Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Duty Of Care To Foreseeable And Unforeseeable Plaintiffs

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Duty Of Care To Foreseeable And Unforeseeable PlaintiffsQuestion 1 of 18

While driving a tanker truck for Superior Fuel Co., Dan negligently ran a red light and overturned the truck, spilling gasoline across a downtown intersection. Dan was uninjured and climbed out. Firefighters arrived within minutes and began stringing yellow caution tape. Milo, a delivery driver stopped in the next block, left his van, walked past the caution tape, and crossed the gasoline-covered intersection to "check on the driver," even though he could see Dan standing safely beside a police officer. A car driven by Paula skidded on the gasoline and struck Milo. Milo sued Superior. In Ortiz v. Caliber Freight, the state's highest court adopted this rule: "A rescuer is a foreseeable plaintiff if the defendant's negligence created an apparent risk of physical harm to a person or property, the rescuer reasonably believed that emergency intervention was necessary, and the rescuer's attempt was not imprudent. A person who goes to the scene merely to observe, or whose attempt is imprudent under the circumstances, is not owed a duty."

Under Ortiz, which of the following is Superior's best argument that it owed no duty to Milo?

Milo was not a rescuer because firefighters had already arrived, so as a matter of law he could not reasonably believe that emergency intervention was necessary.

Milo acted imprudently by ignoring the caution tape and crossing a gasoline-covered intersection to help a driver who was already safe, so he was not a foreseeable plaintiff.

Milo was not within the zone of danger created by the spill because the gasoline endangered Dan and the crowd at the curb, not Milo.

Paula's skid on the gasoline was an independent act that broke the causal connection between Superior's negligence and Milo's injuries.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Duty Of Care To Foreseeable And Unforeseeable Plaintiffs

Practice Duty Of Care To Foreseeable And Unforeseeable Plaintiffs in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Duty Of Care To Foreseeable And Unforeseeable Plaintiffs, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

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Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

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Question 1

Under Ortiz, which of the following is Superior's best argument that it owed no duty to Milo?

Milo was not a rescuer because firefighters had already arrived, so as a matter of law he could not reasonably believe that emergency intervention was necessary.
Milo acted imprudently by ignoring the caution tape and crossing a gasoline-covered intersection to help a driver who was already safe, so he was not a foreseeable plaintiff. (correct answer)
Milo was not within the zone of danger created by the spill because the gasoline endangered Dan and the crowd at the curb, not Milo.
Paula's skid on the gasoline was an independent act that broke the causal connection between Superior's negligence and Milo's injuries.

Explanation: Whenever a torts question involves a rescuer, your job is to apply the stated rule element by element. Under Ortiz, a rescuer is owed a duty only if there was an apparent risk, the rescuer reasonably believed emergency help was needed, and the attempt was not imprudent. Here, Superior's best argument is that Milo acted imprudently: he ignored police caution tape, walked across a gasoline-covered intersection, and went to "check on" a driver he could see was already safe beside an officer. That conduct falls squarely outside the rule's protection, because no reasonable person would think emergency intervention was necessary once Dan was safe and firefighters were on scene. The choice that says firefighters had already arrived so Milo could not reasonably believe intervention was necessary is too absolute; arrival of firefighters is important evidence, but the rule does not make it a categorical bar. The "zone of danger" argument misunderstands the rescuer doctrine, which can extend duty to rescuers outside the original danger zone if the rule is satisfied. And Paula's skid was not an independent superseding cause — a car skidding on spilled gasoline is a foreseeable outcome of the defendant's negligence, not a break in causation. Study tip: when a rescuer ignores official warnings or helps someone already safe, those facts are red flags for "imprudent" and "no reasonable belief." Apply the Ortiz elements mechanically, and let those facts carry the answer.

Question 2

In 2009, Dr. Chen prescribed Vera a medication manufactured by Medix Corp. The medication was later found to contain a toxic contaminant because of Medix's negligent quality-control failures. Vera took the medication for six months in 2009 and experienced no physical illness. In 2012, Vera conceived a daughter, Aria, who was born in 2013 with severe limb defects. Aria's experts can prove that the contaminant caused her defects. Aria, through her guardian, sued Medix for negligence. In Alvarez v. Meridian Labs, the state supreme court held: "A defendant owes a duty of care only to a plaintiff who was within the class of persons to whom a risk of harm was foreseeable at the time of the defendant's negligent act. A child who was not conceived until after the defendant's negligent act cannot be within that class, because no risk to that particular child existed when the act occurred. The child's later birth does not create a duty."

Under Alvarez, which of the following is Medix's best argument that it owes no duty to Aria?

Aria cannot show that the contaminant was the actual cause of her limb defects because the ingestion occurred years before she was conceived and no defect was apparent at birth.
Medix owed no duty to Vera because Vera suffered no physical injury from the contaminated medication, so any duty would have to run directly to Aria.
Aria's injuries are too remote as a matter of law because they did not manifest until after she was born, and remoteness in time defeats duty.
Aria was not conceived at the time of Medix's negligent act, so she was not within the class of persons to whom a foreseeable risk of harm existed when the act occurred. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests the scope of a defendant's duty in negligence, specifically whether foreseeability of the plaintiff is measured at the time of the negligent act. When you see a duty question, focus on the relationship between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's status at the moment of that conduct. Here, Alvarez controls: a defendant owes a duty only to a plaintiff who was within the foreseeable class of persons at the time of the negligent act. Aria was conceived in 2012, three years after Vera ingested the contaminated medication in 2009. So Medix's best argument is that Aria was not conceived at the time of Medix's negligent act and therefore was not within the class of persons to whom a foreseeable risk of harm existed then. The expert proof that the contaminant caused Aria's defects cannot create a duty that Alvarez says never existed. The statement that Aria cannot show actual cause is wrong because expert proof can establish causation, and the issue here is duty, not causation. The argument that Medix owed no duty to Vera because Vera suffered no physical injury is beside the point: Aria's claim is derivative only in the sense that the injury happened before conception; Vera's lack of damages does not determine whether Medix owed Aria a duty. Finally, the argument that Aria's injuries were "too remote" because they appeared after birth misreads Alvarez—the court grounded duty in whether the child was conceived at the time of the act, not in when symptoms manifested. Study tip: separate duty from causation. In duty questions, ask who was foreseeable at the negligent act, not what injuries later resulted.

Question 3

Dr. Rao is a psychiatrist at a state hospital. Her patient, Thomas, was involuntarily committed after threatening coworkers. During a therapy session, Thomas told Dr. Rao that he was "going to make them pay" and that "one day soon, I am going to come back to the warehouse and open fire." He did not name any individual. Dr. Rao believed Thomas was serious, but she did not notify the warehouse or the police because she thought Thomas was too heavily medicated to act. Three weeks later, Thomas was discharged, went to the warehouse, and shot several workers, including Lucia. Lucia sued the state, claiming Dr. Rao breached a duty to protect her. The state's high court, in Washington v. Price, adopted this rule: "A person who has a special relationship with another may owe a duty to exercise reasonable care to control that other's conduct and to protect a third person from harm, but only if the person knows or has reason to know of a specific and imminent threat of physical harm directed at an identifiable victim. A general threat of harm to a group or to the public at large is not sufficient to create a duty to any particular plaintiff."

Under Washington v. Price, which of the following is the best reason Lucia's claim fails?

Dr. Rao did not know that Thomas would be discharged before he could carry out the threat.
Thomas did not identify Lucia or any other specific victim, and the threat was not sufficiently imminent. (correct answer)
Dr. Rao's relationship was with Thomas, not with Lucia, so she owed Lucia no duty of care.
The state cannot be liable for the intentional criminal acts of a person who was involuntarily committed and later discharged.

Explanation: This question tests the "duty to protect" exception to the usual rule that a person has no duty to control another's conduct. When you see facts about a therapist, a threat, and an injured third party, focus on the jurisdiction's standard: here, Washington v. Price requires a specific and imminent threat directed at an identifiable victim. Dr. Rao did have a special relationship with Thomas, but the threat was expressly general—"come back to the warehouse and open fire"—with no named victim. It also was not imminent in the required sense: Dr. Rao believed Thomas was too medicated to act and did not expect him to be discharged. Therefore, no duty to Lucia arose. The claim that Dr. Rao "did not know Thomas would be discharged" misses the point: the duty analysis focuses on the threat at the time Dr. Rao learned of it, not on later events she could not foresee. The statement that her relationship was with Thomas, not Lucia, is also a trap: a special relationship can create a duty to a third person, but only if the threat satisfies the specific-victim requirement. Finally, the idea that the state is never liable for intentional criminal acts is too broad; under Price, liability would be possible if the threat had been specific and imminent. Remember: general danger to the public is not enough. Look for named victims and a concrete, immediate threat—those are the triggers for a duty to protect.

Question 4

A city bus was crowded with standing passengers. One passenger carried a large paper bag. As the bus made a sharp turn, the driver lost control and the bus jumped a curb. The passenger with the bag fell, and the bag hit a metal seat rail and tore open. The bag contained dry cement mix, and cement dust filled the air. A passenger with asthma suffered an asthma attack and was hospitalized. She sued the transit authority.

Which fact is most important in determining whether the transit authority owed a duty to the asthmatic passenger?

Whether the bus driver knew that the passenger was carrying a bag of dry cement mix.
Whether the asthmatic passenger was sitting or standing when the bus left the roadway.
Whether the loss of control created a foreseeable risk that a standing passenger would fall and drop a package. (correct answer)
Whether the asthmatic passenger had experienced asthma attacks before the accident and carried an inhaler.

Explanation: In negligence, duty is fundamentally about foreseeability: whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would recognize a risk of harm to this type of plaintiff. Here, the transit authority does owe a heightened duty as a common carrier, but the key question is whether the harm was within the foreseeable scope of the accident. The most important fact is whether the loss of control created a foreseeable risk that a standing passenger would fall and drop a package. That fact links the bus's dangerous maneuver directly to the escape of the cement dust and the passenger's injury. If a reasonable bus operator would foresee a standing passenger falling and dropping a bag during a sharp turn, then the chain of harm is foreseeable and a duty exists. The choice about whether the driver knew the bag contained dry cement mix is less important because knowledge of the exact contents is not required if the risk of a dropped package causing injury is foreseeable. The sitting-versus-standing choice is irrelevant; the transit authority owes a duty to all passengers regardless of position. The choice about prior asthma attacks and carrying an inhaler is a classic "eggshell plaintiff" trap — the defendant takes the victim as found, and a preexisting condition does not negate duty; it may affect damages but not the existence of a duty. On duty questions, anchor yourself to foreseeability of the general risk, not the precise injury or the plaintiff's particular vulnerability.

Question 5

A courier van ran a red light and rear-ended a sedan in an intersection. The sedan's driver was not hurt, but the car stalled in the middle of the lane. A pedestrian crossing the street saw the stalled car and began pushing it toward the curb so that traffic could pass. While she was pushing, another vehicle entering the intersection struck her, breaking her leg. The pedestrian sued the courier van driver, who moved for summary judgment on the ground that he owed no duty to the pedestrian.

Which of the following facts, if established, would be most important in determining whether the courier van driver owed a duty to the pedestrian?

The pedestrian had not been asked by the sedan's driver to help push the car.
The sedan's driver appeared dazed and unable to get out of the car after the collision. (correct answer)
The pedestrian saw the other vehicle approaching before she began pushing the car.
The other vehicle was being driven by a person who had just suffered a sudden medical emergency.

Explanation: When you see a negligence question focusing on duty, ask whether the plaintiff's injury was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct. Here, the van driver's negligence (running the red light) caused the sedan to stall. The critical fact is that the sedan's driver appeared dazed and unable to get out. This transforms the pedestrian from a mere bystander into a rescuer. Under the "danger invites rescue" doctrine, a tortfeasor who negligently places another in peril owes a duty to any third party who reasonably attempts to rescue that person. Because the dazed driver is incapacitated in a live traffic lane, it is entirely foreseeable that a passerby would push the car, making the pedestrian a foreseeable plaintiff. The fact that the pedestrian had not been asked to help is irrelevant—the rescue doctrine protects volunteers who act reasonably, and an invitation is not a prerequisite for duty. Seeing the other vehicle approaching speaks only to the pedestrian's own comparative fault (did she act negligently?) and not to whether the van driver owed a duty to her. The other vehicle's sudden medical emergency could break causation as a superseding cause, but the question specifically asks about the existence of duty, which is established by the foreseeable rescue. For duty questions, look for facts that link the defendant's negligence to a foreseeable class of plaintiffs—rescuers are always in that class.

Question 6

A construction company was hired to demolish an abandoned warehouse. On the day of the implosion, it posted warning signs and stationed lookouts at the two public streets bordering the warehouse. A delivery person who was using a private alley behind the warehouse to reach a loading dock was struck by a piece of falling concrete and sued the company for negligence. The company moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to the delivery person because it had no notice that anyone used the alley and did not know the delivery person was there.

Which additional fact, if true, would most help the delivery person establish that the company owed a duty of care?

The company's project manager had regularly seen delivery workers and residents use the alley while preparing the demolition plan. (correct answer)
The concrete that struck the delivery person came from the warehouse wall that the company had been hired to demolish.
The lookouts assigned to the two public streets had left their posts before the blast was detonated.
The delivery person had been instructed by a tenant in the warehouse to use the alley to reach the loading dock that morning.

Explanation: Whenever a negligence question turns on duty, your focus should be on foreseeability: would a reasonable company have anticipated someone in the delivery person's position being near the blast? The key fact is that the company's project manager had regularly seen delivery workers and residents use the alley while preparing the demolition plan. That prior knowledge makes the delivery person a foreseeable user of the alley, so the company owed a duty to take reasonable precautions for his safety—even though the alley was private and not one of the posted public streets. The other choices attack different elements rather than duty. The concrete coming from the warehouse wall the company was hired to demolish helps prove causation, but it does nothing to show the company should have anticipated this plaintiff; it is just the physical source of the injury. The lookouts leaving their posts relates to breach—whether the company failed to exercise reasonable care—but duty is a separate threshold question the company already moved on. And the delivery person having been instructed by a tenant to use the alley explains why he was there, but the company's duty depends on what the company knew or reasonably should have known, not on the plaintiff's private instructions. Since the project manager's regular observations gave the company notice that people used the alley, the delivery person was a foreseeable victim, and duty exists. Study tip: on duty questions, ask "Did the defendant have reason to know this class of plaintiffs might be in the zone of danger?" Actual knowledge is often decisive.

Question 7

A man ran to catch a train, holding a small paper bag. A railroad employee reached out and grabbed the man's arm to keep him from stumbling. The bag dropped onto the platform. Inside the bag was a loaded handgun. The gun fired on impact, and the bullet ricocheted and struck a passenger standing near a ticket window at the far end of the platform. The injured passenger sued the railroad.

Which fact is most important in determining whether the railroad owed a duty to the injured passenger?

Whether the employee knew or should have known that the bag contained a gun or other dangerous object. (correct answer)
Whether the injured passenger was standing in a crowded area of the platform.
Whether the man was lawfully carrying the gun and had a permit for it.
Whether the employee grabbed the man to prevent a fall or to stop him from boarding the train.

Explanation: When you see a negligence question, first identify which element is at issue. Here, the question asks about duty—specifically, whether the railroad owed a duty to the passenger. Duty in a case of affirmative conduct depends on whether the injury was foreseeable: was the passenger a foreseeable plaintiff, and was the risk of harm foreseeable? The most important fact is whether the employee knew or should have known that the bag contained a gun or other dangerous object. If he had that knowledge (or reasonably should have had it), then grabbing the man's arm and causing the bag to drop would foreseeably risk a gun discharging and injuring someone. If he had no reason to know the bag was dangerous, the injury would be unforeseeable, and no duty would arise. The other choices miss the mark. "Whether the injured passenger was standing in a crowded area" goes to the standard of care or breach—how a reasonable person would act—but it doesn't establish whether the employee owed a duty in the first place. "Whether the man was lawfully carrying the gun and had a permit" is irrelevant to foreseeability; the lawfulness of the gun's possession doesn't affect whether the employee should have anticipated the risk. "Whether the employee grabbed the man to prevent a fall or to stop him from boarding" might affect whether the employee's conduct was negligent (breach), but the existence of duty is determined by foreseeability, not the motive behind the act. On the bar, when duty is contested, zero in on what the defendant knew or should have known about the risk. Foreseeability is the key—ignore facts about the plaintiff's location or the legality of the item, which distract from that core inquiry.

Question 8

Ortega was waiting in the main concourse of a bus terminal, about 100 feet from the boarding gates. A bus company employee, while helping a passenger board a bus, negligently jostled the passenger's arm, causing the passenger to drop a large paper shopping bag bearing the words 'DANGEROUS—FIREWORKS.' The bag struck the platform and exploded; the force of the explosion knocked over a metal luggage cart near Ortega, and the cart fell on her, injuring her. Ortega sued the bus company. The following statute governs:

Public Carrier Liability Act. A common carrier is liable for injuries caused by the negligent acts of its employees to passengers and to other persons lawfully in its terminal, provided that the injured person was within the immediate area in which the negligent act posed a foreseeable risk of physical impact at the time the act occurred. An injury caused by a chain reaction that began with the negligent act, but suffered by a person outside that immediate area, is not actionable even if the chain reaction was foreseeable and proximately caused the injury.

Under the Act, is the bus company liable to Ortega?

No, because Ortega was outside the immediate area of physical risk created by the employee's negligent act, and her injury came about through a chain reaction rather than direct exposure to that risk. (correct answer)
No, because Ortega was not a passenger boarding the bus, and a common carrier's statutory duty extends only to passengers and to employees acting within the scope of employment.
Yes, because the employee's negligence proximately caused Ortega's injury, and a common carrier owes a duty to all persons lawfully in its terminal whose injuries are foreseeable.
Yes, because the warning label made the contents of the passenger's bag foreseeable, so the explosion and its consequences were foreseeable results of the employee's negligent jostling.

Explanation: This question tests whether you apply a special statute precisely rather than general tort foreseeability. The Act limits liability to persons in the "immediate area" where the negligent act posed a foreseeable risk of physical impact. Here, the employee jostled a passenger near the boarding gates, causing the passenger to drop a bag that exploded. That explosion knocked over a cart 100 feet away, and the cart injured Ortega. Because Ortega was 100 feet away and was hurt only through a chain reaction after the explosion, she was outside the immediate area and not directly exposed to the risk from the employee's act. Thus the bus company is not liable, even if the chain reaction was foreseeable. The "not a passenger" answer misreads the Act, which protects "other persons lawfully in its terminal." The "proximately caused and foreseeable duty" answer ignores the Act's stricter immediate-area requirement. The "warning label made the explosion foreseeable" answer likewise misses the point: foreseeability alone is not enough under the statute. On exam day, when a statute supplies an element, apply that element exactly. Ask: was the plaintiff in the immediate risk area, or injured by a later chain reaction?

Question 9

During a rainstorm, Amara stopped her car at a red light. A delivery van driven by Paolo skidded on the wet roadway and struck her car from behind. The impact was relatively minor, but Amara had a preexisting spinal condition that caused her to suffer a ruptured disc and permanent nerve damage. Amara sued Paolo for negligence. Paolo moved for summary judgment, arguing that he owed no duty to Amara because he did not know of her spinal condition and could not have foreseen that a low-speed collision would cause such a severe injury.

Which fact, if true, would most support Amara's argument that Paolo owed her a duty of care?

A reasonable driver in Paolo's position would have foreseen that a rear-end collision could injure the driver of the car ahead. (correct answer)
Paolo had been following Amara's car for several miles and had not observed any sign of her spinal condition.
Amara's spinal condition had been diagnosed by her physician several years before the collision and was documented in her medical records.
The rainstorm had been forecast earlier that day, but Paolo had not increased his following distance to account for the wet roadway.

Explanation: Whenever you see a negligence question involving a plaintiff's preexisting condition, think about the eggshell plaintiff rule and the distinction between duty and scope of harm. Duty is determined by the foreseeability of harm to an ordinary person, not to this specific plaintiff's vulnerabilities. The fact that most supports Amara is that a reasonable driver in Paolo's position would have foreseen that a rear-end collision could injure the driver of the car ahead. That is exactly the duty question: a driver owes a duty to avoid rear-ending another car, because it foreseeably causes injury. Once Paolo breached that duty, the eggshell plaintiff rule makes him liable for the full extent of Amara's injuries, including her ruptured disc, even though he could not have foreseen her spinal condition or the severity of harm. The law takes the victim as you find them, so the unforeseeability of the extent of injury does not erase the duty. The other choices miss the point. The fact that Paolo followed Amara for several miles without observing signs of her condition does not matter——nonexpert drivers are not expected to detect hidden medical conditions, and it says nothing about whether his conduct created a foreseeable risk. The diagnosis ordocumentation of Amara's spinal condition is also irrelevant, because duty is not premised on the defendant's actual knowledge of the plaintiff's condition. Finalmente, the forecast rainstorm and following distance might support breach of duty (negligence per se or unreasonable conduct,) but it does not address the duty to Amara specifically——the duty exists regardless of weather conditions. Your study tip: distinguish duty from breach and from proximate cause. The eggshell plaintiff rule applies to damages——once tortious conduct causes physical impact, the defendant takes the plaintiff as is. Duty, however, is measured by what a reasonable person would foresee happening to an ordinary person—not by knowledge of special vulnerabilities.

Question 10

Rhea, who was 35 weeks pregnant, was a front-seat passenger in a car driven by her sister. At an intersection, a delivery truck ran a red light and struck the car on Rhea's side. Rhea suffered bruises but no internal injuries. The next day she went into labor and gave birth to a son, who was born with a lung condition caused by his premature birth. The son's guardian sued the trucking company for negligence. The trucking company moved to dismiss, arguing that any duty it owed ran only to Rhea because her son was not a person at the time of the collision and could not be a foreseeable plaintiff.

Which issue is most central to the trucking company's motion to dismiss?

Whether a child who was in utero at the time of a negligent collision can be owed a duty of care if the child is born alive after the collision. (correct answer)
Whether Rhea's bruises from the collision were sufficient physical impact to support a claim for emotional distress damages.
Whether the truck driver's running the red light was a substantial factor in causing the son's premature birth.
Whether the trucking company can be held liable for the driver's conduct if the driver was making a delivery at the time.

Explanation: Whenever you see a motion to dismiss based on "no duty," isolate the element of duty from breach, causation, and damages. The trucking company's argument is purely about duty: it claims the son was not a legal person at the time of the collision and therefore no duty was owed to him. The central issue is therefore whether a child in utero can be owed a duty of care if the child is born alive after the collision. Under the prevailing born-alive rule, a child born alive may maintain an action for prenatal injuries caused by negligence, because the injury becomes legally actionable once the child is born with that injury. Here, the son's lung condition allegedly resulted from the premature birth caused by the collision, so the duty question controls. The other choices misidentify the issue. Whether Rhea's bruises were sufficient physical impact to support emotional distress damages concerns Rhea's own claim, not the son's duty question. Whether running the red light was a substantial factor in causing the premature birth addresses causation, which the trucking company's motion does not truly contest. And whether the company can be held liable for the driver's conduct during a delivery raises vicarious liability, a separate issue from whether a duty ran to the unborn child. On exam day, when a defendant moves to dismiss on duty grounds, keep your focus on duty. Remember "born alive" as the key answer to the no-duty-to-an-unborn-plaintiff argument.

Question 11

At a crowded train platform, a passenger carrying a small wrapped package boarded a train. A conductor, trying to help the passenger aboard, negligently pushed him; the package fell and exploded because it contained fireworks. The explosion caused a heavy set of scales at the other end of the platform to fall onto Rosa, injuring her. Rosa sued the railroad. The state's highest court, in Simmons v. Northern Rail, held: "A defendant's duty of care is limited to those plaintiffs who are within the reasonably foreseeable zone of danger created by the defendant's negligent act. The question is not whether some harm to someone was foreseeable; it is whether the plaintiff, or the class of persons of which the plaintiff was a member, was foreseeably endangered by the act. If the plaintiff was outside that zone, no duty exists."

Under Simmons, does the railroad owe Rosa a duty?

Yes, because the conductor's push was a negligent act and the explosion was a foreseeable consequence of pushing a passenger carrying a package.
Yes, because Rosa was a passenger on the platform and all passengers are foreseeable plaintiffs for any negligent act on the platform.
No, because Rosa was not the passenger the conductor was helping and therefore was not within the class of persons to whom he owed a duty.
No, because Rosa was at the other end of the platform and was not within the reasonably foreseeable zone of danger created by the conductor's push. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests the scope of a negligence duty: a defendant owes care only to plaintiffs within the reasonably foreseeable zone of danger created by the negligent act. Here, the conductor negligently pushed a passenger, but the passenger's wrapped package—unbeknownst to anyone—contained fireworks. The explosion occurred at the other end of the platform and caused scales to fall on Rosa. Under Simmons, the relevant inquiry is whether Rosa, or her class, was foreseeably endangered by the conductor's push. She was not: she was far away, and the harm arose through an extraordinary chain from a concealed package. Thus, no duty was owed to Rosa. The answer claiming that the explosion was a foreseeable consequence of pushing a passenger carrying a package is wrong because negligence is judged by what was apparent or foreseeable; a wrapped package does not signal fireworks. The answer saying all passengers on the platform are foreseeable plaintiffs for any negligent act overstates duty—being on the platform does not put every passenger within every zone of danger. The answer saying Rosa was outside the class because she was not the passenger being helped is closer but misstates the rule: the conductor's duty is not limited only to the person he was helping; it extends to anyone within the foreseeable zone of danger, which Rosa was not. On exam day, when you see an injury caused by a bizarre chain of events, ask: was this plaintiff within the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's act? If not, no duty exists.

Question 12

At a downtown bus stop, a city bus lurched forward just as a passenger, Lena, was stepping off. Lena's coat was caught in the closing door, and the bus began to drag her alongside the roadway. A bystander, Jordan, ran after the bus, pulled Lena free, and fell, fracturing his arm. Lena was not seriously injured. Jordan sued the city. The city argued Jordan was not a foreseeable plaintiff because he was a stranger who voluntarily placed himself in danger and the driver could not anticipate his intervention.

Which issue is most likely to determine whether the city owed Jordan a duty of care?

Whether the bus driver's negligent operation created the peril to Lena that prompted Jordan to intervene. (correct answer)
Whether Jordan's decision to run alongside a moving bus was the most reasonable way to rescue Lena.
Whether Lena would have suffered death or serious injury if Jordan had not acted.
Whether the bus driver saw Jordan before Jordan came alongside the bus.

Explanation: Whenever you see an injured rescuer, think "danger invites rescue." A defendant who negligently creates a peril that endangers another owes a duty not only to that victim but also to a rescuer who comes to help — because the rescue is a foreseeable consequence of the negligence. Here, Jordan's claim against the city rises or falls on whether the bus driver's negligent operation created the peril to Lena that prompted Jordan to intervene. If that peril existed, Jordan was a foreseeable plaintiff even though he was a stranger; if the driver created no peril, the city owed him no duty. The other choices miss the duty question. Jordan's decision to run alongside a moving bus goes to the reasonableness of his rescue — relevant to comparative negligence, not whether a duty existed; in an emergency, a rescuer need not choose the perfect course. Whether Lena would have suffered death or serious injury if Jordan had not acted might show the seriousness of the peril, but it does not establish that the city caused it; a duty arises from the defendant's creation of danger, not just from howbad the outcome would have been. And whether the bus driver saw Jordan before he came alongside asks about actual foresight; the law uses objective foreseeability, not subjective observation, and the driver need not anticipate the specific rescuer's identity — only the general risk that someone would attempt a rescue. When you see a rescuer on the bar exam, anchor your analysis there: did the defendant's negligence create the victim's peril? If yes, the rescuer is foreseeable; reasonableness of the rescue and the rescuer's identity are secondary.

Question 13

A delivery van ran a red light and struck the rear of a car driven by Mira, who was eight months pregnant. Mira was not seriously injured, but she went into labor immediately and gave birth to a baby with a permanent arm injury. Experts testified that the injury was caused by the force of the collision. The baby's guardian sued the delivery company. The delivery company argued that it owed no duty to the baby because the baby was not yet born when the collision occurred.

Which fact, if true, would be most important in determining whether the delivery company owed a duty to the baby?

The baby's injury would not have occurred if Mira had not been pregnant at the time of the collision.
Mira's pregnancy was apparent to an ordinary observer at the time of the collision. (correct answer)
The delivery driver knew Mira personally and knew that she was pregnant before the collision.
The baby's arm injury was permanent and would require continuing medical care and treatment.

Explanation: Whenever you see a negligence question involving an unborn child, remember the core principle: a child born alive can sue for prenatal injuries, but the defendant's duty hinges on foreseeability—whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have anticipated that a fetus was present and at risk. The court applies an objective standard, not a subjective one. Here, the fact that Mira's pregnancy was apparent to an ordinary observer at the time of the collision is decisive. It establishes that the delivery driver, exercising reasonable care, should have foreseen that a pregnant woman—and therefore a vulnerable unborn child—was in the car. This foreseeability creates the legal duty to the baby. Without this observable condition, the driver could not reasonably have anticipated the harm to the fetus, and no duty would attach. The fact that the injury would not have occurred if Mira had not been pregnant speaks to causation, not duty. It proves the pregnancy was a necessary link in the chain of events, but it does not tell you whether the driver had a legal obligation to protect the fetus. The driver's personal knowledge of Mira's pregnancy is a tempting distractor because it suggests awareness, but the standard for duty is objective, not subjective. A driver who personally knew is no more liable than one who should have noticed; the law uses the "ordinary observer" test to avoid rewarding willful ignorance. Finally, the permanency of the injury and the need for continuing medical care relates to damages, which is a separate element of negligence. It makes the harm more costly, but it has no bearing on whether a duty existed in the first place. Strategy tip: When a question asks "which fact is most important," immediately classify each option into the four elements of negligence—duty, breach, causation, and damages. Anything that doesn't bear on the element in dispute (here, duty) is almost certainly a distractor.

Question 14

Nadia and Mateo were engaged and lived together. Mateo was sitting on a bench in a small park across the street from Nadia's apartment. Nadia was on her balcony watching Mateo when a van driven by Sellers negligently jumped the curb, struck a tree, and knocked a large branch onto Mateo, killing him instantly. Nadia screamed, ran downstairs, and was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder; she did not suffer physical impact. A statute governs:

Civil Code § 4420. A person may recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress only if the plaintiff suffered physical injury or was within the zone of physical danger created by the defendant's negligence. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress without physical injury or zone-of-danger exposure if the plaintiff was physically present at the scene and personally observed the defendant's negligence cause bodily injury or death to the plaintiff's spouse, domestic partner, parent, child, or sibling. A relationship of engagement or cohabitation does not qualify.

Is Nadia likely to recover?

No, because Nadia was outside the zone of physical danger, and the statutory exception for bystander emotional-distress claims does not list a fiancé as an immediate family member. (correct answer)
Yes, because Nadia personally observed Sellers's negligence kill Mateo, was physically present at the scene, and suffered severe emotional distress.
Yes, because it was foreseeable that Mateo's fiancée would suffer emotional distress when she witnessed his death, and Sellers's negligence was a substantial factor in causing that distress.
No, because the van's striking the tree and dislodging the branch was an unforeseeable intervening force, absolving Sellers of liability for the death of Mateo.

Explanation: This question tests negligent infliction of emotional distress under a statute that narrows the common-law bystander rules. The key move is to check the statutory text before applying general foreseeability principles. The statute allows recovery only if the plaintiff suffered physical injury or was within the zone of physical danger—and Nadia was on her balcony across the street, so she fails both. The only exception lets a plaintiff recover without those elements if she was physically present and personally observed negligence cause injury or death to a spouse, domestic partner, parent, child, or sibling. Nadia and Mateo were engaged and living together, but the statute expressly says a relationship of engagement or cohabitation does not qualify. Therefore Nadia is unlikely to recover. Choice B says she should recover because she personally observed the death and suffered severe emotional distress. That ignores the statute's limiting list: observation alone is insufficient unless the victim was an immediate family member. Choice C invokes foreseeability and substantial factor causation, but the statute displaces ordinary foreseeability analysis for bystander NIED—the test is statutory, not general proximate cause. Choice D blames an unforeseeable intervening force, butt the issue is not the causaation chain; Sellers's negligent driving caused the series of events, and even if this argument addressed duty, it would not explain why the statutory bystander exception fails for a fiancé. On an exam, when a statute supplies the elements, apply it mechanically—do not stretch common-law doctrines like foreseeability to expand recovery. Watch for civil codes that define exactly which family relationships count; engagement and cohabitation are conspicuous omissions.

Question 15

Odum, a paid firefighter, was driving home after his shift when he came upon an accident caused by Pell. Pell had negligently run a stop sign and struck a utility pole, causing live wires to fall across a car and trap the driver. Odum stopped, identified himself as a firefighter, grabbed a fire extinguisher from his car, and sprayed around the arcing wires while waiting for the utility crew. A transformer then exploded, throwing Odum backward and injuring him. Odum sued Pell. The court in Ackers v. Grand Prairie Transit held:

The rescue doctrine provides that a tortfeasor whose negligence imperils a person owes a duty of care to a rescuer who is injured in attempting to rescue the imperiled person; the rescue attempt is a foreseeable consequence of the negligence. This duty applies equally to professional rescuers and volunteers. A public safety officer, however, is barred by the firefighter's rule from recovering for injuries arising from the same risk that caused the officer to respond. An off-duty officer who is under no official duty to act and intervenes as a private person is not barred by the firefighter's rule and is instead treated as a volunteer rescuer.

Is Pell liable to Odum?

No, because the transformer explosion was not a foreseeable consequence of running the stop sign, and a rescuer may not recover for injuries caused by hazards independent of the original negligence.
No, because Odum is a professional firefighter, and the firefighter's rule bars any claim by a firefighter for injuries sustained while responding to an emergency.
Yes, because Pell's negligence made rescue foreseeable, and Odum, off duty and with no official duty to act, is treated as a volunteer rescuer. (correct answer)
Yes, because Odum's injury arose from the same electrical hazard that made Pell's conduct dangerous, and the firefighter's rule applies only to hazards unrelated to the emergency.

Explanation: Whenever you see a rescue doctrine or firefighter's rule question, separate the rescuer's status from the risk. The rescue doctrine makes a negligent tortfeasor liable to rescuers because rescue is a foreseeable consequence of creating danger. The firefighter's rule is an exception: on-duty public safety officers cannot recover for injuries from the same risk that caused them to respond. But an off-duty officer with no official duty to act who intervenes as a private person is treated as a volunteer. Here Odum was off duty and under no official duty; he stopped and acted as a volunteer rescuer. Pell's negligent running of the stop sign caused the accident, and the rescue of the trapped driver was foreseeable. The transformer explosion was not an independent hazard—it arose from the live-wire emergency Pell created. So Pell is liable. The "No" answer claiming the transformer explosion was unforeseeable mistakes foreseeability of rescue for foreseeability of the exact injury mechanism; the precise manner of injury need not be foreseeable. The other "No" answer invoking the professional firefighter rule ignores the off-duty volunteer exception and overstates the rule as a blanket bar. The "Yes" answer saying the firefighter's rule applies only to hazards unrelated to the emergency is backwards—the rule bars same-risk injuries, not unrelated ones, and Odum was not acting as an officer anyway. Study tip: classify the rescuer first—on-duty professional versus off-duty volunteer—then apply foreseeability. The firefighter's rule is a narrow same-risk bar, not immunity for all firefighters.

Question 16

Yuki was waiting to cross Oak Street on the northeast corner. Her 8-year-old son Kenji stood on the southwest corner. As Kenji began to cross in the crosswalk, a delivery van driven by Ned ran the red light and struck him. Yuki saw the impact from across the street; she was never in danger of being hit because the van stayed in the southbound lane. Kenji suffered serious injuries. Yuki sued Ned for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The applicable state statute, Section 34-2-301, provides: "A defendant owes a duty of care to a plaintiff claiming emotional distress from observing harm to another only if (1) the plaintiff and the injured person are closely related, (2) the plaintiff was present at the scene, (3) the plaintiff contemporaneously perceived the injury, and (4) the plaintiff was within the zone of danger, meaning the plaintiff was himself or herself exposed to a substantial risk of physical injury from the defendant's negligent conduct."

Under Section 34-2-301, does Ned owe Yuki a duty?

No, because Yuki was not herself exposed to a substantial risk of physical injury from Ned's negligent driving. (correct answer)
Yes, because Yuki is Kenji's mother, was present at the scene, and contemporaneously saw the van strike him.
Yes, because Yuki was near enough to the accident to satisfy the zone-of-danger requirement and reasonably feared for Kenji's safety.
No, because Yuki was on the opposite corner and did not contemporaneously perceive Kenji's injury, even though she was present at the scene.

Explanation: Whenever you see a statutory cause of action with a list of requirements, treat them as conjunctive—every element must be satisfied. This bystander negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim is gated by Section 34-2-301, and the final element is the key: the plaintiff must have been "within the zone of danger," meaning exposed to a substantial risk of physical injury from the defendant's conduct. Yuki easily meets the first three statutory elements—she is Kenji's mother, was present at the scene, and contemporaneously perceived the van strike him. But those alone are insufficient. The evidence shows Yuki stood on the opposite corner and the van stayed in the southbound lane; she was never in danger of being hit. Thus she was not exposed to a substantial risk of physical injury to herself, so Ned owes her no duty under the statute. The "Yes, because Yuki is Kenji's mother…saw the van strike him"distractor ignores the zone-of-danger element;it lists only three of the four requirements. The"Yes, because Yuki was near enough to the accident…" distractor misreads the zone of danger as mere physical proximityor as reasonable fear for Kenji's safety;but the statute demands exposure to risk of injury to herself, not emotional concern for her son. The"No, because Yuki was on the opposite corner and did not contemporaneously perceive…" distractor misstates the facts—she did contemporaneously perceive the injury, since she saw the impact from across the street. Thecorrect no answer rests on her lack of personal physical exposure, not on any failure of perception. On exam day, when a statute lists elements, checklist them all; don't let emotional sympathy—or satisfaction of only some prongs—tempt you into ignoring the final requirement.

Question 17

Golden Gate Construction Co. owns a fenced lot on a residential street. Children from the neighborhood had often climbed through a gap in the fence to play on piles of dirt. Golden Gate knew this but did nothing. One Saturday, 13-year-old Devon climbed through the gap to retrieve his baseball. He saw a deep, water-filled excavation trench that Golden Gate had dug to install a sewer line. Devon knew the trench was dangerous, but he decided to wade in to cool off and drowned. Devon's parents sued Golden Gate. The applicable statute, Section 5-2-102, provides: "An owner of land owes a duty of reasonable care to a trespassing child for an artificial condition on the land if (1) the owner knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass at the location; (2) the owner knows or has reason to know that the condition involves an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm; (3) the child, because of youth, did not discover the condition or realize the risk it posed; and (4) the burden of eliminating the danger is slight compared with the risk to children."

Under Section 5-2-102, which of the following is Golden Gate's best argument that it owed no duty to Devon?

Devon was 13 years old and thus no longer a "child" within the meaning of the statute.
The trench was an open and obvious artificial condition that Golden Gate had no reason to know children would encounter.
Devon discovered the trench and realized the risk it posed, so the statutory condition based on youth is not satisfied. (correct answer)
The burden of filling in or fencing off the trench was greater than the risk to children because the lot was already fenced.

Explanation: When you see a statute-based tort question, your job is to match the facts to each element. Here, the statute sets out the attractive nuisance doctrine. The key is element (3): the child, because of youth, must have failed to discover the condition or realize the risk. Devon saw the deep, water-filled trench and knew it was dangerous. He waded in anyway. Because he fully appreciated the risk, the statutory condition based on youth is not satisfied, so Golden Gate owes no duty. That is why the correct answer is that Devon discovered the trench and realized the risk. The wrong answers each miss this. The claim that Devon, at 13, is no longer a "child" fails because the statute has no bright-line age cutoff; youth is a factor in whether the child understood the risk, but here he did. The claim that the trench was open and obvious is a trap: open and obvious is relevant to whether the child realized the danger, but the statute focuses on the child's actual realization, not the condition's visibility—and Devon did realize it. The claim that the burden of filling the trench was greater than the risk ignores that the risk is drowning, which is enormous, and fixing a fence or filling a trench is slight in comparison. Remember: for attractive nuisance, the child's subjective appreciation of the risk is the pivotal element. Don't get distracted by age or obviousness; ask, "Did this specific child know the danger?"

Question 18

Torres was twelve weeks pregnant with twins, though her pregnancy was not yet outwardly visible. She was a passenger in a car struck from behind by a delivery truck driven by Brody, who was texting while driving. Torres suffered a placental abruption; one twin was stillborn; the other twin was delivered prematurely but survived and was later diagnosed with permanent brain damage caused by the collision. Torres sought damages for her own physical injuries and emotional distress from the stillbirth; the surviving twin sought damages for her brain damage; and the estate of the stillborn twin sought wrongful-death damages. The court in Nunez v. Riverside Hospital held:

A negligent defendant who causes injury to a pregnant woman owes a duty of care to any child of hers who is later born alive, whether or not the defendant knew of the pregnancy and whether or not the child was viable at the time of injury. A child who is not born alive has no cause of action for prenatal injuries, and no wrongful-death claim may be brought on that child's behalf. The mother may recover for her own physical injuries, and for emotional distress caused by the loss of a pregnancy when that distress is a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence.

Which of the following best describes Brody's liability?

Brody is liable to Torres for her physical injuries and emotional distress, and to the surviving twin for her brain damage; no claim lies for the stillborn twin's wrongful death. (correct answer)
Brody is liable to Torres for her physical injuries and emotional distress, and to the estate of the stillborn twin for wrongful death; the surviving twin may not recover because she was not viable at the time of the collision.
Brody is liable to Torres for her physical injuries only; neither twin may recover because Brody neither knew nor reasonably could have known that Torres was pregnant, so any injury to the twins was unforeseeable.
Brody is liable to Torres for her physical injuries and emotional distress, and to the stillborn twin's estate for wrongful death; the surviving twin may recover only for medical expenses paid by Torres, not for her own pain and suffering.

Explanation: When you see a prenatal-injury tort question, focus on the legal rule governing duty to unborn children. The key is that a child born alive can sue for injuries suffered before birth, even if the defendant did not know about the pregnancy and even if the child was not yet viable. By contrast, a child not born alive has no cause of action, and no wrongful-death claim can be brought on its behalf. Here, the holding in Nunez controls. Torres may recover for her own physical injuries and for emotional distress from the stillbirth because that distress was a foreseeable result of Brody's negligence. The surviving twin was born alive and suffered permanent brain damage caused by the collision, so she may recover for that harm. The stillborn twin's estate cannot recover wrongful-death damages because the child was not born alive, so no claim lies. The wrong answers reveal common traps. Any answer allowing the stillborn twin's estate to recover—such as one saying Brody is liable to the estate, or one saying the estate recovers while the surviving twin gets only medical expenses—misreads the born-alive rule. The surviving twin has her own claim for her injuries, including pain and suffering, not just expenses paid by Torres. An answer denying both twins recovery because Brody did not know Torres was pregnant also fails: knowledge of the pregnancy is irrelevant to the duty owed to a child later born alive. Remember: born alive means the child can recover regardless of viability or knowledge; stillborn means no claim, but the mother's emotional distress may still be compensable.