Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Parties To Crime

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Parties To CrimeQuestion 1 of 12

Priya Nakamura agreed to drive her friend Malik Brown to a convenience store so Malik could rob it. Priya knew Malik always carried a loaded handgun on robberies and had said he would 'shoot anybody who gets in the way.' Unbeknownst to Priya, Malik's brother Jordan, whom Priya had never met, was staying with Malik and rode along in the back seat. Inside the store, when the clerk grabbed Malik's arm, Jordan seized Malik's gun and shot the clerk, who died. Priya was charged as an accomplice to the murder. The reviewing court applied the rule announced in People v. Overton:

'In People v. Overton, we held that an accomplice is answerable not only for the offense he intended to promote or facilitate but also for the natural and probable consequences of that offense. The test is objective: would a reasonable person in the accomplice's position, with the knowledge the accomplice possessed, foresee the resulting offense as a likely consequence of carrying out the intended offense? Liability extends to a resulting offense committed by the principal or by any other accomplice, provided the resulting offense was committed in furtherance of the common design. The accomplice need not know the identity of the person who will commit the resulting offense.'

Under Overton, is Priya liable for the clerk's murder?

No, because she did not know Jordan was present and therefore could not foresee that Jordan, rather than Malik, would shoot the clerk.

No, because she never intended or agreed that anyone would be shot, and accomplice liability requires intent to promote the specific offense charged.

Yes, because a shooting during an armed robbery is a foreseeably likely consequence to a person with Priya's knowledge, and liability extends to offenses committed by any accomplice in furtherance of the design.

Yes, because an accomplice is strictly liable for every crime committed by any person present during the intended offense, even if the crime was wholly unrelated to the common design.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Parties To Crime

Practice Parties To Crime in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Parties To Crime, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

Under Overton, is Priya liable for the clerk's murder?

No, because she did not know Jordan was present and therefore could not foresee that Jordan, rather than Malik, would shoot the clerk.
No, because she never intended or agreed that anyone would be shot, and accomplice liability requires intent to promote the specific offense charged.
Yes, because a shooting during an armed robbery is a foreseeably likely consequence to a person with Priya's knowledge, and liability extends to offenses committed by any accomplice in furtherance of the design. (correct answer)
Yes, because an accomplice is strictly liable for every crime committed by any person present during the intended offense, even if the crime was wholly unrelated to the common design.

Explanation: Whenever you see accomplice liability for an unintended killing, think natural and probable consequences: the prosecution need not prove intent for the murder, but must show a reasonable person in the accomplice's shoes would foresee it as likely. Under Overton, the test is objective, based on what Priya knew. She knew Malik always carried a loaded handgun on robberies and had threatened to shoot anyone who got in the way. An armed robbery escalating to a shooting is exactly the kind of likely consequence the rule reaches. Overton also expressly extends liability to offenses committed by "the principal or by any other accomplice" and says the accomplice need not know the identity off the shooter. So Jordan being unknown to Priya doesnot matter, provided the killing was committed in furtherance off the common design—and shooting the clerk during the robbery satisfies that. The choice saying she is not liable because she did not know Jordan was present is wrong:it imports a specific-foreseeability requirement, but Overton requires foreseeing the resulting offense as likely, not foreseeing which particular person would commit it. The choice saying she is not liable because she never intended or agreed that anyone would be shot is also wrong:intent to promote the intended robbery is enough; liability for natural and probable consequences doesnot require intent for the murder. Finally, the choice saying she is strictly liable for every crime committed by any person present is overbroad:Overton limits liability to foreseeable offenses committed in furtherance of the common design, not unrelated crimes by anyone present. Keep the anchor in mind: furtherance plus objective foreseeability.

Question 2

Nadia Petrova, desperate for money, decided to have her 13-year-old son, Leo, steal a diamond necklace from a jewelry store. She stayed at home and sent Leo to the store. Before Leo left, Nadia told him, 'If you don't bring me that necklace, I will lock you in the basement for a week.' Leo, believing his mother would carry out the threat, entered the store, took the necklace, and brought it to Nadia. Nadia was charged with larceny of the necklace.

Relevant statute — Section 9-2 of the Penal Code: 'A principal in the first degree is a person who actually commits the offense, or who, with the mental state required for the offense, causes an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. A principal in the second degree is a person who is actually or constructively present at the commission of the offense and who aids, abets, or encourages its commission. An accessory before the fact is a person who, being absent at the time of the commission of the offense, commands, counsels, or procures another to commit the offense. A person under 14 years of age is an 'irresponsible person' for purposes of this section.'

Under the statute, Nadia should be convicted as:

A principal in the first degree, because she caused Leo, an irresponsible person, to commit the larceny with the required mental state. (correct answer)
A principal in the second degree, because she was constructively present through Leo and aided, abetted, or encouraged the theft.
An accessory before the fact, because she commanded and procured the larceny while absent from the place where it was committed.
Not guilty of larceny, because Leo took the necklace, and no one other than Leo committed the taking.

Explanation: Whenever you see a statute that defines degrees of participation, categorize the defendant under each definition before falling back on common-law labels. Here, Nadia intended the necklace be stolen and used a threat to make Leo carry it out. Because Leo is 13 — under 14 — the statute expressly labels him an "irresponsible person." That label is decisive. The first-degree principal definition includes someone who, with the required mental state, causes an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. Nadia acted with larceny's mental state — she wanted the necklace taken and permanently kept — and her threat caused Leo to take it. So she is a principal in the first degree, even though she stayed homel. The "constructively present through Leo" option is wrong because constructive presence means Nadia herself was present at or near the scene, not that Leo's presence can be imputed to her. She was absent, so she cannot be a second-degree principal. The "accessory before the fact" option is also wrong: although she commanded and procured the theft, that category presupposes she caused a responsible person to commit the offense. Because Leo is irresponsible, his act is attributed to her as a first-degree principal instead. Finally, "not guilty because Leo took the necklace" misunderstands accomplice liability: causing an innocent agent to commit a crime is a classic way of committing it yourself. Leo's taking is no defense when she made it happen. On exam day, when you see an "innocent or irresponsible person" provision, recognize that it turns the absent commander into a first-degree principal.

Question 3

Manny began punching Victor in a parking lot. Lou, Manny's friend, walked up and stood about ten feet away. Lou did not speak or call for help. When Victor tried to get up, Lou moved a few steps closer and kept watching. After Manny stopped, Lou drove Manny away. Lou is charged with the battery of Victor.

Which issue is most important in deciding whether Lou can be held responsible for Manny's battery?

Whether Lou's presence and continued watching were intended to encourage Manny and had that effect. (correct answer)
Whether Lou had a legal duty to protect Victor from Manny's attack.
Whether Lou knew that Manny intended to batter Victor before Manny began.
Whether Lou was close enough to physically stop Manny if he had chosen to.

Explanation: When you see a question about whether someone can be liable for another person's crime, the core issue is accomplice liability: did the defendant intentionally aid or encourage the principal, with the intent that the crime be committed? Mere presence at the scene is not enough. Here, Lou's conduct is his presence and continued watching, plus moving closer as Victor tried to get up. To hold Lou responsible for Manny's battery, the state must show Lou's actions were intended to encourage Manny and actually had that effect. If Lou's presence was just passive observation, he is not an accomplice; if it was deliberate encouragement that emboldened Manny, he can be liable. The wrong answer about a legal duty to protect Victor misses the point: criminal battery liability for another's act is not based on a failure to rescue. Generally, no one has a duty to stop a crime unless a special relationship exists. Similarly, whether Lou was close enough to physically stop Manny would matter only if Lou had a duty to intervene, which he did not. Whether Lou knew Manny intended to batter Victor beforehand is relevant but not enough by itself—knowledge without intentional encouragement does not make someone an accomplice. The real question is what Lou did to assist, not what he merely knew. Your study tip: in accomplice liability questions, look for the defendant's mental state and conduct—did he intend to help the crime and did he help? If the facts show only watching, standing nearby, or failing to act, the likely answer is no liability unless a legal duty exists.

Question 4

After a bar fight, Hal fatally stabbed Victor and fled. An hour later, Hal called his sister Inez, told her what happened, and asked for help. Inez had not known about the fight and had never discussed it with Hal. She drove Hal to a relative's house and gave him money to leave town. Inez is charged with Victor's murder.

Which issue is most important in deciding whether Inez can be convicted of the murder?

Whether Inez knew that Hal had killed Victor when she drove him away.
Whether Inez's help came only after the killing was complete and was not arranged or encouraged by her beforehand. (correct answer)
Whether Inez's help in driving Hal and giving him money actually allowed him to avoid arrest.
Whether Inez would have helped Hal if she had personally witnessed the killing before it happened.

Explanation: When you see a question charging someone with a crime for helping after the fact, distinguish accomplice liability from accessory-after-the-fact. The key is timing and prior involvement. Here, Inez arrived after Hal fatally stabbed Victor. A person cannot be convicted as a principal or accomplice to murder solely for post-crime assistance; that makes her an accessory after the fact at most. Therefore, the decisive issue is whether her help came only after the killing was complete and was not arranged or encouraged by her beforehand. If she had promised before the fight to help him flee, she could be an accomplice to the murder; if not, she is not guilty of murder. The choice "whether Inez knew that Hal had killed Victor" is not enough: knowledge is required for accessory-after-the-fact liability, but it does not transform post-crime aid into murder. "Whether her help actually allowed him to avoid arrest" also misses the mark; the accessory statute may require intent to hinder apprehension, but success is not the element that makes her a murderer. "Whether she would have helped if she had personally witnessed the killing" is purely hypothetical and irrelevant; liability depends on what she actually agreed to or did, not on speculation. On the bar exam, when a defendant helps only after a crime ends, ask: Did she encourage or arrange the crime beforehand? If no, she is not an accomplice to the underlying crime.

Question 5

Olivia drove her friend Walter to a warehouse because Walter asked for a ride. She knew Walter planned to steal boxes from the loading dock and that he wanted the ride so he could get there before security arrived. Olivia told Walter she thought it was a bad idea, but she drove him anyway and later drove him home with the boxes. Olivia is charged with the theft.

Which issue is most important in deciding whether Olivia can be held responsible for the theft?

Whether Olivia's disapproval of the theft proved that she did not want Walter to succeed.
Whether Olivia knew that Walter had the boxes in her car when she drove him home.
Whether Olivia drove Walter to the warehouse before or after the boxes were actually stolen.
Whether Olivia intended, by giving Walter the ride, to help him commit the theft. (correct answer)

Explanation: Accomplice liability turns on two things: an act that assists the crime and the specific intent to help the crime succeed. Here, Olivia's theft charge cannot rest merely on her knowledge of Walter's plan or her disapproval; the decisive question is whether her ride was intended as aid. If she drove him with the purpose of facilitating the theft, she is liable even if she hoped he would fail. That is why the most important issue is whether Olivia intended, by giving Walter the ride, to help him commit the theft. "Whether Olivia's disapproval of the theft proved that she did not want Walter to succeed" is a tempting defense, but ambivalence is not the same as lacking intent—you can help someone while wishing the outcome were different. "Whether Olivia knew that Walter had the boxes in her car when she drove him home" concerns conduct after the theft; it might support a separate charge like accessory after the fact, but it is not essential to liability for the theft itself. "Whether Olivia drove Walter to the warehouse before or after the boxes were actually stolen" could matter only if the ride occurred after the crime, because an accomplice must assist before or during the offense; on these facts, the ride was part of the plan to get Walter there before security, so the core issue remains her intent. On the bar, remember: for accomplice liability, knowledge of a crime is not enough—look for intent to promote or facilitate it.

Question 6

Janet wanted her neighbor's new tablet. She told her six-year-old son, Kyle, to go into the neighbor's house through the unlocked back door, take the tablet from the kitchen table, and bring it to her. Kyle did exactly what she said. Janet is charged with larceny of the tablet.

Which issue is most important in deciding whether Kyle's act of taking the tablet can be treated as Janet's act?

Whether Janet was physically near the neighbor's house when Kyle took the tablet.
Whether Janet intended to keep the tablet for her own use or to sell it to someone else.
Whether Kyle had taken another person's property on a prior occasion without Janet's knowledge.
Whether Kyle understood that taking the tablet was wrong or was acting as Janet's innocent instrument. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about whether one person's criminal act can be attributed to another, think about the doctrine of innocent instrumentality. A defendant can commit larceny by using an innocent human agent to physically take property, because the law treats the defendant's direction and the agent's act as one. Here, Janet told six-year-old Kyle to enter the neighbor's house and take the tablet, so the key is whether Kyle was merely her innocent instrument. If Kyle did not understand that taking the tablet was wrong, he lacked the mens rea for larceny, and Janet's intent supplies the required culpability; Kyle's hands were, in effect, Janet's. That is why this issue matters most. Whether Janet was physically near the neighbor's house is irrelevant because a person can act through an agent while far away. Whether Janet intended to keep the tablet or sell it is also not central to attribution—both involve an intent to permanently deprive, which larceny requires, but neither affects whose act the taking was. And whether Kyle had stolen before without Janet's knowledge tells us nothing about his role in this specific taking. Remember: whenever one person causes another to perform the physical act of a crime, ask whether the actor was a knowing, culpable participant or just an innocent instrument. If the latter, the defendant is the principal.

Question 7

Gordon helped two friends plan a burglary by drawing a floor plan and lending them bolt cutters. The night before the burglary, Gordon told one friend, "I'm out. I won't be there." He did not ask for the bolt cutters back, did not tell the other friend, and did not warn the police. The friends used the bolt cutters to commit the burglary. Gordon is charged with the burglary.

Which issue is most important in deciding whether Gordon has a defense?

Whether Gordon decided to withdraw voluntarily rather than because he feared being caught.
Whether Gordon communicated his decision to withdraw to at least one of his friends.
Whether Gordon took reasonable steps to counteract the help he had already given. (correct answer)
Whether the burglary would have been committed without Gordon's floor plan and bolt cutters.

Explanation: When you see a question about accomplice liability, the core issue is whether a person who helped plan or commit a crime can escape responsibility by backing out. Merely changing your mind is not enough — the law requires that you neutralize the help you already gave. Here, Gordon drew the floor plan and lent bolt cutters, then told one friend he was "out." The decisive issue is whether Gordon took reasonable steps to counteract his earlier assistance. Withdrawal from a completed conspiracy or from aiding a crime requires either timely communication to all parties or action to negate the aid, such as retrieving the tools or warning police. Gordon did neither. He left the bolt cutters with the burglars and stayed silent, effectively leaving his help in place. Therefore, he has no defense. The other choices miss the legal standard. "Whether Gordon decided to withdraw voluntarily rather than because he feared being caught" matters for the defense of abandonment in attempt crimes, not for accomplice withdrawal — his motive is irrelevant here. "Whether Gordon communicated his decision to withdraw to at least one of his friends" is incomplete: communication alone is enough only if it happens before the crime and gives the other accomplices the chance to abandon; here he told only one friend, and the other still used his tools. "Whether the burglary would have been committed without Gordon's floor plan and bolt cutters" confuses accomplice liability with but-for causation — once you aid the crime, you need more than showing the crime could have happened anyway. Study tip: For withdrawal, remember the three R's — Renounce, Communicate, and Reinforce? No, actually Retrace your aid. Ask: "Did he take back the tools or tell the police?" If not, he remains liable.

Question 8

Ed and Farrah agree to rob a convenience store. Ed is to enter, take cash, and jump into the car Farrah will keep running. Farrah knows Ed is carrying a knife. During the robbery, Ed stabs a customer who reaches for her phone. Ed jumps into the car and says, "Go!" Farrah does not know the customer was stabbed until after they reach the hideout. Farrah is charged with the stabbing.

Which issue is most important in deciding whether Farrah can be held responsible for the stabbing?

Whether Farrah intended, before the robbery began, that Ed would stab a customer.
Whether Ed's stabbing occurred during the robbery and was a foreseeable risk of the plan Farrah agreed to assist. (correct answer)
Whether Farrah's act of driving away after Ed jumped in the car made her a participant in the stabbing.
Whether Farrah knew that a customer was inside the store when the robbery began.

Explanation: When you see accomplice liability on a criminal-law question, the core idea is that an accomplice is responsible not just for the crime she intended to help but also for other crimes committed by her partner that are within the common plan and reasonably foreseeable. Here, Ed and Farrah agreed to an armed robbery: Farrah knew Ed had a knife. The key issue, therefore, is whether the stabbing occurred duringthe robbery and wasa foreseeable risk ofthe plan Farrah agreed to assist. It was: armed robberies routinely escalate when customers resist, reach for phones, or confront the criminal. Because that escalation is a foreseeable consequenceofthe armed robbery, Farrah can be held responsible forthe stabbing even though she did not know it happened until later. The other choices miss this principle. "Whether Farrah intended,before the robbery began,that Ed would stab a customer" is not required: an accomplice need not foresee the specific victim or exact injury, only the general type of harm. She may not have wanted any stabbing,but she helped create the foreseeable risk. "Whether Farrah's act of driving away after Ed jumped in the car made her a participant" fails because the stabbing had already occurred before she drove; her getaway driving did not cause or further that stabbing. "Whether Farrah knew that a customer was inside the store" is likewise not controlling: she need not know a particular victim was present for a foreseeable harm to attach, as long as the robbery itself carried the foreseeable risk. Remember: on bar-exam questions, ask whether the resulting crime was within the scope of the joint venture and reasonably foreseeable — not whether the accomplice hoped for, knew of, or specifically intended that exact result.

Question 9

Detective Voss is investigating a series of armed robberies. During a bank robbery, the robber—later identified as Marcus Reid—shot and killed a security guard. That evening, Reid went to the home of his cousin, April Chen. Chen had heard a police bulletin describing Reid as the armed bank robber sought in the shooting. Reid told Chen, 'The cops are closing in. I need to get out of town.' Chen, terrified that Reid would become violent if she refused, drove Reid to a train station and gave him $200 for a ticket. Reid was arrested two weeks later. At Reid's trial, the court suppressed the sole eyewitness's identification, and the jury acquitted Reid of all charges. The prosecution then charged Chen as an accessory after the fact.

Relevant statute — Section 9-12 of the Penal Code: 'A person is an accessory after the fact if, knowing that a felony has been committed, he or she receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon with the purpose of enabling the felon to avoid or escape arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment. A person may be prosecuted and convicted as an accessory after the fact whether or not the felon has been arrested, tried, or convicted, and it is no defense that the felon has been acquitted, if the evidence otherwise establishes that a felony was in fact committed. A person acts with the requisite purpose even if his or her assistance is motivated by fear, sympathy, or payment.'

If the prosecution charges Chen as an accessory after the fact, Chen should be:

Acquitted, because Reid's acquittal conclusively establishes that no felony was committed, and accessory liability cannot exist without a predicate felony.
Acquitted, because she assisted Reid only out of fear for her own safety, and the statute's purpose element cannot be satisfied by fear-driven assistance.
Convicted, because she knowingly assisted a felon after the felony with the purpose of enabling his escape, and Reid's acquittal does not bar her prosecution. (correct answer)
Convicted, because her post-crime assistance made her an accomplice to the bank robbery and to the shooting of the guard.

Explanation: Whenever you see an accessory-after-the-fact question, focus on the statute's elements: knowledge of a felony, assistance, and purpose to help the felon escape. Here, all three are met. Chen knew Reid was the armed robber from the police bulletin, drove him to the train station, and gave him $200 to flee. The statute expressly says fear-driven assistance still satisfies the purpose element. It also expressly says the felon's acquittal is no defense if the evidence otherwise establishes the felony was committed. Because the shooting occurred during the robbery, a felony was in fact committed, so Chen can be convicted. The first wrong answer claims Reid's acquittal conclusively proves no felony occurred—that misreads the statute, which permits prosecution even after acquittal. The second wrong answer says fear negates purpose—the statute rejects that. The fourth wrong answer treats Chen as an accomplice to the robbery and shooting, but accessory-after-the-fact liability is separate and occurs after the felony is complete; Chen did not participate in the bank robbery or shooting. Remember: the bar often tests whether a statute overrides a common-law assumption, like "acquittal bars accessory liability" or "fear is a defense." Read the statutory language carefully—it may explicitly answer the question.

Question 10

Elena Vasquez, a licensed firearms dealer, sold a semiautomatic rifle to Carla Deeds. Before the sale, Deeds told Vasquez that she intended to use the rifle to kill her former business partner. Vasquez completed the sale. As she handed over the rifle, she added: 'Wear gloves, and don't leave the box in your car.' Deeds took the rifle to the partner's home, killed him with it,and was arrested. Vasquez was charged as an accomplice to the murder. The court applied People v. Sutter:

'In People v. Sutter, we held that a person who supplies goods or services to another with knowledge of the other's criminal purpose is not an accomplice unless the supplier intends to promoteor facilitate the crime. Intent is not established by knowledge alone; a seller who merely completes an ordinary commercial transaction, even knowing how the buyer will use the product, lacks the required intent. Intent may, however, be inferred from conduct beyond the sale itself, such as giving the buyer instructions on how to avoid detection or supplying a means the buyer could not otherwise obtain.'

Under Sutter, Vasquez is:

Not an accomplice, because the rifle sale was an ordinary commercial transaction and a licensed dealer has no duty to investigate a buyer's purpose.
Not an accomplice, because accomplice liability requires presence at the crime or a share of the proceeds,and Vasquez had neither.
An accomplice, because she knew Deeds intended to kill her partnerand completed the sale with that knowledge.
An accomplice, because her instruction to avoid detection went beyond the sale itselfand evidenced an intent to promote the killing. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see accomplice liability based on supplying goods, the key is the Sutter rule: knowledge of a buyer's criminal purpose is not enough — the supplier must intend to promote or facilitate the crime. That intent can be inferred from conduct beyond the ordinary sale. Here, Vasquez's sale alone, even with knowledge that Deeds planned a murder, would have been insufficient. But Vasquez did more than complete an ordinary commercial transaction: she gave Deeds specific advice on how to avoid detection — "Wear gloves, and don't leave the box in your car." That is operational support for the killing, not neutral seller small talk. Therefore, under Sutter, Vasquez is an accomplice because her instruction to avoid detection went beyond the sale itselfand evidenced an intent to promote the killing. The choice claiming she is not an accomplice because the rifle sale was an ordinary commercial transaction misses the point: the sale was ordinary, but her subsequent instruction was not, and Sutter explicitly looks to conduct beyond the sale. The suggestion that a licensed dealer has no duty to investigate a buyer's purpose is also irrelevant — actual knowledge plus intentional facilitation isenough. The choice saying accomplice liability requires presence at the crime or a share of the proceeds is wrong; an accomplice can act before the crime and need not share in any spoils. Finally, the choice saying she is an accomplice merely because she knew Deeds intended to kill and completed the sale with that knowledge misstates Sutter — knowledge alone is insufficient; it was the additional instruction that supplied the required intent. Study tip: in supply-based accomplice questions, ask yourself what the defendant did beyond the transaction. Extra advice, modifications, targeting, or logistical help usually transforms knowledge into intent.

Question 11

Detective Omar asked his neighbor, Ray Sullivan, to help catch a car thief who had been stealing luxury cars in the area. The detective told Ray, 'Just act like you want to buy stolen cars. If anyone offers you one, call me.' That evening, Ray ran into Marcus Webb, who bragged that he could steal any car. Ray said to Webb: 'I'll pay you $10,000 if you steal a black Ferrari from the downtown dealership tonight. I've already parked a flatbed truck behind the dealership, and I've left the gate unlocked.' Webb stole the Ferrari and delivered it to Ray, who immediately called the detective. Webb was arrested. Ray was charged as an accomplice to the theft of the Ferrari. The court applied State v. Pruitt:

'In State v. Pruitt, we held that a private citizen who participates in a criminal enterprise at the direction of law enforcement and for the purpose of detecting the crime is not an accomplice if his participation is limited to feigning cooperation with the offender's plan. The defense is unavailable, however, if the citizen originates the criminal design, supplies the means of commission, or otherwise actively encourages the specific offense beyond merely pretending to go along.'

Under Pruitt, Ray is:

Not an accomplice, because he acted at Detective Omar's request and immediately reported the theft to the police after Webb delivered the car.
An accomplice, because he originated the specific criminal design and actively encouraged the theft by supplying the means, conduct that goes beyond feigned cooperation. (correct answer)
Not an accomplice, because he feigned cooperation with Webb's boast and never shared Webb's purpose of permanently depriving the owner of the car.
An accomplice, because a private citizen who participates in a crime to assist the police is never entitled to the feigned-accomplice defense; only sworn officers are.

Explanation: When a question involves a private citizen helping police catch a criminal, the key is the line between true undercover cooperation and actually manufacturing the crime. Under State v. Pruitt, a citizen is not an accomplice only if he merely feigns cooperation with the offender's existing plan. But the defense disappears if the citizen originates the criminal design, supplies the means, or actively encourages the specific offense. Here, Ray did far more than pretend to go along. Webb boasted he could steal any car, but Ray originated the specific plan: he named the black Ferrari, offered $10,000, arranged the flatbed truck, and unlocked the gate. That is actively encouraging the theft and supplying the means, so Ray is an accomplice despite his goal of catching the thief. The answer claiming Ray is not an accomplice because he acted at Detective Omar's request and reported the theft afterward misses the point: those facts do not matter once Ray supplied the means and created the design. Similarly, the answer saying he merely feigned cooperation with Webb's boast is false—Ray did not just go along; he drove the plan. And the answer asserting only sworn officers can use the defense is also wrong; Pruitt expressly allows the defense for private citizens, but only when their participation is limited to feigning cooperation. Study tip: on accomplice questions, look for "originate," "supply," or "encourage." If the helper sets the target, price, or tools, the feigned-accomplice defense fails.

Question 12

Dante Mora gave his friend Owen Price a key to the apartment of Dante's former employer, telling Owen, 'Everything valuable is in the bedroom safe; help yourself.' Owen planned to burglarize the apartment that night. The next morning, Dante had second thoughts. At 10 a.m., Dante called Owen and said, 'I don't want any part of this. I'm out.' Owen replied, 'Fine, I'll do it myself.' That night, Owen used the key to enter the apartment and stole jewelry from the safe. Dante was charged as an accomplice to the burglary.

Relevant statute — Section 9-15 of the Penal Code: 'A person is not an accomplice to an offense if, before the commission of the offense, he or she: (a) communicates to every other party the person's withdrawal from the enterprise; and (b) makes a timely, good-faith effort to neutralize any assistance the person has provided, including, when feasible, retrieving any instrumentality supplied by the person. Communication of withdrawal alone is insufficient; the person must also take all reasonable steps to prevent the offense.'

Dante should be:

Not liable, because he communicated his withdrawal to Owen before the burglary and Owen acknowledged that he would proceed alone.
Liable, because he did not retrieve the key or take other reasonable steps to prevent the burglary after announcing his withdrawal. (correct answer)
Not liable, because his phone call was a timely, good-faith effort that satisfied the statute's neutralization requirement.
Liable, because once a party has supplied an instrumentality that is later used in the offense, withdrawal is never available.

Explanation: When you see an accomplice-liability question, your first instinct should be to ask: did the defendant both communicate withdrawal and neutralize assistance before the crime? Here, Dante supplied the key—an instrumentality of the burglary—so withdrawing meant more than saying "I'm out." Dante is liable because he failed the statute's second requirement. His phone call did communicate withdrawal to Owen, and Owen acknowledged it, but Section 9-15 expressly says communication alone is insufficient. Since Dante had given Owen the key, a feasible neutralizing step was retrieving it or taking reasonable measures to prevent the burglary. Doing neither leaves his earlier aid in place, so he remains accountable for Owen's crime. The wrong answers each twist the law. "Not liable, because he communicated his withdrawal and Owen acknowledged he would proceed alone" confuses notice with full withdrawal; acknowledgment does not replace neutralization. "Not liable, because his phone call was a timely, good-faith effort" mistakes a necessary step for a sufficient one—the statute calls that effort insufficient. Finally, "Liable, because once a party has supplied an instrumentality, withdrawal is never available" overstates the rule; withdrawal can be available, but only if the party neutralizes the assistance, which Dante did not do. Study tip: for withdrawal, remember the two-part test—communicate and neutralize. If the defendant supplied a tool or key, ask whether they got it back; if not, they're still on the hook.