever you see a standing order or protocol, the manufacturer must warn the actual administerer, not just the physician who drafted the rule.