Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Justiciability Requirements Case Or Controversy And Standing

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Justiciability Requirements Case Or Controversy And StandingQuestion 1 of 12

Congress enacted the Religious Landmarks Preservation Act, appropriating $10 million from the federal treasury to the Department of the Interior to make grants 'for the preservation of historic religious structures.' Pursuant to the Act, the Department awarded a church a grant to repair its steeple and install an accessible entrance. A federal taxpayer sued in federal district court, alleging that the grant violates the Establishment Clause. The government moved to dismiss for lack of standing.

How should the court rule on the motion?

Grant the motion, because the taxpayer's alleged injury is identical to that of every other taxpayer and is therefore a generalized grievance.

Deny the motion, because a federal taxpayer may challenge any congressional appropriation that arguably exceeds an enumerated power.

Deny the motion, because the suit challenges an exercise of Congress's taxing and spending power and specifically alleges an Establishment Clause violation.

Grant the motion, because the taxpayer has not shown that the church or the Department caused him any personal injury distinct from the public at large.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Justiciability Requirements Case Or Controversy And Standing

Practice Justiciability Requirements Case Or Controversy And Standing in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Justiciability Requirements Case Or Controversy And Standing, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

How should the court rule on the motion?

Grant the motion, because the taxpayer's alleged injury is identical to that of every other taxpayer and is therefore a generalized grievance.
Deny the motion, because a federal taxpayer may challenge any congressional appropriation that arguably exceeds an enumerated power.
Deny the motion, because the suit challenges an exercise of Congress's taxing and spending power and specifically alleges an Establishment Clause violation. (correct answer)
Grant the motion, because the taxpayer has not shown that the church or the Department caused him any personal injury distinct from the public at large.

Explanation: When you see a standing question involving a federal taxpayer challenging a spending program, remember the general rule: mere taxpayer status usually does not create standing because the injury is shared by all taxpayers. But there is a narrow, important exception: a taxpayer may challenge a congressional appropriation under the Taxing and Spending Clause when the suit specifically alleges that the expenditure violates the Establishment Clause. Here, Congress appropriated funds specifically for "preservation of historic religious structures," and the Department awarded a grant to a church. The taxpayer alleges the grant violates the Establishment Clause. That fits the exception exactly, so the motion to dismiss should be denied. The first option, saying the injury is identical to every other taxpayer and therefore a generalized grievance, states the general rule but ignores the Establishment Clause exception. Similarly, the last option, saying the taxpayer failed to show personal injury distinct from the public, is the same misconception in different words—the exception does not require distinct personal injury. The other wrong answer goes too far by suggesting any federal taxpayer may challenge any appropriation that arguably exceeds an enumerated power; the Supreme Court has limited taxpayer standing to Establishment Clause challenges, not all spending-power disputes. Your takeaway: taxpayer standing is usually barred, but whenever you see a federal spending program and an Establishment Clause allegation, think Flast v. Cohen—the exception that allows the suit.

Question 2

An environmental organization sued the Forest Service in federal court to set aside the agency's approval of a mining plan adjacent to a national forest. The organization alleged that increased truck traffic on forest roads will impair its members' enjoyment of the forest and that its mission includes protecting public lands. It sought only injunctive and declaratory relief; no individual member was named. The Forest Service argued that the organization lacks standing because it has not shown that any member personally suffered an injury.

Which of the following is the most accurate statement about the organization's standing?

It has standing if its members would have standing, the interests it seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and the relief sought does not require individual members' participation. (correct answer)
It has standing because an organization may sue on behalf of its members whenever the challenged action is germane to its organizational mission.
It lacks standing because an organization must name at least one individual member as a plaintiff to establish Article III jurisdiction.
It lacks standing because an organization's asserted injury must be economic, and diminished recreational enjoyment is not concrete enough.

Explanation: Whenever you see an organization suing on behalf of its members, your reflex should be the associational standing test. An organization need not name an individual plaintiff; it must satisfy three requirements: its members would have standing to sue in their own right, the interests it seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and the requested relief does not require individual members' participation. Here, the environmental organization alleged concrete recreational injury to its members and sought only injunctive and declaratory relief, which fits that test. The choice saying it has standing if members would have standing, the interests are germane, and relief does not require individual participation is correct because it states this exact rule. The choice saying an organization may sue whenever the action is germane to its mission is wrong because it omits the members-standing and participation requirements. The choice saying it lacks standing because no individual member is named is wrong; Article III does not require naming a member when associational standing exists. The choice saying the injury must be economic is also wrong: diminished recreational enjoyment can be concrete and particularized if members actually use and enjoy the forest. For your exam, remember the three-part associational standing test and notice that non-economic environmental harms can satisfy standing. When an answer reduces standing to a single factor, it is probably incomplete.

Question 3

To obtain a prompt ruling on whether a recently enacted state firearms statute is constitutional, the state attorney general and a gun-rights organization designed a test case. The organization recruited a member who stated that he opposes the statute but could not identify any way it affected him. The attorney general agreed not to raise any factual or procedural defenses and to let the court decide the constitutionality of the statute. Both sides filed briefs urging the court to reach the merits.

Should the federal court dismiss the action as not a case or controversy?

No, because the parties have adverse legal positions on the statute's constitutionality and the court's decision will be binding.
No, because a defendant's agreement not to raise defenses cannot deprive a federal court of jurisdiction.
Yes, because the plaintiff lacks a genuine, concrete injury and the parties have manufactured the dispute, so the court would be issuing an advisory opinion. (correct answer)
Yes, because suits challenging the constitutionality of state statutes may not be brought in federal court while state litigation is available.

Explanation: Whenever you see a federal court asked to rule on a statute's constitutionality, first check Article III justiciability: the plaintiff must have standing, meaning a concrete, particularized, actual injury. A test case only works if the people bringing it are genuinely harmed. Here, the plaintiff merely "opposes" the statute but admits no way it affects him. That is an ideological objection, not an injury in fact. Worse, the attorney general agreed to waive all defenses so the court would reach the merits. That tells you the parties manufactured the dispute to get a ruling. A federal court cannot issue an opinion on a hypothetical or contrived controversy, because doing so would be an advisory opinion. Therefore, dismissal for lack of a case or controversy is correct. The "no" choices all miss this core point. The "adverse legal positions" choice incorrectly assumes disagreement plus a binding judgment substitutes for a real injury; courts need a live dispute with personal stakes. The "defendant's agreement not to raise defenses" choice states a true jurisdictional rule, but it distracts you: the problem is not that defenses were waived, it is that no justiciable injury ever existed. The "state litigation available" choice invokes abstention, but federal courts are not categorically barred from hearing state-statute challenges; this dispute fails on standing, not federalism. Study tip: whenever you see parties cooperating to create a "friendly" test case, look immediately for lack of concrete injury. Wanting a constitutional answer is never enough.

Question 4

State law makes it a felony to 'knowingly display any visual material harmful to minors within 500 feet of a school.' A museum located within 500 feet of a public school has scheduled an exhibition containing two paintings with nude figures; the exhibition will be open to the public, including children, next month. The museum sued in federal court to enjoin enforcement, alleging the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The state attorney general has stated publicly that she will enforce the statute 'to the full extent of the law,' and she has not disclaimed enforcement against the museum. The museum has never before been prosecuted under the statute.

Is the museum's suit justiciable?

No, because the museum has not yet been prosecuted and cannot show an actual injury until the statute is enforced against it.
No, because the state attorney general's general statement of enforcement is not a specific threat directed at the museum.
Yes, because the museum has a concrete and imminent intention to display the paintings, the statute arguably covers that display, and the state has not disclaimed enforcement. (correct answer)
Yes, because a plaintiff may obtain an advisory opinion about the constitutionality of a criminal statute before deciding whether to comply.

Explanation: When you see a suit challenging a criminal statute before anyone has been prosecuted, think pre-enforcement review — the test is whether the plaintiff faces a credible threat of prosecution, not whether the statute has already been enforced. Here, the museum has concrete plans to open the exhibition next month, the statute arguably covers nude-figure paintings displayed near a school, and the attorney general has promised to enforce the statute "to the full extent of the law" without exempting the museum. That combination makes the injury sufficiently imminent and the case justiciable. The choice saying the suit fails because the museum has not yet been prosecuted misunderstands standing: an actual prosecution is not required when a plaintiff is about to engage in arguably prohibited conduct and enforcement is threatened. Likewise, the choice requiring a "specific threat directed at the museum" demands too much; a general policy of enforcement, with no disclaimer, can still create a credible fear. The advisory-opinion choice is a trap — plaintiffs may seek declaratory relief before complying with a statute, but only if the dispute is ripe, not merely to test a law in the abstract. For the exam: when evaluating ripeness in a First Amendment challenge, look for three things — concrete planned conduct, arguable coverage by the statute, and an enforcement threat that is not disclaimed. If all three are present, the suit is justiciable.

Question 5

After the census, a state legislature adopted a congressional redistricting map that, according to the complaint, was drawn to ensure that the majority party would continue to control at least 70 percent of the state's congressional seats. A group of voters sued the state in federal court, alleging that the map is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. They asked the court to invalidate the map and order the state to create a nonpartisan redistricting commission. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that the claim is nonjusticiable.

Which of the following is the best basis for the court's decision?

Deny the motion, because partisan intent can be measured objectively by election data and a court can order a neutral redistricting process.
Grant the motion, because challenges to congressional districting may be brought only in state court, not federal court.
Deny the motion, because the map's effect on voters' voting power is an injury that the Equal Protection Clause is designed to redress.
Grant the motion, because there are no judicially manageable standards for deciding how much partisan advantage is too much, so the claim presents a political question. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a partisan-gerrymandering claim, the first question is justiciability: can a federal court decide how much partisanship is too much? The Supreme Court has said no—these claims present political questions. In Rucho v. Common Cause, challenges like this one under the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause were dismissed because there are no judicicially manageable standards for measuring partisan advantage. The state's motion should therefore be granted. The map's alleged intent to preserve a 70 percent majority may be empirically detectable, but choosing the acceptable level of partisan skew requires a political judgment, not a legal rule. The first distractor says partisan intent can be measured and a court can order a neutral process. That confuses evidence of intent with a judicicable standard; even if intent is measurable, courts have no baseline for deciding how much advantage is unconstitutional. The second says congressional districting challenges may be brought only in state court. That is wrong; federal courts have jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to redistricting, although they may decline to decide political questions. The third says the effect on voting power is an injury the Equal Protection Clause redresses. That reflects a real theory, but the Supreme Court has nonetheless held that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable because no standard distinguishes permissible from unconstitutional partisan effect. The takeaway: for gerrymandering questions, remember the key distinction—racial gerrymandering claims are justiciable under strict scrutiny, but statewide partisan gerrymandering claims fail at the political question threshold for lack of manageable standards.

Question 6

Congress enacted a statute appropriating funds from the general Treasury for the Department of Education to award after-school tutoring grants to private community organizations. The statute expressly authorizes the Secretary to make grants to faith-based organizations. The Department awarded a grant to a religious organization that uses prayer as part of its tutoring program. Several individual federal income taxpayers, none of whom has a child in the program and none of whom applied for a grant, sue the Secretary, alleging that the statutory authorization violates the Establishment Clause and asking the court to enjoin further disbursements under the statute. The Secretary moves to dismiss for lack of standing.

How should the court rule on the Secretary's motion to dismiss?

Grant the motion, because the plaintiffs have alleged only a generalized grievance as taxpayers, and taxpayer standing never permits challenges to government expenditures.
Deny the motion, because taxpayer standing is recognized when a taxpayer challenges a congressional exercise of the spending power as violating the Establishment Clause. (correct answer)
Grant the motion, because the plaintiffs have not shown that the grant program increased their tax liability or that an injunction would reduce their taxes.
Deny the motion, because the Establishment Clause gives any person a right to challenge government funding of religion.

Explanation: Whenever you see a challenge to government spending, remember that Article III standing normally bars taxpayers from suing over how their taxes are spent. There is, however, a narrow, specific exception: taxpayer standing is allowed when a taxpayer challenges an exercise of Congress's spending power as violating the Establishment Clause. Here, Congress appropriated funds from the general Treasury and expressly authorized the Secretary to award grants to faith-based organizations. The plaintiffs are federal taxpayers suing to enjoin that statutory spending, alleging an Establishment Clause violation. That fits the exception squarely. They do not need a child in the program, an application for a grant, or proof that the spending increased their taxes; the very act of congressional spending in aid of religion is the asserted injury. The first wrong answer claims taxpayer standing never permits challenges to government expenditures—that is too absolute and ignores the Establishment Clause exception. The third wrong answer demands increased tax liability or tax reduction from an injunction, which misstates the rule; the taxpayer's injury is the alleged unconstitutional expenditure itself. The fourth wrong answer says the Establishment Clause gives any person a right to challenge government funding of religion—that overstates standing, which still requires a plaintiff to fit an established category, not merely to care about the issue. On exam day, when you see "federal taxpayer" plus "Establishment Clause" plus "Congressional spending," think Flast v. Cohen: that combination unlocks standing.

Question 7

An environmental organization sued the Environmental Protection Agency in federal court to set aside its approval of a new pesticide. The organization alleged that the EPA violated the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act by failing to hold a required public hearing before approving the pesticide. The complaint did not allege that any member had suffered or would suffer any particularized harm from the approval; it alleged only that members were denied the right to participate in the hearing and are concerned about the pesticide's effects. The EPA moved to dismiss for lack of standing.

How should the court rule?

Grant the motion, because the organization has alleged only a bare procedural violation and no concrete injury to its members from the agency action. (correct answer)
Deny the motion, because an organization's members need not show individual injury when the organization sues to enforce an environmental statute.
Deny the motion, because Congress created a procedural right to a hearing and the organization has standing to enforce that right.
Grant the motion, because organizations lack standing to sue federal agencies on behalf of their members.

Explanation: Whenever you see a standing question involving an organization or an alleged procedural violation, start with Article III fundamentals: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. An organization suing on behalf of its members must show that at least one member would have standing to sue in the member's own right. A statutory procedural right does not erase that requirement; it can relax causation or redressability only after a concrete injury is established. Here, the organization alleged only that members were denied the right to participate in the hearing and are concerned about the pesticide's effects. It did not allege any particularized harm to any member from the approval. That is a bare procedural violation, not a concrete injury, so the court should grant the motion to dismiss. The choice saying members need not show individual injury when an organization sues to enforce an environmental statute is wrong: associational standing depends on individual member injury. The choice saying Congress created a procedural right and therefore the organization has standing is also wrong: Congress cannot override Article III's case-or-controversy requirement. And the choice saying organizations lack standing to sue federal agencies on behalf of their members overshoots: organizations can have associational standing when the members have standing, the interests are germane, and individual participation is not required. Thus the only correct result is granting the motion because the organization alleged only a bare procedural violation and no concrete injury to its members from the agency action.

Question 8

An environmental organization sues a mining company in federal court on behalf of its members. The complaint alleges that the company's discharges have polluted a river, diminishing the members' recreational use of the river and reducing the value of their riverside properties. The organization seeks an injunction ordering the company to stop discharging and also seeks money damages to compensate the members for their losses. The organization does not assert any injury of its own. The company moves to dismiss for lack of standing.

Which of the following is the most accurate statement about the organization's standing?

The organization may maintain the entire suit because its members have concrete injuries and the suit is germane to the organization's purpose; the organization may recover damages on their behalf.
The organization may maintain the suit for injunctive relief, but not for damages, because the damage claims would require individualized participation by the members. (correct answer)
The organization may maintain the suit for damages, but not for injunctive relief, because prospective relief is not available in an associational suit unless the organization itself is injured.
The organization may not maintain the suit at all because an organization cannot assert the rights of its members unless it has suffered an injury of its own.

Explanation: Whenever you see an organization suing on behalf of members, think associational standing. The key test has three parts: the members themselves must have standing (injury, causation, redressability); the lawsuit must be germane to the organization's purpose; and the claim or relief requested must not require individualized participation by each member. Here, the members have concrete injuries: lost recreational use and reduced property values. Those injuries are caused by the company's pollution and could be redressed by a court order. The suit also seems germane to an environmental organization's purpose. But the critical limit is relief. Injunctive relief — stopping the discharge — benefits all members collectively and requires no individualized proof, so the organization may seek it. Money damages, by contrast, require calculating each member's separate loss and would demand individualized participation, so associational standing does not permit that claim. The choice saying "the organization may maintain the entire suit" and recover damages on the members' behalf is wrong because damages are exactly the kind of relief that defeats associational standing. The choice saying damages are allowed but injunctive relief is not gets the rule backwards: prospective relief is a classic associational remedy. And the choice saying the organization cannot sue at all unless it has suffered its own injury misstates the doctrine — an organization may assert its members' injuries without an independent injury as long as the three-part test is met. Study tip: On standing questions, separate the injury question from the relief question. Even when members have standing, associational plaintiffs can usually get injunctive or declaratory relief but not individualized damages.

Question 9

State law prohibits abortion after a fetal heartbeat is detected, which is usually about six weeks after fertilization. When the law took effect, Jane was eight weeks pregnant and sued in federal court to enjoin enforcement. The district court denied her request for a preliminary injunction. By the time her appeal was decided, she had given birth. In a sworn declaration, Jane stated that she intends to have another child and will again seek an abortion before six weeks if medically necessary. The state moved to dismiss the appeal as moot.

How should the appellate court rule on the state's motion?

Grant the motion, because Jane's pregnancy has ended and her intent to become pregnant again is too speculative to constitute an injury in fact.
Deny the motion, because the state may not moot a case by waiting until the plaintiff's pregnancy ends.
Grant the motion, because abortion challenges are inherently moot once a plaintiff gives birth and the issue cannot be reviewed before the pregnancy ends.
Deny the motion, because the controversy is capable of repetition yet evading review: the gestational period is too short to complete litigation, and Jane could be subjected to the law again. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a mootness challenge involving pregnancy, abortion, or another inherently time-limited condition, your first thought should be the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception. That exception applies when the challenged conduct is too short in duration to be fully litigated before it ends, and there is a reasonable expectation that the same plaintiff will be subjected to it again. Here, Jane's own pregnancy has ended, so her individual claim for injunctive relief is moot in the ordinary sense. But the six-week abortion limit is almost always shorter than the time needed to obtain a preliminary injunction and appeal, so the issue evades review. Her sworn declaration that she intends to have another child and would again seek an abortion if medically necessary makes future exposure concrete, not merely speculative. Thus, the appellate court should deny the motion under the exception. The other choices miss this. Granting because her intent is too speculative ignores her declaration and the exception's purpose. Denying because the state may not moot a case by waiting misstates the doctrine: the pregnancy ended naturally, not by government action, so the real issue is the exception, not voluntary cessation. Granting because abortion challenges are inherently moot once a plaintiff gives birth similarly fails because the exception exists precisely for injuries that end before litigation can finish. Study tip: when a defendant argues mootness, ask whether the harm is too brief for full review and whether the same plaintiff credibly could face it again. That pairing is the whole test.

Question 10

Congress amended the Endangered Species Act to require every federal agency, before approving a project that might affect a listed species, to obtain a biological opinion from the Fish and Wildlife Service. The amendment also provides that 'any person' may sue to enjoin a violation of this requirement. The Bureau of Reclamation approved a dam on the Missouri River without obtaining a biological opinion. Mara, who lives in Chicago, has never visited the river and has no plans to do so, but she has donated to a pallid sturgeon conservation fund and follows the species online. She sues in federal district court to enjoin the dam, relying on the amendment. The government moves to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

How should the court rule on the motion to dismiss?

Deny the motion, because Congress expressly authorized any person to sue to enforce the consultation duty and Mara alleges a violation of that statutory right.
Deny the motion, because harm to an endangered species is a concrete injury to every person who values that species, and an injunction would redress the harm.
Grant the motion, because Mara's asserted injury is a generalized grievance about the government's compliance with the law, not a concrete and particularized injury to herself. (correct answer)
Grant the motion, because the Bureau's approval of the dam is committed to agency discretion by law and is therefore a political question.

Explanation: Whenever you see a statute that says "any person may sue," pause: Congress can create statutory rights, but it cannot override the Article III standing requirement that every federal plaintiff show a concrete, particularized injury. Here, Mara's complaint rests on a generalized grievance—that the Bureau violated the Endangered Species Act's consultation duty. Her donation to a conservation fund and online interest in the pallid sturgeon do not make the injury to her distinct from the injury to every concerned citizen. She has never visited the river and has no plans to, so the alleged harm is abstract and not concrete. The court therefore grants the motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The choice saying Congress expressly authorized "any person" to sue misses the point: a statutory cause of action still requires constitutional standing. The choice arguing that harm to an endangered species injures every person who values it is also wrong, because that is precisely a generalized grievance; if everyone suffers the same abstract injury, no one has particularized standing. Finally, the choice invoking "committed to agency discretion" or a political question fails here because the statutory consultation requirement is a mandatory, reviewable duty—not a discretionary policy choice. The real lesson: when a plaintiff is merely ideologically or emotionally invested in government compliance, the case cannot proceed, even with a citizen-suit provision. On the exam, separate statutory standing from Article III standing, and look for facts showing the plaintiff personally uses or is directly affected by the resource.

Question 11

A state law makes it a felony for a physician to perform an abortion after 15 weeks' gestation except in a medical emergency. Dr. Grant, an obstetrician who performs abortions through 20 weeks, sued in federal court to enjoin the law. The complaint alleged that the law violates the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests of Dr. Grant's patients and that Dr. Grant faces a credible threat of prosecution because she intends to continue performing abortions after 15 weeks. No patient was named as a party. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that Dr. Grant lacks standing to assert her patients' rights.

Should the court dismiss the suit?

Yes, because Article III requires a plaintiff to assert her own legal interests; Dr. Grant cannot rely on injuries to her patients.
No, because a physician subject to criminal penalties may raise the rights of all present and future patients whenever a law restricts a procedure she performs.
No, because Dr. Grant has alleged both a credible threat of prosecution and a close physician-patient relationship, and patients face practical obstacles to asserting their own rights. (correct answer)
Yes, because Dr. Grant has not yet been prosecuted, so her alleged injury is speculative and must await an actual enforcement proceeding.

Explanation: This question tests third-party standing: the rule that a plaintiff generally must assert her own legal rights, but may raise the rights of others when she has an injury in fact, a close relationship with the rights-holders, and those rights-holders face obstacles to suing themselves. Start by asking: Does the doctor have her own concrete injury, and can she step into her patients' shoes? Here, Dr. Grant's credible threat of prosecution is a concrete, non-speculative injury: she intends to keep performing abortions after 15 weeks, and the law makes that a felony. That satisfies Article III standing. Then, the exception to the ban on asserting others' rights applies. She has a close physician-patient relationship, and her patients face practical obstacles—privacy concerns, the short window to challenge the law, and the sensitive nature of abortion—that make it unrealistic for them to bring suit. So dismissal is wrong. The "plaintiff must assert her own legal interests" argument misreads Article III: Dr. Grant does assert her own interest—avoiding prosecution—plus she invokes patients' rights under the third-party exception. The broader claim that a physician may always raise patients' rights whenever a law restricts a procedure is too sweeping; the exception requires a close relationship and obstacles to patients suing. And the "not yet prosecuted" argument confuses ripeness with standing: a credible threat of enforcement is enough; she need not wait for arrest. On exam day, when you see a doctor suing over patients' rights, check for credible threat plus relational and practical barriers—that's the third-party standing recipe.

Question 12

An arrestee was held in a county jail while awaiting trial and was required to appear at pretrial hearings in leg shackles and jail clothing, under a county policy mandating that all pretrial detainees appear that way. He sued the county in federal court, seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging that the policy violates due process. Before the district court ruled, he was convicted and sentenced to a term in state prison. He has no pending county charges and has not been returned to the county jail, but he argues the case is not moot because many pretrial detainees face the same brief exposure and the issue will otherwise evade review. The county moves to dismiss.

How should the court rule on the county's motion to dismiss?

Grant the motion, because the plaintiff's claim for prospective relief became moot when he left county custody, and he has not shown a reasonable likelihood that he will be subjected to the same policy again. (correct answer)
Deny the motion, because the county continues to apply the policy to other detainees, so a declaratory judgment would settle an ongoing controversy.
Deny the motion, because the policy affects each pretrial detainee for only a short time and will otherwise evade review for every person subjected to it.
Grant the motion, because a plaintiff's release from the custody or institution that administered the challenged policy always moots a claim for equitable relief.

Explanation: Whenever you see a challenge to prison or jail conditions after the plaintiff has left custody, the key issue is mootness. A federal court only decides live controversies, so after a plaintiff stops being subjected to a policy, his claim for declaratory and injunctive relief generally becomes moot. Here, the plaintiff was transferred to state prison and faces no pending county charges. He therefore cannot show a reasonable likelihood that he will be subjected to the county's shackling-and-jail-clothing policy again. His claim for prospective relief is moot, so the district court should grant the county's motion to dismiss. The choice saying the county's continued policy for other detainees keeps the controversy alive is tempting but wrong—a controversy must remain live between these parties, not between the county and other people. The choice saying the issue evades review for every detainee is also wrong: "capable of repetition yet evading review" requires both that the challenged action is too short to litigate fully and that the same plaintiff is reasonably likely to encounter it again. The choice saying release from custody always moots equitable claims is overbroad; release does not moot a claim if a realistic chance of returning exists. Here, there is none. Study tip: when a plaintiff seeks only prospective relief, ask two questions—Is the harm ongoing for this plaintiff, and could he face it again? If both answers are no, the case is moot.