Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Harms To The Person
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Harms To The PersonQuestion 1 of 20

At a crowded bar, D threw a full beer bottle just past V's head to frighten V after an argument. The bottle struck X, a patron standing behind V, causing a laceration. D had not noticed X and had no intent to touch anyone. X sued D for battery.

Should X recover?

No, because D intended only to frighten V, and an intent to cause apprehension cannot supply the intent required for battery.
No, because D was unaware of X and therefore could not have intended to make contact with X.
Yes, because D's intent to cause V to apprehend immediate harmful contact is sufficient intent for battery and transfers to X.
Yes, because D acted with reckless disregard for the safety of everyone in a crowded bar, which is sufficient intent for battery.
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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Harms To The Person

Practice Harms To The Person in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Harms To The Person, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

At a crowded bar, D threw a full beer bottle just past V's head to frighten V after an argument. The bottle struck X, a patron standing behind V, causing a laceration. D had not noticed X and had no intent to touch anyone. X sued D for battery.

Should X recover?

  1. No, because D intended only to frighten V, and an intent to cause apprehension cannot supply the intent required for battery.
  2. No, because D was unaware of X and therefore could not have intended to make contact with X.
  3. Yes, because D's intent to cause V to apprehend immediate harmful contact is sufficient intent for battery and transfers to X. (correct answer)
  4. Yes, because D acted with reckless disregard for the safety of everyone in a crowded bar, which is sufficient intent for battery.
Explanation: Whenever you see an intentional tort with an unintended victim, think about transferred intent. Battery requires intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, but that intent can be satisfied by an intent to commit a different tort against a different person. Here, D threw the bottle intending to cause V to apprehend immediate harmful contact—that is the intent for assault. Because the bottle actually struck X, the law transfers D's intent to commit assault onto the battery against X. The identity of the victim does not matter; the intent follows the act. The correct answer is the one saying D's intent to cause V apprehension is sufficient and transfers to X. That is exactly the rule: intent to commit assault transfers to the completed battery on an unintended victim. Now the wrong choices. "No, because D intended only to frighten V" misunderstands that assault intent is a valid basis for battery via transfer. "No, because D was unaware of X" also fails—transferred intent specifically covers unknown victims. Finally, "Yes, because D acted with reckless disregard" is tempting but wrong: recklessness does not satisfy the intent requirement for battery. Battery needs purpose or knowledge to a substantial certainty, not mere recklessness, even in a crowded bar. Study tip: Memorize that transferred intent applies among assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels—and it transfers both across torts and across victims. When you see a tort intent aimed at one person but harm hitting another, immediately check for transferred intent.

Question 2

D, angry at his neighbor V, walked onto a playground where V's 10-year-old child C was playing, pointed a loaded gun at C for several seconds, and said, "Tell your father to watch his back." D knew M, C's mother, was watching from 40 feet away. M suffered severe emotional distress and sued D for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Is M likely to recover?

  1. Yes, because D's outrageous conduct was directed at M's child, M was present and contemporaneously aware, and immediate family members need not show physical injury. (correct answer)
  2. Yes, because any person who contemporaneously observes outrageous conduct directed at a close relative can recover for severe emotional distress.
  3. No, because D's conduct was directed at C, not at M, and M was not the target of the threat.
  4. No, because M was not physically endangered and did not suffer a physical injury, which is required for third-party claims.
Explanation: Whenever you see an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim involving conduct aimed at someone other than the plaintiff, focus on the third-party/bystander rule. Here, D's conduct—pointing a loaded gun at C and threatening C's father—is extreme and outrageous. M, C's mother, watched from 40 feet away, so she was present and contemporaneously aware of the threat. M also suffered severe emotional distress. Because M is an immediate family member, she does not need to show physical injury to recover. So the choice that D's outrageous conduct was directed at M's child, M was present and contemporaneously aware, and immediate family members need not show physical injury is correct. The choice saying any person who contemporaneously observes outrageous conduct directed at a close relative can recover is too broad: the no-physical-injury rule applies to immediate family, not any bystander, and unrelated witnesses generally must show physical injury or be targeted themselves. The choice saying M cannot recover because D's conduct was directed at C, not M, misstates the law—third-party IIED exists precisely to protect family bystanders from outrageous conduct aimed at their loved ones. Finally, the choice saying M cannot recover because she was not physically endangered and suffered no physical injury reflects a requirement that applies to non-family third-party claims, not to immediate family members. On exam day, remember: immediate family + present + contemporaneous awareness = no physical injury required.

Question 3

During a recreational soccer match, D became angry after V fouled him. After the referee's whistle stopped play, D ran up to V, who was bending over tying his shoe, and deliberately kicked V in the back, fracturing a vertebra. V sued D for battery.

Will V prevail?

  1. No, because V impliedly consented to physical contact by choosing to participate in a contact sport.
  2. Yes, because players consent only to contacts reasonably expected in the sport, and D's post-whistle deliberate kick was not such a contact. (correct answer)
  3. No, because physical contact during an athletic contest is governed by the game's rules, not by tort law.
  4. Yes, because any intentional harmful contact in the course of an athletic event is a battery, regardless of consent.
Explanation: Whenever you see a battery question involving sports, focus on the scope of consent. By stepping onto the field, V did not waive all protection; he consented only to contacts reasonably expected in that sport under the circumstances. That is why the correct answer is yes: D's kick came after the whistle, while V was tying his shoe, and was deliberate retaliation, not part of the ordinary give-and-take of soccer. Such conduct falls outside the implied consent that makes hard tackles or incidental bumps non-actionable. The choice that V impliedly consented to physical contact by choosing to participate in a contact sport is too broad; participation does not consent to every harmful contact, especially after play has stopped. Likewise, the claim that physical contact during an athletic contest is governed by the game's rules, not tort law, misunderstands the relationship: rules and customs help define what contacts are reasonable, but they do not abolish tort liability. Finally, the statement that any intentional harmful contact during an athletic event is a battery regardless of consent goes too far the other way; a player who consents to normal contact, such as a clean tackle, cannot recover for it. For the bar, remember: sports-battery questions hinge on the scope of consent, not on the absence of all consent.

Question 4

D, a toll collector, became angry when P drove through the toll plaza without stopping. D shouted at P, "Pull over right now, or the next thing you'll feel is my flashlight across your face." D was standing inside the toll booth, twenty feet from P's car, and P knew D could not leave the booth to reach the car. P laughed and drove away.

If P later sues D for assault, which of the following is the best basis for D's defense?

  1. P did not subjectively apprehend imminent harmful or offensive contact. (correct answer)
  2. D's words were conditional and therefore cannot constitute an assault.
  3. D did not make a physical movement toward P.
  4. A threat to use a flashlight is not a threat of harmful or offensive contact.
Explanation: This question tests the tort of assault. Assault requires both an intent by the defendant to cause a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact, and actual apprehension by the plaintiff. When you see an assault question, focus on two things: what the plaintiff perceived, and whether the defendant had the apparent ability to follow through. Here, D's words—"the next thing you'll feel is my flashlight across your face"—were threatening, but P knew D was trapped inside the toll booth twenty feet away and could not reach the car. Because P did not subjectively believe harmful contact was imminent, P did not experience the apprehension required for assault. That is the best defense. The conditional nature of D's words is not a defense by itself: a conditional threat can still be an assault if the condition is unmet and the defendant has the present ability to act. D's lack of a physical movement is also not dispositive, because words alone can create apprehension, and assault does not require a movement toward the victim. Finally, a flashlight can absolutely be a means of harmful or offensive contact; that is not the problem here. The problem is that P knew D could not deliver it. For study: in assault questions, separate the defendant's intent and the plaintiff's apprehension. A threat with no apparent ability to carry it out is not an assault.

Question 5

P, a recent widow, was waiting for a bus at night. D, a stranger, approached P, whispered that he had followed her for three blocks, and then began slowly describing in graphic detail how he would break into her home and harm her. D never touched P, but P became terrified, screamed, and ran to a nearby police station. Following the incident, P was unable to sleep for several weeks, was afraid to leave her house, and was diagnosed with an anxiety disorder by her physician. D later admitted that he made the statements solely to frighten P and that he had no intention of carrying them out.

If P sues D for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which of the following is the strongest argument in favor of P's claim?

  1. D's conduct was outrageous, and P suffered severe emotional distress that manifested in a diagnosed anxiety disorder. (correct answer)
  2. D's statements were a true threat and therefore automatically satisfy the extreme-and-outrageous requirement.
  3. D intentionally frightened P, and any intentionally inflicted fear is enough to support liability.
  4. D's conduct would outrage a reasonable person, and P's emotional distress need not be severe because D acted with purpose.
Explanation: When you see an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, anchor yourself to the two core elements: extreme and outrageous conduct, and severe emotional distress. Here, D followed P, described in graphic detail how he would break into her home and harm her, and admitted he acted solely to frighten her. That conduct can qualify as outrageous, and P's diagnosed anxiety disorder, sleeplessness, and fear of leaving home demonstrate the required severe distress. The strongest argument, therefore, is that D's conduct was outrageous and P suffered severe emotional distress manifested in a diagnosed anxiety disorder. The "true threat" argument is tempting but flawed: even if a statement qualifies as a true threat and loses First Amendment protection, it does not automatically satisfy the extreme-and-outrageous requirement for IIED. The "any intentionally inflicted fear is enough" argument misunderstands the tort—IIED demands more than intentional fright; the resulting distress must be severe. The "would outrage a reasonable person and distress need not be severe because D acted with purpose" option is also wrong: severe distress is an indispensable element, regardless of how deliberate the defendant's misconduct was. Study tip: IIED questions on the bar exam often test whether the plaintiff has met the high threshold for both outrageousness and severity. If either is missing, the claim fails even where the defendant intended harm.

Question 6

A, angry at B, decided to frighten B by firing a pistol at the ground just in front of B's feet. A aimed carefully at the pavement, but the bullet ricocheted off a metal plate and struck C, a bystander standing twenty feet away. C suffered a broken arm. C sues A in tort for battery. A had no idea C was nearby.

Should C prevail on a battery claim?

  1. No, because A did not intend to cause a harmful or offensive contact with C.
  2. Yes, because A's intent to commit an assault on B transfers to the battery committed on C. (correct answer)
  3. No, because A intended only to frighten B and did not intend to commit a battery against anyone.
  4. Yes, because any foreseeable victim of an intentional act may recover for resulting bodily harm.
Explanation: Whenever a battery question involves the wrong victim, your first instinct should be to check for transferred intent. Battery requires an intentional harmful or offensive contact, but the intent need not be directed at the plaintiff. The doctrine of transferred intent applies when a defendant intends an intentional tort against one person and instead commits a different intentional tort (or the same tort) against another. Here, A deliberately fired a pistol near B's feet to frighten B—that is the intent required for assault: an act causing a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact. When the bullet ricocheted and struck C, A's intent to commit an assault on B transferred to the completed battery on C. So C prevails. The choice saying "A did not intend to cause a harmful or offensive contact with C" fails because intent to commit assault on B satisfies the intent element through transfer. Likewise, "A intended only to frighten B and did not intend to commit a battery against anyone" ignores that assault is itself an intentional tort whose intent transfers to a battery. The "foreseeable victim" choice misstates the rule: battery is an intentional tort, so foreseeability without intent is insufficient—that sounds like negligence. Study tip: Remember "transferred intent follows the intent, not the victim." If A intends any of the five intentional torts (assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass to land, trespass to chattels) and the act lands on a different person or tort, the intent transfers.

Question 7

V fell asleep in a fitting room at D's department store. Near closing time, an employee, unaware that anyone was in the room, locked the fitting-room door from the outside with a key, making it impossible to open from inside. V slept until morning, when another employee unlocked the door. V was unaware of having been locked in and suffered no harm. V sued D for false imprisonment.

Should V recover?

  1. Yes, because V was actually confined for several hours without consent, and actual confinement is enough.
  2. Yes, because false imprisonment does not require the plaintiff's awareness or proof of harm.
  3. No, because V had a reasonable means of escape and could have left at any time.
  4. No, because V was unaware of the confinement and suffered no harm, and the employee did not intend to confine V. (correct answer)
Explanation: Whenever you see a false imprisonment question, immediately run through the elements: (1) an act intended to confine or restrain the plaintiff;(2) actual confinement;(3) causation;(4) plaintiff's awareness of the confinement or actual harm. Here, the employee had no idea V was in the room, so there was no intent to confine—the element is missing from the start. Even if you treated the locked door as confinement, V slept through it, never realized she was trapped, and suffered no injury. False imprisonment protects against deprivation of liberty, but a plaintiff who neither knew of the confinement nor suffered harm cannot recover under the traditional rule. Therefore, V should not recover. The trap choices test whether you conflate actual confinement with the other elements. "Yes, because V was actually confined for several hours without consent" gets the facts wrong on intent and ignores the awareness requirement; actual confinement alone is not enough. "Yes, because false imprisonment does not require the plaintiff's awareness or proof of harm" is also wrong—awareness or harm is usually required, and here the employee's lack of intent is independently fatal. "No, because V had a reasonable means of escape" is an incorrect reason:the door was locked from the outside, so no reasonable escape existed;hat would not be the basis for denying recovery. The correct reason is the employee did not intend to confine V and V lacked awareness or injury. Study tip: on bar exam torts, always check the intent element first. If the defendant did not know the plaintiff was there, there is no intentional tort—and an unintentional lock-in with no harm is negligence at best, not false imprisonment.

Question 8

V, a juror, was walking to her car in the courthouse parking lot after a trial. D, the defendant, handcuffed and being led by a deputy to a transport van, shook his fist at V and shouted, "You'll pay for this. After I'm released, I'll be looking for you." V feared D would harm her and later sued D for assault.

Is V likely to prevail?

  1. Yes, because D's threat and gesture caused V reasonably to fear immediate harmful contact.
  2. Yes, because words alone can constitute an assault whenever they create apprehension in the listener.
  3. No, because V suffered no physical injury or physical contact, and assault requires some physical harm.
  4. No, because D's statement threatened future harm and D lacked the present apparent ability to carry it out. (correct answer)
Explanation: When you see an assault question, remember the core test: an intentional act that creates a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact. Imminence and apparent ability are the key concepts. Here, D was handcuffed and being led to a transport van when he shook his fist and threatened to "look for" V "after I'm released." That is a threat of future harm, not a present or imminent one. Because D lacked the present apparent ability to carry out the threat, V cannot establish assault. That is why the correct choice is the one stating D's statement threatened future harm and D lacked the present apparent ability to carry it out. The first wrong answer—that V reasonably feared immediate harmful contact—misreads the facts: D was restrained and the threat was for after release, so no immediacy existed. The second wrong answer—that words alone constitute assault whenever they create apprehension—is overbroad; words can be assault only when they create fear of imminent contact, not merely any fear. The third wrong answer—that V cannot prevail because she suffered no physical injury—confuses assault with battery; assault requires no contact, only apprehension of imminent contact. Watch for the "future threat" trap: when a statement references a later time or the defendant lacks current ability, the claim fails. On the bar exam, always ask: is the threatened contact imminent, and does the defendant have the apparent ability to act now?

Question 9

P told his psychiatrist D that he intended to kill V as soon as he was discharged. D believed P was serious but, concerned about patient confidentiality, did not warn V or take other steps to protect V. Shortly after discharge, P shot and killed V. V's estate sued D for negligence.

Is D liable?

  1. No, because a psychotherapist owes no duty to a nonpatient who is threatened by a patient.
  2. No, because D's duty of confidentiality to P is absolute and prevented any disclosure to V or the authorities.
  3. Yes, because a psychotherapist who knows a patient poses a serious danger to an identifiable victim has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect the victim. (correct answer)
  4. Yes, because psychotherapists are strictly liable whenever a patient commits violence.
Explanation: This question tests the scope of a psychotherapist's duty to protect third parties from patient violence. In negligence, duty normally runs to foreseeable plaintiffs, but here the key is the special relationship between psychotherapist and patient. When a patient communicates a serious threat of violence against an identifiable victim, the therapist has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect that victim — typically by warning the victim or notifying law enforcement. Because D believed P was serious about killing V, and V was specifically identified, D had a duty to act. D's failure to warn V or take other protective steps was a breach, so D is liable. The choice saying a psychotherapist owes no duty to a nonpatient who is threatened confuses the general rule with this well-established exception. The danger to an identifiable victim creates a duty despite the lack of a doctor-patient relationship with that victim. The choice saying D's confidentiality duty is absolute is also wrong: confidentiality is important but not absolute, and it yields when necessary to prevent serious harm. The choice saying psychotherapists are strictly liable whenever a patient commits violence overstates the rule — the standard is negligence, not strict liability, and no duty arises unless the therapist knew or should have known of the danger to an identifiable victim. Remember the Tarasoff pattern: serious threat + identifiable victim = duty to take reasonable protective steps.

Question 10

D negligently ran a red light and struck V's car, fracturing V's leg. At the hospital, Dr. M, while treating the fracture, negligently administered a drug to which V was allergic, and V died. V's estate sued D for wrongful death.

Is D liable for V's death?

  1. No, because Dr. M's negligence was an independent intervening cause that superseded D's negligence.
  2. Yes, because a tortfeasor is liable for additional harm caused by negligent medical treatment of the injury, even if the treatment was itself negligent. (correct answer)
  3. No, because D's negligence caused only the fracture, not the allergic reaction that led to death.
  4. Yes, because D is strictly liable for all consequences of his negligent conduct without regard to causation.
Explanation: Whenever you see an injury followed by medical treatment, think about intervening causes in torts. The key rule: a negligent tortfeasor is liable for additional harm caused by negligent medical treatment of the original injury, because such treatment is a foreseeable consequence of causing harm. D negligently ran the red light and broke V's leg; V then died because Dr. M negligently gave V an allergy-inducing drug while treating that fracture. D's negligence is still a substantial factor in the death: but for D's collision, V would not have been in the hospital receiving treatment. Therefore, D is liable for wrongful death. The suggestion that Dr. M's negligence was an independent intervening cause that superseded D's negligence is the common trap. Medical malpractice is a dependent, foreseeable intervening force, not a superseding cause. Likewise, saying D caused only the fracture and not the allergic reaction misunderstands proximate cause: D need not foresee the exact allergic reaction; it is enough that death flowed from the chain of events set in motion by the injury. Finally, the idea that D is strictly liable for all consequences without regard to causation overstates the rule—D's liability rests on actual and proximate cause, not strict liability. Study tip: when a question has an injury followed by negligent medical care, the original tortfeasor is usually still liable. Distinguish truly unforeseeable, independent intervening causes from foreseeable responses like medical treatment.

Question 11

D saw X raise a chair above V's head as if to strike V. Believing that V faced imminent serious bodily harm, D shoved X hard. X fell and broke his wrist. It later turned out that X had only been pretending to threaten V as part of a practical joke, and V was never in real danger. X sued D for battery.

Is D liable to X?

  1. Yes, because X did not actually pose a threat to V, so D's belief was mistaken.
  2. Yes, because D used more force than was reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
  3. No, because D reasonably believed V was in imminent danger, and defense of others is judged by the actor's reasonable belief. (correct answer)
  4. No, because D intended only to protect V, and the intent to protect negates the intent required for battery.
Explanation: When you see a battery claim, remember that intentional torts have affirmative defenses that can excuse the contact. Here, the issue is the defense of others. The key rule is that you are privileged to use reasonable force to defend a third party if you reasonably believe that party faces imminent harm. This is judged by an objective standard of reasonableness—not by what actually happened. Because D saw X raise a chair over V's head, D's belief that V was in imminent danger was entirely reasonable, even though it later turned out to be a prank. A reasonable mistake does not defeat the defense. Therefore, D is not liable. Now, examine the wrong choices. The first, "Yes, because X did not actually pose a threat," assumes actual danger is required, but the defense only needs a reasonable belief, not actual danger. The second, "Yes, because D used more force than was reasonably necessary," is incorrect because a shove was proportionate to the apparent threat—there was no excessive force. The third, "No, because D intended only to protect V, and the intent to protect negates the intent required for battery," is a misconception. D did intend to make a harmful contact (the shove), but the defense of others justifies that contact; it does not negate the intent. The privilege is what saves D, not a lack of intent. For your study, remember that defenses to intentional torts often hinge on reasonableness. If you see a mistaken belief, ask whether it was objectively reasonable—if so, the defense still works. Also, don't confuse "justification" with "lack of intent."

Question 12

Dana, furious at her business partner Xavier during an argument in their crowded office, hurled a heavy glass paperweight so that it would sail just past his head. She intended only to frighten him and was confident she would miss. The paperweight did miss Xavier, but it struck Priya, a client who had just stepped into the doorway behind him and whom Dana had not seen, breaking her cheekbone. Xavier had his back turned and never saw the throw. The jurisdiction follows this rule: "(1) If an act is done with the intention of inflicting upon another an offensive but not a harmful bodily contact, or of putting another in apprehension of either a harmful or offensive bodily contact, and the act causes a bodily contact to the other, the actor is liable to the other for a battery. (2) If an act is done with the intention of affecting a third person in the manner stated in subsection (1), but causes a harmful bodily contact to another, the actor is liable to such other as fully as though the actor intended so to affect that person."

Is Dana liable to Priya for battery?

  1. No, because Dana intended only to frighten Xavier and was confident she would miss, so she did not intend a contact with anyone.
  2. No, because Dana did not know Priya was in the doorway, and intent cannot transfer to a person the actor did not perceive.
  3. Yes, because Dana intended to put Xavier in apprehension of a contact, and that intent transfers to the harmful contact her act caused Priya. (correct answer)
  4. No, because Xavier never saw the throw, so no assault on him occurred and there was no completed tort from which intent could transfer.
Explanation: Under subsection (1), an intent to put someone in apprehension of a contact is a sufficient intent for battery; the actor need not intend the contact itself. Under subsection (2), that intent transfers when the act causes a harmful contact to a different person. Dana threw the paperweight intending to put Xavier in apprehension of being hit, and the throw caused a harmful contact to Priya, so Dana is liable to Priya as though she had intended to affect her. The answer resting on Dana's intent to miss makes the common error of treating battery intent as limited to an intent to touch; the rule expressly includes an intent to cause apprehension. The answer requiring that Dana perceive Priya adds a foreseeability or awareness condition that transferred intent does not contain. The answer requiring a completed assault on Xavier confuses the transfer of intent with the transfer of a completed tort: what transfers is the intention to affect a third person, and subsection (2) asks only whether the act was done with that intention, not whether Xavier actually experienced apprehension.

Question 13

Marcus, a regional manager, was presenting at a staff meeting when Lena, a junior analyst, interrupted to point out an error in his figures. Furious, Marcus walked to Lena's seat and, without touching her body or clothing, jerked her personal laptop out of her hands, snapped it shut, and set it on a side table, saying, "You're done talking." Lena was not injured, and the laptop was not damaged. Lena felt humiliated in front of her colleagues and sued Marcus for battery.

Is Marcus liable to Lena for battery?

  1. Yes, because forcibly taking an object Lena was holding is a contact with her person, and the contact was offensive to a reasonable sense of dignity. (correct answer)
  2. No, because Marcus never touched Lena's body or the clothing she was wearing, and battery requires contact with one of these.
  3. No, because Lena suffered no physical injury and the laptop was undamaged, so there was no harm for which battery provides a remedy.
  4. No, because Marcus intended only to stop Lena from speaking, not to injure or insult her, and battery requires an intent to cause harm or offense to the plaintiff.
Explanation: Battery protects against harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff's person, and the person includes things so closely connected to the body that they are customarily regarded as part of it, such as an object held in the hand. Snatching an object out of someone's hands in anger, in front of colleagues, offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity. Marcus intended the contact, and it was offensive, so he is liable. The answer requiring contact with the body or worn clothing states the contact element too narrowly and ignores objects intimately connected with the person. The answer relying on the absence of injury overlooks that offensive battery is a dignitary tort that requires no physical harm; nominal and dignitary damages are available. The answer resting on Marcus's purpose misstates the intent element: Marcus intended to make the contact, and he knew that yanking a laptop from an employee's hands in front of her coworkers to silence her would offend her, so even a requirement of intent to offend would be met.

Question 14

Nora underwent knee surgery under general anesthesia at a teaching hospital. Owen, a first-year medical student, was permitted to observe from the edge of the operating room but was not part of the surgical team and had no role in Nora's care. While the surgeons' backs were turned, Owen, on a dare from another student, stroked Nora's hair and kissed her on the cheek. Nora was unconscious throughout, suffered no physical harm, and learned of the incident three weeks later when a nurse reported it. Nora was deeply distressed and humiliated, and she sued Owen for battery.

Is Owen liable to Nora for battery?

  1. No, because Nora was unconscious when she was touched, so she could not have experienced the contact as offensive when it occurred.
  2. Yes, because the contacts would offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity, and a plaintiff need not be aware of a contact when it happens. (correct answer)
  3. No, because Nora consented to being touched during her surgery, and Owen was in the operating room with the hospital's permission.
  4. No, because Nora suffered no physical harm, and an unconscious plaintiff can recover in battery only for a contact that causes bodily injury.
Explanation: Offensiveness in battery is measured objectively, by whether the contact would offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity, and the plaintiff need not know of the contact at the time it occurs. Kissing and stroking an anesthetized patient's hair without any medical purpose is plainly offensive, and Owen intended the contact. Nora's later discovery and humiliation go to damages. The answer relying on Nora's unconsciousness imports the awareness requirement that applies to assault, which protects against apprehension, into battery, which protects against the contact itself. The answer based on consent misreads its scope: Nora consented to medical touching by her surgical team for the purpose of the operation, not to personal touching by an observer with no role in her care, and the hospital's permission for Owen to watch is not her consent to be touched. The answer requiring bodily injury invents a rule; an unconscious plaintiff, like any other, may recover for offensive contact without physical harm.

Question 15

Riley consented in writing to arthroscopic surgery on her right knee, to be performed by Dr. Ames. During the operation, while Riley was under general anesthesia, Dr. Ames noticed a small, benign fatty growth just above her left knee. The growth posed no risk to her health, but Dr. Ames believed she would want it gone and that removing it then would spare her a second procedure. He removed it through a one-inch incision. The removal was performed with full professional skill, and Riley healed with a faint scar. Riley sued Dr. Ames for battery. The jurisdiction applies this rule: "Consent is effective only for conduct within its scope. Consent to one medical procedure does not extend to a substantially different procedure. A physician may extend an operation beyond the consent given only if an emergency makes it impracticable to obtain consent and a reasonable person in the patient's position would consent to the extension."

Is Dr. Ames liable to Riley for battery?

  1. Yes, because removing the growth was a substantially different procedure from the one authorized, and no emergency kept Dr. Ames from obtaining consent. (correct answer)
  2. No, because the removal was in Riley's interest and was skillfully done, and a beneficial medical contact is not harmful or offensive.
  3. No, because Riley consented to surgery by Dr. Ames under general anesthesia, and further work by the same surgeon in the same operation was within that consent.
  4. Yes, but only if Dr. Ames failed to meet the professional standard of care, because a claim arising from consented surgery sounds only in negligence.
Explanation: Consent defeats battery only for conduct within its scope. Riley consented to surgery on her right knee; cutting into her left leg to remove a separate growth is a substantially different procedure. The rule permits an extension only when an emergency makes obtaining consent impracticable and a reasonable patient would agree. The growth posed no health risk and could have been removed later with Riley's consent, so there was no emergency, and Dr. Ames is liable even though the removal was skillful and arguably helpful. The answer stressing benefit and skill confuses the physician's good intentions with the patient's right to decide; an unconsented surgical incision is a harmful contact whatever its purpose. The answer treating the consent as covering anything the same surgeon does during the same operation ignores that consent attaches to the procedure, not merely to the surgeon and the occasion. The answer limiting Riley to negligence confuses lack of consent, which is battery, with lack of care, which is malpractice; skillful performance does not cure a contact that was never authorized.

Question 16

Late one night in a dim parking garage, Kara was walking to her car when Ben, a stranger, ran up quickly behind her shouting, "Hey! Stop!" and reached for her shoulder. Ben had seen Kara drop her wallet and was trying to return it, but Kara could not see the wallet in his other hand. Reasonably believing she was about to be grabbed and robbed, Kara spun and punched Ben once in the face, breaking his nose. Ben staggered back several feet, held the wallet out at arm's length, and said, "Your wallet, you dropped your wallet." Kara saw the wallet and realized what had happened, but, still angry at being startled, she stepped forward and sprayed Ben in the face with pepper spray. Ben sued Kara for battery. The jurisdiction applies this rule: "A person is privileged to use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, to defend against a harmful or offensive contact that the person reasonably believes another is about to inflict intentionally. The privilege exists even if the belief is mistaken, provided it is reasonable. The privilege ends when the person no longer reasonably believes that the threat exists."

For which of Kara's acts, if any, is she liable to Ben for battery?

  1. Both, because Ben was not actually attacking Kara, and the privilege of self-defense is unavailable to an actor whose belief turns out to be wrong.
  2. Neither, because Kara reasonably believed she was being attacked, and the privilege covers all force used during a single, continuous encounter.
  3. The pepper spray only, because the punch was a reasonable response to a reasonably perceived threat, but the threat had ended before she used the spray. (correct answer)
  4. The punch only, because breaking Ben's nose was force likely to cause serious bodily harm, while pepper spray is a form of nondeadly force.
Explanation: The privilege of self-defense turns on the actor's reasonable belief, not on whether the threat was real, and it lasts only as long as that belief remains reasonable. When Ben ran up shouting and reached for her in a dark garage, Kara reasonably believed she was about to be grabbed, and a single punch is reasonable nondeadly force, so the punch was privileged despite her mistake. By the time she used the pepper spray, Ben had backed away, was holding out the wallet, and had explained himself, and Kara had realized what happened. The privilege had ended, and the spray was a battery. The answer making Kara liable for both acts states the error that a mistaken belief defeats the privilege; the rule expressly protects reasonable mistakes. The answer protecting both acts treats the privilege as covering a whole encounter rather than each use of force while the threat reasonably appears to exist. The answer reversing the result mislabels a single punch as force likely to cause serious bodily harm and ignores that nondeadly force is still unprivileged once the threat has ended.

Question 17

As Paul walked away from Dev after a heated argument in a park, Dev picked up a baseball bat and swung it hard at the back of Paul's head, deliberately missing by a few inches because he wanted only to frighten him. Paul was wearing noise-canceling headphones, did not see or hear the swing, and kept walking. Ten minutes later, a bystander caught up with Paul and described what had happened. Paul was badly shaken, had nightmares for weeks, and sued Dev for assault.

Is Dev liable to Paul for assault?

  1. No, because Paul was unaware of the swing when it occurred, so he was never in apprehension of an imminent contact. (correct answer)
  2. Yes, because Dev intended to frighten Paul, and Paul suffered real fear and distress once he learned how close the bat had come.
  3. No, because Dev deliberately missed, and an actor who does not intend to make contact lacks the intent required for assault.
  4. Yes, because swinging a dangerous weapon within striking distance of another is an assault whether or not the other perceives it.
Explanation: Assault protects against the apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact, so the plaintiff must be aware of the threatened contact while it is imminent. Paul neither saw nor heard the swing, and by the time the bystander told him about it, no contact was imminent. His later fear, however genuine, is fear of something that already happened, not apprehension of an imminent contact. Dev is not liable for assault. The answer relying on Dev's intent and Paul's later distress treats the tort as complete once the actor intends to frighten and the plaintiff eventually becomes upset, skipping the element of contemporaneous apprehension. The answer relying on Dev's deliberate miss misstates the intent element; an intent to cause apprehension is sufficient for assault, so this reasoning reaches the right result on a wrong ground. The answer treating any swing within striking distance as an assault ignores that the tort requires the plaintiff's apprehension; an unperceived swing is at most an attempted battery, which is not itself a tort.

Question 18

Leo, a shopper at a mall, saw Ivy walk briskly out of a jewelry store holding a necklace, followed moments later by a clerk who seemed to be shouting after her. Leo reasonably concluded that Ivy had stolen the necklace, which would be a felony. He stepped in front of her, flashed an old security-guard badge from a job he had left a year earlier, and said, "Mall security. You're being detained. Sit on that bench until the police arrive." Unsure whether Leo had authority, Ivy sat on the bench for 20 minutes. In fact, Ivy had paid for the necklace, and the clerk had been calling after her because she had left her credit card on the counter. Ivy sued Leo for false imprisonment. The jurisdiction applies these rules: "Confinement may be accomplished by the actor's assertion of legal authority, if the other submits because she believes the assertion valid or is in doubt as to its validity. A private person may arrest another without a warrant if (a) a felony has in fact been committed and the actor reasonably believes the other committed it, or (b) the other commits a breach of the peace in the actor's presence."

Is Leo liable to Ivy for false imprisonment?

  1. No, because Leo reasonably believed Ivy had just committed a felony, which is all that an arrest by a private person requires.
  2. No, because Leo did not touch or threaten Ivy, and she remained on the bench of her own accord.
  3. Yes, but only because Leo falsely claimed to be mall security; an honest citizen's arrest on the same facts would have been privileged.
  4. Yes, because Ivy submitted to Leo's assertion of authority, and his privilege failed because no felony had actually been committed. (correct answer)
Explanation: Confinement can be accomplished by an assertion of legal authority to which the plaintiff submits while believing it valid or being in doubt. Ivy sat on the bench because Leo claimed to be security and she was unsure of his authority, so she was confined. The only possible defense is the private-arrest privilege, and under clause (a) it requires both that a felony has in fact been committed and that the actor reasonably believes the plaintiff committed it. No theft occurred, so Leo's reasonable belief does not save him, and no breach of the peace occurred. Leo is liable. The answer resting on Leo's reasonable belief drops the actual-felony requirement, the most common error with this privilege. The answer relying on the absence of force ignores confinement by asserted authority. The answer limiting liability to the false badge suggests that an honest citizen's arrest would have been privileged; it would not, because the privilege fails for any private person when no felony was in fact committed. The badge matters only to show how the confinement was achieved.

Question 19

Quinn, a store detective at Delmar's department store, watched Alma take a silk scarf from her own tote bag, compare it with scarves on a display, and put it back in her bag. Reasonably suspecting theft, Quinn stopped Alma at the exit and asked her to come to the security office, and she agreed. In the office, within five minutes, Alma produced a dated receipt showing that she had bought that very scarf at another Delmar's branch that morning. The item code on the receipt matched the tag, and Quinn was satisfied that the scarf was hers. Quinn then said, "Before you go, you need to sign this form promising never to shop here again and releasing Delmar's from any claims. Until you sign, you stay." Alma refused for 15 minutes, then signed and left. She sued Delmar's for false imprisonment. A state statute provides: "A merchant who has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has unlawfully taken merchandise may detain the person, in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable time, for the purpose of investigating the ownership of the merchandise. A detention for any other purpose is not privileged by this section."

Is Delmar's liable to Alma for false imprisonment?

  1. Yes, because once Quinn was satisfied the scarf was Alma's, holding her to get her signature was a detention for a purpose other than investigating ownership. (correct answer)
  2. No, because Quinn had reasonable grounds when the detention began, and a detention that is privileged at its outset remains privileged for a reasonable time.
  3. No, because the entire detention lasted about 20 minutes, a reasonable time, and the statute limits only how long a merchant may detain a person.
  4. Yes, because Alma had not taken anything, and a merchant's privilege is lost whenever the person detained turns out to be innocent.
Explanation: The statute privileges a detention only while it is reasonable in manner and time and is for the purpose of investigating ownership. The first five minutes fit: Quinn had reasonable grounds, Alma came voluntarily, and the investigation was prompt. Once Quinn was satisfied the scarf was Alma's, the investigation was over, and holding her until she signed a ban and a release served a different purpose, which the statute expressly excludes. Delmar's is liable for that detention. The answer treating the privilege as fixed at the outset ignores that the privilege is defined by purpose and continues only while the purpose does. The answer focusing on total duration reads the statute as limiting only time, but it also limits purpose and manner, and a short detention for an improper purpose is unprivileged. The answer making innocence decisive states a rule the statute rejects; a merchant with reasonable grounds may detain a person who turns out to be innocent, so Alma's innocence alone would not have made the first five minutes actionable.

Question 20

Ari has a severe, medically diagnosed phobia of spiders that causes panic attacks. After she had a panic attack at work when a spider crawled across her desk, she explained the condition to her team, including her coworker Finn. A month later, Finn, thinking it would be funny, hid a realistic rubber tarantula in Ari's desk drawer. When Ari opened the drawer, she suffered a severe panic attack, hyperventilated until she lost consciousness, and was hospitalized overnight. She was treated for anxiety for several months afterward. Ari sued Finn for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jurisdiction applies this rule: "An actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is liable for that distress and for any resulting bodily harm. Mere insults, indignities, and pranks are not extreme and outrageous. But conduct that would otherwise be a mere indignity may become extreme and outrageous where the actor knows that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress because of a physical or mental condition."

Is Finn liable to Ari for intentional infliction of emotional distress?

  1. Yes, because Finn's knowledge of Ari's phobia made the prank outrageous, and he acted in reckless disregard of the high risk of severe distress. (correct answer)
  2. No, because a rubber spider is a harmless prank, and outrageousness is measured by the conduct's likely effect on a person of ordinary sensibilities.
  3. No, because Finn meant the prank as a joke, and the tort requires that the actor act with the purpose of causing severe emotional distress.
  4. No, because Ari's loss of consciousness and hospitalization were bodily harms, which must be pursued in battery or negligence rather than in this tort.
Explanation: A prank is ordinarily not extreme and outrageous, but the rule makes an otherwise minor indignity outrageous when the actor knows the victim is peculiarly susceptible because of a physical or mental condition. Finn knew of Ari's diagnosed phobia, having been told after her earlier panic attack, and he targeted it directly. Given that knowledge, he acted at least in reckless disregard of the high probability of severe distress, which satisfies the intent element, and Ari's distress was severe. Finn is liable. The answer measuring outrageousness by the effect on a person of ordinary sensibilities states the default rule but ignores the susceptibility exception, which exists for exactly this case. The answer requiring a purpose to cause distress omits recklessness, which the rule expressly includes. The answer routing the claim to battery or negligence is wrong because the rule makes the actor liable for the distress and for any resulting bodily harm, so physical consequences of severe distress are recoverable in this tort.