Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Cotenancy
18 questions · exam conditions
0:00
CotenancyQuestion 1 of 18

Elena and Theo inherited a farm as tenants in common. For twelve years, Elena has lived on the farm alone, paid the mortgage, property taxes, and replaced the barn roof after a storm. Theo lived elsewhere and contributed nothing. Theo now seeks partition by sale. Elena wants reimbursement for half those expenditures from Theo's share before any proceeds are split.

Which legal issue is most significant in determining whether Elena may recover those expenditures in the partition?

Whether the mortgage, tax, and roof-replacement expenses are chargeable against Theo's share in the partition.
Whether Theo's twelve-year delay in seeking partition bars him from obtaining a partition now.
Whether Elena's labor and time spent managing the farm are compensable apart from her contribution claims.
Whether Elena's long possession was adverse so that she acquired Theo's interest before the partition action.
← Back to quizzes

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Cotenancy

Practice Cotenancy in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Cotenancy, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

Elena and Theo inherited a farm as tenants in common. For twelve years, Elena has lived on the farm alone, paid the mortgage, property taxes, and replaced the barn roof after a storm. Theo lived elsewhere and contributed nothing. Theo now seeks partition by sale. Elena wants reimbursement for half those expenditures from Theo's share before any proceeds are split.

Which legal issue is most significant in determining whether Elena may recover those expenditures in the partition?

  1. Whether the mortgage, tax, and roof-replacement expenses are chargeable against Theo's share in the partition. (correct answer)
  2. Whether Theo's twelve-year delay in seeking partition bars him from obtaining a partition now.
  3. Whether Elena's labor and time spent managing the farm are compensable apart from her contribution claims.
  4. Whether Elena's long possession was adverse so that she acquired Theo's interest before the partition action.
Explanation: When you see a partition action between co-tenants, the central battle is usually financial fairness: who paid what to preserve the property, and how that should be offset against sale proceeds. That's why this question tests contribute and accounting in partition, not title disputes. Elena's claim depends on whether mortgage payments, property taxes, and roof replacement are expenses chargeable against Theo's share in a partition by sale. As a tenant in common, Elena may seek equitable contribution from Theo for disproportionate payment of expenses necessary to preserve the common property—such as carrying costs and necessary repairs. If those expenditures qualify, a partition court can reimburse her from Theo's share before splitting proceeds; if not, the claim fails. Thus this legal issue is decisive. Theo's twelve-year delay does not bar his partition right; co-tenants generally may seek partition at any time absent unusual laches, and mere delay without prejudice rarely suffices. Elena's labor and time managing farm are a different claim—absent an agreement, courts generally do not compensate a co-tenant for personal services, even if valuable; that would be unjust enrichment reasoning, not a contribution offset. Elena's long possession was not adverse—as a tenant in common, she is already legally entitled to possess the whole, and her use did not become hostile to Theo unless she ousted him or clearly repudiated his title. Paying taxes and repairs, alone, does not start adverse possession against a co-tenant. Study takeaway: in partition problems, first categorize expenditures—necessary carrying costs and repairs are contribution-eligible; improvements and personal labor are handled differently—then ask whether the court can charge the non-paying co-tenant's share, not whether delay or adverse possession changed title.

Question 2

Hana and Ivan, a married couple, own a beach house as tenants by the entirety. Without Ivan's knowledge, Hana executed and delivered a deed conveying "all of her right, title, and interest in the beach house" to her sister Lila. Hana later died. Ivan claims that he owns the entire beach house; Lila claims that she and Ivan each own an undivided one-half as tenants in common.

Who owns the beach house?

  1. Ivan owns the entire property, because Hana's unilateral deed did not sever the tenancy by the entirety and Ivan took Hana's share by right of survivorship at her death. (correct answer)
  2. Ivan and Lila each own an undivided one-half as tenants in common, because Hana's deed conveyed her present one-half interest and broke the unities of time and title.
  3. Ivan owns a life estate and Lila owns a vested remainder in one-half, because Hana could convey her possessory interest but not her survivorship right.
  4. Lila owns the entire property, because Hana's deed transferred to Lila Hana's survivorship interest, which ripened into full title when Hana died.
Explanation: Whenever you see married owners and a unilateral deed, think about whether the estate is protected from severance. A tenancy by the entirety is a form of co-ownership available only to spouses, and neither spouse can convey or encumber the property without the other's consent. Hana's deed did not sever that tenancy because the unities—especially the unity of person—remained intact. So during Hana's life, Lila received no transferable present interest. When Hana died, the survivorship feature automatically gave Ivan her share, meaning Ivan owns the entire beach house. Why are the others wrong? The choice saying Ivan and Lila each own one-half as tenants in common assumes Hana had an alienable one-half interest. She did not: a tenant by the entirety owns the whole, not a separate share, and cannot unilaterally break that estate. The life-estate/remainder option wrongly treats Hana's survivorship right as a separately conveyable thing; survivorship rights in a tenancy by the entirety are not severable or transferable to a third party. Finally, the choice giving Lila entire ownership misunderstands survivorship: Hana could not transfer a survivorship interest that would ripen at death, because Ivan's right of survivorship was equal and superior, and Hana's death did not cut off Ivan's interest. Study tip: remember "spouses are one person" in a tenancy by the entirety—unilateral action fails. Contrast with a joint tenancy, which one owner can unilaterally sever.

Question 3

Paula owns a three-fourths undivided interest, and Quentin owns a one-fourth undivided interest, in a 240-acre farm as tenants in common. The farm consists of two contiguous 120-acre fields of comparable soil quality. The west field contains the farmhouse, barns, and other improvements and is worth $300,000; the east field has its own road frontage but no improvements and is worth $180,000. Paula lives in the farmhouse and farms the west field. Quentin wants the court to partition the farm in kind, awarding him the east field. Paula wants the entire farm sold and the proceeds divided, arguing that her much larger share makes a fair division in kind impossible and that a sale will maximize value.

How should the court rule on the method of partition?

  1. Order the farm sold and the proceeds divided according to the parties' shares, because any co-tenant may compel partition by sale whenever the parties cannot agree on a division.
  2. Partition the farm in kind, awarding Paula the west field and Quentin the east field, with Quentin required to pay Paula $60,000 to equalize the shares. (correct answer)
  3. Partition the farm in kind, awarding Paula the west field and Quentin the east field, with no cash payment, because each party receives an entire 120-acre field.
  4. Deny the partition petition, because compulsory partition is available only when co-tenants hold equal shares and the property can be divided exactly in proportion to those shares.
Explanation: Whenever you see a partition question, remember that the law strongly favors partition in kind (physical division) over partition by sale. A sale is only ordered when a physical division cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners. Here, the farm consists of two contiguous 120-acre fields of comparable soil quality, so division in kind is feasible. The correct approach is to divide the land and adjust for any value disparity with an "owelty" payment. The total farm is worth 480,000(480,000 (300,000 + $180,000). Paula's 3/4 share is $360,000; Quentin's 1/4 is 120,000.IfPaulagetsthewestfield(120,000. If Paula gets the west field (300,000) and Quentin gets the east field ($180,000), Paula is short $60,000 and Quentin is over by $60,000. So the court should award Paula the west field and Quentin the east field, but require Quentin to pay Paula $60,000 to equalize their shares. Now consider the wrong answers. The choice stating that "any co-tenant may compel partition by sale whenever the parties cannot agree" is wrong because sale is a last resort, not a right triggered by mere disagreement—you must show great prejudice to justify a sale. The choice with "no cash payment" is wrong because it would leave Paula with $300,000 and Quentin with $180,000, failing to reflect their 3/4 and 1/4 interests; owelty is needed to achieve fairness. The choice denying the petition entirely is wrong because partition is available to any co-tenant regardless of whether shares are equal—exact proportional division isn't required since owelty can compensate. Your study tip: on the bar exam, if the property is physically divisible, choose partition in kind and look for an owelty payment to fix unequal values. Sale is only proper when division would destroy the property's utility or value.

Question 4

Walt and Xena own a warehouse as tenants in common, each owning an undivided half. Without Xena's consent, Walt spent $60,000 to renovate the warehouse, increasing its market value by $45,000. Xena spent $8,000 on an emergency roof repair after notifying Walt and demanding contribution; Walt refused. The warehouse was sold in a judicial partition sale for $245,000. The court found that $45,000 of the sale price was attributable to Walt's renovation and that Xena's roof repair, although necessary, did not by itself increase the value of the property. The sale was free of liens, and there were no sale costs.

How should the court distribute the sale proceeds?

  1. Walt receives $152,500 and Xena receives $92,500.
  2. Walt receives $148,500 and Xena receives $96,500.
  3. Walt receives $122,500 and Xena receives $122,500.
  4. Walt receives $141,000 and Xena receives $104,000. (correct answer)
Explanation: Whenever you see a partition sale between co-tenants, remember that equal ownership is only the starting point. The court adjusts proceeds to prevent unjust enrichment and to honor necessary expenses. Walt's renovation increased the property's value by $45,000, so that is the amount Walt gets as a credit—not his $60,000 cost. The extra $15,000 was money spent that did not add value, and Xena should not have to pay for that. Xena's roof repair was necessary and she demanded contribution, so she receives her $8,000 even though the repair did not increase market value; necessary repairs can be reimbursed as common expenses. Subtract those two credits from the $245,000 sale price: $245,000 − $45,000 − $8,000 = $192,000. Divide the remaining proceeds equally: $96,000 for each co-owner. Walt therefore receives $45,000 + $96,000 = $141,000, and Xena receives $8,000 + $96,000 = $104,000. The "Walt receives $152,500 and Xena receives $92,500" split wrongly credits Walt for the full $60,000 renovation cost and ignores Xena's roof repair entirely. The "Walt receives $148,500 and Xena receives $96,500" split correctly credits Xena's repair but still overcompensates Walt for the renovation. The equal $122,500/$122,500 split ignores both credits. The $141,000/$104,000 division is correct because it limits improvements to actual value added while honoring necessary repairs. On exam day, ask: did the expense add lasting value, and was it necessary? That tells you which credits to apply before splitting the remainder.

Question 5

O conveyed Greenacre "to A, B, and C as joint tenants with right of survivorship." A later executed and delivered to D a deed conveying all of A's interest in Greenacre. B later died, leaving her interest in Greenacre to X by will. C later died, leaving her interest in Greenacre to Y by will.

Who currently owns Greenacre?

  1. D, X, and Y each own a one-third interest as tenants in common.
  2. D owns a one-third interest and Y owns a two-thirds interest, as tenants in common. (correct answer)
  3. D owns a one-third interest and X owns a two-thirds interest, as tenants in common.
  4. A owns a one-third interest and Y owns a two-thirds interest, as tenants in common.
Explanation: Whenever you see a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, remember the four unities (time, title, interest, possession) and that a unilateral conveyance by one joint tenant severs the joint tenancy as to that share only. Here, O's conveyance creates a joint tenancy among A, B, and C. When A conveys his interest to D, that severance breaks the joint tenancy as to A's share, making D a tenant in common with B and C, who remain joint tenants as between themselves. So D holds a 1/3 interest, and B and C jointly hold 2/3. When B dies, because B and C are still joint tenants, B's 1/3 passes to C by right of survivorship, not to X under B's will. Thus, C now holds the entire 2/3 share. When C dies, that 2/3 passes to Y through C's will. Therefore, D owns a 1/3 interest and Y owns a 2/3 interest, held as tenants in common. The choice saying D, X, and Y each own a one-third interest is wrong because X receives nothing—B's will is ineffective to pass the interest since survivorship operates at death. The choice giving X a two-thirds interest is wrong for the same reason. The choice naming A as an owner is wrong because A conveyed all interest to D, so A is out of the picture. Remember the key: a joint tenant's unilateral conveyance severs the joint tenancy only as to that share, but the remaining joint tenants continue to hold their shares with survivorship rights.

Question 6

Frank and Gina inherited from their father a parcel of land containing a sand-and-gravel quarry that their father had operated for decades. Frank continued to operate the quarry in substantially the same manner as their father had, selling the gravel and keeping the proceeds. Gina demanded half of the net proceeds; Frank refused. Gina then sued to enjoin Frank from further extraction and to recover damages for waste. Frank's operations have complied with industry standards and have not accelerated depletion beyond the quarry's ordinary rate of output.

Will Gina prevail on her claims?

  1. Yes, because one co-tenant may not unilaterally extract minerals from common property for personal profit, regardless of how the property was used before the tenancy began.
  2. Yes, because Frank's continuing extraction permanently reduces the value of Gina's interest and is therefore waste as a matter of law.
  3. No, because the quarry was an open mine when the cotenancy began and Frank's continuation of the existing operation in the same manner is not waste. (correct answer)
  4. No, provided that Frank pays Gina the fair market value of the gravel already removed; if he does not, the court will enjoin further extraction.
Explanation: When you see one co-tenant extracting minerals or timber from commonly owned land, your first thought should be the law of waste—and its important exception for "open mines." If the extraction was already underway when the cotenancy began, a co-tenant may continue the established operation in substantially the same manner without being liable for waste. Here, Frank and Gina inherited a quarry their father had operated for decades. That made it an open mine at the start of the cotenancy. Frank continued the same type of operation, complied with industry standards, and did not accelerate depletion. Therefore his extraction is not waste, and Gina cannot enjoin it or recover waste damages. This is exactly what the correct choice says: the open-mine exception controls. The first wrong choice incorrectly states a flat rule that a co-tenant may never extract minerals for personal profit; that ignores the open-mine exception. The second wrong choice treats any permanent reduction in value as waste, but continuing an established use is not waste under this doctrine. The last wrong choice is tempting but misstates the remedy: Frank does not owe Gina the fair market value of the gravel removed, and the court will not enjoin him. At most, Gina may be entitled to an accounting for her share of net profits from the quarry, but that is not a waste claim. Study tip: when you see "waste" and "mine," check whether the mine was open before the cotenancy began—that single fact often decides the answer.

Question 7

Tom and Ursula inherited a house as tenants in common and never partitioned it. Tom moved in and lived there for three years. During the first two years, Ursula visited occasionally and raised no objection. At the beginning of the third year, Tom changed the locks and sent Ursula a letter stating that he considered the house his alone and that she was no longer welcome. Ursula stayed away after receiving the letter. The house has a fair rental value of $2,000 per month. Ursula sued Tom for an accounting, seeking the fair rental value of the property and partition.

What may Ursula recover from Tom?

  1. $72,000, representing the full fair rental value for the entire three years Tom occupied the house.
  2. $24,000, representing the full fair rental value for the twelve months after the ouster.
  3. $36,000, representing her one-half share of the fair rental value for the entire three years Tom occupied the house.
  4. $12,000, representing her one-half share of the fair rental value for the twelve months after the ouster. (correct answer)
Explanation: This question tests the rights of cotenants to collect rent from each other. When tenants in common occupy property, one co-tenant is generally not liable to the other for fair rental value merely for living there — unless the occupying co-tenant has ousted the other or there was an agreement to pay rent. Here, the key is identifying when the ouster occurred. For the first two years, Tom lived in the house but Ursula visited and raised no objection. That was not an ouster, so Tom owes nothing for that period. At the beginning of the third year, however, Tom changed the locks and wrote that Ursula was no longer welcome. That unequivocally excluded her, and she stayed away because of it. From that point, Tom became liable to Ursula for her share of the fair rental value: one-half of $2,000 per month for 12 months, which is $12,000. The $72,000 full fair rental value for the entire three years is wrong because it ignores the lack of ouster during the first two years and gives Ursula the full value rather than her share. The $24,000 full fair rental value for only the twelve months after ouster is closer but still mistakes the remedy: Tom owes Ursula only her one-half share, not the entire rental value. The $36,000 one-half share for the entire three years wrongly treats the first two years as an ouster despite Ursula's consent and visits. On cotenancy questions, first locate the ouster, then apply the co-tenant's ownership fraction only from that date forward.

Question 8

Two cousins, Mia and Logan, inherited a lake house as tenants in common. For five summers, Mia alone used the house; she paid the property taxes and insurance, made minor repairs, and never asked Logan to contribute. Logan never visited or asked to use it. Now, before agreeing to sell, Logan demands half the fair rental value of the house for those five summers. Mia refuses, saying Logan chose not to use it.

Which additional fact, if true, would be most important in determining whether Logan may recover a share of the fair rental value?

  1. Logan sent Mia a letter each summer saying he planned to visit, but Mia never replied.
  2. At the start of the five summers, Mia told Logan he was not welcome and would be trespassing if he came. (correct answer)
  3. Mia believed from family conversations that Logan was too busy to use the house and had no interest in visiting.
  4. Each summer, Logan told Mia he would not use the house but was not surrendering his ownership interest.
Explanation: Whenever a co-tenant who did not occupy the property seeks rent from the one who did, the key issue is ouster. A co-tenant in possession generally owes nothing for mere exclusive use, because every tenant in common has an equal right to possess. Rent liability arises only when the occupant wrongfully excludes the other from the property. That is why the strongest fact is that Mia told Logan he was not welcome and would be trespassing if he came. That explicit denial of Logan's right to enter turns Mia's exclusive use into an ouster, making Logan's claim for half the fair rental value viable. The fact that Logan sent letters saying he planned to visit but Mia never replied is not enough: planning to visit does not demand possession, and failing to reply is not the same as refusing entry. Mia's belief that Logan was too busy or uninterested is also irrelevant; ouster depends on conduct, not her subjective impressions. Finally, Logan's statements that he would not use the house but was not surrendering his ownership interest merely preserved his title; voluntary nonuse, without exclusion, creates no right to rent. On questions like this, always start by asking, "Was there an ouster?" Distinguish mere exclusive occupancy from affirmative conduct excluding the other co-tenant.

Question 9

Ana and Ben, who are not related, bought a commercial building as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Ana later borrowed money from First Bank for her separate business, giving the bank a note and mortgage on her interest in the building. Ana has now died, leaving her estate to her sister. The bank claims its mortgage still encumbers the building. Ben claims he owns the building free of the mortgage because of survivorship.

Which legal issue is most important in resolving whether the bank may foreclose?

  1. Whether Ana's mortgage of her interest severed the joint tenancy before her death. (correct answer)
  2. Whether Ben's survivorship interest relates back to the original purchase and outranks the bank's mortgage.
  3. Whether Ana's sister succeeded to Ana's right of survivorship as part of the estate.
  4. Whether the bank's failure to foreclose during Ana's lifetime extinguished its mortgage.
Explanation: Whenever a joint tenant acts alone to mortgage her interest, focus immediately on whether that act severed the joint tenancy. In most jurisdictions, a joint tenant's mortgage of her interest severs the joint tenancy, at least as to that interest. Because Ana mortgaged her interest before death, the joint tenancy was likely broken; Ben and the bank then held interests as tenants in common. After Ana died, Ben did not automatically take Ana's former share by survivorship—that share was already encumbered. The bank may foreclose on Ana's former interest. Why not the other choices? Ben's survivorship interest does not "relate back" to the original purchase and outrank the mortgage; survivorship is defeated by any severance that occurs before death. Ana's sister also did not succeed to Ana's right of survivorship—a right of survivorship is not an inheritable asset, and it disappears if severance occurred. The bank's failure to foreclose during Ana's lifetime did not extinguish its mortgage; a mortgagee may foreclose after the mortgagor's death against the successor to the encumbered interest. Study tip: when a joint tenant mortgages or conveys her interest, ask "severance before death?" If yes, survivorship is destroyed and the mortgage survives against that interest.

Question 10

Alan, Beth, and Carl own Blackacre as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Alan enters into a signed, enforceable contract to sell "all of my right, title, and interest in Blackacre" to Dana, with closing set for 90 days later. Before closing, Alan dies. One month later, Beth dies. Dana tenders the purchase price and demands a deed. Carl claims Blackacre. The State Concurrent Estates Act provides:

Section 2. Severance of a Joint Tenancy.

(a) A joint tenant may sever a joint tenancy only by a conveyance of the tenant's entire interest to a third person. A contract to convey, an option, or a pledge of a joint tenant's interest does not sever the joint tenancy, even if the contract is specifically enforceable.

(b) If a joint tenant dies before delivering a conveyance that would sever, the contract or option is not enforceable against surviving joint tenants, though it may give rise to a claim against the deceased tenant's estate.

(c) A severance by one joint tenant creates a tenancy in common as to that tenant's interest, but surviving joint tenants continue to hold their interests as joint tenants as to each other.

Who owns Blackacre, and what rights, if any, does Dana have?

  1. Carl owns Blackacre in fee simple, free of Dana's contract, but Dana may have a claim for breach or restitution against Alan's estate. (correct answer)
  2. Carl and Dana own Blackacre as tenants in common, because the contract operated as an equitable severance of Alan's one-third interest before his death.
  3. Carl owns Blackacre in fee simple, subject to Dana's right to specific performance of the contract because a contract to convey a joint tenant's interest is enforceable against surviving joint tenants.
  4. Carl owns an undivided two-thirds interest and Dana owns an undivided one-third interest as tenants in common, because Beth's share passed to Carl by survivorship and Alan's contracted share passed to Dana.
Explanation: Whenever you see a joint tenancy question, the central issue is whether anything severed the tenancy before death. Here, the State Act controls: a contract to convey does not sever a joint tenancy, and if the contracting joint tenant dies before delivering a deed, the contract is not enforceable against the surviving joint tenants. Alan's signed contract with Dana gave Dana only an expectancy, not an interest in Blackacre. Because Alan died before closing and without conveying, his share passed by survivorship to Beth and Carl, not to Dana. When Beth later died, her share passed to Carl. Therefore, Carl owns Blackacre in fee simple, and Dana is left with a claim against Alan's estate for breach or restitution. The wrong answers each misread the statute. Saying the contract operated as an equitable severance before Alan's death ignores Section 2(a), which explicitly rejects equitable severance by contract. Saying Dana can enforce specific performance against surviving joint tenants contradicts Section 2(b), which bars enforcement against them. And saying Dana owns an undivided one-third interest as a tenant in common wrongly treats Alan's contracted share as having left the joint tenancy; it did not. Study tip: when a statute defines the exclusive way to sever a joint tenancy, apply it literally. Do not import equitable-conversion reasoning unless the statute allows it. A contract alone is usually a claim against the estate, not a path to the land.

Question 11

Carlos and Dana own Whiteacre as joint tenants with right of survivorship. A creditor obtained a judgment against Carlos alone and recorded it in the county where Whiteacre is located. The recording statute provides that a recorded judgment is a lien on all real property interests of the judgment debtor but does not by itself permit seizure or sale of property. Carlos died before any execution or forced sale of his interest occurred. The creditor claims that its lien attached to Carlos's interest and survives his death; Dana claims that she owns Whiteacre free of the lien.

Who prevails?

  1. Dana, because a judgment lien does not sever a joint tenancy and Carlos's interest terminated at his death before any forced sale. (correct answer)
  2. Dana, but only if she pays the creditor the amount of the judgment, because the lien attached to Carlos's share while he was alive.
  3. The creditor, because the recorded judgment lien attached to Carlos's interest, and a valid lien on real property is not extinguished by the debtor's death.
  4. The creditor, because recording the judgment lien severed the joint tenancy and the lien now encumbers the entire property.
Explanation: Whenever you see a joint tenancy with a creditor of one co-tenant, focus on survivorship: each joint tenant holds an undivided interest with a right of survivorship, and that interest is not freely alienable by will but can be severed during life. The key question is whether anything happened before death to sever Carlos's interest. Here, the creditor only recorded a judgment lien against Carlos's interest. A judgment lien does not sever a joint tenancy. Carlos died before any execution or forced sale, so his interest vanished at death and Dana became sole owner by survivorship. Therefore, Dana prevails free of the lien. The choice saying Dana prevails only if she pays the creditor is wrong because the lien never attached to a surviving interest—Carlos's share ceased to exist at death, so there is no debt to pay from the property. The choice saying the creditor prevails because a valid lien survives the debtor's death is also wrong: that general rule applies to property the debtor owned at death, but Carlos had no ownable interest left after survivorship. Finally, the choice saying recording the judgment lien severed the joint tenancy and encumbers the entire property is wrong because severance requires something more, like a conveyance, partition, or execution sale during life—a mere lien does not destroy survivorship. Study tip: on real-property questions, separate "lien attached" from "severance occurred." A lien may attach to a joint tenant's interest, but if no forced sale happens before death, survivorship wins.

Question 12

Edna and Frank own Blackacre as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Edna's creditor obtained a judgment, caused a writ of execution to be levied on Edna's interest, and at a sheriff's sale Otis bought Edna's interest. Six months later, Frank died, leaving his entire estate by will to his daughter Gail. Edna is still alive.

Who owns Blackacre?

  1. Otis and Gail each own an undivided one-half as tenants in common. (correct answer)
  2. Otis and Edna each own an undivided one-half as tenants in common.
  3. Gail owns the entire fee simple by right of survivorship.
  4. Otis owns the entire fee simple because the execution sale terminated Frank's right of survivorship.
Explanation: This question tests the doctrine of severance in joint tenancy. Remember, a joint tenancy requires the four unities—time, title, interest, and possession. Any act that breaks one of these unities, such as a conveyance, a mortgage, or a creditor's execution sale, severs the joint tenancy as to that owner's interest. Here, Edna and Frank are joint tenants. When Otis buys Edna's interest at the sheriff's sale, the joint tenancy is severed as to Edna's share. Otis and Frank now own Blackacre as tenants in common, each holding an undivided one-half. Critically, the right of survivorship is destroyed. When Frank later dies, his one-half interest does not pass to Otis or Edna by survivorship; instead, it passes through his estate to his devisee, Gail. Therefore, Otis and Gail each own an undivided one-half as tenants in common. Now consider the wrong answers. "Otis and Edna each own an undivided one-half" is incorrect because Edna's interest was sold at the execution sale; she retains nothing, and Frank's share goes to Gail, not Edna. "Gail owns the entire fee simple by right of survivorship" is wrong because the execution sale severed the joint tenancy, eliminating the right of survivorship; Gail only inherits Frank's one-half. Finally, "Otis owns the entire fee simple because the execution sale terminated Frank's right of survivorship" is a trap—while the sale did terminate Frank's right of survivorship, it did not terminate his ownership interest. Frank retained his one-half, which now passes to Gail. Study tip: Whenever a joint tenant's interest is involuntarily transferred (via execution, bankruptcy, or partition), that interest is severed, converting the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common. The remaining joint tenant's share will pass by will or intestacy, not by survivorship. Watch for this on the bar exam—it's a frequent trap.

Question 13

Four siblings—Ann, Ben, Claire, and Dan—inherited 160 acres as tenants in common, each with an equal one-quarter interest. The property consists of one 80-acre cultivated field and 80 acres of pasture and woods. It has road access. Ann and Ben want to keep their shares; Claire and Dan want a sale. A real estate appraiser testified that if sold as a single parcel, the property would bring $1,600,000; if divided into four 40-acre parcels, each parcel would bring $250,000, for a total of $1,000,000. The court finds that neither the physical characteristics nor the number of parcels prevents an equal division into four parcels, but a division would reduce the aggregate fair market value by $600,000. The State Partition Act provides:

Section 1. Partition.

(a) Any cotenant may maintain an action for partition.

(b) The court shall order partition in kind unless it finds that partition in kind cannot be made without great prejudice to one or more cotenants. Great prejudice may be established by showing: (1) a substantial reduction in the aggregate fair market value of the property if divided; (2) a substantial disparity between the value of the parcel allotted to a cotenant and that cotenant's fractional share; or (3) physical conditions that prevent fair and equitable division.

(c) The fact that a majority of cotenants favor sale, or that one or more object to partition in kind, is not alone sufficient to justify sale.

(d) If partition in kind is ordered, the court may order owelty payments to equalize shares.

How should the court rule on the partition action?

  1. Order partition in kind, because the land can be divided into four equal parcels and the preferences of Claire and Dan for a sale cannot override Ann and Ben's right to keep their shares.
  2. Order partition in kind, with owelty, because the court can equalize any value differences and partition in kind is strongly preferred over sale.
  3. Order sale, because division would substantially reduce the aggregate fair market value of the property, which constitutes great prejudice under the Act. (correct answer)
  4. Order sale, because a cotenant may compel a sale whenever another cotenant objects to continuing co-ownership; no one can be forced to remain a tenant in common.
Explanation: Whenever you see a partition action, remember that partition in kind is the default—the law favors keeping land physically divided among co-owners. But the default yields when partition would cause "great prejudice" to any co-owner, and the statute defines great prejudice to include a substantial reduction in the aggregate fair market value of the property. That is exactly what happens here: dividing 160 acres into four 40-acre parcels drops total value from $1,600,000 to $1,000,000—a $600,000, or 37.5%, loss. The court found division physically possible, but physical possibility alone does not control because the prejudice of destroying $600,000 in value is substantial. Therefore the court should order a sale. The choices proposing partition in kind miss this. The choice saying land can be divided into four equal parcels, and Claire and Dan's preference cannot override Ann and Ben's rights, ignores the statutory great-prejudice exception: a substantial aggregate value reduction overrides the normal preference. The choice recommending partition in kind "with owelty" also fails: owelty only equalizes differences in value between allotted parcelsl—it does not compensate for the overall $600,000 loss to all co-owners. Finally, the choice claiming a co-tenant may compel a sale whenever another objects to co-ownership misstates the law: the act expressly says that majority favor of sale or objection to partition in kind is not alone sufficient; a sale requires showing great prejudice, which is present here for a different reason. Study tip: On partition questions, first ask whether antipartition-in-kind barrier is present—often a "substantial reduction in aggregate fair market value" is the decisive statutory trigger, regardless of how fairly the land could be split.

Question 14

Renee and Omar, a married couple, bought their home as tenants by the entirety. Without Renee's knowledge, Omar guaranteed a business loan for his brother. The borrower defaulted, and the lender obtained a judgment against Omar alone. The lender now asks a court to allow execution against the home. Renee objects.

Which legal issue is most significant in determining whether the lender may execute on the home?

  1. Whether Omar's guaranty is chargeable to Renee because it was incurred during the marriage.
  2. Whether a judgment against only one spouse may be enforced against property held as tenants by entirety. (correct answer)
  3. Whether the home is community property subject to Omar's separate creditor.
  4. Whether Renee's lack of consent to the guaranty invalidates the judgment against Omar.
Explanation: Whenever you see a question about a married couple's property and one spouse's debt, your first move should be to identify the form of ownership. Here, the home is held as tenants by the entirety, a form reserved for married couples in which each spouse has an undivided interest and neither can alone sever the tenancy. That form of ownership is the key: a judgment against only one spouse generally cannot be enforced against property held by the entirety, because the debtor spouse has no separately reachable interest while the marriage continues. The lender's judgment is valid against Omar, but the home is not an asset the court may execute on to satisfy it. The wrong answers each miss this central point. Saying the guaranty is chargeable to Renee because it was incurred during marriage confuses spousal liability with property rights; marriage alone does not make one spouse liable for the other's separate debts. Calling the home community property mischaracterizes it—tenants by the entirety is a form of co-ownership with survivorship, not community property. And arguing that Renee's lack of consent invalidates the judgment against Omar confuses the validity of the personal judgment with the reachability of specific property; Omar's promise binds him, but it still cannot expose the entirety property. On exam day, remember: ask first who owns the property and what form that ownership takes, then ask what a creditor can actually reach. Tenancy by the entirety is a shield against one spouse's separate creditors.

Question 15

A and B inherited a house as tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half interest. A moved into the house and lived there alone for ten years. B knew of A's occupancy, never asked to live there, and never attempted to enter; A never refused B access. During that period, A paid $40,000 in property taxes and $30,000 to replace a leaking roof. A also paid $50,000 to add a bathroom, which increased the house's value by $35,000. The fair rental value of the house during A's occupancy was $100,000. The house is now sold in a partition sale for $600,000, and the court must allocate the proceeds between A and B.

Which allocation of the sale proceeds is correct?

  1. A receives $317,500; B receives $282,500.
  2. A receives $335,000; B receives $265,000.
  3. A receives $302,500; B receives $297,500.
  4. A receives $352,500; B receives $247,500. (correct answer)
Explanation: When you see a partition sale between tenants in common, focus on two things: whether an ouster occurred (which would create a rent obligation) and how to adjust the proceeds for contributions. Here, B never demanded access and A never refused, so there is no ouster—A owes no rent for his occupancy. A is entitled to reimbursement for the property taxes (40,000)andthenecessaryroofrepair(40,000) and the necessary roof repair (30,000) because these are common expenses that benefited the entire property. For the bathroom improvement, A is only entitled to the lesser of the cost (50,000)ortheincreaseinvalue(50,000) or the increase in value (35,000), so the credit is $35,000. Total reimbursement: $40,000 + $30,000 + $35,000 = $105,000. Subtract this from the $600,000 sale price, leaving $495,000, which is split equally: $247,500 each. A receives his half plus the $105,000 credit, totaling $352,500, while B receives $247,500. The option giving A $317,500 only credits the $35,000 improvement increase, ignoring the taxes and roof. The option giving A $335,000 credits only half of the taxes and repairs (treating them as contribution for the other's share) plus the full improvement—but the correct method is to reimburse the full amount paid for common expenses and then divide the remainder. The option giving A $302,500 incorrectly subtracts $50,000 (half the fair rental value) from A's share, assuming he owes rent, but without ouster, no rent is due. Study tip: For partition, remember "no ouster, no rent." Add all reimbursable expenses, subtract from the sale price, then split the remainder equally.

Question 16

Hal and Wendy, a married couple, took title to Greenacre by a deed that conveyed the property "to Hal and Wendy, as tenants by the entirety." Without Wendy's knowledge, Hal borrowed $200,000 from First Bank and signed a mortgage on Greenacre. Later, Vic obtained a judgment against Hal alone for a personal injury and recorded it. Hal and Wendy divorced, and the divorce judgment provided that the former spouses would hold Greenacre as tenants in common, each with an undivided one-half interest. Hal died one month later. Hal's will devised "all my property" to Wendy. First Bank claims an interest under its mortgage; Vic claims a lien on Greenacre. The State Married Persons Property Act provides:

Section 1. Tenancy by the Entirety.

(a) A conveyance to two persons who are married to each other creates a tenancy by the entirety unless a contrary intention is stated.

(b) During a tenancy by the entirety, neither spouse alone may convey or encumber the property; any such conveyance or encumbrance is void.

(c) A judgment lien against only one spouse does not attach to property held by the entirety.

(d) Upon dissolution of the marriage, a tenancy by the entirety becomes a tenancy in common; a judgment lien against a former spouse attaches to that former spouse's one-half interest as of the date of dissolution.

(e) If a spouse dies while the tenancy by the entirety exists, the surviving spouse takes the property by survivorship, free of claims of the deceased spouse's creditors.

Who owns Greenacre, and what interests, if any, do First Bank and Vic have?

  1. Wendy owns Greenacre in fee simple; First Bank's mortgage is void because Hal alone could not encumber; Vic has no interest because Hal's interest passed to Wendy by will.
  2. Wendy owns Greenacre in fee simple; First Bank's mortgage is void; Vic has a judgment lien on the one-half interest Hal owned after the divorce. (correct answer)
  3. Wendy and Vic own Greenacre as tenants in common, each with an undivided one-half interest; First Bank's mortgage is void because Hal lacked authority.
  4. Wendy owns Greenacre subject to First Bank's mortgage and to Vic's judgment lien on one-half; First Bank's mortgage attached when Hal's tenancy by entirety became a tenancy in common.
Explanation: Whenever you see a tenancy by the entirety, track events in order: marriage, one spouse's attempted encumbrance, creditor judgments, divorce, then death. Here, while Hal and Wendy were married, Hal alone gave First Bank a mortgage. Under the Act, a sole spouse may not encumber entirety property, so that mortgage is void from the start. Vic's judgment against Hal also did not attach during the marriage, because a judgment lien against one spouse does not attach to entirety property. The divorce was the turning point: the Act converted the entirety into a tenancy in common and made Vic's lien attach to Hal's one-half as of the date of dissolution. Hal then died, so his one-half passed by will to Wendy—but it passed subject to Vic's already attached lien. Wendy therefore owns Greenacre in fee simple, and Vic has a judgment lien on the one-half interest Hal owned after the divorce. The answer saying Vic has no interest because Hal's property passed to Wendy by will is wrong: a transfer by will does not extinguish a valid judgment lien. The answer saying Wendy and Vic own as tenants in common is wrong because Vic has only a lien, not ownership. And the answer making Wendy subject to First Bank's mortgage is wrong because the Act explicitly makes Hal's unauthorized mortgage void, so it cannot later "attach" when the estate changes form. On the exam, remember: divorce is the event that lets a sole spouse's creditors attach, but it never resurrects a void encumbrance.

Question 17

Rachel and Sam own a four-unit apartment building as tenants in common. Rachel manages the building and lives in one unit; Sam lives elsewhere. Rachel leases the other three units to tenants. Over the past year, Rachel collected $60,000 in rent and paid $12,000 for necessary repairs on the leased units and $9,000 in property taxes on the building. Rachel notified Sam of the repairs and asked him to contribute, but Sam refused. Sam now demands an accounting. Rachel did not exclude Sam or deny him access to any part of the building.

How much must Rachel pay Sam?

  1. $19,500 (correct answer)
  2. $24,000
  3. $25,500
  4. $30,000
Explanation: Whenever you see a co-tenant accounting question, think: rents from third parties are shared, common expenses are shared, and—unless there was an ouster—an occupying co-tenant owes nothing for personal use. Rachel and Sam are tenants in common with presumed equal shares. Rachel collected $60,000 in rent from the leased units, so that income must be accounted for. She also paid $12,000 in necessary repairs and $9,000 in property taxes—both common expenses chargeable to the co-tenancy. So the net common fund is: $60,000−12,000−9,000=39,00060{,}000 - 12{,}000 - 9{,}000 = 39{,}000 $ Sam’s equal half is $19,500. Rachel can offset his refused share of the expenses against the rent she owes him, which is why that amount is correct. The $24,000 choice subtracts only the repairs and ignores the property taxes. The $25,500 choice subtracts only the property taxes and ignores the repairs. The $30,000 choice takes half of the gross rents and gives no credit for necessary expenses at all. The detail that Rachel did not exclude Sam or deny him access is also crucial: there was no ouster, so she does not owe Sam rent for the unit she personally occupies. Study tip: for co-tenant accounting, use the formula "third-party rents minus common expenses, then split by ownership share," and always check for ouster facts before considering rent for self-occupancy.

Question 18

Olivia and Paul own a lake house as tenants in common, each with an undivided one-half interest. Olivia occupied the house full time for two years; Paul never visited or demanded entry. Olivia then told Paul by email that she considered the house hers alone. Paul replied by email, "I will be there next month; I demand entry." When Paul arrived, Olivia had changed the locks and refused him entry. Olivia continued to occupy the house exclusively during the next six months. During that period she paid $12,000 in property taxes, $8,000 to replace a deteriorated roof, and $25,000 for a new dock and landscaping. Paul sues for an accounting. The State Cotenancy Act provides:

Section 1. Duties and Liabilities of Cotenants. (1) Unless a cotenant has ousted another, a cotenant who occupies property is not liable to any other cotenant for rent for that occupancy, even if the occupying cotenant uses the entire property. (2) A cotenant ousts another when the cotenant, by words or conduct, denies the other's right to possession and refuses a demand for rightful entry. (3) An ousted cotenant may recover from the ousting cotenant the ousted cotenant's share of the fair rental value of the property for the period of ouster. In calculating this recovery, the ousting cotenant is entitled to an offset for the ousted cotenant's share of any property taxes and necessary repairs paid by the ousting cotenant during that period, but not for improvements.

What is Paul entitled to recover?

  1. One-half of the fair rental value of the property from the date Olivia refused Paul entry, offset by Paul's one-half share of taxes and roof-repair costs Olivia paid during that period, but not by dock/landscaping costs. (correct answer)
  2. One-half of the fair rental value of the property from the date Olivia first occupied the property, offset by Paul's one-half share of all taxes, roof repair, dock, and landscaping costs Olivia paid.
  3. One-half of the fair rental value of the property from the date Olivia emailed her exclusive-ownership claim, offset by Paul's one-half share of taxes and roof-repair costs, but not by dock/landscaping costs.
  4. Nothing, because Olivia, as a tenant in common, was entitled to possess the entire property until Paul obtained a court order of partition.
Explanation: Whenever you see a cotenancy question, start by identifying whether an ouster occurred and when. Under the State Cotenancy Act, a tenant in common is ordinarily not liable for rent for occupancy, but an ousted cotenant may recover fair rental value once the ousting cotenant denies the right to possession and refuses a demand for entry. Here, Olivia's email claiming the house as hers alone was a denial, but Paul's demand for entry was not refused until Olivia changed the locks and turned him away. That refusal is the date ouster began. Paul is therefore entitled to one-half of the fair rental value from that date, not from her initial occupancy or her earlier email claim. Olivia may offset Paul's one-half share of property taxes and necessary roof repairs paid during the ouster period, because the statute expressly allows offsets for taxes and necessary repairs. The dock and landscaping are improvements, and the statute says no offset for improvements, even if they add value. The choice saying Paul gets rent from the date Olivia first occupied the property is wrong because pre-ouster occupancy is free, not rent-producing. The choice starting recovery from Olivia's email is wrong because ouster required both denial and refused demand; the demand was not refused until Paul arrived. The choice saying Paul gets nothing is wrong because ouster gives him a statutory remedy despite the general rule that each cotenant may possess the whole. Study tip: on ouster questions, anchor the timeline to the actual refusal of entry, then apply the statutory offsets strictly—taxes and necessary repairs yes, improvements no.