Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Future Interests

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Future InterestsQuestion 1 of 12

This State's Estates Code provides: "Section 201. Except as provided in Section 202, all future interests are freely alienable, devisable, and descendible. Section 202. A contingent remainder is not alienable unless the instrument creating it expressly provides that it is alienable. A possibility of reverter is not alienable during the holder's lifetime, but is devisable and descendible. A right of entry is not alienable, devisable, or descendible."

O conveys Blackacre "to A for life, then to the first child of A to reach age 21." A has one child, B, age 10. The deed contains no provision about transferability of future interests. Before B reaches 21, B executes a written assignment to C of "all of B's right, title, and interest in Blackacre." B later reaches 21, and A then dies.

Who owns Blackacre?

C, because B's assignment was of a future interest and the interest became possessory during B's lifetime.

C, because Section 201 makes all future interests freely alienable, including contingent remainders.

B, because the assignment was ineffective until B reached 21, and B's later reaching 21 divested C of any interest.

B, because B's contingent remainder was not alienable under Section 202 and the deed did not make it alienable.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Future Interests

Practice Future Interests in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Future Interests, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

Who owns Blackacre?

C, because B's assignment was of a future interest and the interest became possessory during B's lifetime.
C, because Section 201 makes all future interests freely alienable, including contingent remainders.
B, because the assignment was ineffective until B reached 21, and B's later reaching 21 divested C of any interest.
B, because B's contingent remainder was not alienable under Section 202 and the deed did not make it alienable. (correct answer)

Explanation: Start by classifying B's interest at the time of the attempted transfer. Before B reached 21, the remainder "to the first child of A to reach age 21" was contingent because the condition of reaching 21 had not yet occurred. That classification matters because the Estates Code does not treat all future interests the same. Section 201 makes future interests freely alienable, but it begins "except as provided in Section 202," and Section 202 specifically provides that a contingent remainder is not alienable unless the instrument creating it expressly says so. The deed from O contained no such provision, so B's written assignment to C was ineffective. When B later reached 21, B's interest vested; when A died, B owned Blackacre. The choice arguing that C takes because the assignment was of a future interest that later became possessory misses the Section 202 bar—later vesting does not cure a void earlier assignment. The choice claiming Section 201 makes even contingent remainders freely alienable ignores the explicit exception in Section 202. And the choice saying the assignment was ineffective until B reached 21, then B's reaching 21 "divested" C, misstates the legal effect: the attempted transfer was void, not merely delayed, so C never had any interest to lose. On exam day, classify the future interest first, then apply any statutory exceptions. If you see a contingent remainder assigned before the condition occurs and the creating deed is silent on alienability, the assignment is invalid.

Question 2

Orin owned a ranch. By deed, Orin conveyed the ranch "to my daughter Lara for life, then to Lara's children." At the time of the conveyance, Lara had one child, Carl. Two years later, Lara gave birth to another child, Nina. Carl claims that he owns the entire remainder because he was Lara's only child when the deed was delivered. Nina claims that she owns an equal share.

Which of the following issues is most likely to determine whether Nina has an equal share?

Whether Carl's remainder was completely divested when Lara gave birth to Nina.
Whether Lara's life estate terminated when Nina was born, causing the remainder to accelerate.
Whether Nina was a beneficiary of Orin's estate or a devisee under Orin's will.
Whether the deed's reference to "Lara's children" was intended to include children born after the deed was delivered. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests future interests and class gifts. When a grantor conveys a remainder "to Lara's children," that language creates a class gift: all persons fitting the class description, whenever born, share equally unless the deed clearly says otherwise. The decisive issue is therefore whether the deed's reference to "Lara's children" was intended to include children born after the deed was delivered. It ordinarily does—class gifts are read as including after-born members unless the grantor manifests contrary intent. Thus Nina is a class member and takes an equal share with Carl. Why not the others? The idea that Carl's remainder was completely divested when Nina was born misstates the effect of a class opening. Carl's vested remainder is subject to open—his share is reduced, not eliminated, when Nina joins the class. The suggestion that Lara's life estate terminated when Nina was born, causing the remainder to accelerate, confuses a life estate with a condition precedent; Nina's birth does not end Lara's life estate, and acceleration is not needed because Nina takes the same remainder interest. Finally, whether Nina was a beneficiary of Orin's estate or a devisee under Orin's will is irrelevant because Orin conveyed the ranch by deed during his life; succession law is not involved. On exam day, whenever you see a remainder to a group like "children" or "heirs," ask whether the class is open or closed. Absent contrary intent, children born later are included and simply share the class gift.

Question 3

By deed, Orin conveyed a parcel to "the City of Westbrook, but if the parcel ceases to be used as a public library, then the grantor or her heirs may re-enter and take possession." The deed was recorded. Orin died, and her heir Paula inherited Orin's interest. The city later closed the library and began using the parcel for vehicle storage. Paula demanded that the city surrender the parcel. The city refused, claiming that it still owns the parcel.

Which of the following issues is most likely to determine whether Paula may recover the parcel?

Whether the city's interest ended automatically when library use ceased, without any action by Paula.
Whether the city's vehicle-storage use was a substantial breach of the deed's condition.
Whether Paula inherited the power to terminate the city's interest and must exercise that power to recover possession. (correct answer)
Whether the city's continued possession after the library closed was adverse to Paula's interest.

Explanation: Whenever you see deed language like "but if" followed by "the grantor or her heirs may re-enter," you should classify the estate before doing anything else. This is a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, not a fee simple determinable. The grantor retained a right of entry (power of termination), which is descendible to heirs. When the library closed, the city's estate did not end automatically; instead, Paula, as Orin's heir, inherited the power to terminate the city's estate. To recover the parcel, she must affirmatively exercise that power—by entering or bringing suit. That is why the correct issue is whether Paula inherited the power to terminate and must exercise it. The choice saying the city's interest ended automatically is wrong because automatic termination is the hallmark of a fee simple determinable with a possibility of reverter, not a right of entry. The choice focusing on whether vehicle storage was a "substantial breach" misses the point: the condition was non-library use, and vehicle storage plainly violated it, but the central question is still how the retained interest operates. Finally, adverse possession is irrelevant because the city's possession was originally permissive under the deed, not hostile. On exam day, read re-entry language carefully: "may re-enter" means someone must act; "so long as" means termination is automatic.

Question 4

Owen owned Blackacre. In 2010, Owen conveyed Blackacre "to my sister Ruth for life, then to my niece Vera and her heirs." Owen died in 2022, and his son Paul, as his sole heir, claims that Blackacre will revert to Owen's estate when Ruth dies. In 2020, Vera conveyed to Ruth by deed "all of Vera's right, title, and interest in Blackacre." Ruth claims that she now owns Blackacre in fee simple.

Which of the following issues is most likely to determine whether Ruth owns Blackacre in fee simple?

Whether Ruth's acquisition of Vera's future interest, when combined with Ruth's life estate, gave Ruth the entire fee simple. (correct answer)
Whether Owen's death terminated Ruth's life estate and caused Vera's former interest to pass to Paul as Owen's heir.
Whether Paul's claim as Owen's heir is a possibility of reverter that defeats Ruth's title despite Vera's deed.
Whether Vera's deed to Ruth was invalid because Vera received no payment or other consideration for the conveyance.

Explanation: Whenever you see a conveyance that splits ownership into a life estate and a future interest, your first step is to map every estate. Owen's deed gave Ruth a life estate and Vera a vested remainder in fee simple (since it was "to Vera and her heirs"). Because Vera's remainder is a fee simple absolute, Owen retained no reversion—there was nothing left for Paul to inherit. The real issue is the doctrine of merger: when a life tenant acquires the next vested remainder in fee simple, the two interests merge into a single fee simple absolute. Thus, Ruth's acquisition of Vera's interest, when combined with her life estate, gave Ruth the entire fee simple, defeating Paul's claim. The distractor about Owen's death terminating Ruth's life estate is wrong because a life estate is measured by Ruth's life, not Owen's, and Owen had no interest to pass to Paul. The "possibility of reverter" claim is also flawed—that interest arises only from a determinable fee (e.g., "so long as"), not from this standard life-estate-plus-remainder conveyance. Finally, the deed's lack of consideration is irrelevant; a valid deed needs no payment, and a gift deed operates as a valid transfer. On the bar, when you see a life estate followed by a remainder, always ask whether a subsequent transfer causes merger, and remember that the grantor keeps a reversion only if the remainder is not a fee simple absolute.

Question 5

In her will, Thea devised her house "to my husband, Arthur, for life, then to my daughter Dana, but if Dana does not survive Arthur, then to my son Carl." Thea has died; Arthur and both children are living. Dana has contracted to sell her interest in the house to a buyer. Carl has told the buyer that Dana cannot convey a marketable interest because Dana's interest will fail if she dies before Arthur.

Which of the following issues is most likely to determine whether Dana has a marketable interest to convey?

Whether Dana's future interest would be defeated if she died before Arthur, so that Carl would take the house at Arthur's death. (correct answer)
Whether Carl's interest is a reversionary interest that would give him the house if Dana failed to survive Arthur.
Whether Arthur's life estate prevents Dana from conveying her future interest in the house.
Whether Thea's will was required to be recorded before Dana's interest could be conveyed.

Explanation: This question tests future interests and marketability of a future interest, so your first step is to classify every interest created by the will. Arthur has a life estate. Dana's gift is phrased as a direct remainder—"then to Dana"—with a later "but if" clause cutting it off if she does not survive Arthur. That makes Dana's interest a vested remainder subject to divestment: she is a living, ascertained person, but her interest can be defeated. Critically, a vested remainder subject to divestment is alienable, but the buyer takes it subject to the same divesting condition. So the decisive issue is whether Dana's future interest would be defeated if she died before Arthur; if so, Carl would take at Arthur's death, and the buyer must evaluate that risk. Carl's interest is not a reversionary interest. A reversion is retained by the transferor, not by a third-party devisee; Carl takes a shifting executory interest, not a reversion. Arthur's life estate does not prevent Dana from conveying her remainder—it only postpones possessory enjoyment. And recording Thea's will is not a condition for Dana's interest to exist or be conveyed; probate establishes the devise, while recording affects notice and priority, not validity. On future-interest questions, label every interest and watch for "but if" language—it usually creates a divesting condition rather than a reversion, making the prior interest conveyable but defeasible.

Question 6

Grantor owned a vacant lot. By deed, Grantor conveyed the lot "to the Greenfield School District so long as the lot is used for school purposes." The deed was recorded. Grantor died before the district stopped using the lot. The district then stopped using the lot and sold it to a commercial developer who knew of the condition. Grantor's heirs claim that the lot reverted to them when the school use ceased. The developer claims that it owns the lot.

Which of the following issues is most likely to determine whether the heirs own the lot?

Whether the school district's sale to the developer terminated the district's interest before the condition could operate.
Whether the deed's language caused the district's interest to end automatically when school use ceased. (correct answer)
Whether the grantor's heirs were required to make a formal entry on the lot before their interest could become possessory.
Whether the developer's purchase was made in good faith and without notice of the condition in the deed.

Explanation: This question tests whether you can identify the type of estate created by the deed. Whenever you see language like "so long as," "until," or "while," think of a fee simple determinable—an estate that ends automatically when the stated condition occurs. Here, the deed conveyed the lot "to the Greenfield School District so long as the lot is used for school purposes." That language creates a fee simple determinable, with a possibility of reverter retained by the grantor. When the district stopped using the lot for school purposes, its interest ended automatically by operation of the deed itself—no action by the grantor or heirs was required. Because the grantor had died before that event, the possibility of reverter passed to his heirs, and the lot reverted to them immediately. That is why the central issue is whether the deed's language caused the district's interest to end automatically. The wrong answers miss this distinction. "Whether the school district's sale to the developer terminated the district's interest" gets the timing backwards: the school use ceased before the sale, so the district had no interest left to sell. "Whether the grantor's heirs were required to make a formal entry" describes the rule for a fee simple subject to condition subsequent with a right of entry, not a determinable estate. And "whether the developer's purchase was made in good faith" is irrelevant; the deed was recorded, the developer knew of the condition, and automatic reversion defeats a later purchaser regardless. Remember: "so long as" = automatic reverter; "but if" or "provided that" often = right of entry requiring action.

Question 7

In re Estate of Cullen (2020), this State's Supreme Court held: "A merger of a life estate with a remainder occurs only when the same person acquires both the preceding estate and the next vested estate. If the remainder is contingent, the two interests do not merge. The transferor's reversion remains to support the contingent remainder until the condition occurs."

O conveys Blackacre "to A for life, then to B if B reaches age 21." B is 17. A conveys his entire life estate in Blackacre to B.

Before B reaches 21, which statement best describes the interests in Blackacre?

B has a fee simple absolute because his life estate and contingent remainder have merged.
B has a life estate, and O has a reversion; B's contingent remainder is extinguished.
B has a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, and O has a right of entry.
B has a life estate and a contingent remainder; O has a reversion. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a life estate followed by a contingent remainder, the key is to test for merger: merger occurs only when the same person acquires both the preceding estate and the next vested remainder. Here, B already had a contingent remainder (conditioned on reaching 21), and then A conveyed the life estate to B. But because B's remainder is contingent—not vested—the two interests do not merge. They coexist as separate interests. O originally held a reversion because the remainder might fail, and that reversion remains to support the contingent remainder until the condition occurs. Thus B has a life estate plus a contingent remainder, and O has a reversion. Now the wrong answers: The choice claiming B has a fee simple absolute because of merger ignores the requirement that the remainder be vested—this is the classic trap. The choice saying B has only a life estate and O has a reversion, with the contingent remainder extinguished, misapplies the rule: the remainder is not extinguished; it remains contingent and viable. The choice offering a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent with a right of entry is irrelevant—no condition subsequent language exists, and a right of entry is a separate future interest, not a reversion. Study tip: On future-interest questions, always ask: (1) Is the remainder vested or contingent? (2) If contingent, does the transferor retain a reversion? Merger is only possible with a vested remainder—memorize that.

Question 8

Section 1 of this State's Future Interest Classification Act provides: "A 'remainder' is a future interest in a transferee that is capable of becoming possessory upon the natural termination of the preceding estate. A 'vested remainder subject to divestment' is a remainder that is vested in an ascertained person but may be cut short by a condition subsequent. An 'executory interest' is a future interest in a transferee that is not a remainder and that is capable of becoming possessory, if at all, only by cutting short an estate or interest that would otherwise continue. A limitation in favor of a transferee that follows a remainder and takes effect in possession upon the termination of the preceding life estate is an executory interest if it operates to divest the preceding remainder."

O conveys Blackacre "to A for life, then to B, but if B dies before A, to C." B and C are alive.

Under the Act, what is the proper classification of C's interest in Blackacre?

A contingent remainder, because C's interest is subject to the condition precedent that B die before A.
A vested remainder subject to divestment, because C will take possession at the natural termination of A's life estate.
A shifting executory interest, because C's interest can become possessory only by cutting short B's remainder. (correct answer)
A reversion, because if C's interest never becomes possessory, the property will return to O.

Explanation: Whenever you see a future interest classification question, start by mapping the estates in order. Here O created A's life estate, then B's remainder, then the clause "if B dies before A, to C." B's remainder is vested subject to divestment: B is ascertained and would possess at A's death unless the condition cuts B short. C's interest follows B's remainder and operates only by divesting B's remainder before it becomes possessory—that is the statutory definition of a shifting executory interest. C does not have a contingent remainder, because C is an ascertained person, and the statute classifies an interest that divests a preceding remainder as executory rather than a remainder. C also does not have a vested remainder subject to divestment, because C is not the remainder directly following A's life estate; B is. And there is no reversion, because O disposed of the entire fee through the life estate, the remainder, and the executory interest—nothing is left to return automatically to O. The trap here is focusing on the word "if" and automatically thinking "condition precedent." Instead, ask what estate C's interest would cut short: it cuts short B's remainder, so it is shifting executory. Study tip: sketch the future interests in order and label who each interest divests; when a transferee's interest divests another transferee, call it shifting.

Question 9

Section 3 of this State's Future Interests Act provides: "The common-law rule that a contingent remainder is destroyed if it does not vest before or at the termination of the preceding freehold estate is abolished. If a contingent remainder has not vested when the preceding estate terminates, the transferor's reversion becomes possessory, but it is subject to divestment if the condition precedent is later satisfied, and the remainderman then takes the property as if the condition had been satisfied before the preceding estate terminated."

O conveys Blackacre "to A for life, then to B if B reaches age 25." B is 20. A dies when B is 22. B later reaches 25.

Who owns Blackacre when B reaches 25?

B owns Blackacre, because his contingent remainder was not destroyed by A's death and his later satisfaction of the condition entitled him to possession. (correct answer)
O owns Blackacre in fee simple absolute, because B's contingent remainder was destroyed when A died before B reached 25.
O owns a life estate, and B owns a remainder, because B's interest was automatically converted to an executory interest at A's death.
B owns Blackacre only if O's reversion was expressly retained in the deed.

Explanation: Whenever you see a contingent remainder followed by a gap before the condition is satisfied, remember that this State's statute abolishes the common-law destructibility rule. At A's death, B's remainder had not yet vested because B was only 22, so O's reversion became possessory. But the statute says that reversion is subject to divestment if B later satisfies the condition. Therefore, when B turns 25, the condition is satisfied, O's reversion is divested, and B takes Blackacre as if he had already been 25 when A died. That is why the choice saying "B owns Blackacre, because his contingent remainder was not destroyed by A's death" is correct. The choice claiming "O owns Blackacre in fee simple absolute, because B's contingent remainder was destroyed" reflects the old common-law rule that the statute explicitly abolishes — that is the main trap. The choice stating "O owns a life estate, and B owns an executory interest" is wrong because O never had a life estate; O had a reversion, and B's interest remained a contingent remainder, not an executory interest. Finally, the choice saying B owns only if O's reversion was expressly retained confuses a reversion with a possibility of reverter or a right of entry; a reversion arises automatically by operation of law and need not be stated in the deed. Study tip: whenever a statute abolishes a common-law rule, apply the statutory rule first, and treat the old rule as the likely wrong answer.

Question 10

Section 4 of this State's Estates Code provides: "The common-law doctrine of worthier title is in force. A limitation in a conveyance purporting to create a remainder in the heirs of the grantor is void, and the grantor retains the same interest as if the limitation had been omitted."

O, who is alive and has two children, conveys Blackacre by deed "to A for life, then to O's heirs." A is alive.

Which statement best describes the interests in Blackacre?

A has a life estate, O has a reversion in fee simple, and O's children have a contingent remainder.
A has a life estate, O has a reversion in fee simple, and O's children have no interest. (correct answer)
A has a fee simple absolute because the remainder to O's heirs merges with A's life estate.
A has a life estate, O has a possibility of reverter, and O's children have a vested remainder subject to open.

Explanation: This question tests the common-law doctrine of worthier title, which applies whenever a conveyance attempts to create a remainder in the grantor's own heirs. Here O's deed says "to A for life, then to O's heirs." Under the statute, that limitation in favor of O's heirs is void and treated as omitted. So the conveyance reads, in effect, "to A for life" only. A therefore has a life estate, and O retains a reversion in fee simple because he never conveyed away the full fee. O's children are merely potential heirs; they have no legal interest—present or future—because the challenged remainder was void, not merely unvested. The answer saying the children have a contingent remainder is wrong: the limitation did not create a valid contingent remainder; it was void by statute. The answer saying they have a vested remainder subject to open is also wrong: there is no class remainder at all, and a possibility of reverter would follow a determinable fee, not a life estate. The fee-simple-absolute answer is wrong because A's life estate does not merge with O's reversion; merger requires successive estates vested in the same person, and O—not A—holds the reversion. Thus the only correct description is: A has a life estate, O has a reversion in fee simple, and O's children have no interest. Remember the pattern: whenever you see a conveyance to the grantor's own heirs, apply worthier title—the limitation drops out, and the grantor keeps the same interest as if it had never been written. Also distinguish it from Rule in Shelley's Case, which involves heirs of the grantee, not the grantor.

Question 11

Oscar owned a cabin. By deed, Oscar conveyed the cabin "to my brother Alex and his heirs, but if Alex or his heirs ever use the cabin for commercial purposes, then to my sister Beth and her heirs." The deed was recorded. Alex used the cabin as a private residence for years. Last month, Alex began renting the cabin to tourists for money. Beth has demanded that Alex vacate and surrender the cabin to her.

Which of the following issues is most likely to determine whether Beth may immediately take possession?

Whether Alex's heirs would take the cabin if Alex died before the commercial use ended.
Whether Alex's rental use was sufficiently commercial to constitute waste of Beth's future interest.
Whether Beth must first record a separate deed from Oscar before she can enforce her interest.
Whether Alex's rental use automatically terminated Alex's interest and gave Beth a present possessory right. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a deed that grants land "to A, but if [condition], then to B," you are dealing with a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. The grantor has given away both the present and future interests: A holds the fee simple, but that estate automatically terminates upon the specified condition, and B's executory interest becomes possessory without any further action. Here, Oscar's deed gives Alex a fee simple subject to that condition—commercial use—and Beth a shifting executory interest. The critical question is whether Alex's rental activity actually triggered the condition, because if it did, Alex's estate ends automatically and Beth may immediately take possession. That is exactly what the correct choice asks: whether the rental use automatically terminated Alex's interest and gave Beth a present possessory right. The other options miss the mark. The choice about Alex's heirs taking if he died before the commercial use ended is irrelevant—the condition is about use, not death, and death before the condition would not affect Beth's executory interest. The choice about waste is a distractor: waste concerns damage to the property, not a breach of a condition; rental use might constitute waste if it harms the cabin, but that is a different claim. Finally, the choice about recording a separate deed is wrong because Beth's interest was created in the original recorded deed—she needs no further document to enforce it. The key strategy: identify the estate type first, then ask whether the triggering event occurred. Watch for executory interests—they automatically follow a condition.

Question 12

This State's Perpetuities Act provides: "A nonvested interest is invalid unless it is certain, at the time the interest is created, that it will vest or fail no later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest. If, but only if, the interest is not so certain, a court shall reform the instrument, consistent with the transferor's probable intent, so that the interest vests or fails no later than 90 years after its creation."

O's will creates a trust, directing that income be paid to O's children for their lives and that the principal then be distributed "to my grandchildren who reach age 25, in equal shares." At O's death, O's children A and B are alive; A has a child X, age 2, and B has no children. The will contains no other relevant provision.

Under the statute, what should the court do with the gift to grandchildren?

Uphold the gift as written because A and B are lives in being and every grandchild will necessarily be born during the lifetime of A or B.
Invalidate the gift because it is possible that a grandchild will reach 25 more than 21 years after the death of every life in being.
Reform the gift so that the interest of each grandchild must vest or fail no later than 90 years after O's death. (correct answer)
Reform the gift so that only grandchildren alive at O's death can take, because the class must close within 21 years after O's death.

Explanation: Whenever you see a trust with a condition precedent like "reach age 25," you're dealing with the Rule Against Perpetuities. At common law, you ask if the interest must vest within 21 years after some life in being. Here, A and B are lives in being, but a grandchild could be born to B (who has no children) just before B dies, and then reach 25 more than 21 years after B's death. So the interest is not "certain" to vest within the permissible period. The statute provides that if it is not so certain, a court "shall reform" the instrument to vest or fail within 90 years of creation. Thus, the correct remedy is to reform the gift to that 90-year period. The choice "Uphold the gift as written because A and B are lives in being..." is wrong because it confuses the birth of the grandchild (which occurs during A or B's life) with the vesting event (reaching 25), which can happen long after they die. The choice "Invalidate the gift because it is possible..." is wrong because the statute does not call for invalidation; it explicitly mandates reformation. The choice "Reform the gift so that only grandchildren alive at O's death can take..." is wrong because the statute does not close the class at O's death; it imposes a 90-year vesting period. Your takeaway: when a statute provides a reformation period (like 90 years), a violating interest is reformed, not struck down, and always test the vesting condition—not just the birth of class members—against the measuring lives.