Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Impaired Driving And Vehicular Manslaughter

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Impaired Driving And Vehicular ManslaughterQuestion 1 of 12

Section 20-4 of the State Code provides:

(a) A person commits vehicular manslaughter ifthe person, while operating a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner,causes the death of another person.

(b) "Criminally negligent manner" means operating a motor vehicle with a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe,and with conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.

(c) A defendant's manner of driving is a cause of death if it is a substantial factor in producingthe death,andthe death is a foreseeable result of that manner. A victim's failure to wear a seatbelt,a victim's intoxication, or a victim's preexisting medical condition is not a superseding cause, even if it made the death more likely.

Rivera was intoxicated,drove through a red light at45 miles per hour,and struck Vega's car. Vega was not wearing a seatbelt,was thrown from the car,and died of head injuries. An expert will testify thatthe collision probably would not have been fatal if Vega had been wearing a seatbelt,but that fatal head trauma is a foreseeable result of a 45-mile-per-hour intersection collision,and Rivera's intoxicationandspeed were substantial factors in Vega's death.

If Rivera is charged with vehicular manslaughter, should he be convicted?

Yes,because Rivera's intoxicated driving was a substantial factor in Vega's death,and seatbelt nonuse is not a superseding cause.

No,because Rivera did not intend to kill or consciously appreciate that death might result from his driving.

No,because Vega's failure to wear a seatbelt,not Rivera's driving,was the but-for cause of Vega's death.

Yes,because vehicular manslaughter imposes liability whenever an intoxicated driver's vehicle is involved in a death.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Impaired Driving And Vehicular Manslaughter

Practice Impaired Driving And Vehicular Manslaughter in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Impaired Driving And Vehicular Manslaughter, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

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Question 1

Section 20-4 of the State Code provides:

(a) A person commits vehicular manslaughter ifthe person, while operating a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner,causes the death of another person.

If Rivera is charged with vehicular manslaughter, should he be convicted?

Yes,because Rivera's intoxicated driving was a substantial factor in Vega's death,and seatbelt nonuse is not a superseding cause. (correct answer)
No,because Rivera did not intend to kill or consciously appreciate that death might result from his driving.
No,because Vega's failure to wear a seatbelt,not Rivera's driving,was the but-for cause of Vega's death.
Yes,because vehicular manslaughter imposes liability whenever an intoxicated driver's vehicle is involved in a death.

Explanation: Whenever a vehicular-manslaughter question supplies a statutory definition, your job is to apply that definition precisely rather than rely on general criminal-law intuitions. Here the statute requires both a criminally negligent manner of driving—a gross deviation with conscious disregard of risk—and causation. Rivera's intoxication, running a red light, and driving 45 mph easily establish conscious disregard of a substantial risk; intent to kill is not required. On causation, the statute adopts a substantial-factor test and expressly says a victim's seatbelt nonuse is not a superseding cause, even if it made death more likely. Since the expert says Rivera's intoxication and speed were substantial factors and fatal head trauma was foreseeable, conviction is proper. The correct choice is the one recognizing that Rivera's intoxicated driving was a substantial factor and seatbelt nonuse is not a superseding cause. The "no intent or conscious appreciation" choice fails because criminal negligence does not require intent, and the facts show conscious disregard through drunk driving through a red light. The "seatbelt was the but-for cause" choice misreads causation: but-for the collision, Vega would not have died, and the statute makes seatbelt nonuse non-superseding. The "liability whenever intoxicated driver involved" choice is overbroad—intoxication alone is not enough; the driving must negligently cause death. Study tip: on causation questions, spot statutory language about superseding causes and foreseeable results—it usually decides the answer.

Question 2

At a work party, Nina drank several glasses of wine. She walked to her car in her employer's parking garage, which was open to the public, put her purse in the trunk, started the engine to run the heater on a cold night, and leaned the driver's seat back to rest before driving home. A security guard called police, who found Nina asleep in the driver's seat with the engine running and the car in park. She was charged with driving while intoxicated.

Which issue is most likely to determine whether Nina can be convicted?

Whether Nina was in actual physical control of the car while asleep with the engine running. (correct answer)
Whether Nina was under the influence of alcohol at the time the police found her.
Whether the employer's parking garage is a public place for purposes of the DUI statute.
Whether the security guard's call gave police reasonable suspicion to approach Nina's car.

Explanation: Whenever you see a DUI question, break it into the statutory elements: intoxication, operating or being in actual physical control of a vehicle, and doing so in a public place. Here the decisive issue is actual physical control. Nina was asleep in the driver's seat with the engine running and the car in park, so a court could find she had the capability to immediately move the car, even if she was not driving at that moment. DUI statutes typically reach beyond moving vehicles to cover this exact risk: an intoxicated person positioned to operate the car. Sleeping does not defeat control; it often demonstrates the danger the law is designed to prevent. The other choices are less likely to determine the case. Whether Nina was under the influence is necessary, but it is not the disputed issue because the prosecution would still have to prove control separately. Whether the employer's parking garage is a public place may be relevant, but a garage open to the public likely satisfies that element, and the central dispute remains control. Whether the security guard's call gave police reasonable suspicion concerns evidence and police conduct, not an element of the offense; a sleeping driver with the engine running would justify a welfare check anyway. Remember the key pattern: for DUI, "actual physical control" can exist even when the driver is asleep, as long as the car is running and the person is positioned to operate it.

Question 3

During a light rain, Marcus drove about five miles over the speed limit while reaching for a fallen water bottle. His car hydroplaned and struck a pedestrian who was crossing against the light. The pedestrian died. Marcus is charged with vehicular manslaughter.

Which issue is central to whether Marcus can be convicted?

Whether Marcus's reaching for the bottle violated the state's distracted-driving statute.
Whether Marcus owed a duty of care to the pedestrian under civil tort principles.
Whether Marcus's conduct, though careless, rose to the level of criminal negligence required for vehicular manslaughter. (correct answer)
Whether the pedestrian's contributory negligence was the but-for cause of the collision.

Explanation: When you see a criminal statute like vehicular manslaughter, your first move should be to separate criminal liability from civil negligence. The central issue is Marcus's mental state: did his careless conduct rise to the level of criminal negligence? That standard requires more than ordinary carelessness. The state must prove a gross deviation from reasonable care—often involving a conscious disregard of a substantial risk. Reaching for a bottle while speeding in the rain may be negligent, but the conviction turns on whether it was culpable enough for a crime. The distractors miss that focus. The distracted-driving statute may be evidence of wrongdoing, but a statutory violation alone does not satisfy the heightened criminal-negligence standard. A duty of care under civil tort principles is about lawsuits, not the criminal mens rea required here. And the pedestrian's contributory negligence, while relevant to comparative fault or cause-in-fact, is not a defense to criminal homicide; even if the victim was also at fault, Marcus's own culpable conduct is what matters. Study tip: whenever a crime is defined around negligence or recklessness, zero in on the degree of risk and awareness—not just carelessness, causation, or civil fault.

Question 4

Omar ran a red light while reaching for his phone, striking Liam, who was crossing legally. Liam was taken to the hospital with a broken leg but died of anaphylactic shock after a pharmacist administered an antibiotic despite a prominent allergy flag in Liam's chart. Omar is charged with vehicular manslaughter.

Which issue most strongly supports Omar's defense?

Whether Liam's allergy was a preexisting condition that made him unusually susceptible to death.
Whether Liam's broken leg qualified as a serious bodily injury under the vehicular manslaughter statute.
Whether Omar's running the red light was a cause in fact of Liam's being at the hospital.
Whether the hospital's failure to heed Liam's allergy record was an intervening cause that broke the causal chain. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a vehicular-manslaughter question, focus on causation: the state must prove both cause-in-fact and proximate cause. Even if Omar caused the collision, a later, independent act can cut off his responsibility if it is an unforeseeable superseding cause. Here, Liam did not die from the broken leg; he died from anaphylactic shock after a pharmacist gave an antibiotic despite a prominent allergy flag. That medical error is the strongest defense because it directly attacks proximate cause. The pharmacist's conduct was independent of Omar's reckless driving and highly unforeseeable, so it may break the causal chain. The other choices are traps. The allergy-as-preexisting-condition argument fails because the criminal law's "eggshell victim" rule makes a defendant responsible for the victim's unusual vulnerabilities. Whether the broken leg was "serious bodily injury" is irrelevant because vehicular manslaughter charges death, not merely injury. And whether running the red light was cause in fact of Liam being at the hospital is weak: but-for causation is likely satisfied—no red light, no collision, no hospital admission. Study tip: distinguish cause-in-fact from proximate cause, and remember that foreseeability determines whether an intervening act is superseding. Gross negligence by a medical professional often qualifies; ordinary medical complications usually do not.

Question 5

After losing his license in a prior DUI and completing a court-ordered alcohol-awareness class, Jordan drank at a bar and then drove home. He swerved across a lane and fatally struck a cyclist. His blood alcohol was twice the legal limit. Jordan is charged with second-degree murder rather than merely vehicular manslaughter.

Which issue is most likely to determine whether Jordan can be convicted of murder?

Whether Jordan's blood alcohol level was high enough to establish that he was under the influence at the time of the crash.
Whether Jordan's conduct amounted to a conscious disregard for human life, as distinct from gross negligence. (correct answer)
Whether Jordan's intoxication made him unable to form an intent to kill.
Whether Jordan's license revocation was itself a crime warranting enhanced punishment.

Explanation: When you see a murder charge built on drunk driving, the question is not really about intoxication—it's about mens rea. Murder requires malice aforethought, which can be implied when a person acts with conscious disregard for human life. Manslaughter, by contrast, can be based on gross negligence—a serious but unintentional failure to act safely. That is the line this question draws. The deciding issue is whether Jordan's conduct showed conscious disregard for human life, not just gross negligence. Because he lost his license for a prior DUI and completed an alcohol-awareness class, he likely knew the risks of drinking and driving. If the jury finds he consciously ignored that known danger, his conduct supports implied malice and second-degree murder. The wrong answers miss that key distinction. Whether his blood alcohol was high enough to prove intoxication goes to the DUI or vehicular manslaughter, not to malice. Whether intoxication made him unable to form an intent to kill misunderstands the theory: implied malice does not require intent to kill, and voluntary intoxication generally does not negate a defect of this kind. Whether license revocation was itself a crime is irrelevant to the homicide grading—it only shows notice of danger. On exam day, whenever a crime requires malice or knowledge, distinguish subjective awareness of risk from objective carelessness. That difference separates murder from manslaughter.

Question 6

Lena has epilepsy but had been seizure-free for eight years, and her neurologist had cleared her to drive. One day, without any warning aura, she lost consciousness at the wheel. Her car jumped the curb and killed a pedestrian. Lena is charged with vehicular manslaughter.

Which defense is most likely to prevail?

She was not in actual physical control of the car because she was unconscious when the collision occurred.
She did not intend to kill the pedestrian, so she lacked criminal intent.
Her loss of consciousness was sudden and not reasonably foreseeable, so her unconscious driving was not a culpable voluntary act. (correct answer)
The pedestrian's death was caused by the car's loss of power, not by any act of Lena.

Explanation: When you see a question about criminal liability, always separate the two core components: the physical act (actus reus) and the mental state (mens rea). Criminal liability requires a voluntary act, meaning a conscious, willed bodily movement. Here, Lena's key argument is that her unconscious driving was not a voluntary act at all. The correct defense is that her loss of consciousness was sudden and not reasonably foreseeable, so her unconscious driving was not a culpable voluntary act. This is the classic "involuntary act" defense: if a person blacks out without warning and had no reason to foresee it, the resulting movement—or failure to control the car—is not a voluntary act for criminal liability. The fact that she was cleared to drive by her neurologist and had been seizure-free for years supports the lack of foreseeability. The choice saying she was not in "actual physical control" of the car is a trap: that phrase comes from DUI law, and physical control at the moment of the crash is not the same as a voluntary act. The choice about lacking intent to kill also fails because vehicular manslaughter generally does not require intent to kill; recklessness or criminal negligence can be enough. Finally, the claim that the death was caused by the car's loss of power misstates the causation—her unconscious driving caused the car to leave the road, and she caused the car to be driven in the first place. On the bar exam, when you see sudden incapacitation, ask: was the loss of consciousness foreseeable? If not, the actus reus collapses.

Question 7

During a traffic stop, an officer smelled alcohol on Priya's breath and saw an open container in her car. She failed field sobriety tests and was arrested. At the station, without obtaining a warrant, the officer ordered a blood draw, citing a state statute providing that anyone who drives on state roads has consented to such testing. Priya objected, but the sample was drawn. She now moves to suppress the blood evidence.

Which constitutional claim is most directly raised by these facts?

That the compulsory blood draw violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search because it was done without a warrant and over her objection. (correct answer)
That compelling her to submit to a blood draw violated her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the test produced evidence of her intoxication.
That the officer's failure to advise Priya that she could refuse the blood draw rendered her consent involuntary under the Sixth Amendment.
That the state's implied-consent statute violated equal protection by treating DUI arrestees differently from other drivers.

Explanation: Whenever you see a search-and-seizure question, ask first whether a government action counts as a "search." A compelled blood draw is a physical intrusion into the body, so it is unquestionably a Fourth Amendment search. That is the key move here. The strongest claim is that the compulsory blood draw violated Priya's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search because it was done without a warrant and over her objection. A warrant is normally required for a blood draw unless an exception applies. The state's implied-consent statute may create limited consent, but Priya explicitly objected, so the officer could not rely on that consent. Thus suppression is the proper remedy. Now the distractors. The Fifth Amendment claim fails because the blood draw did not compel Priya to produce testimonial or communicative evidence; tests showing intoxication are physical, not testimonial. The Sixth Amendment claim fails because the Sixth Amendment guarantees counsel at critical stages of criminal proceedings, not a warning about refusing a blood draw; involuntary-consent issues are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, not the Sixth. The equal protection claim fails because implied-consent statutes apply to all drivers who use state roads; treating DUI arrestees differently from other driver groups is rationally related to highway safety and does not implicate a suspect class. Your study tip: when a question involves bodily fluids, DNA, or fingerprinting, automatically test the Fourth Amendment first, then consider whether the evidence is testimonial for Fifth Amendment purposes.

Question 8

State v. Linder, 485 State 2d 101 (2019), held: A warrantless blood draw from an unconscious driver is admissible under the Fourth Amendment if the officer had probable cause to believe the driver was impaired and it was not reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant before the draw. In deciding practicability, courts consider whether the driver needed emergency medical treatment, whether medical personnel were already drawing blood for treatment, and whether delaying the draw to obtain a warrant would interfere with medical care. The natural dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream is not alone enough to establish an exigency.

After a one-car crash, Edwards was unconscious and was taken to a trauma center. Officer Nguyen smelled alcohol on Edwards and saw an empty vodka bottle in the car. At the hospital, the trauma team was about to draw blood for emergency testing. A telephonic warrant could have been obtained in about 30 minutes, but the treating physician said that delaying the blood draw for 30 minutes would interfere with Edwards's emergency care and that a second vial could be drawn at the same time with no added risk. Officer Nguyen asked the nurse to draw the second vial for blood-alcohol testing; it showed a 0.16 alcohol concentration.

Edwards moves to suppress the blood-alcohol test result. Should the court grant the motion?

Yes, because alcohol dissipates naturally, and the state may not rely on dissipation alone to justify the warrantless draw.
Yes, because the officer had 30 minutes to obtain a telephonic warrant and failed to do so, making the draw unreasonable.
No, because Edwards impliedly consented to the blood draw by driving on a public highway, and consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.
No, because the draw was done while medical personnel were already drawing blood for emergency treatment, and waiting for a warrant would have interfered with that care. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a warrantless blood draw, focus on the exigency doctrine and whether a warrant was reasonably practicable. In State v. Linder, the key nuance is that natural dissipation alone does not justify skipping a warrant, but a separate medical exigency can. Here, Officer Nguyen had probable cause — smell of alcohol, empty vodka bottle, unconscious driver — and the trauma team was already drawing blood for emergency treatment. The physician said delaying 30 minutes for a telephonic warrant would interfere with Edwards's emergency care, so it was not reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant before the draw. Drawing a second vial at the same time added no risk, making the warrantless seizure reasonable. The first wrong answer cites dissipation alone and says the state may not rely on it. That's true, but it ignores the independent exigency posed by the emergency medical draw. The second wrong answer emphasizes the 30 minutes available for a telephonic warrant. That seems strong, but practicability isn't measured by time alone; here the delay would have interfered with medical care, so the officer's failure to seek the warrant was justified. The third wrong answer claims implied consent from driving on a public highway. Implied consent statutes exist, but driving does not consent to every warrantless blood draw, and that doctrine is not the basis for this result. The correct outcome is suppression denied, because the draw occurred while medical personnel were already drawing blood for emergency treatment, and waiting for a warrant would have interfered with that care. Study tip: when a blood-draw question appears, look for the "medical overlap" fact pattern — if hospital staff are already drawing blood and a warrant delay would disrupt treatment, that creates a compelling exigency even though alcohol dissipation alone would not.

Question 9

Section 7-9-1 of the State Code provides in relevant part:

(a) A person commits driving under the influence if the person, while under the influence of an impairing substance, operates a motor vehicle on a public highway.

(b) "Operates" means driving or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.

(c) A person is in actual physical control if the person is in the driver's seat whilethe engine is running, whether or notthe vehicle is moving, unless the vehicle is lawfully parked, the engine is turned off,andthe person has taken reasonable steps to prevent the vehicle from rolling.

(d) A public highway includes a rest area or parking area open to the public for motorists using a public highway.

Donovan drank heavily at a bar. A sober friend drove Donovan's car to a rest area off Interstate 10,and then left. Donovan moved into the driver's seat, started the engine to run the heater, put the transmission in park, setthe parking brake,and fell asleep. An officer found Donovan at 2:00 a.m.;a blood test showed a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.14. Donovan was charged under Section ́-9-1.

Should Donovan be convicted of driving under the influence?

No, because Donovan was asleep, and therefore could not have the intent required to operate a motor vehicle.
Yes, because Donovan was in the driver's seat withthe engine running, but the statutory exception applies only ifthe engine is turned off. (correct answer)
No, because the car was lawfully parked, with the transmission in park and the parking brake set.
Yes, because any person who is in a vehicle located in a highway rest area while under the influence has committed the offense.

Explanation: Whenever you see a DUI statute with a definition of "operates," your job is to apply that statutory definition—not your common-sense idea of "driving." The question tests whether the "lawfully parked" exception removes Donovan from liability. Donovan was in the driver's seat with the engine running, which satisfies the statute's definition of "actual physical control." The exception for a "lawfully parked" vehicle requires both that the engine is turned off and that reasonable steps prevent rolling. Here, the engine was on to run the heater, so the exception does not apply. Conviction is proper. Choice "No, because Donovan was asleep" confuses criminal intent with objective physical control. The statute defines control by location and engine status, not by mental state or awareness. Choice "No, because the car was lawfully parked, with the transmission in park and the parking brake set" misunderstands the exception: parking brake and transmission matter, but the engine was running, and the exception explicitly requires it be off. Choice "Yes, because any person who is in a vehicle located in a highway rest area while under the influence" overstates the law—rest areas count as public highways, but the person must also be operating the vehicle under the statute; mere presence is not enough. Study tip: read statutory exceptions literally and note every condition. If one required element is missing, the exception fails—here, "engine turned off" was the missing piece.

Question 10

State law provides, in relevant part: §18-4. Implied Consent and Refusal.

(a) A person who operates a vehicle on a public highway is deemed to have consented to a chemical test of breath, blood, or urine if an officer has probable cause to believe the person operated while impaired.

(b) The person may refuse. If the person refuses, the test shall not be administered except under a search warrant.

(c) The fact of a refusal is admissible. A statement made by the person in refusing is admissible only if it is not testimonial.

In State v. Pirelli,the state supreme court explained that a driver's act of turning away from a breath-test device or otherwise declining to provide a sample is physical conduct, not a testimonial communication. By contrast, a statement explaining the reason for refusal—for example, "I refused because I had been drinking"—is testimonial because it communicatesthe driver's belief or knowledge of a fact.

Officer Lee had probable cause to arrest Parish for impaired driving. Officer Lee read Parish the implied-consent notice. Parish shook her head,and,when Officer Lee asked why,said,"Because I had too much to drink." Officer Lee obtained no warrant,and administered no test. At Parish's trial,the prosecution seeks to prove that Parish refused,and to introduce Parish's statement.

Which of the following best describes the admissibility of the evidence?

The fact of refusal is admissible,butthe statement is inadmissible because it is a testimonial communication of Parish's belief that she had been drinking. (correct answer)
Both are inadmissible,because the officer did not obtain a warrant,andthe refusal cannot be used as a substitute for a chemical test.
Both the fact of refusal and the statement are admissible,because the decision to refuse a chemical test is physical conduct,and the statement was made during the refusal.
The statement is admissible as a verbal act of refusal,butthe fact of refusal is inadmissible becausethe statement already proves the refusal.

Explanation: Whenever you see an implied-consent question, separate the physical refusal from any words spoken. The Fifth Amendment protects testimonial communications, but not physical acts. Here, Parish's act of shaking her head was a physical refusal, so the state may prove that fact. Her later statement, "Because I had too much to drink," is different: it communicates her belief and knowledge of a fact, making it testimonial under State v. Pirelli. Thus the fact of refusal is admissible, but the statement is inadmissible. The lack of a warrant only barred administering the test; it did not make the refusal itself unusable, so the choice saying both are inadmissible because no warrant was obtained misreads the statute. The choice saying both are admissible because the statement was made during the refusal overlooks that the statement explains the reason and is therefore testimonial, not mere physical conduct. Finally, the choice treating the statement as a verbal act of refusal and excluding the fact of refusal gets the rule backwards: the physical act of shaking her head already proves refusal, and the statement is not a verbal act but a testimonial declaration. On exam day, ask yourself: is this evidence a physical act, or does it communicate the defendant's thoughts? If it communicates a fact, the privilege likely bars it.

Question 11

Section 104-1 provides that it is a traffic infraction to operate a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding the posted speed limit. Section 104-2 provides:

(a) A person commits vehicular homicide if the person, while operating a motor vehicle in a manner prohibited by Section 104-1, proximately causes the death of another person.

(b) A prohibited manner is a proximate cause of death if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the death and the death is a natural and probable consequence of that manner. It is not a proximate cause if the death would have occurred in substantially the same manner even had the person operated the vehicle in a lawful manner.

(c) A victim's act is not a superseding cause if the risk of that act was among the risks that made the defendant's manner of driving prohibited.

Harmon drove 60 miles per hour in a 30-mile-per-hour zone on a city street at night. Justus darted out from between two parked trucks 60 feet ahead of Harmon's car and was struck. An expert will testify that even a law-abiding driver at 30 miles per hour could not have stopped before reaching Justus, but would have struck Justus at about 18 miles per hour and Justus would probably have survived. At Harmon's actual speed, the car struck Justus at about 50 miles per hour, and Justus died from head injuries.

Harmon is charged with vehicular homicide. Which of the following is correct?

Not guilty, because the collision would have occurred even if Harmon had driven at the speed limit, so the speeding was not a but-for cause of the death.
Not guilty, because Justus's sudden act in darting into the road was an unforeseeable intervening cause that breaks the chain of causation.
Guilty, because speeding was a substantial factor in making the collision fatal, and death from a high-speed pedestrian collision on a city street was a natural and probable consequence. (correct answer)
Guilty, because any violation of the speed limit that is followed by a fatal collision is a proximate cause of the death, regardless of how the collision occurred.

Explanation: This question tests causation under a vehicular homicide statute. Whenever a statute defines proximate cause, apply its language rather than general tort intuitions. Here §104-2 requires the prohibited speed to be a substantial factor in bringing about death and death to be a natural and probable consequence; it also says no proximate cause only if death would have occurred in substantially the same manner even at lawful speed. At 60 mph in a 30 zone, Harmon struck Justus at 50 mph, killing him. A law-abiding driver at 30 mph would also have hit Justus, but at about 18 mph, and Justus would probably have survived. Therefore the speeding was a substantial factor making the collision fatal, and death from a high-speed pedestrian collision on a city street was a natural and probable consequence. Guilty. The "not guilty because collision would have occurred even at the speed limit" answer confuses but-for cause of the collision with but-for cause of death; the death would not have occurred at lawful speed. The "Justus's sudden darting was unforeseeable superseding cause" answer is wrong because §104-2(c) says a victim's act is not superseding if the risk of that act is among the risks that made the driving prohibited — darting pedestrians are a classic risk of speeding on a city street. The "any violation followed by a fatal collision is a proximate cause regardless" answer is too broad; causation still requires a substantial factor and natural/probable consequence. On the exam, separate "collision would have happened" from "death would have happened," and check whether the statute itself addresses victim acts or lawful-speed hypotheticals.

Question 12

Section 12-10 of the State Code provides:

(a) A person commits driving under the influence of cannabis ifthe person operates a motor vehicle while impaired by cannabis to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely driving.

(b) If a blood sample taken within two hours of driving contains 5 or more nanograms of delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol ((THC) per milliliter,the person is presumed to be under the influence of cannabis. This presumption is rebuttable.

(c) A blood sample containing less than5 ng/mL of THC does not create a presumption thatthe person was not under the influence; such a result may be considered with all other evidence of impairment.

After Officer Patel saw Diaz's car weave within its lane for nearly half a mile,andbrake suddenly for no apparent reason,she stopped Diaz. Diaz had bloodshot eyes,thick speech,and performed poorly on field sobriety tests. A blood sample taken one hour after the stop contained 4.2 ng/mL of active THC,andno alcohol. Diaz was charged under Section12-10. At the close of the state's evidence,Diaz moved for a judgment of acquittal,arguing thatthe 4.2 ng/mL result conclusively showed he was not under the influence.

Should the court grant Diaz's motion?

Yes,because the statute makes 5 ng/mL the legal definition of impairment from cannabis,and Diaz's result was below that level.
Yes,because a sub-threshold THC result is not enough by itself to prove impairment,andthe state introduced no evidence that Diaz drove erratically.
No,because any measured amount of THC creates a conclusive presumption that a driver is impaired,regardless of the 5 ng/mL level.
No,because a sub-threshold result does not create a presumption of sobriety,yet may be combined with the observed driving,and field-sobriety evidence. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever a statute attaches a numerical threshold to impairment, your job is to identify exactly what legal effect that number has—presumption, conclusive rule, or merely admissible evidence. Here, Section 12-10(b) says that 5 or more ng/mL of THC within two hours creates a rebuttable presumption of impairment, while subsection (c) says a below-threshold result creates no presumption of sobriety and may be considered with all other evidence. Diaz's 4.2 ng/mL result therefore does not conclusively show he was sober, and the court should deny the motion. The correct answer is the one stating that a sub-threshold result does not create a presumption of sobriety but may be combined with observed driving and field-sobriety evidence. The officer testified about Diaz weaving, braking suddenly, having bloodshot eyes, thick speech, and failing field sobriety tests—all relevant evidence of impairment regardless of the numerical result. The first wrong answer misreads the statute: 5 ng/mL is not a legal definition of impairment; it merely triggers a rebuttable presumption. The second wrong answer claims the state introduced no evidence that Diaz drove erratically, but the officer described specific erratic driving. The third wrong answer overstates the law: not every measured amount creates a conclusive presumption; only 5 or more creates a rebuttable presumption, and even below-threshold results can be used with other evidence. When you see a statutory presumption, ask: What is presumed? Is it rebuttable? What does the statute say about results below the threshold? A rebuttable presumption never automatically decides guilt, and the absence of a presumption is not the same as proof of innocence.