Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Defenses

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DefensesQuestion 1 of 20

At D's murder trial, the court instructed the jury:

"Under § 13-2105, D is not guilty by reason of insanity if, at the time of the offense, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity either (1) to appreciate the criminality of his conduct (meaning more than mere knowledge that the act is prohibited) or (2) to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The defense must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. A defendant who planned an offense may nonetheless lack substantial capacity to conform if the planning itself was the product of the mental disease."

D, diagnosed with schizophrenia, believed that V was an alien about to destroy the world. D spent two weeks buying a gun and following V, then shot V. He later said, "I knew you can't kill people, but the alien had to be stopped." A defense expert testified that the delusion caused D to lack the substantial capacity to conform his conduct and that D's planning was part of his delusional mission. The state's expert testified that D's planning showed he had the capacity to conform.

Which of the following statements is correct?

D cannot be found not guilty by reason of insanity because he knew that killing was criminal and he engaged in extended planning, which shows he retained at least substantial capacity to conform his conduct.

D's evidence is sufficient to support a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity if the jury credits the defense expert, because the statute's volitional prong may be satisfied even where the defendant knows the act is criminal and the planning was itself delusion-driven.

D is not guilty by reason of insanity only if the mental disease prevented him from appreciating the criminality of his conduct; evidence that he could not conform his conduct is irrelevant under the statute.

Because the state's expert offered a contrary opinion, the jury must accept the state's evidence and find D sane, because the prosecution bears the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Defenses

Practice Defenses in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Defenses, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

At D's murder trial, the court instructed the jury:

Which of the following statements is correct?

D cannot be found not guilty by reason of insanity because he knew that killing was criminal and he engaged in extended planning, which shows he retained at least substantial capacity to conform his conduct.
D's evidence is sufficient to support a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity if the jury credits the defense expert, because the statute's volitional prong may be satisfied even where the defendant knows the act is criminal and the planning was itself delusion-driven. (correct answer)
D is not guilty by reason of insanity only if the mental disease prevented him from appreciating the criminality of his conduct; evidence that he could not conform his conduct is irrelevant under the statute.
Because the state's expert offered a contrary opinion, the jury must accept the state's evidence and find D sane, because the prosecution bears the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.

Explanation: When you see an insanity-defense question, start by breaking down the statute's two prongs: cognitive (appreciate criminality) and volitional (conform conduct). law). The defense must prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence, but it may satisfy either prong—even if the defendant knew the act was criminal. Here, D's own statement shows he understood killing was prohibited, so the cognitive prong is weak. But the defense expert testified that the delusion drove D's lack of capacity to conform, and that even his two weeks of planning were part of delusional mission. If the jury credits that testimony, the volitional prong is satisfied under the statute. Planning does not automatically prove sanity; it can itself be symptom of mental disease. Thus D's evidence is legally sufficient, and the jury may return not guilty by reason of insanity. The choice saying D cannot be found insane "because he knew killing was criminal and engaged in extended planning" is wrong: it collapses everything into cognition and treats planning as conclusive proof of control, which contradicts either/or statutory language. The choice limiting the defense to lack of appreciation of criminality is also wrong: it ignores the statute's express volitional prong. Finally, the choice claiming the jury must accept the state's expert because the prosecution bears burden of proving sanity beyond reasonable doubt misunderstands burden allocation: D bears the burden by clear and convincing evidence, and conflicting expert testimony is for the jury to weigh, not a mandatory verdict for the state. Study tip: on bar exam insanity questions, first identify which prong(s)the statute recognizes, then ask whether the evidence, if credited, could satisfy one of them. A defendant who knew what he did was wrong can still prevail under a volitional prong if his loss of control was itself caused by mental disease.

Question 2

State law provides:

"It is a defense that the defendant was entrapped by a law enforcement officer or an agent of law enforcement. Entrapment exists only if the government used methods of persuasion or inducement that would cause a person not otherwise disposed to commit the offense. In determining predisposition, the jury may consider the defendant's ready and willing participation, prior similar offenses, and the defendant's familiarity with the criminal activity. Merely affording an opportunity to commit the offense does not constitute entrapment."

An undercover officer met D at a job fair. Over the next six weeks, the officer contacted D nine times, offered $2,000 for a pound of methamphetamine, and said, "I'm sick and need it; please help me." D refused five times, then agreed to make the sale. D had two prior convictions for methamphetamine distribution, and police found scales and baggies in his home.

Which of the following is correct regarding D's entrapment defense?

D is not entitled to a directed verdict of entrapment because the evidence of prior meth convictions, scales, and baggies is sufficient for a jury to find he was predisposed, even if the officer's repeated offers were a form of inducement. (correct answer)
D may not assert entrapment because the officer's conduct merely afforded D an opportunity to sell drugs and involved no inducement.
D is entitled to a directed verdict of entrapment because the officer initiated contact, made repeated pleas, and continued pressuring him after D refused five times.
D is entitled to a directed verdict of entrapment because the officer's repeated pleas and large payment would have induced an ordinary person not otherwise disposed to commit the offense, and the government offered the inducement first.

Explanation: Whenever you see an entrapment question, the central issue is the defendant's predisposition—not just how pushy the government was. Entrapment requires the government to have induced a person not otherwise disposed to commit the crime. A directed verdict for the defendant is only proper if no reasonable jury could find predisposition. Here, the evidence of two prior methamphetamine distribution convictions, plus scales and baggies in D's home, is more than enough for a jury to conclude D was already disposed to sell drugs. The officer's repeated contacts, $2,000 offer, and desperate pleas are strong evidence of inducement, but inducement alone does not defeat the state's case. Therefore, D is not entitled to a directed verdict, even if the officer's tactics were aggressive. The choice saying D "may not assert entrapment because the officer merely afforded an opportunity" is wrong because the officer did far more than provide an opportunity—repeated persuasion and pleas can constitute inducement, so the defense is available for the jury to consider. The choice saying D is entitled to a directed verdict because the officer initiated contact and pressured him after refusals is also wrong: that conduct supports an entrapment argument, but the predisposition evidence creates a jury question. Finally, the choice relying on an "ordinary person" standard is wrong because this is a subjective entrapment test focusing on D's own disposition, not an objective test of what would tempt an average person. Study tip: on entrapment questions, ask first, "Is there evidence the defendant was predisposed?" If yes, the case goes to the jury; no directed verdict for the defense.

Question 3

State law § 9-22 provides:

"Conduct that would otherwise constitute an offense is justified if the actor reasonably believes it is necessary to avoid imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or another, and the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweighs the harm sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense. In a prosecution for escape from a correctional institution, the defense is available only if the defendant proves (1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, (2) no reasonable opportunity to complain to prison authorities, (3) no time or opportunity to resort to the courts, and (4) surrender to authorities promptly after attaining safety."

D, an inmate, was threatened by gang members who said, "We will cut you tonight." D had reported two prior gang threats to prison officials, but nothing was done. Later that night, gang members cornered D in the laundry room. D ran and climbed the prison fence, fleeing the prison. He hid in a nearby town for two weeks and was then arrested. D was charged with escape and raises necessity.

Under § 9-22, is D entitled to the necessity defense?

No, because D failed to surrender to authorities promptly after attaining safety, and the statute makes prompt surrender a condition of the defense. (correct answer)
Yes, because the threat from gang members made continued confinement a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, and the harm of escape is clearly less serious than the harm of being killed.
Yes, because D reasonably believed escape was necessary to avoid imminent death and had reported the threats to prison authorities, satisfying the first three statutory conditions.
No, because the necessity defense is never available for an escape from a correctional institution.

Explanation: Whenever a statute defines a defense with explicit conditions, treat it like a checklist: the defendant must satisfy every element. Under § 9-22, necessity justifies escape only if the inmate proves all four listed requirements—immediate threat, no recourse to prison authorities or courts, and prompt surrender after attaining safety. D's evidence may satisfy the first three: he reasonably feared imminent serious bodily harm, had reported threats, and had no realistic opportunity to complain when cornered. But he then hid in a nearby town for two weeks instead of surrendering promptly. Because the statute makes prompt surrender a condition, that failure defeats the defense. So the correct answer is the one stating that D failed to surrender promptly after attaining safety. The "Yes" option based on balancing the harms of escape against death misreads the statute: although general necessity weighs harms, this escape-specific statute adds stricter conditions that must also be satisfied. The other "Yes" option, based only on the first three statutory conditions, ignores the fourth independent requirement. And the "No" option saying necessity is never available for escape is too broad—§ 9-22 expressly makes it available under limited circumstances. On the exam, when a statute lists conditions for a defense, check every element and do not stop once you find plausible justification—missing any one condition is fatal.

Question 4

Malik was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. He stopped taking his medication. On the day of the incident, he also drank several beers. That night, he called 911 to report that his neighbor was an alien who was broadcasting his thoughts. When officers arrived, Malik threw a knife at them. He was arrested. In jail, after sobering up, Malik continued to insist that the neighbor was an alien and refused to take medication.

Which defense should Malik's attorney most seriously investigate?

Voluntary intoxication
Insanity (correct answer)
Necessity
Duress

Explanation: This fact pattern tests criminal defenses based on a defendant's mental state at the time of the offense. When you see bizarre behavior plus substance use, ask: did a mental disease exist independently of the intoxication, and did it persist after the effects of the drugs or alcohol wore off? Here, Malik has a diagnosed schizoaffective disorder, stopped his medication, and continued to insist his neighbor was an alien even after sobering up in jail. Insanity is the defense to investigate most seriously because it applies when a mental disease or defect makes a person unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or unable to conform his conduct to the law. The persistence of his delusions after the alcohol was gone is crucial: it points to an underlying mental illness rather than a temporary, chemical state. Voluntary intoxication is the tempting distractor. But intoxication generally cannot excuse criminal conduct; at most, it can negate specific intent, and here Malik's delusions did not disappear when he sobered up. Necessity fails because throwing a knife at officers was not a choice made to prevent an imminent greater harm. Duress fails because nothing shows Malik acted under a threat of immediate death or serious bodily injury from the officers. Remember: when alcohol and mental illness are both present, ask which condition actually drove the conduct after the substance wore off. That question separates an insanity investigation from a voluntary intoxication argument.

Question 5

Jordan parked his identical gray sedan in a hotel garage. After a late meeting, he used his key fob to unlock a gray sedan parked in the same row, got in,and drove it to his home. The next morning he realized his own sedan was still in the garage. He immediately drove the other car back and told the manager what happened. The owner had reported it stolen. Jordan is charged with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.

Which defense should Jordan's attorney most seriously investigate?

Mistake of fact (correct answer)
Mistake of law
Necessity
Entrapment

Explanation: When you see a defense question, ask first: did the defendant have the required guilty mind? Unauthorized use of a motor vehicle typically requires knowingly driving a vehicle without the owner's consent. Jordan parked his identical gray sedan in the same row, used his key fob to unlock another gray sedan, and drove it home. That supports an honest and reasonable mistake about a fact—the identity or ownership of the car—which negates the knowledge element of the offense. So mistake of fact is the defense most worth investigating. Mistake of law would involve misunderstanding a legal rule, such as not knowing that driving another person's car without permission is a crime. Jordan misunderstood the factual situation, not the law. Necessity applies when someone breaks the law to avoid imminent harm with no lawful alternative; driving home from a meeting does not qualify. Entrapment requires government agents inducing the crime, but here the owner and hotel manager are private parties, and there is no inducement. On exam day, distinguish mistake of fact from mistake of law by asking whether the defendant was mistaken about what happened in the world versus what the law says. A reasonable factual mistake that negates a required mental state can be a complete defense.

Question 6

At a subway station, Nina saw a man in a security uniform punch a teenager who was sitting on the ground with his hands up. The man had already handcuffed the teenager and continued punching him. Nina ran over, pulled the man off, and struck him twice in the face. The man was not seriously hurt. Nina is charged with assault. The teenager later admitted he had tried to steal the man's phone.

Which defense should Nina's attorney most seriously investigate?

Self-defense
Defense of others (correct answer)
Necessity
Duress

Explanation: This question tests justification defenses, specifically when force used to protect another person. Whenever you see assault facts involving intervention, ask: did the defendant reasonably believe force was necessary to prevent imminent unlawful harm to a third person, and was the force proportionate? Here, Nina saw a man in a security uniform punch a handcuffed teenager who was sitting on the ground with his hands up. That gave her a reasonable belief the teenager was being unlawfully attacked. Her response—pulling the man off and striking him twice—was proportionate to the ongoing punching, and the man was not seriously hurt. The fact the teenager later admitted trying to steal the phone does not destroy Nina's defense, because reasonableness is judged from her perspective at the moment; a handcuffed, compliant suspect no longer poses a threat justifying continued punches. Self-defense fails because Nina was not defending herself; she was not the target of the man's force. Necessity is a more general justification for choosing the lesser harm, but the specific doctrine here is defense of others: using force to protect a third person from unlawful force. Duress requires an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm directed at the defendant, forcing her to act; no facts suggest Nina was coerced. Strategy: in bar-style questions, sort justifications by who is being protected—self, third person, or society. If the defendant acted to rescue someone from apparently excessive force, defense of others is nearly always the doctrine to investigate, provided the belief was reasonable and the force proportional.

Question 7

Detective Moore, working undercover, met Frank at a community center and became friendly. Over several months, Moore repeatedly told Frank that his daughter was ill and that he needed money for her treatment. Moore asked Frank to steal laptop computers from an office building and sell them to him, saying he would pay far above market value. Frank refused four times. Moore then gave Frank a key card to the building and said, "Just this once, or my daughter will suffer." Frank took the laptops and sold them to Moore. Frank had no prior arrests.

Which defense should Frank's attorney most seriously investigate?

Duress
Necessity
Entrapment (correct answer)
Mistake of fact

Explanation: When you see an affirmative defense in a criminal law question, first ask: did the defendant have the required mental state, and more importantly, is the defense based on the defendant's situation or on the government's conduct? Entrapment focuses on the latter. Frank's attorney should investigate entrapment because the government, through Detective Moore, planted the idea of the crime, repeatedly pressured a reluctant Frank, used a key card to enable the theft, and exploited his sympathies over a sick daughter. Frank refused four times, which strongly suggests he was not predisposed to commit this crime—a key element of entrapment. The detective's "or my daughter will suffer" threat is improper inducement, not just an opportunity to commit crime. Now consider the distractors. Duress requires an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm; Moore threatened Frank's daughter's suffering, but not imminent physical harm, and Frank had time to seek help. Necessity applies when a person breaks the law to prevent a greater harm, but Frank's action did not directly prevent his daughter's illness—the harm was speculative and not caused by the laptops. Mistake of fact would require Frank to misunderstand a factual element, but he knew he was stealing. The trap here is sympathy: Frank's difficult situation makes duress and necessity feel plausible, but the real issue is the government's overreach. On the exam, remember that entrapment requires both government inducement and a lack of predisposition—look for repeated refusals and extraordinary pressure.

Question 8

State law provides:

"A person who engages in sexual intercourse with a person under 16 years of age is guilty of second-degree rape. It is an affirmative defense that the defendant reasonably believed the victim was at least 18 years of age. In determining reasonableness, the trier of fact shall consider whether the defendant used all reasonable efforts to ascertain the victim's true age, including asking the victim for government-issued identification and verifying the identification's apparent validity. A fake identification, by itself, does not establish the defense."

At a college party, V told D she was a 19-year-old college sophomore and showed D a student ID bearing a birth date making her 19. D did not ask for a driver's license or any other government-issued identification and did not try to verify her age. V was actually 15. D is charged with second-degree rape.

Under the statute, is D entitled to the affirmative defense?

D is entitled to the defense because he actually believed V was 19, and the belief was reasonable from V's appearance, college party context, and the student ID.
D is entitled to the defense if the student ID would have convinced a reasonable person, regardless of whether he asked for a driver's license or other government-issued identification.
D is not entitled to the defense because the statute makes the offense one of strict liability and does not allow a mistake-of-age defense under any circumstances.
D is not entitled to the defense because he did not make all reasonable efforts to ascertain V's age, and the statute requires consideration of whether he asked for and verified government-issued identification. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see an affirmative defense defined by statute, your job is to apply the statute's exact requirements, not common-sense assumptions about reasonableness. Here the defense requires that the defendant reasonably believed the victim was at least 18, and that the trier of fact must consider whether he used all reasonable efforts to ascertain age, "including asking for government-issued identification and verifying its apparent validity." D falls short because he neither asked for nor verified any government-issued identification. The student ID V showed is not government-issued, and D did not try to verify whether it was genuine. Because the statute expressly tells the trier of fact to consider this factor, a defendant who skipped that step cannot establish the defense as a matter of law. His subjective belief and appearance-based reasonableness are not enough. The choice saying D is entitled because he actually believed V was19, with the belief reasonable from her appearance, party context, and student ID fails because it ignores the statute's mandatory consideration of government-issued ID verification. Similarly, the choice saying D is entitled if the student ID would convince a reasonable person, regardless of whether he asked for a driver's license or other government-issued ID, misreads the law: a fake ID, by itself, does not establish the defense, and reasonable-person test must incorporate the statutory efforts requirement. The choice claiming the offense is strict liability with no mistake-of-age defense under any circumstances is also wrong, because the statute expressly creates this affirmative defense. There is no diversion distinction here; the decisive fact is D did not make all reasonable efforts to ascertain V's true age, even though the statute made clear that consideration includes asking for and verifying government-issued identification. For statutory affirmative defenses, anchor your analysis in the statutory checklist — do not substitute your own intuition about "reasonable" behavior.

Question 9

State law provides:

"Homicide is murder in the first degree when it is committed purposely and with deliberation. For purposes of this section, deliberation means a period of reflection and a considered judgment. Homicide is murder in the second degree when it is committed purposely but without deliberation. Voluntary intoxication may be considered in determining whether the defendant acted with deliberation, but it may not be considered in determining whether the defendant acted purposely or with recklessness. Voluntary intoxication is not otherwise a defense."

D and V argued in a bar after D had been drinking for several hours. D stabbed V once and killed him. D testified, "I wanted him dead at that moment." A toxicologist testified that D's blood alcohol level was 0.28 and that D was incapable of the sustained reflection required for deliberation. The trial court instructed the jury as stated, and D requested an instruction allowing conviction for second-degree murder.

Which of the following is correct regarding D's request?

D may not introduce the intoxication evidence because the statute says voluntary intoxication is not a defense, so evidence of it is irrelevant to any culpable mental state.
D may introduce the evidence only to negate purpose; if the jury finds he did not purposely kill V, the proper verdict is manslaughter, not second-degree murder.
D may introduce the evidence only to negate deliberation; if the jury finds he acted purposely but without deliberation, the proper verdict is second-degree murder, not first-degree murder. (correct answer)
D may introduce the evidence to negate either purpose or deliberation, and if either is negated the most serious offense supported by the evidence is manslaughter.

Explanation: This question tests how voluntary intoxication interacts with specific mental states in homicide. When a statute tells you exactly which mental states intoxication may negate, follow that blueprint precisely: here, intoxication can negate deliberation but not purpose. The correct approach is that D may introduce the intoxication evidence only to negate deliberation. The toxicologist's testimony that D could not engage in sustained reflection directly attacks the "deliberation" element of first-degree murder. But D's own testimony—"I wanted him dead at that moment"—supports purpose. Under the statute, the jury may not use intoxication to negate purpose, so if it finds D acted purposely but without deliberation, the proper verdict is second-degree murder, not first-degree. The choice saying D may not introduce the intoxication evidence because voluntary intoxication is "not a defense" is wrong: the statute expressly allows it for deliberation, so it is not categorically irrelevant. The choice saying D may introduce the evidence only to negate purpose is wrong for two reasons: the statute forbids using intoxication to negate purpose, and if purpose were negated, the result would not necessarily be second-degree murder. Finally, the choice saying D may use the evidence to negate either purpose or deliberation, with either reducing the offense to manslaughter, is doubly wrong: purpose cannot be negated by intoxication, and negating deliberation reduces first-degree murder to second-degree murder, not manslaughter. On exam day, when you see voluntary intoxication and homicide, immediately ask: which mental states does the statute allow it to negate? Then match the remaining elements to the correct degree of murder.

Question 10

State statute § 7-11 provides:

"For purposes of this section, deadly force means force that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. (a) A person is justified in using deadly force if he reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or another. (b) A person who initially uses nondeadly force against another is not justified in using deadly force against that other unless he withdraws in good faith and communicates his withdrawal to that other. (c) Paragraph (b) does not apply if the other person responds to the nondeadly force with deadly force. (d) A person has no duty to retreat before using deadly force if he is in a place where he has a right to be."

D and V argued in a parking lot. D shoved V. V pulled a knife and lunged at D's chest, saying "I'll kill you." D, who did not retreat, shot and killed V. D claims self-defense.

Under § 7-11, is D justified in using deadly force?

D is not justified because he was the initial aggressor, and a person who starts a physical confrontation must withdraw and communicate withdrawal before using deadly force.
D is justified because V responded to a nondeadly shove with deadly force, which removes the withdrawal requirement, and D had no duty to retreat from a place where he had a right to be. (correct answer)
D is justified only if he first attempted to retreat, because the initial shove made the encounter a public altercation and required D to avoid deadly force if possible.
D is not justified because V's knife lunge was not an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, since D had created the distance by shoving V.

Explanation: This question tests how the statute's withdrawal requirement interacts with an opponent's escalation to deadly force. Break the law into pieces: (a) deadly force is allowed to prevent imminent death or serious bodily injury; (b) if you started with nondeadly force, you must withdraw and communicate before using deadly force; (c) that requirement disappears if the other responds to your nondeadly force with deadly force; and (d) no duty to retreat in a place where you have a right to be. Here, D's shove was nondeadly. V responded with deadly force — a knife lunging at D's chest, plus "I'll kill you." That is exactly subdivision (c): V's deadly response removes the withdrawal requirement, so D did not have to withdraw or communicate before shooting. Under (d), D also had no duty to retreat from the parking lot, a place where he had a right to be. Because V's lunge posed an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, D reasonably believed deadly force was necessary. So D is justified. The answer claiming D is not justified because he was the initial aggressor and must withdraw misses (c)—once V escalated a shove into a knife attack, the withdrawal requirement no longer applies. The answer claiming D is justified only if he first attempted to retreat wrongly imports a duty retreat that (d) rejects. The answer claiming V's knife lunge wasn't an imminent threat because D "created the distance" misreads the facts: a lunging knife at chest is the paradigm of imminent deadly threat, regardless of who shoved first. When a self-defense statute create an exception, diagram each subsection; here, remember that deadly escalation by the other person resets the analysis: no withdrawal, no retreat, and justification under (a) governs.

Question 11

At a party, Diego's friend handed him a bottle of water that, unknown to Diego, contained a large dose of a sedative. Diego drank it and soon became confused and sluggish. A short time later, while apparently asleep, he sat up and struck a nearby guest. He had no memory of the incident. Diego had not consumed alcohol or any other drug. He is charged with assault.

Which defense should Diego's attorney most seriously investigate?

Voluntary intoxication
Insanity
Involuntary intoxication (correct answer)
Necessity

Explanation: Whenever you see an intoxication question on a criminal law exam, separate the two threshold inquiries: did the defendant knowingly ingest the substance, and what mental state does the crime require? Here, the critical fact is that Diego had no idea the bottle contained a sedative. That makes this involuntary intoxication, not voluntary. Involuntary intoxication can excuse a defendant when it prevents him from forming the required intent or causes him to act unconsciously. Diego became confused, sluggish, and apparently asleep before striking the guest; if he acted in a drug-induced automatism, he did not make a voluntary act, and his lack of memory supports that claim. Voluntary intoxication is not the right theory because it requires knowing consumption, and Diego did not know. Even if he had voluntarily consumed the drug, voluntary intoxication is generally no defense to assault, a general intent crime. Insanity is also wrong because it requires a severe mental disease or defect; a one-time unknowing dose of a sedative is not a mental disorder, and involuntary intoxication is the more specific fit. Necessity fails because Diego was not choosing to strike the guest to avoid a greater imminent harm; there is no choice-of-evils emergency. Takeaway: when a question says "unknown to" or "spiked," investigate involuntary intoxication first. If ingestion was knowing, then ask whether the crime is specific intent before considering voluntary intoxication.

Question 12

Alyssa's seven-year-old son was kidnapped by Ramon. Ramon told Alyssa that unless she stole a box of surgical anesthetic from the hospital where she worked, he would kill her son. Alyssa took the anesthetic from a locked supply room and delivered it to Ramon. Police arrested her. Alyssa has no criminal record.

Which defense should Alyssa's attorney most seriously investigate?

Duress (correct answer)
Necessity
Self-defense
Entrapment

Explanation: Whenever you see a criminal-defense question, first identify the source of the pressure and what crime was committed. Here, Alyssa stole property because Ramon threatened to kill her son. That is the classic fact pattern for duress: an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious bodily harm that caused her to commit the crime, with no reasonable escape. The son was the third-party victim of the threat, but duress covers threats to others as well, so her attorney should investigate whether a jury would find her fear reasonable and the threat imminent. Necessity is the wrong lens because it applies when a person breaks the law to avoid a greater harm caused by natural circumstances, not by another person's coercion. Here, the pressure came from Ramon, a human threat, so duress is the better fit. Self-defense fails because Alyssa was not using force to protect herself; she was stealing property, and self-defense justifies defensive force against an attacker, not theft of anesthesia. Entrapment fails because Ramon was a private kidnapper, not a government agent inducing her to commit a crime. Your takeaway: when a defendant commits a crime because someone threatened to kill them or a loved one, think duress first. Ask two questions: who made the threat, and what did the defendant do in response? Human threat → duress; natural disaster → necessity; police setup → entrapment.

Question 13

Rowan suffers from severe chronic pain that conventional medications have not relieved. Her doctor told her that cannabis was the only treatment likely to help, and she began growing a few plants at home for her own use. Two years earlier, the state legislature had debated and voted down a bill that would have allowed medical use of cannabis, and the state's drug statute contains no medical exception. Charged with cultivating cannabis, Rowan raises the defense of necessity. The state's code provides that conduct the actor believes necessary to avoid harm to herself or another is justified if the harm avoided is greater than the harm the law defining the offense seeks to prevent, and if a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.

Is Rowan entitled to a necessity defense?

Yes, because the harm she sought to avoid, severe and untreatable pain, was greater than the harm of growing cannabis for her own use.
No, because necessity is available only when the threatened harm comes from an outside force, not from the defendant's own medical condition.
Yes, because Rowan acted on her doctor's advice, so she reasonably believed that her conduct was necessary to avoid harm.
No, because the legislature considered and rejected a medical exception, which plainly excludes her claimed justification. (correct answer)

Explanation: Necessity justifies conduct that avoids a greater harm, but not when the legislature has already weighed the competing values and decided against the justification. The legislature debated and rejected a medical-cannabis exception, and the statute contains none. That plainly shows a purpose to exclude the justification Rowan claims, so the defense is unavailable no matter how the harms might otherwise balance. The balancing answer applies the first element correctly and ignores the legislative-purpose limit. The outside-force answer misstates necessity, which can arise from natural circumstances, including illness, as well as human threats; duress is the defense that requires a human threat. The doctor's-advice answer addresses the actor's belief, which is satisfied, but belief does not overcome a legislative choice to exclude the defense.

Question 14

In a jurisdiction that recognizes the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, Abe shot and killed Ray, a neighbor who was walking toward him in a dark driveway holding a cell phone. Abe testified that he believed the phone was a gun and that Ray was about to shoot him. The jury finds that Abe honestly held that belief, but that the belief was unreasonable. Abe was not the initial aggressor, and he intended to kill Ray when he fired.

Of what offense, if any, is Abe guilty?

Murder, because self-defense requires a reasonable belief in the need for deadly force, and the jury found Abe's belief unreasonable.
No crime, because Abe honestly believed his life was in danger, and an honest belief in the need for deadly force is a complete defense.
Voluntary manslaughter, because his honest but unreasonable belief that deadly force was necessary negates malice. (correct answer)
No homicide offense, because Abe's belief that he was defending himself means he lacked the intent to kill required for a homicide.

Explanation: Complete self-defense requires an honest and reasonable belief that deadly force is necessary. Where a jurisdiction recognizes imperfect self-defense, a killing in the honest but unreasonable belief that deadly force is necessary is not murder; the honest belief negates malice, and the killing is voluntary manslaughter. The jury found Abe's belief honest but unreasonable, and he was not the aggressor, so he is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The murder answer correctly rejects complete self-defense but stops there, ignoring the mitigating doctrine. The complete-defense answer drops the reasonableness requirement. The no-intent answer confuses intent with malice; Abe intended to kill, and his belief mitigates the offense by negating malice, not by negating intent.

Question 15

Over two and a half years, federal agents posing as advocacy groups sent Hal eleven mailings describing a federal ban on buying certain prohibited materials as unjust censorship and urging recipients to "fight back" by obtaining them. Before the mailings began, Hal had no criminal record, and nothing showed that he had ever sought such materials. At the end of the campaign, an agent offered to sell him the materials, and he promptly placed an order. He was arrested when they were delivered. At trial, the government emphasizes that Hal ordered eagerly and without hesitation the first time a sale was offered. The court applies the federal entrapment test.

Has Hal established entrapment?

Yes, because the government cannot show that Hal was predisposed before its agents first approached him. (correct answer)
No, because Hal placed his order eagerly the first time a sale was offered, which shows that he was predisposed to commit the crime.
No, because the agents merely gave Hal an opportunity to commit the crime, and offering an opportunity is not entrapment.
Yes, because the government's conduct was so outrageous that prosecution violates due process, whatever Hal's predisposition.

Explanation: Under the federal test, entrapment exists when the government induces a crime by a person not predisposed to commit it. Once inducement is shown, the government must prove that the defendant was predisposed before government agents first approached him. Hal had no record or prior interest, and the agents spent more than two years urging him to defy the law. His readiness when finally offered the chance is as consistent with a disposition created by the campaign as with one that existed before it, so the government cannot carry its burden. The eagerness answer measures predisposition at the wrong time. The mere-opportunity answer states a correct rule but ignores the years of inducement that preceded the offer. The outrageous-conduct answer invokes a separate due-process theory that courts recognize only in extreme cases; Hal prevails on the ordinary predisposition analysis.

Question 16

Gus planned to rob a jewelry store. He parked outside, put on a ski mask, and walked to the store's door carrying a loaded gun in his jacket pocket. As he reached for the handle, he saw a police cruiser turn onto the street. He walked back to his car and drove away, later telling a friend that he would "try another day when there aren't cops around." He was arrested and charged with attempted robbery. The jurisdiction recognizes renunciation as a defense to attempt, following the Model Penal Code approach.

Does Gus have a renunciation defense?

Yes, because Gus stopped before entering the store, and a person who abandons a crime before completing it is not guilty of attempt.
Yes, because Gus never entered the store, so his conduct had not gone beyond mere preparation into a substantial step.
No, because once a person has taken a substantial step toward a crime, abandoning the effort is never a defense to attempt.
No, because stopping out of fear of detection, with a plan to try again, is not a voluntary and complete renunciation. (correct answer)

Explanation: Under the Model Penal Code approach, a person who has taken a substantial step toward a crime has a defense if he abandons the effort under circumstances showing a complete and voluntary renunciation of criminal purpose. Renunciation is not voluntary if motivated by circumstances that increase the risk of detection, and it is not complete if the person merely postpones the crime. Gus turned back because a police car appeared and planned to try again, so he has no defense. The stopped-in-time answer treats any abandonment as a defense, ignoring the voluntariness and completeness requirements. The preparation answer misjudges the facts: arriving masked and armed at the door and reaching for the handle is a substantial step. The never-a-defense answer states the traditional common-law view, which this jurisdiction has rejected; it reaches the right result for the wrong reason.

Question 17

At 2 a.m., Wes saw a man breaking into his detached garage, which stands about 100 feet from his house and holds power tools. Wes shouted, and the man grabbed a drill and ran across the yard toward the street, away from the house. Wes, who reasonably believed the man was unarmed and posed no threat to anyone, shot him in the back, killing him. In the jurisdiction, burglary of any building is a felony. Wes is charged with murder and claims he was justified in using deadly force to prevent or end a felony. The jurisdiction permits deadly force to prevent or end a crime only when the crime is a dangerous felony involving a threat of death or serious bodily harm to a person.

Was Wes justified in using deadly force?

Yes, because burglary is a felony, and a person may use deadly force when necessary to prevent the commission of a felony.
No, because the fleeing man posed no threat of death or serious harm, so his felony was not one that permits deadly force. (correct answer)
Yes, because a person may use deadly force against an intruder to defend his dwelling.
No, because a person may use force to protect property only after first demanding that the wrongdoer stop.

Explanation: Modern law permits deadly force to prevent or end a crime only when the crime is a dangerous felony that threatens death or serious bodily harm. The man was fleeing with a drill, unarmed and threatening no one, so even though burglary is a felony, it was not one that justified deadly force, and Wes was not justified. The any-felony answer states the older common-law rule, which the jurisdiction has narrowed. The dwelling answer misapplies defense of habitation: the man was in a detached garage and running away from the house, so no one in the dwelling was threatened. The demand answer reaches the right result for the wrong reason; Wes did shout, and in any event a demand would never make deadly force to protect property permissible.

Question 18

Kay agreed with Lou and Max to rob an armored car, and, as planned, she bought disguises for all three. A week later, she changed her mind. She told Lou and Max in person that she was out, urged them to abandon the plan, and returned her share of the money set aside for the robbery. Lou and Max robbed the armored car anyway. Kay is charged with conspiracy to commit robbery and with the robbery itself. The jurisdiction follows the common law of conspiracy, requires an overt act, and holds each conspirator liable for crimes committed by coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Of which crimes may Kay be convicted?

Conspiracy only, because her withdrawal ended her liability for the later robbery but not for the conspiracy, which was already complete. (correct answer)
Neither, because Kay effectively withdrew by telling her coconspirators she was out and urging them to abandon the plan.
Both, because withdrawal is effective only if the conspirator alerts the police or otherwise thwarts the crime.
Robbery only, because the conspiracy merged into the robbery once the robbery was completed.

Explanation: A conspiracy is complete when the parties agree and one commits an overt act in furtherance; Kay's purchase of the disguises was that act. Under the common law, withdrawal requires timely communication to all coconspirators. It cuts off liability for crimes they commit afterward but does not undo the completed conspiracy. Kay withdrew effectively before the robbery, so she is not liable for it, but she remains guilty of conspiracy. The neither answer extends withdrawal to the conspiracy itself. The thwarting answer states the Model Penal Code's requirement for renouncing the conspiracy offense itself; under the common law the jurisdiction follows, communicating withdrawal is enough to avoid liability for later crimes. The merger answer misstates the law; conspiracy does not merge into the completed offense, and Kay's withdrawal means she is not liable for the robbery at all.

Question 19

A state statute makes it a crime to operate certain electronic gaming machines. In 2024, the state's intermediate appellate court held, in a published opinion, that machines like the "Lucky Seven" model are not covered by the statute. Relying on that opinion, Pace installed Lucky Seven machines in his bar in 2025. In 2026, the state supreme court reversed, holding that such machines are covered, and the state charged Pace for operating them in 2025. The state follows the Model Penal Code approach to mistake of law.

Does Pace have a defense?

No, because ignorance or mistake of the law is no excuse, and the statute covered the machines all along.
No, because the supreme court's decision declared what the statute always meant and applies to conduct before it was issued.
Yes, because he reasonably relied on an official statement of the law in a judicial decision that was later held erroneous. (correct answer)
No, because reliance on a judicial decision is a defense only if the decision came from the state's highest court.

Explanation: Ignorance of the law is generally no excuse, but the Model Penal Code recognizes an exception for a defendant who acts in reasonable reliance on an official statement of the law, later determined to be erroneous, contained in a statute, a judicial decision, an administrative order, or an official interpretation by the officer charged with enforcing the law. Pace relied on a published appellate opinion holding his machines legal. That is the kind of official statement the exception protects, so he has a defense. The ignorance answer states the general rule and ignores the exception. The retroactivity answer captures how judicial interpretation normally works but does not defeat the defense; the exception exists precisely because a later decision can reveal an earlier official statement to be wrong. The highest-court answer invents a limitation; a published opinion of an intermediate appellate court is a judicial decision on which a person may reasonably rely.

Question 20

Tobin, who has severe bipolar disorder, set fire to his former employer's warehouse during a manic episode. Two psychiatrists testify, without contradiction, that Tobin knew he was setting a fire, knew that arson was illegal and morally wrong, and had told a friend beforehand that "it would be wrong, but I can't stop myself"; and that his illness made him unable to resist an overwhelming urge to do it. The jurisdiction uses the M'Naghten test for insanity.

Should the jury be instructed that it may find Tobin not guilty by reason of insanity?

Yes, because uncontradicted expert testimony shows that a severe mental disease made Tobin unable to resist committing the act.
No, because Tobin knew the nature of his act and that it was wrong, and the jurisdiction's test does not excuse an inability to control conduct. (correct answer)
Yes, because a defendant who lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate wrongfulness or to conform his conduct to the law is legally insane.
No, because bipolar disorder is a mood disorder rather than a psychosis, so it cannot be a mental disease supporting an insanity defense.

Explanation: Under M'Naghten, a defendant is insane only if, because of a mental disease, he did not know the nature and quality of his act or did not know that it was wrong. The test is purely cognitive; it does not excuse a defendant who knew the act was wrong but could not control himself. Tobin knew he was setting a fire and knew it was wrong, so he is not insane under the jurisdiction's test, and no instruction is warranted. The irresistible-impulse answer applies a volitional test that M'Naghten rejects. The substantial-capacity answer accurately states the Model Penal Code test, which includes a volitional prong, but the jurisdiction does not use it. The mood-disorder answer reaches the right result for the wrong reason; bipolar disorder can be a qualifying mental disease, and Tobin fails because of what he knew, not because of his diagnosis.