All questions
Question 1
A, an elderly collector, wants to make a binding gift of a valuable 1794 silver dollar to B, a young neighbor. A signs a document stating: 'In consideration of $1 paid to me by B, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I transfer my 1794 silver dollar to B.' Neither party intended that B actually pay the $1, and B never did. A later refuses to deliver the coin.
Is A's promise to transfer the coin enforceable?
- Yes, because consideration need not be adequate, and $1 is a sufficient peppercorn.
- Yes, because A's signed written acknowledgment of receipt is conclusive proof of consideration.
- No, because neither party intended the $1 to be paid, so the recital was a pretense and no bargain occurred. (correct answer)
- No, because $1 is plainly inadequate consideration for a coin of that value.
Explanation: Consideration must actually be bargained for; a written recital of consideration that neither party intended to be paid is a mere pretense of bargain, not consideration. Because B never paid and both understood $1 as a formality, A's promise was gratuitous and unenforceable. Choice A is wrong because adequacy of consideration is irrelevant only when consideration actually exists. Choice B is wrong because a recital is not conclusive when no consideration was in fact given. Choice D is wrong because inadequacy alone does not defeat consideration; here the absence of any real bargain does.
Question 2
A owes B $5,000 under an overdue loan. B's father, C, anxious to see B paid, promises A: 'If you pay B the $5,000 by Friday, I will pay you $1,000.' A pays B by Friday. C refuses to pay A. A sues C.
Is C's promise enforceable?
- No, because A's payment to B merely satisfied A's existing debt, so A suffered no legal detriment.
- No, because C received no direct benefit from A's payment, and consideration must move to the promisor.
- Yes, because A paid B only after C sought that payment as the price of C's promise. (correct answer)
- Yes, because C, as B's father, received a benefit from A's payment to B.
Explanation: Under the preexisting-duty rule, performance of a duty already owed to the promisor is not consideration. Here A's duty was owed to B, not to C, the promisor. Because A's payment to B was requested by C as the price of C's promise, A's payment was bargained-for consideration. Choice A misapplies the preexisting-duty rule to a duty owed to a third person. Choice B is wrong because a benefit to the promisor is not required. Choice D is wrong because C had no obligation to B that A's payment discharged, and C's emotional interest does not supply consideration.
Question 3
O owns a vacant lot and hires G, a general contractor, to build a house for $400,000. During excavation, G strikes a massive underground granite ledge that a soil report commissioned by O had indicated would not be present. Removing it will cost an additional $40,000. G tells O he will stop work unless O agrees to pay an extra $40,000. O, anxious to complete the project, signs a written modification promising to pay the extra amount. After the house is completed, O refuses to pay the $40,000. G sues.
Is G entitled to recover the additional $40,000?
- No, because G's promise to continue building was merely performance of G's preexisting contractual duty.
- No, because O's agreement to pay more was procured by G's threat to walk off the job, which is duress.
- Yes, because the rock ledge was an unforeseen condition that the soil report had indicated would not be present, making O's promise to pay the extra amount binding. (correct answer)
- Yes, because O got the house built and O's promise to pay extra is supported by the benefit received.
Explanation: A modification of an executory contract generally requires consideration, but an exception permits enforcement without new consideration when the modification is fair and equitable and based on circumstances not anticipated when the contract was made. G's encounter with a granite ledge that the soil report had indicated would not be present was unanticipated, and the extra $40,000 was fair; so O's promise to pay is enforceable. Choice A states the general preexisting-duty rule but ignores the exception. Choice B is wrong because G's threat to stop due to a genuine unforeseen condition was not duress. Choice D is wrong because O's receipt of the house is a benefit, not consideration for the promise to pay extra.
Question 4
A, a manufacturer, agrees in writing to sell B 5,000 custom-designed circuit boards for $15 each. Before A begins production, a new federal safety regulation requires A to add a component costing an additional $3 per board. A tells B he cannot proceed unless B agrees to pay $18 per board. B, who needs the boards for a government contract, agrees. A and B sign a written modification at $18 per board. After delivery, B refuses to pay the $3 increase. A sues for it.
Is A entitled to the price increase?
- No, because B's promise to pay more was not supported by any new concession from A.
- No, because A was already contractually bound to deliver B the boards at $15 each.
- Yes, because A's added cost resulted from a new government rule, and B agreed to the increase in a signed writing. (correct answer)
- Yes, because B's promise to pay the increase was itself consideration for A's promise to deliver the boards.
Explanation: Under UCC 2-209, a contract for sale of goods may be modified without new consideration, provided the modification is sought in good faith. A's additional $3 cost was caused by a new federal safety regulation, not by a desire to get a better bargain, so the modification is enforceable. Choice A applies the common-law preexisting-duty rule, which UCC displaces. Choice B is wrong because the fact that A was already bound does not bar a UCC modification made in good faith. Choice D is wrong because B's promise to pay more is not needed as consideration, and A's delivery promise was preexisting.
Question 5
A is a police officer employed by the City of Eastville. While on vacation in the neighboring City of Westville, A sees a man rob a bank and escape into a crowd. A, wearing casual clothes and off duty, pursues and subdues the robber. Westville has posted a $10,000 reward for the capture and arrest of the bank robber. A knows of the reward and has no legal duty to act in Westville. He turns the robber over to Westville police, and the robber is convicted. A claims the reward.
Is A entitled to the reward?
- No, because A, as a police officer, was under a public duty to apprehend lawbreakers, so his act cannot be consideration.
- No, because A did not supply information leading to the arrest, as the reward notice required.
- Yes, because A was on vacation, off duty, and outside the city that employed him, so he had no duty to act in Westville. (correct answer)
- Yes, because A's capture of the robber conferred a substantial benefit on Westville, and anyone who confers such a benefit may claim the reward.
Explanation: A public employee generally may not claim a reward for performing acts within the scope of official duties. Here A was off duty, on vacation, outside the city that employed him, and had no legal duty to intervene in Westville; his capture of the robber was therefore not a preexisting public duty, and it was performed in response to Westville's reward offer, making it consideration. Choice A is wrong because the public-duty rule has no application when there is no official duty. Choice B is wrong because the reward was for capture and arrest, not information. Choice D is wrong because a benefit to Westville alone, without a bargain, is insufficient.
Question 6
A, a wholesale dealer in commercial kitchen equipment, signs a written offer to sell B twenty restaurant ovens at $3,000 each. The offer states: 'This offer shall remain open for 60 days.' B pays A nothing for this promise. Thirty days later, before B has accepted, A tells B he is revoking the offer.
Is A's revocation effective?
- Yes, because B did not pay for the promise to keep the offer open, so A was free to revoke.
- Yes, because an offer is generally revocable at any time before acceptance.
- No, because A's written promise to hold the offer open for 60 days was made by a dealer in the goods and is binding for that period. (correct answer)
- No, because the signed writing and A's 60-day commitment made the offer irrevocable as a common-law option contract.
Explanation: Under UCC Article 2, a merchant who signs a written offer to buy or sell goods and gives assurance that it will be held open creates a firm offer irrevocable for up to three months without consideration. A is a merchant, the offer was signed and expressly open for 60 days, so A could not revoke within that period. Choice A states the common-law option rule requiring consideration, which does not apply to merchant firm offers. Choice B is wrong because this offer falls within the firm-offer exception. Choice D is wrong because a common-law option contract requires consideration, and B gave none; the irrevocability comes from the UCC firm-offer rule, not from a common-law option contract.
Question 7
A's large oak tree, which had been inspected and certified healthy by an arborist two months earlier, is toppled by an unusually severe storm and crashes onto B's car. B threatens to sue A for $8,000 in damage, claiming A was negligent for failing to maintain the tree. A believes B's claim is weak but not frivolous. To avoid litigation costs, A promises to pay B $3,000 if B signs a release of all claims. B signs and accepts the $3,000. B later sues A for the remaining $5,000.
- No, because B's claim had no reasonable basis, so B's release was not given for consideration.
- No, because B's release was obtained by A's promise to pay only $3,000, which is inadequate.
- Yes, because B dropped a disputed claim against A in exchange for $3,000, and the settlement was reached before suit. (correct answer)
- Yes, because B's release was in writing and signed, so it is enforceable regardless of consideration.
Explanation: Forbearance to assert a claim can be consideration even if the claim would ultimately fail, if the claim is doubtful or honestly believed valid. B's claim, though weak, was not frivolous: A's tree was on A's property and B incurred real damage. B's release was therefore given in exchange for A's $3,000 payment, and the settlement bars further suit. Choice A is wrong because B's claim was colorable, not baseless. Choice B is wrong because adequacy of consideration is irrelevant. Choice D is wrong because a signed writing is not a substitute for consideration; the release was enforceable because of the bargained-for exchange of payment for forbearance.
Question 8
After A's prized Labrador retriever disappears, A posts a flyer offering a $500 reward 'for the safe return of my dog.' B, a neighbor, had found the dog wandering loose the previous day and had spent the night caring for it. That afternoon, unaware of any reward, B returns the dog to A's house. That evening, B sees A's flyer and asks A for the $500. A refuses.
Is B entitled to the $500 reward?
- Yes, because B returned the dog to A, and A had promised to pay anyone who did so.
- Yes, because A received the benefit of the dog's safe return, and the reward offer became binding once the dog was returned.
- No, because B was not aware of the reward when he returned the dog, so his return was not made in exchange for A's promise. (correct answer)
- No, because B's care for the dog was voluntary and B had no legal right to compensation for caring for a lost dog.
Explanation: Consideration requires a bargained-for exchange: the promisee's act must be sought by the promisor in exchange for the promise and given in exchange for it. B returned the dog before knowing of A's offer, so his act could not have been given in exchange for A's promise; it was a voluntary benefit, not consideration. Choice A is wrong because B's lack of knowledge defeats the bargain even though A had promised to pay. Choice B is wrong because benefit alone, without bargain, does not create consideration. Choice D is wrong because voluntariness alone is not the defect; lack of bargain is.
Question 9
B, a heavy smoker, has mentioned to friends that he intends to quit smoking someday, but has not set a date or quit smoking. A, B's employer, says to B: 'If you refrain from smoking for one full year, I will pay you $5,000.' B agrees, refrains from smoking for a year, and demands payment. A refuses.
Is B entitled to the $5,000?
- No, because B's refraining from smoking was not a legal detriment, since smoking is harmful to B's health.
- No, because B had already planned to quit smoking, so A's promise did not induce B's abstinence.
- Yes, because B gave up his lawful right to smoke at A's request, despite having previously thought about quitting. (correct answer)
- Yes, because A benefited from B's improved health and productivity, which supports the promise.
Explanation: Forbearance of a lawful right can be consideration if bargained for. B had a legal right to smoke; A sought B's abstention as the price of his promise, and B acted accordingly. The fact that B had previously thought about quitting does not show that his abstention was not given in exchange for A's promise; independent motives do not necessarily negate bargain. Choice A is wrong because legal detriment is not measured by whether the conduct is good for the promisee; giving up any legal right suffices. Choice B is wrong because there is no 'but-for' causation requirement when the promised performance was in fact bargained for. Choice D is wrong because the benefit to A was not the bargained-for exchange and cannot by itself supply consideration.
Question 10
A, a bakery, enters a written contract with B, a grocery store chain: A promises to sell and B promises to buy 'all the bread B requires in its stores during the next year at $1.50 per loaf.' The contract does not state a specific quantity. After two months, B's business thrivesand it orders 1,000 loaves per week. A delivers. At the end of six months, B, having found a cheaper supplier, tells A it no longer has any 'requirements' and will buy nothing more for the rest of the year. A sues B for breach.
Is B's promise enforceable as consideration for A's promise?
- No, because B's promise left B free to decide that it needed no bread, making it illusory.
- No, because the contract's failure to state a definite quantity makes it too indefinite to enforce.
- Yes, because B's promise to buy its 'requirements' carried an implied duty to continue its needs in good faith. (correct answer)
- Yes, because A's promise to sell at a fixed price is enough consideration, regardless of whether B promised anything.
Explanation: A promise to buy 'all requirements' is not illusory because it implies an obligation to make good-faith purchases of the quantity actually needed. B could not, while continuing to operate thriving stores, simply declare that it had no requirements to avoid the contract; its promise supplied consideration for A's promise. Choice A mischaracterizesa requirements promise as a purely discretionary promise. Choice B is wrong becausea requirements term provides an objective standard. Choice D is wrong because mutuality requires B to be bound; A's fixed-price promise alone is insufficient.
Question 11
A owes B $50,000 under an undisputed loan that is immediately due. A writes B: 'If you agree to accept $45,000 as full payment, I will pay you that amount by Friday.' B agrees; A pays $45,000. B later demands and sues for the remaining $5,000.
Is B entitled to recover the remaining $5,000?
- No, because B agreed to accept $45,000 in full satisfaction, and A paid that amount.
- No, because A's agreement to pay $45,000 was itself consideration for B's promise to accept it as full payment.
- Yes, because B's promise to accept less than the full amount was not supported by any new performance from A. (correct answer)
- Yes, because A's payment of $45,000 was an accord that satisfied B's claim when accepted.
Explanation: Under the preexisting-duty rule, part payment of an undisputed debt is not consideration for a creditor's promise to discharge the balance, so B's promise to accept less is unenforceable and B may recover the remaining $5,000. Choice A ignores lack of consideration. Choice B is wrong because A's payment of an already-due debt was not new consideration. Choice D is wrong because an accord and satisfaction requires a disputed claim or new consideration; here the claim was undisputed and A gave no new consideration.
Question 12
A says to B: 'If you drive my elderly mother, C, to her doctor's appointment on Friday, I will pay you $50.' B, who had no prior plans, agrees and drives C to the appointment. A refuses to pay, arguing that he received no benefit from B's act because the ride benefited C, not A.
Is B entitled to the $50 from A?
- No, because B's act of driving C benefited only C, not A, so A received no consideration.
- No, because C did not request B's act, and a third party cannot supply consideration.
- Yes, because B drove C at A's request, even though C received the benefit. (correct answer)
- Yes, because C's receipt of the ride is treated in law as A's receipt, since A arranged it.
Explanation: Consideration does not require that the promisor receive a benefit; it is enough that the promisee incur a burden or give a performance requested by the promisor. B's act of driving C was bargained for by A and performed by B, even though C received the benefit. Choice A states a common but incorrect 'benefit to promisor' requirement. Choice B is wrong because consideration can be requested by the promisor and furnished to a third party. Choice D is wrong because C's benefit is not imputed to A.