Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Jurisdiction

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JurisdictionQuestion 1 of 10

State A's Criminal Nonsupport Act provides: A person commits criminal nonsupport if the person knowingly fails, without just cause, to provide support for the person's child in accordance with a court order issued by a court of this State. For purposes of territorial jurisdiction, a prosecution under this Act may be brought in this State if: (1) the child resides in this State; (2) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the child resided in this State; and (3) the defendant failed to comply with the court order while the child so resided. The defendant's absence from this State is not a defense to jurisdiction.

Marcus and Nina were divorced in State A. A State A court ordered Marcus to pay monthly child support for their child. Marcus later moved to State B. Nina and the child remained in State A. Marcus knew the child remained in State A but made no payments after moving. State A charges Marcuswith criminal nonsupport.

Marcus moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Should the court grant the motion?

Yes, becauseuber?

No, becauseuber?

Yes, becauseuber?

No, becauseuber?

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Jurisdiction

Practice Jurisdiction in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Jurisdiction, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

Marcus moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Should the court grant the motion?

Yes, becauseuber?
No, becauseuber? (correct answer)
Yes, becauseuber?
No, becauseuber?

Explanation: Whenever you see a territorial-jurisdiction question under a criminal nonsupport statute, focus on the statute's elements, not on where the defendant currently lives. Here, the statute allows prosecution in State A if the child resides there, the defendant knew or should have known that, and the defendant failed to comply while the child so resided. All three elements are satisfied: Nina and the child stayed in State A, Marcus knew the child remained there, and he made no payments after moving. The statute also expressly says that absence from State A is not a defense to jurisdiction. So the court should deny the motion. The correct "No" answer is the one that identifies Marcus's knowledge, the child's continued residence in State A, and Marcus's failure to pay while the child lived there. A "No" answer based only on the fact that State A issued the original support order is incomplete—the order alone is not enough; the statutory jurisdictional test must be met. Any "Yes" answer based on Marcus having moved to State B, being physically absent from State A, or no longer being domiciled in State A misunderstands the law: the defendant's location is irrelevant because the statute keys jurisdiction to the child's residence and the defendant's knowledge. A "Yes" answer claiming that the court order cannot be enforced outside State A would also be wrong, because the statute explicitly contemplates prosecution in State A despite the defendant's absence. On exam day, when a statute defines jurisdiction, apply it element by element. If the facts match each element, the defendant's presence is not required.

Question 2

State B's Criminal Jurisdiction Statute provides:

(a) A person may be prosecuted for an offense in this State if conduct that is an element of the offense, or a result that is an element of the offense, occurs in this State.

(b) In a prosecution for attempt, jurisdiction also lies in this State if the offense attempted would have been committed in this State had the attempt succeeded, even if the defendant's substantial step occurred entirely outside this State, provided the defendant intended the criminal result to occur in this State.

(c) Subsection (b) is the exclusive basis for attempt jurisdiction when no element of the attempt occurred in this State.

Dina, while in State A, mailed a package containing a bomb to Vera at Vera's residence in State B. Dina intended the bomb to explode when Vera opened it. Postal inspectors in State A discovered and disarmed the bomb before the package left State A. State B charges Dina with attempted murder of Vera. Vera was in State B at all relevant times.

Does State B have jurisdiction over the attempted-murder prosecution?

No, because the attempted murder was complete when Dina placed the package in the mail,and that substantial step occurred in State A.
No, because no attempt element occurred in State B;the package was intercepted before crossing into State B.
Yes, because Dina intended to kill a State B resident,and under subsection (b) a defendant's intent to cause a result in the forum issufficient without regard to where a completed murder would have occurred.
Yes, because the murder Dina intended would have been committed in State B had the bomb detonated there,and Dina intended that result; subsection (b) permits jurisdiction despite the State A substantial step. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a jurisdiction statute with a special attempt subsection, don't stop at the general "element occurred here" rule—read the attempt provision carefully. State B's subsection (b) is designed exactly for this situation: it gives jurisdiction over attempt when the completed offense would have occurred in State B and the defendant intended that result, even if the substantial step happened entirely outside the state. Here, Dina intended the bomb to detonate at Vera's State B residence, so the completed murder would have occurred in State B. The fact that the package was intercepted in State A is irrelevant under subsection (b). The first wrong answer, saying no jurisdiction because the attempt was complete when Dina mailed the package in State A, confuses the timing of the attempt with jurisdiction; the statute explicitly overrides that concern. The second wrong answer, saying no attempt element occurred in State B, also ignores subsection (b), which applies precisely when no attempt element occurred in the forum. The remaining wrong answer, saying intent to kill a State B resident is enough without regard to where the completed murder would have occurred, is too broad: victim residency alone isn't the test—the statute requires the intended completed crime would have been committed in State B, which is true here because Vera and the bomb's destination were in State B. On the exam, treat statutory jurisdiction questions as close-reading exercises: check whether an attempt-specific provision displaces the default elements-based rule, and don't assume interception outside the forum defeats jurisdiction.

Question 3

State B's Criminal Jurisdiction and Accountability Statute provides: A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when, acting with the culpability required for the offense,the person causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in that conduct. For purposes of territorial jurisdiction,the conduct of the innocent or irresponsible person in this State is deemed to be the conduct of the person who caused it. State B's Forgery Statute provides: A person commits forgery if, with intent to defraud,the person makes, alters, or uttersa written instrument that falsely purports to be the act of another.

Rina,in State A,created a check drawn on Vera's accountand payable to Rina,signing Vera's name without authorization. Rina gave the check to Paul,a courier who believed the check was genuine,and asked Paul to present it for deposit at Rina's bankin State B. Paul presented the check at the State B bank. State B prosecutes Rina for forgery.

Should the court grant Rina's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction?

No, because Paul presented the check in State B,and Rina caused Paul's innocent act with the intent to defraud; Paul's act is deemed Rina's act for jurisdictional purposes. (correct answer)
Yes, becauseughe making of the check occurred in State A,and Paul's presentationis a separate act for which Rina is not legally accountable.
Yes, because forgery is complete whenughe false instrument is made,so a later presentation cannot create jurisdiction over the maker.
No, becauseughe check was presented in a State B bank;a State in which a forged instrumentis presented has jurisdiction over everyone who later benefits from the instrument.

Explanation: When a defendant did not personally act in the forum state, the key is whether a statute attributes another person's in-state conduct to her. State B's accountability statute does exactly that for causing an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in conduct, and its territorial-jurisdiction provision then deems that conduct to be the defendant's own. Here, Rina forged the check in State A, but the crime charged can also be based on the utterance or presentation of the forged instrument. Paul presented the check in State B, and he was innocent—he believed it was genuine. Rina caused his presentation by giving him the check and asking him to deposit it, and she acted with the intent to defraud. Therefore, Paul's presentation is legally Rina's act for jurisdictional purposes. The court should deny dismissal. The first wrong answer claims the making in State A and Paul's presentation are separate acts for which Rina is not accountable. That ignores the statute making her accountable for causing an innocent person's conduct. The second wrong answer argues forgery is complete upon making, so later presentation cannot create jurisdiction. But forgery also covers uttering, and jurisdiction may rest on the in-state utterance caused by Rina. The third wrong answer says any State B bank presentment gives jurisdiction over everyone who later benefits. That is overbroad: mere benefit is not enough; the statute requires causing an innocent agent's in-state conduct with the required culpability. On exam day, when you see an out-of-state defendant and an in-state innocent actor, check for an accountability statute—it often converts the actor's location into the defendant's jurisdiction.

Question 4

The defendant, while in State A, mailed a threatening letter to a federal judge at the judge's residence in State B. The letter demanded that the judge dismiss a pending case. The defendant was later arrested in State A. A federal prosecutor wants to charge the defendant in the federal district in State B. The defendant objects, arguing that prosecution must occur in the district where the letter was mailed.

Which issue is most important in deciding whether the State B federal district is a proper place for the prosecution?

Whether the threatening letter was received by the judge in State B. (correct answer)
Whether the defendant had a motive to influence the judge's ruling.
Whether the judge was actually intimidated by the letter.
Whether the defendant used the U.S. mail system to send the letter.

Explanation: Whenever you see a venue objection in a federal criminal case, ask where the offense was begun, continued, or completed. Mailing offenses are special: because the letter physically travels through the mail, venue may lie both in the district where it was sent and in the district where it was received. Here, the prosecutor chose the federal district in State B, so the decisive fact is whether the threatening letter was received by the judge in State B. If it was, the offense continued into and was completed in State B, making venue proper there. The defendant's claim that only State A can prosecute is therefore wrong for a mailing offense. The judge's actual intimidation is not required—threat statutes generally use an objective standard, so the recipient's subjective fear is irrelevant. The defendant's motive to influence the judge's ruling is also not an element of the crime or a basis for venue; motive might be evidence, but it does not tell you where the crime occurred. Finally, the defendant used the U.S. mail does supply federal jurisdiction, but it is only a jurisdictional hook; without receipt in State B, mailing alone would not make State B a place where the offense was completed. Study tip: always separate jurisdiction from venue. A federal interest can make the crime prosecutable in federal court, but venue requires a geographic connection through the elements of the offense—especially where the crime was completed.

Question 5

The defendant, an enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe, is accused of assaulting another tribal member inside a casino on the tribe's reservation. The casino is owned by the tribe and sits on land held in trust by the United States for the tribe. Federal prosecutors want to charge the defendant in federal district court. The defendant argues that the matter belongs in tribal court, not federal court.

Which issue must be resolved first in deciding whether the federal court can hear the case?

Whether the casino is within Indian country. (correct answer)
Whether the assault occurred during a tribal ceremony.
Whether the tribe has consented to federal prosecution.
Whether the victim suffered serious bodily injury.

Explanation: Whenever a federal criminal case involves an Indian defendant and a reservation, the threshold question is always jurisdiction: did the crime occur in "Indian country"? Federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is defined by statute, so you should start by mapping the location of the offense. Here, that threshold issue is whether the casino is within Indian country. If it is—and a tribal casino on land held in trust by the United States for the tribe almost certainly is—then the federal district court may have jurisdiction over an assault by an enrolled tribal member. The land's status as Indian country is what makes federal jurisdiction possible in the first place. The other choices are premature or irrelevant. Whether the assault occurred during a tribal ceremony does not affect the location-based jurisdictional analysis. Whether the tribe has consented to federal prosecution is also not the first question; tribes generally do not have a veto over federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. And whether the victim suffered serious bodily injury might affect the particular federal statute or charge, but it is not a jurisdictional prerequisite—it cannot tell you whether the federal court has authority to hear the case at all. On questions like this, remember the gatekeeping step: establish "Indian country" before considering anything else. The location of the crime is the jurisdictional key, not the ceremony, not consent, and not the injury.

Question 6

A driver crossing a mountain pass in State A loses control of his truck after striking a patch of ice. The truck crosses the state line and collides with a motorcycle on a road in State B, injuring the motorcyclist. The motorcyclist is airlifted to a hospital in State A and dies there two weeks later. The driver is arrested in State A. A State B prosecutor wants to charge the driver with homicide. At a preliminary hearing, the driver argues that State B has no authority to prosecute him because his allegedly negligent conduct and the resulting death both occurred in State A.

Which issue is the most significant in evaluating the driver's argument?

Whether the motorcyclist's death in State A makes State B's homicide statute inapplicable to the collision.
Whether the driver's negligent act had a sufficient effect within State B to support the exercise of State B's jurisdiction. (correct answer)
Whether a driver who is charged in State B can be required to stand trial while remaining in State A's custody.
Whether the motorcyclist's decision to be airlifted to a State A hospital interrupted the causal connection between the collision and the death.

Explanation: Whenever a criminal case crosses state lines, stop and ask which state has territorial jurisdiction. This isn't about which event happened "first" or "last"; it's about whether the crime had a sufficient connection to the prosecuting state. Here, the driver's key factual claim is that his negligence and the death both happened in State A. But the homicide is more than those two moments: the truck collided with the motorcyclist on a State B road, causing the injury in State B. That collision is the harmful effect of the driver's conduct and is a sufficient basis for State B's jurisdiction. A state may punish conduct that occurs outside its borders if that conduct produces a harmful result within the state. State B's interest in protecting people on its roads makes its homicide statute applicable even though death later occurred in State A. The answer suggesting that the death in State A makes State B's statute inapplicable mistakes the timing of death for the only jurisdictional fact; the injury and collision in State B are enough. The answer about the driver's custody in State A confuses territorial jurisdiction with procedural matters like extradition or venue. And the answer about the airlift is a causation trap—medical transport to a hospital does not ordinarily interrupt the causal chain, and causation is not the central jurisdictional question here. Study tip: in multi-state crime questions, map where the conduct, injury, and death occurred. If either the conduct or the harmful result occurred in the state, that state likely has jurisdiction.

Question 7

Drake lives in State A. He was angry with Owen, his former business partner, who lived in State B. Drake traveled to State C and paid Cash, a State B resident, $50,000 to kill Owen. Cash then drove to State B and shot Owen to death. Drake returned to State A, where he was arrested. A State B grand jury indicted Drake for murder as an accomplice. At his first appearance in State B after extradition, Drake moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that State B could not prosecute him because he had never been in State B and none of his own acts occurred there.

Which of the following is the most significant legal issue raised by Drake's motion?

Whether State B may exercise criminal jurisdiction over Drake because the murder he allegedly procured was committed in State B, even though Drake was never present in State B. (correct answer)
Whether Drake's payment of $50,000 to Cash in State C is legally sufficient to support Drake's conviction as an accomplice to a murder committed in State B.
Whether State B may obtain custody of Drake through the Extradition Clause before its grand jury can continue to hold Drake for trial in State B.
Whether Drake's interstate travel from State A to State C makes federal criminal jurisdiction over the offense exclusive and therefore bars State B's prosecution.

Explanation: When Drake moves to dismiss because he never entered State B and no act of his occurred there, the key is to separate criminal jurisdiction from the merits of guilt. A state may prosecute a defendant when the offense has a sufficient territorial connection to that state. Here, the crime Drake allegedly procured—the murder of Owen—was completed in State B. Because an accomplice is liable for the offense the principal commits, the murder occurred in State B, and State B has territorial jurisdiction over Drake even though he was never physically present. So the central issue is whether State B can exercise criminal jurisdiction based on the result in its territory. The payment's legal sufficiency to make Drake an accomplice is a merits question about proof of intent and causation, not a jurisdictional challenge. The Extradition Clause issue concerns how Drake was brought to State B, not whether State B may try him once he is there. And Drake's interstate travel does not make federal jurisdiction exclusive; state and federal prosecutions can coexist, and a mere interstate trip does not bar state murder charges. Because Drake's motion attacks the court's power over him based on where he acted, the real question is jurisdiction over the offense. On questions like this, ask whether the crime's conduct or result occurred in the forum state—presence is often beside the point.

Question 8

State A's Conspiracy Jurisdiction Statute provides: A person may be prosecuted for conspiracyin this State only if: (1)the defendant entered into the agreementin this State; or (2)the defendant or any co-conspirator performed an overt act in this State in furtherance of the conspiracy. An overt act includes an act of preparation for the offense if the act is undertaken to accomplish the conspiracy's objective.

Dana and Paul, residents of State B, agreed in State B to burglarizea warehouse in State A. They agreed that Paul would first scoutthe warehouse. Paul drove into State A, rented a motel room near the warehouse, walked the perimeter for ninety minutes recording security-camera locations, and returned to State B. He never entered the warehouse. Dana never entered State A. State A charges Dana with conspiracy to commit burglary.

Should the court grant Dana's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction?

Yes, becauseugly conspiracy agreement was made in State B,and Dana personally took no act in State A.
No, because Paul's scouting was an overt act in State A in furtherance of the conspiracy, and the act is attributable to Dana. (correct answer)
Yes, because scoutinga warehouseis mere preparation,and mere preparation cannot be an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy.
No, becauseugly burglary that was the conspiracy's object would have been committed in State A,and object-offense jurisdiction is sufficient for conspiracy.

Explanation: When you see a conspiracy jurisdiction question, look first to the statute: it defines jurisdiction by either an in-state agreement or an in-state overt act by any co-conspirator. Here, the agreement occurred in State B, so the first basis fails. But the second basis succeeds. Paul drove into State A, rented a motel room, and scouted security-camera locations. Although those actions were preparatory, the statute expressly defines an overt act to include preparation undertaken to accomplish the conspiracy's objective. Paul's scouting was undertaken to facilitate the planned burglary, so it is an overt act in State A. Under conspiracy law, Paul's act is attributable to Dana as a co-conspirator, even though Dana never entered State A. Therefore, State A has jurisdiction. The choice saying dismissal is required because the agreement was made in State B and Dana personally took no act in State A ignores the statute's overt-act prong and the rule that co-conspirators' acts count. The choice arguing scouting is mere preparation misreads the statute, which explicitly allows preparatory acts as overt acts. The choice asserting object-offense jurisdiction is sufficient is also wrong: this statute does not create jurisdiction simply because the target burglary would occur in State A; the required nexus is agreement or an overt act in the state. Remember: on conspiracy jurisdiction questions, check the statute's wording and remember that one co-conspirator's overt act can create jurisdiction over all.

Question 9

Federal law provides: 18 U.S.C. §7(3): The term 'special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States' includes any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the United States. 18 U.S.C. §113(a): Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is guilty of an assault shall be punished as provided in this section. 18 U.S.C. §113(b): For purposes of this section, 'assault' includes an attempt to commit a battery, a completed battery, or an act intentionally placing another in reasonable apprehension of imminent bodily harm. The Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §13(a): Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is guilty of any act or omission that, although not made punishable by an Act of Congress, would be punishable if committed within the jurisdiction of the State in which such place is situated, shall be guilty of a like offenseand subject to a like punishment.

Fort Ames, a United States Army installationin State O, is under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the United States. During a quarrel in the parking lot of the post exchange, Dana, a civilian contractor, shoved Parker, a civilian visitor, causing no physical injury. State O's simple-assault statute makes it a crime intentionally to cause offensive physical contact. A federal prosecutor charges Dana with simple assault under the Assimilative Crimes Act, incorporating State O law, solely to obtain State O's higher maximum penalty.

Should the charge be dismissed?

Yes, because the parking lot is not within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction; the United States has only exclusive legislative jurisdiction, not territorial jurisdiction, over Fort Ames.
No, because Fort Ames is within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, so all state criminal laws in force at the fort are incorporated into federal law.
Yes, becauseughe shove is already punishable under the federal simple-assault statute,and the Act assimilates only conduct not made punishable by an Act of Congress. (correct answer)
No, becauseughe Assimilative Crimes Act authorizes assimilation whenever the State offense carries a higher penalty thanughe closest federal offense.

Explanation: Whenever you see the Assimilative Crimes Act, think "gap-filler": it lets a federal prosecutor borrow state criminal law only for conduct that Congress has not already made punishable inside federal enclaves. Here, Dana shoved Parker, causing offensive physical contact. Under 18 U.S.C. §113(b), "assault" includes a completed battery, and offensive physical contact is a completed battery. So Dana's conduct is already punishable under the federal simple-assault statute. That means the prosecutor cannot use the ACA to import State O's simple-assault statute solely to get a higher maximum penalty; the Act applies only to acts "not made punishable by an Act of Congress." The jurisdiction objection is not a way out: Fort Ames is under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the United States, so it falls squarely within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction under §7(3). Similarly, the claim that "all state criminal laws in force at the fort" are incorporated is too broad—state law is incorporated only when it fills a gap in federal law, not as a wholesale replacement. And the argument that the ACA authorizes assimilation whenever the state penalty is higher is backwards: a higher penalty cannot create authority to prosecute when the same conduct is already covered by a federal statute. On exam day, when you see the ACA, first ask: Is this exact conduct already punishable by federal law? If yes, the analysis stops—no assimilation, no matter how attractive the state penalty.

Question 10

State v. Ellison, decided by the appellate court of State B, holds: A State may prosecute a nonresident for an offense if the defendant's conduct was deliberately aimed at this State and the defendant knew that the conduct would cause a harmful result in this State. A State may not prosecute solely becauseugly victim later moved to this State or because property connected withthe offense was later found in this State. For a continuing offense, jurisdiction exists in any State where the offense was begun, continued, or completed.

Leo, in State A, telephoned Nina at her home in State B and falsely told her thata coin he was selling would double in value. Relying on the false statement, Nina wired $10,000 from her State B bank account to Leo's State A account. Leo never entered State B. State B prosecutes Leo for theft by deception.

Does State B have jurisdiction?

No, becauseugly false representation originated in State A and Leo received the money in State A, so no element of theft by deception occurred in State B.
No, becauseugly Due Process Clause requires thata criminal defendant have some physical presenceinuglyforum before prosecution may begin.
Yes, because Nina resided in State B and acted from State B, anda state always has jurisdiction to protect its residents from economic harm.
Yes, because Leo deliberately aimed his false statementat Nina in State B and knew that any resulting loss would occur in State B. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a criminal-jurisdiction question built on out-of-state conduct, the central issue is due process and the defendant's connection to the forum state—not physical presence. The rule from Ellison: a state may prosecute if the defendant deliberately aimed conduct at that state and knew harmful results would occur there. Here, that test is satisfied. Leo telephoned Nina in State B, knowingly aimed his false sales pitch at her home state, and knew that if the deception worked, the loss would hit her bank account in State B. Nina's reliance and the wiring of funds from her State B account took place in State B, so the state has jurisdiction. The choice saying "no element occurred in State B" is wrong because the false representation was received and relied upon in State B, and the victim's loss occurred there. The choice requiring "physical presence in the forum" is also wrong: due process is based on minimum contacts, not physical presence. And the choice claiming a state "always has jurisdiction to protect its residents" is overbroad—residence alone is not enough; the defendant must deliberately aim his conduct at the state. For strategy, remember: ask who aimed the conduct, and where did the harm hit? Physical presence is not required; deliberate targeting plus foreseeable in-state harm is enough.