Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Identify Relevant And Dispositive Sources

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Identify Relevant And Dispositive SourcesQuestion 1 of 12

Owner planned to open a restaurant and hired Builder to renovate the space. Supplier refused to extend credit to Builder. Owner orally told Supplier: 'Deliver the materials to Builder; if Builder does not pay you, I will pay you.' After Builder did not pay, Supplier sued Owner. Owner raised the Statute of Frauds. The court is considering: State Statute of Frauds § 4: 'No action shall be brought on a promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person, unless the promise, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged.' Reed v. Moore (State Supreme Court): 'The suretyship provision does not apply when the promisor's main purpose is to obtain a direct economic benefit for the promisor, even if the promise also benefits the primary debtor.' Adams v. Bell (Court of Appeals of a neighboring state): 'A promise to pay another person's debt is a suretyship promise, and the promisor's motive is irrelevant if the form is a guarantee.' UCC § 2-201: 'A contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable unless there is a writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made.'

Which source is dispositive of whether Owner's promise must be in writing?

State Statute of Frauds § 4, because the promise is to answer for Builder's debt to Supplier and is oral.

Reed v. Moore, because Owner's main purpose was to get his restaurant open, a direct economic benefit, so the promise is not within § 4.

Adams v. Bell, because the form of the promise is a guarantee and motive does not matter.

UCC § 2-201, because the materials are goods and the value exceeds $500, so the promise must be in writing.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Identify Relevant And Dispositive Sources

Practice Identify Relevant And Dispositive Sources in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Identify Relevant And Dispositive Sources, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

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Question 1

Which source is dispositive of whether Owner's promise must be in writing?

State Statute of Frauds § 4, because the promise is to answer for Builder's debt to Supplier and is oral.
Reed v. Moore, because Owner's main purpose was to get his restaurant open, a direct economic benefit, so the promise is not within § 4. (correct answer)
Adams v. Bell, because the form of the promise is a guarantee and motive does not matter.
UCC § 2-201, because the materials are goods and the value exceeds $500, so the promise must be in writing.

Explanation: Whenever you see a Statute of Frauds question involving a promise to pay someone else's debt, first identify whether the "main purpose" exception applies: if the promisor's primary goal is their own economic benefit, the suretyship writing requirement is removed. Here, Owner promised to pay Supplier if Builder did not, which looks like a classic guarantee. But Owner's actual purpose was to get his restaurant open—a direct economic benefit to himself. Reed v. Moore, as a State Supreme Court decision, controls and adopts exactly that main-purpose exception. Therefore, Owner's oral promise is enforceable despite § 4's writing requirement. The State Statute of Frauds § 4 is not dispositive on its own because Reed interprets it to exclude promises made for the promisor's direct economic benefit; the statute must be read together with binding precedent. Adams v. Bell, though factually similar, is from a neighboring state and is merely persuasive, not controlling, so its contrary view—that motive is irrelevant—cannot decide the case. Finally, UCC § 2-201 is a trap: it applies to contracts for the sale of goods, but Owner did not contract to buy goods; he guaranteed Builder's debt. The suretyship issue is governed by state statute and case law, not the UCC. Your study tip: when a question asks which source is "dispositive," focus on hierarchy of authority—binding supreme court precedent beats a neighboring state's court of appeals decision and an irrelevant code provision.

Question 2

In a civil fraud suit, Plaintiff offers a printout of a text message from Defendant's phone that states, 'I will wire the $20,000 tomorrow.' Plaintiff cannot identify who sent it. Defendant objects that the printout has not been authenticated. After State v. Pence was decided, the legislature enacted State Evidence Code § 910. The court is considering: State Evidence Code § 910: 'In a civil action, a printout of an electronic message is admissible only if a party first introduces an affidavit of the custodian of records of the electronic service provider stating that the printout accurately reflects the message in the provider's records.' State Evidence Code § 901: 'The requirement of authentication may be satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter is what its proponent claims. Illustrations include distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all circumstances.' State v. Pence (State Supreme Court 2019): 'Authentication of text messages may be established by circumstantial evidence, including distinctive content, and does not require a custodian affidavit.' A forensic manual explaining that text messages may be retrieved from a cell phone.

Which source is dispositive of whether Plaintiff's printout is admissible?

State Evidence Code § 910, because it imposes a custodian-affidavit condition that Plaintiff has not satisfied. (correct answer)
State Evidence Code § 901, because distinctive content is an illustration of authentication and no witness is required.
State v. Pence, because it is a controlling state supreme court decision allowing circumstantial authentication.
The forensic manual, because it shows the message can be retrieved from the phone and is therefore reliable.

Explanation: Whenever you see competing legal authorities on evidence admissibility, rank them: a later-enacted specific statute ordinarily controls over a general statute and over prior case law. That hierarchy resolves this question. Here, the State Evidence Code §910 custodian-affidavit ruleis dispositive. Plaintiff's printout falls squarely within it: a civil action, a printout of an electronic message, admissible only if a custodian of records affidavit first establishes that the printout accurately reflects the provider's records. Plaintiff offers no such affidavit, so the item fails the statute's explicit condition. The general authentication standard in Section 901 — including distinctive content — does not rescue the printout, because §910 is a more specific rule enacted for exactly this kind of evidence; a later specific statute prevails overageneral one. State v. Pence did permit circumstantial authentication of text messages without a custodian affidavit, but that decision came before the legislature enacted §910. However "controlling" state supreme court decisions can be displaced by a later statute; legislative override is exactly what happened here. The forensic manual also misses the point: showing that text messages can be retrieved from a cell phone is a technical fact, not a rule of law, and retrievalility says nothing about authentication — especially the identity od the sender. So the obstacle is not technical, it's the specific statutory prerequisite. When a modern evidence question involves an electronic message printout, check first for a specific admissibility statute; only if none exists do you fall back on general authentication doctrines like distinctive content or common-law case precedent.

Question 3

Owner conveyed Blackacre to Alice by a deed that Alice did not record. Owner then conveyed the same land to Beth for value and without notice of Alice's deed; Beth recorded promptly. Later, Beth sold Blackacre to Carl for value, and Carl recorded. Carl knew about Alice's earlier unrecorded deed before buying. Alice seeks to quiet title against Carl. The court is considering: State Recording Act § 1: 'An unrecorded conveyance is void as against a subsequent purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration whose conveyance is first duly recorded.' Hall v. Reed (State Supreme Court 1931): 'A grantee who takes from a bona fide purchaser for value without notice acquires the same protection as the grantor even if the grantee himself had notice of the prior unrecorded interest.' Dunn v. Ferry (Court of Appeals of a neighboring state 1988): 'One who takes with notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance cannot claim the benefit of the recording act, even if his immediate grantor was without notice.' A treatise: 'A donee from a bona fide purchaser may invoke the shelter rule.'

Which authority is dispositive of Carl's priority over Alice?

State Recording Act § 1, because Carl is a subsequent purchaser for value who recorded first, so the unrecorded Alice deed is void against him.
Hall v. Reed, because Carl steps into Beth's protected position even though Carl himself had notice. (correct answer)
Dunn v. Ferry, because it is the more recent authority and directly addresses a later purchaser with notice.
The treatise, because it explains that the shelter rule protects transferees from a bona fide purchaser.

Explanation: Whenever a prior unrecorded deed conflicts with a later purchaser, ask two questions: did the later purchaser qualify directly under the recording act, and if not, can the purchaser claim the shelter rule? Here, State Recording Act §1 protects only a subsequent purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration whose conveyance is first duly recorded. Carl bought for value and recorded, but he knew about Alice's earlier deed, so he was not in good faith. Thus the Act does not directly void Alice's deed against him. . But Beth, Carl's grantor, was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of Alice's deed and recorded promptly. Under Hall v. Reed, a State Supreme Court decision, a grantee who takes from a BFP acquires the same protection as the grantor even if the grantee himself had notice of the prior unrecorded interest. Applying that shelter rule, Carl steps into Beth's protected position, so he prevails despite his own knowledge. That makes Hall dispositive. The State Recording Act alone is not enough because Carl fails the good-faith requirement. Dunn v. Ferry, though it addresses a later purchaser with notice, is only a Court of Appeals decision from a neighboring state, so it is persuasive, not binding, and it conflicts with binding State Supreme Court precedent. The treatise similarly is secondary authority; it speaks of a donee from a BFP, not specifically a purchaser with notice, and cannot override a controlling state Supreme Court case. Remember: a buyer from a BFP is sheltered even with notice; the shelter rule transfers the grantor's priority.

Question 4

Defendant intended to kill Victim. Believing Victim was asleep, Defendant fired six shots into Victim's bed. Victim was not home. Defendant is charged with attempted murder. Defendant argues that because Victim was not present, no attempted murder occurred. The court is considering: Attempt Statute: 'A person commits attempt when, acting with the intent to commit a crime, the person takes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime.' State v. Blair (State Supreme Court): 'Factual impossibility—where the intended result is impossible because of circumstances unknown to the actor—is not a defense to attempt.' State v. Chen (State Supreme Court): 'Legal impossibility—where the actor's intended conduct, if completed, would not be a crime—is a defense to attempt.' A law review article arguing that a defendant should not be liable for attempt if the intended victim was absent.

Which source is dispositive of Defendant's impossibility argument?

The Attempt Statute, because shooting at an empty bed is not a substantial step toward killing a person who is not there.
State v. Chen, because the absence of the victim means the completed conduct would not have constituted murder, so the impossibility is legal.
State v. Blair, because the victim's absence was a circumstance unknown to Defendant and is therefore factual impossibility, not a defense. (correct answer)
The law review article, because it is the only authority that addresses the precise empty-bed situation and is persuasive.

Explanation: When you see an attempted-crime question involving a missing victim or a failed plan, the central issue is usually impossibility. Distinguish factual impossibility (the result is impossible only because of unknown circumstances) from legal impossibility (the intended conduct, if completed, would not be a crime). Factual impossibility is not a defense; legal impossibility is. Here, the dispositive authority is State v. Blair. Defendant intended to kill Victim and fired into the bed, but Victim was absent. That absence is a circumstance unknown to Defendant — the crime was impossible only because Victim happened not to be there. Under Blair, that is classic factual impossibility, so it does not defeat attempted murder. The statute alone is not dispositive because it doesn't address impossibility; shooting at an empty bed can still be a substantial step toward killing the person you believe is there. State v. Chen does not apply: if Defendant's intended conduct had succeeded in killing the person in the bed, that would have been murder, so this is not legal impossibility. The law review article is merely persuasive, not binding precedent, and it directly conflicts with controlling case law. Your takeaway: on exam questions involving impossibility, first ask why the crime failed. If the actor's goal was illegal but thwarted by hidden facts — a missing victim, an unloaded gun — that's factual impossibility and no defense. Only when the actor's completed goal would be lawful does legal impossibility apply.

Question 5

Plaintiff, a citizen of State A, sued Defendant, a citizen of State B, in federal court for breach of a consulting contract, seeking $80,000. The contract contains a clause stating: 'In any dispute, the parties' exclusive remedy is a refund of fees paid, not to exceed $45,000.' Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the amount in controversy cannot exceed $75,000. Plaintiff responds that the complaint was filed in good faith and that a jury could award the full $80,000. The court is considering: 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a): 'The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states.' St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938): 'The sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. Dismissal is warranted only when it appears to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.' The contract clause quoted above. A district court opinion from another circuit holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid a contractual damages cap by pleading a larger amount.

Which source is dispositive of whether the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied?

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), because a plaintiff's good-faith allegation of $80,000 establishes the amount in controversy, and the cap is irrelevant to jurisdiction.
The contract clause, because a contractual cap automatically reduces the amount in controversy before filing, regardless of the legal-certainty standard.
St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., because it establishes the legal-certainty test, and the cap shows the claim is really for less than $75,000. (correct answer)
The district court opinion, because it directly addresses contractual caps and is the most on-point authority.

Explanation: When you see an amount-in-controversy challenge, focus on the legal-certainty test, not just the complaint's number. The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), sets the $75,000 threshold, but it does not define how to measure the value of a claim. St. Paul Mercury supplies that rule: the plaintiff’s good-faith allegation controls unless a legal certainty shows the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount. Here, the enforceable contract clause caps the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy at $45,000. Even though the plaintiff pleaded $80,000, the court can be legally certain the recovery cannot reach $75,000. So St. Paul Mercury is dispositive because it directs the court to look past the pleading when a contractual cap makes a larger recovery impossible. The statute alone is not dispositive because it only announces the threshold and says nothing about caps or how to treat them. The contract clause is relevant, but it is not itself a jurisdictional rule—it matters only because St. Paul Mercury makes legally certain recovery the touchstone. The district court opinion may be on point, but it is from another circuit and is not binding; at most it is persuasive. And the plaintiff's good-faith allegation of $80,000 does not control, because the cap demonstrates that the claim cannot actually reach the jurisdictional floor. Remember: a valid contractual cap can destroy diversity jurisdiction even when the complaint demands more, because the court asks what the plaintiff could really recover.

Question 6

A state prison contracted with Nexus Health, a private company, to provide all medical care to inmates. Dr. Lee, a Nexus employee, allegedly delayed treating an inmate's heart attack. The inmate sued Lee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming deliberate indifference. Lee argues that he is not a state actor. The court is considering: West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988): 'A private physician who contracts with the state to provide medical care to prisoners acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 because the state has delegated to him its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical care.' Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982): 'Decisions of a private school receiving public funds and subject to state regulation are not state action because the school makes its own decisions; receipt of funds does not make the school a state actor.' State Contract Immunity Act: 'No person or entity providing services to a state correctional facility under contract shall be deemed a state actor for any purpose.' The contract: 'Nexus shall be solely responsible for the diagnosis and treatment of inmate patients.'

Which source is dispositive of whether Lee may be sued under § 1983?

West v. Atkins, because the state delegated its constitutional duty to provide prison medical care to Nexus and Lee performed that duty. (correct answer)
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, because a private company's exercise of independent judgment is not state action.
State Contract Immunity Act, because it expressly declares private prison contractors to be non-state actors.
The contract, because it makes Nexus solely responsible for medical care and therefore the state has no involvement in Lee's conduct.

Explanation: Whenever you see a §1983 question, the real issue is state action: did the private party's conduct become attributable to the state? The key is whether the state delegated a constitutional duty to the private party, not simply whether it funded or regulated the party. Here, West v. Atkins controls. The state has a constitutional duty to provide adequate medical care to prisoners. By contracting with Nexus to run prison medical care, the state delegated that duty to Nexus, and Dr. Lee performed it. That makes Lee a state actor under color of law, regardless of his private employment. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn is not dispositive because a private school receiving public funds was not performing a state constitutional duty; it made its own decisions. The State Contract Immunity Act also cannot control: a state statute cannot define the meaning of "state action" for federal §1983 purposes, so it cannot immunize Lee from federal liability. Finally, the contract's statement that Nexus is "solely responsible" for diagnosis and treatment does not prove state non-involvement—it proves exactly the opposite: the state delegated its duty entirely to Nexus and Lee. Strategy tip: In state-action questions, ask whether the private actor is performing a function the state itself is constitutionally required to perform. If yes, private status does not matter.

Question 7

Jana is the sole member and manager of GreenScape LLC. A truck owned by GreenScape and driven by an employee struck a pedestrian. The pedestrian sued GreenScape and Jana, alleging that Jana directed the driver to continue despite knowing the brakes were faulty. Jana moved to dismiss, arguing that LLC members cannot be liable for company torts. The court is considering: LLC Act § 304: 'A member of a limited liability company is not liable, solely by reason of being a member, for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company, whether arising in contract or tort.' Price v. Kasdan (State Supreme Court): 'A member may be held liable for torts in which the member personally participates or directs the tortious conduct, regardless of the member's status as an owner.' Wellington v. Sand (State Supreme Court): 'The corporate veil may be pierced only when the entity is a mere instrumentality and adherence to the entity form would sanction fraud or promote injustice.' GreenScape's Operating Agreement: 'Jana shall manage the company and may hire, supervise, and direct employees.'

Which source is most directly dispositive of whether Jana's motion to dismiss should be denied?

LLC Act § 304, because the complaint pleads only that Jana is a member, and members are not liable for LLC torts.
Price v. Kasdan, because Jana is alleged to have directed the tortious conduct, which is outside the 'solely by reason of being a member' protection. (correct answer)
Wellington v. Sand, because veil-piercing standards are not met, so Jana cannot be liable.
The operating agreement, because it made Jana responsible for supervising employees, so she is personally liable for employee negligence.

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about LLC member liability, separate two distinct theories: statutory limited liability for membership alone versus direct liability for personal misconduct. Here, the LLC Act protects a member from liability "solely by reason of being a member," but it does not immunize a member who personally directs a tort. The complaint alleges Jana told the driver to continue despite knowing the brakes were faulty, so the key is whether she personally participated in tortious conduct. That makes Price v. Kasdan most directly dispositive. Price holds that a member may be liable for torts she personally participates in or directs, regardless of owner status. Because Jana is alleged to have directed the driver under those circumstances, the statute's "solely by reason of being a member" shield does not apply, and her motion should be denied. The LLC Act is not the best answer because it ignores the complaint's specific allegation of direction — it would apply only if Jana were sued merely as a member. Wellington v. Sand is also beside the point: veil-piercing applies to corporate separateness and fraud, while this is a claim of direct personal wrongdoing; no veil-piercing theory is needed. The operating agreement is not dispositive either: giving Jana authority to manage and supervise employees explains her role, but managerial authority alone does not automatically make her liable for all employee negligence. Study tip: when a member is sued, ask whether the plaintiff alleges personal involvement or only status. Direct participation bypasses the statute; veil-piercing is for separate cases.

Question 8

Buyer and Seller signed a writing for the sale of 5,000 bushels of wheat. The writing includes this clause: 'This writing is the complete and exclusive statement of the parties' agreement.' Buyer seeks to testify that, before signing, Seller orally promised that freight to Buyer's silo was included in the price. Seller objects under the parol evidence rule. The case is pending in State A. The court is considering: State A UCC § 2-202: 'Terms in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement, but may be explained or supplemented by course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade, and by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.' Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213: 'A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that the integrated agreement is inconsistent with them; a completely integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that they are within its scope.' A State B Supreme Court decision: 'Under UCC § 2-202, a merger clause bars evidence of consistent additional terms when the writing states that it is complete and exclusive.' A law review article arguing that UCC § 2-202 only bars contradictory evidence and never bars consistent additional terms.

Which source is dispositive of whether Buyer's proposed testimony is admissible?

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213, because the writing is completely integrated and the freight term is within its scope.
The State B decision, because it is the only authority specifically addressing merger clauses under UCC § 2-202.
The law review article, because it correctly argues that UCC § 2-202 bars only contradictory evidence.
State A UCC § 2-202, because the writing is a complete and exclusive statement, so evidence of consistent additional terms is excluded. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a parol evidence question, your first move is to identify which law governs. Here, the sale of goods is governed by State A's enactment of UCC § 2-202, which is binding statutory authority in the forum. Under that statute, a written term in a final agreement cannot be contradicted by prior or contemporaneous oral evidence. Even consistent additional terms are excluded if the court finds the writing was intended as a "complete and exclusive statement" of the agreement. The clause in the contract does exactly that—it is a merger clause. Because Buyer's proposed testimony about freight being included is an additional term, and because the writing is complete and exclusive, the testimony is barred. State A UCC § 2-202 is therefore dispositive. The Restatement is not dispositive because State A has enacted the UCC, and the Restatement is only persuasive authority. The State B decision, while directly on point, is not binding in State A and cannot override State A's statute. The law review article is not law at all, and it misreads the UCC: consistent additional terms are barred when the writing is complete and exclusive, not only contradictions. On exam day, remember the hierarchy: enacted statutes control over Restatements, out-of-state cases, and articles. And under UCC § 2-202, a merger clause is the key that closes the door to consistent additional terms.

Question 9

Plaintiff, an auto mechanic, was exposed from 2008 through 2010 to a solvent that Defendant first sold in 2008. In 2025, Plaintiff was diagnosed with aplastic anemia and sued Defendant in 2026. Defendant invokes the twelve-year repose provision. The court is considering: Tort Reform Act § 5: 'A product liability action must be commenced within two years after the claimant discovers or should have discovered the injury and its cause.' Tort Reform Act § 6: 'In no event may a product liability action be commenced more than twelve years after the product was first sold, except that this section does not apply if the manufacturer intentionally concealed the hazard from the public.' Norton v. CRC (State Supreme Court): 'A claim accrues when the plaintiff knows both the injury and its probable cause; the discovery rule delays accrual but does not extend a statute of repose.' A public health study: 'Long-term exposure to the solvent can cause aplastic anemia.'

Which source is dispositive of whether the action is time-barred?

Tort Reform Act § 5, because Plaintiff filed within two years of diagnosis, so the action is timely under the discovery rule.
Norton v. CRC, because the claim did not accrue until 2025 and the limitations period began then.
Tort Reform Act § 6, because the action was filed more than twelve years after first sale and no intentional concealment is alleged. (correct answer)
The public health study, because it proves causation and therefore the discovery rule applies.

Explanation: Whenever you see a product-liability fact pattern with both a limitations period and a repose period, remember the key distinction: a statute of limitations governs when a claim must be filed after it accrues, while a statute of repose absolutely bars claims after a fixed time from the product's sale—unless a statutory exception applies. Here, that distinction resolves the case. The dispositive source is Tort Reform Act § 6. The solvent was first sold in 2008, and suit was filed in 2026—eighteen years later, beyond the twelve-year repose period. The exception for intentional concealment is not alleged, so the repose bar applies no matter when the plaintiff discovered the injury. Tort Reform Act § 5 is not dispositive because the two-year discovery rule only limits the time after the claim accrues; it cannot override a separate repose period. Norton v. CRC says exactly that: the discovery rule delays accrual but does not extend a statute of repose. Thus, even though the plaintiff's claim may have accrued in 2025, the action is still barred by § 6. The public health study is also irrelevant—it may support causation or scientific plausibility, but it does not address the timing bar or any statutory exception. Your takeaway: when a question presents both a limitations period and a repose period, check the repose period first—it is an outside deadline that can bar an otherwise timely-filed claim.

Question 10

Day and Night are equal partners in D&N Landscaping. The partnership agreement states: 'No partner may borrow more than $10,000 without the other partner's written consent.' Day, without Night's consent, signed a note borrowing $50,000 from Bank to buy a dump truck for the landscaping business. Bank knew before the loan that Day had not obtained Night's written consent. D&N defaulted. Bank sues the partnership. The court is considering: State Partnership Act § 301: 'A partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business. An act of a partner for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course the partnership business binds the partnership, unless the partner has no authority and the person with whom the partner deals knows or has notice that the partner lacks authority.' State Partnership Act § 302: 'A statement of authority may be filed with the Secretary of State and, if filed, gives notice of limitations on a partner's authority. No statement was filed in this case.' First Bank v. Lyle (Court of Appeals of a neighboring state): 'A third party who knows that a partner has violated a partnership agreement cannot hold the partnership liable on an unauthorized act.' A partnership law treatise: 'A partner's apparent authority is determined by the partnership's business and the circumstances, not by the partnership agreement alone.'

Which source is dispositive of whether D&N is bound on the note?

State Partnership Act § 301, because buying a dump truck is apparently within the ordinary course of the landscaping business, so the partnership is bound even though Bank knew of the restriction.
State Partnership Act § 302, because no statement of authority was filed, so Bank had no notice of the $10,000 limit.
First Bank v. Lyle, because it is directly on point and, as an appellate decision, controls over the statute.
State Partnership Act § 301, because Bank knew Day lacked the required consent, so the exception to ordinary-course authority applies and the partnership is not bound. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a partnership-liability question, focus on apparent authority and what the third party actually knew. State Partnership Act §301 supplies the rule: a partner's act binds the partnership if it appears to carry on the partnership business in the ordinary course, unless the partner lacked authority and the third party knew or had notice of that lack. Day's purchase of a dump truck for D&N Landscaping was arguably in the ordinary course, and no statement of authority was filed. But Bank knew before the loan that Day had not obtained Night's written consent. That actual knowledge triggers the "unless" clause, so Day's act does not bind the partnership. Thus the dispositive source is §301, and the result is no liability. The answer claiming §301 binds the partnership because buying a dump truck is apparently within the ordinary course ignores the knowledge exception. The answer relying on §302 is tempting but misses the point: §302 only addresses constructive notice from a filed statement; it cannot cure a third party's actual knowledge. The answer citing First Bank v. Lyle incorrectly treats an appellate decision as controlling over a statute; a court of appeals case is persuasive at most, and here it actually agrees with §301's exception. The treatise also does not change the result, because apparent authority is assessed by the business and circumstances—and Bank's knowledge of the consent requirement is a key circumstance. Study tip: when a statute contains an "unless" clause, always test whether the fact pattern satisfies it before choosing apparent authority.

Question 11

Plaintiff slipped on an icy sidewalk outside a store owned by Defendant. Defendant admits ownership and control of the sidewalk. Plaintiff offers Defendant's liability insurance policy to show that Defendant's insurer believed the sidewalk was dangerous. Defendant objects. The court is considering: State Rule of Evidence 411: 'Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible to prove whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require exclusion of evidence of insurance when offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness.' Dowd v. Lane (State Supreme Court): 'Evidence of liability insurance is admissible to prove ownership or control when those facts are genuinely disputed.' The insurance policy, covering the store location. An adjuster's report calling the sidewalk dangerous.

Which source is dispositive of whether the insurance policy is admissible?

State Rule of Evidence 411, because the policy is offered to prove that Defendant acted wrongfully, and no exception applies on these facts. (correct answer)
Dowd v. Lane, because the policy is offered to prove control, and control is an element of Plaintiff's case.
The insurance policy itself, because it covers the location and is therefore directly relevant to whether the sidewalk was dangerous.
The adjuster's report, because it is an admission by the insurer that the sidewalk was dangerous and makes the policy admissible.

Explanation: When you see an evidence question about liability insurance, start with Rule 411's default: insurance evidence cannot be used to show negligence or wrongdoing. Here, Plaintiff offers the policy to show that Defendant's insurer believed the sidewalk was dangerous—in other words, to prove the sidewalk's dangerousness and thus Defendant's negligence. That is exactly the inference Rule 411 forbids. The State Supreme Court's exception for ownership or control does not apply because Defendant admitted ownership and control, so those facts are not genuinely disputed. Nor is there any witness-bias purpose. Therefore, State Rule of Evidence 411 is dispositive and the policy is inadmissible. The policy itself is not relevant to whether the sidewalk was dangerous—liability coverage only reflects risk spreading, not an admission about conditions. The adjuster's report is a separate item, not a source that makes the policy admissible; even if the report might be admissible on its own, it cannot launder the policy into evidence. The answer invoking Dowd v. Lane misses the "genuinely disputed" requirement. On the exam, when insurance evidence is offered, identify the purpose: if it targets negligence or wrongdoing, exclude unless a recognized exception—ownership/control dispute, bias, impeachment—is actually triggered. Don't let an interesting fact like an adjuster's report distract you from the rule's categorical bar.

Question 12

WorldCraft, Inc., a Delaware corporation headquartered in Richmond, Virginia, made a distribution agreement with Metro, a Maryland LLC. The parties do not dispute the validity of this clause: 'The parties consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and waive any objection to venue there.' Metro later sued WorldCraft in the Eastern District of Virginia for breach of contract. WorldCraft moved to dismiss for improper venue or, in the alternative, to transfer to the District of Maryland. The court is considering these authorities: 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b): 'A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction.' 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a): 'For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.' Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court, 571 U.S. 49 (2013): 'When a valid forum-selection clause is involved, the plaintiff's choice of forum merits no weight, and a proper application of § 1404(a) requires that the clause be given controlling weight in all but the most extraordinary circumstances.' A Maryland trial court opinion stating: 'A forum-selection clause in a commercial contract is presumptively valid under Maryland law.'

Which authority is dispositive of whether the court should grant the alternative request to transfer the case?

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because venue is proper only in Maryland, so dismissal for improper venue is required rather than transfer.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), because it makes transfer discretionary and directs the court to weigh convenience and the interests of justice.
Atlantic Marine Construction Co., because it supplies the controlling rule that a valid forum-selection clause governs the § 1404(a) transfer analysis. (correct answer)
The Maryland trial court decision, because Maryland law governs whether the clause is enforceable and controls the venue analysis.

Explanation: Whenever you see a forum-selection clause combined with a motion to dismiss or transfer, separate two questions: ordinary venue under § 1391 and transfer under § 1404(a). A valid clause does not automatically make the original forum "improper" under § 1391; it is enforced through the transfer statute. Here, the clause is valid and undisputed, so the dispositive authority is Atlantic Marine Construction Co. That case supplies the controlling rule: when a valid forum-selection clause exists, the plaintiff's forum choice gets no weight, and the clause must be given controlling weight in all but the most extraordinary circumstances. That rule directly resolves WorldCraft's alternative request to transfer to the District of Maryland. The general venue statute, § 1391(b), is not dispositive because it defines ordinary venue but does not answer whether a forum-selection clause should override the plaintiff's chosen forum. Likewise, § 1404(a) alone is incomplete: it authorizes discretionary transfer for convenience, but Atlantic Marine replaces that open-ended balancing with a presumption in favor of the contractually chosen forum. The Maryland trial court decision is also not controlling; it is a state trial court opinion, and federal venue and transfer procedure are governed by federal law, especially where the parties do not dispute the clause's validity. Study tip: on bar questions, when a valid forum-selection clause appears, immediately think "Atlantic Marine — clause controls; plaintiff's choice gets no weight."