Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Confession And Privilege Against Self Incrimination Fifth Amendment
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Confession And Privilege Against Self Incrimination Fifth AmendmentQuestion 1 of 12

D was arrested for burglary and, at his first court appearance, after a lawyer was appointed, told the judge, 'I want a lawyer before I say anything to anybody.' Weeks later, while D was awaiting trial in jail, police began investigating him for a separate robbery that had not yet been charged. They gave D Miranda warnings, he waived them, and confessed to the robbery. D moves to suppress that confession.

Should the court suppress the robbery confession?

Yes, because D's courtroom request for counsel was an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel and police initiated the later interview.
Yes, because once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached and D requested counsel, police could not question him about any crime without counsel present.
No, because a defendant who already has appointed counsel on one charge cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege unless he first tells police he objects to questioning.
No, because the Sixth Amendment right had not attached to the uncharged robbery and the courtroom request did not invoke a Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Confession And Privilege Against Self Incrimination Fifth Amendment

Practice Confession And Privilege Against Self Incrimination Fifth Amendment in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

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This quiz focuses on Confession And Privilege Against Self Incrimination Fifth Amendment, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

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Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

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Question 1

D was arrested for burglary and, at his first court appearance, after a lawyer was appointed, told the judge, 'I want a lawyer before I say anything to anybody.' Weeks later, while D was awaiting trial in jail, police began investigating him for a separate robbery that had not yet been charged. They gave D Miranda warnings, he waived them, and confessed to the robbery. D moves to suppress that confession.

Should the court suppress the robbery confession?

  1. Yes, because D's courtroom request for counsel was an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel and police initiated the later interview.
  2. Yes, because once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached and D requested counsel, police could not question him about any crime without counsel present.
  3. No, because a defendant who already has appointed counsel on one charge cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege unless he first tells police he objects to questioning.
  4. No, because the Sixth Amendment right had not attached to the uncharged robbery and the courtroom request did not invoke a Fifth Amendment right to counsel. (correct answer)
Explanation: Whenever you see a confession obtained after a defendant has asked for a lawyer, separate the Sixth and Fifth Amendment analyses. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only after formal charges or other adversarial proceedings, and it is offense-specific: it covers the charged offense only. The Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda, by contrast, applies only during custodial interrogation and once a suspect clearly invokes counsel, police must stop questioning. that request, and the Edwards protection bars police-initiated interrogation thereafter. Here D's courtroom statement came at his first appearance for burglary, so the Sixth right attached to burglary alone;the robbery was uncharged, so the Sixth right had not attached to it. Nor did that courtroom request function as a Fifth invocation: D spoke to the judge, not to police during a custodial interrogation, and a request for appointed counsel at a court proceeding is not a Miranda/Edwards request to deal only with police through counsel. McNeil v. Wisconsin makes this exact point. Thus police were free to approach D, give Miranda warnings, and obtain a valid waiver for the robbery confession. The choice arguing that the courtroom request was an unambiguous invocation and police initiated the later interview treats a Sixth-stage court request as a Fifth-stage interrogation invocation, which conflates the two rights and would overextend Edwards. The choice arguing that once the Sixth attached, D could not be questioned about any crime also fails because the Sixth right is not all-purpose; it covers only the charged offense. And the choice claiming a represented defendant cannot invoke the Fifth privilege unless he first tells police he objects is wrong too: a defendant can invoke the Fifth right during custodial interrogation even if he already has counsel on another charge, but D simply never did that here. Study tip: On the bar exam, whenever a defendant has counsel on one charge and is questioned about another crime, check which right was invoked, when, and for what offense. Sixth is charge-specific;Fifth is interrogation-specific.

Question 2

Police chased D into a crowded grocery store after a shooting and arrested him in an aisle. Without giving Miranda warnings, an officer saw a customer approach and asked D, 'Where is the gun?' D nodded toward a bin, and officers found a loaded gun there. D moves to suppress his statement and the gun.

How should the court rule on the motion?

  1. Suppress both, because the officer asked an express question before giving Miranda warnings and the gun was fruit of that question.
  2. Suppress the gun but admit the statement, because the public safety exception allows questioning but not the use of evidence discovered as a result.
  3. Admit the statement but suppress the gun, because the exception ends as soon as D was arrested and handcuffed.
  4. Admit both, because the officer reasonably asked about a loaded weapon in a public place to avert an immediate danger. (correct answer)
Explanation: Whenever you see a Miranda issue, ask whether an exception applies before suppressing anything. This question tests the public safety exception from New York v. Quarles: when police reasonably believe a loaded weapon is hidden in a public place, they may ask about it without first giving warnings to avert immediate danger. Here, after a shooting, police caught D in a crowded grocery store but had not found the gun. The officer's question—"Where is the gun?"—was aimed at locating a dangerous weapon near customers and officers, not at eliciting a confession. Because that questioning was objectively reasonable, D's nod is admissible, and because the statement is admissible, the gun found as its direct result is admissible too. The "suppress both" choice fails because an express question is not automatically forbidden; public safety can justify exactly that question. The "suppress the gun but admit the statement" choice misstates the exception—once the statement comes in, the physical evidence traced to it also comes in. And the "exception ends as soon as D was arrested and handcuffed" choice creates a mechanical cutoff that the law does not apply; the relevant question is whether the danger to the public was still immediate, and with the gun unsecured in a crowded store, it was. On exam day, when you see an unwarned officer asking where a weapon is, focus on the objective emergency: was a dangerous weapon still at large? If yes, admit both the statement and the evidence.

Question 3

D was arrested for armed robbery. After receiving Miranda warnings, he said, 'I don't want to talk about this.' The detective immediately stopped. More than two hours later, a different detective gave D fresh Miranda warnings in a different room, and D waived his rights and confessed to an unrelated burglary. D moves to suppress the burglary confession.

Should the court grant the motion?

  1. Yes, because once D invoked his right to remain silent, any later police-initiated interrogation violated the Fifth Amendment.
  2. Yes, because after invoking his right to silence only a lawyer could reinitiate contact with D.
  3. No, because the police scrupulously honored the invocation by stopping, waiting, giving fresh warnings, and questioning about a different crime. (correct answer)
  4. No, because an invocation of the right to silence must be in writing to remain effective after a break in custody.
Explanation: Whenever you see a question about a suspect invoking Miranda rights, first identify which right was invoked: the right to remain silent or the right to counsel. That distinction drives the rule. Here, D invoked silence, not counsel. Under Michigan v. Mosley, police may reinitiate questioning after a suspect invokes silence if they "scrupulously honor" the invocation. That means stopping immediately, waiting a significant period, giving fresh warnings, and avoiding badgering—often by using a different officer, location, or crime. The correct answer is the one describing that scrupulous-honoring standard. The facts fit: the first detective stopped at once, two hours passed, a different detective gave fresh Miranda warnings, and D confessed to an unrelated burglary. That is exactly the kind of permissible reinitiation Mosley allows. The first wrong choice—that any later police-initiated interrogation violates the Fifth Amendment—is too absolute. Police can reinitiate after an invocation of silence if they satisfy Mosley. The choice saying only a lawyer could reinitiate contact describes the stricter Edwards rule for the right to counsel, not the right to silence. The choice requiring a written invocation is simply false; invocations can be oral, and there is no writing requirement to keep them effective. Strategy tip: on a Miranda question, ask "silence or counsel?" Silence allows later reinitiation under Mosley; counsel blocks reinitiation unless the suspect initiates. Knowing that split will answer many questions quickly.

Question 4

A court order required D, a suspect in a kidnapping, to give a handwriting exemplar by writing the phrase 'Put the money in a bag' ten times. D refused, arguing that the order forced him to provide incriminating communicative evidence. The government intended to compare the exemplar with the handwriting on a ransom note.

Must D comply with the order?

  1. No, because the exemplar would require D to produce a communicative writing in his own hand.
  2. No, because the phrase is the exact incriminating language used in the ransom note and is therefore testimonial.
  3. Yes, because the exemplar is used as a physical identifying characteristic, not for the truth of anything written. (correct answer)
  4. Yes, but only if D is first given Miranda warnings and has counsel present because the writing is a custodial statement.
Explanation: Whenever you see a compelled act or statement in a criminal case, ask: is the government using it for its testimonial content, or as a physical sample? The Fifth Amendment protects only compelled testimonial self-incrimination. A handwriting exemplar is like a fingerprint or voice sample: a physical identifying characteristic. Here, D is not being asked to confess or reveal his thoughts; he is simply reproducing a government-supplied phrase so experts can compare letter formation, stroke, and pressure with the ransom note. The writing's content is irrelevant to the comparison, so it is not testimonial. Thus D must comply. The first "no" answer—that any writing in his own hand communicates and is therefore protected—confuses communicative effect with testimonial assertion; all writing communicates, but only assertions of fact or knowledge are protected. The second "no" answer—that the exact incriminating phrase makes the exemplar testimonial—misses the same point: because the government supplied the words, D reveals nothing from his own mind, and using the phrase as a comparison standard does not assert its truth. The final answer—requiring Miranda warnings and counsel—misapplies Miranda, which applies to custodial interrogation, not to non-testimonial identification procedures. No attorney is required for a physical exemplar. Study tip: classify evidence as physical or testimonial by asking whether the government needs the content for its truth. If not, the Fifth Amendment does not apply.

Question 5

D was held for thirty hours without food or sleep. A detective slapped him and told him he would be convicted unless he confessed. Exhausted, D confessed. He was then given six hours to rest, read Miranda warnings, waived them, and immediately repeated the confession. D moves to suppress both confessions.

What is the most likely ruling?

  1. The first confession is suppressed, but the second is admissible because the Miranda warnings and six-hour break removed any taint.
  2. Both confessions are suppressed because the second was the product of the earlier coercive interrogation and the state did not show attenuation. (correct answer)
  3. The first confession is suppressed, but the second is admissible if it was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.
  4. Both confessions are admissible because physical coercion and delay are relevant to due process, not to the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Explanation: When you see a coerced confession followed by a post-warning repetition, think "cat out of the bag": the first coercion may taint the second. The first confession here is clearly involuntary—thirty hours without food or sleep, a slap, and a threat of conviction unless he confessed. Exhaustion plus physical coercion overbore D's will, so it is suppressed. The harder issue is the second confession. Even after Miranda warnings and six hours of rest, the state must show that the taint from the initial coercion was attenuated—that D's decision to speak was sufficiently independent of the earlier illegality. A break and warnings do not automatically cure; the state bears the burden, and the facts show no intervening act or changed circumstances sufficient to break the causal chain. Thus both confessions are suppressed. The choice saying the second is admissible because the Miranda warnings and six-hour break removed any taint overstates their effect; attenuation requires more. The choice saying the second is admissible if voluntary under the totality of the circumstances is tempting but incomplete: even a voluntary-looking repeat confession is presumed tainted by the earlier coercion unless the state proves attenuation. Finally, the choice saying both are admissible because coercion relates only to due process misses the Fifth Amendment's core protection against compelled self-incrimination—physical coercion and exhaustion are exactly the pressures that make a confession compelled. Remember: for successive confessions, ask not just "was the second voluntary?" but "did the state prove the original taint was dissipated?"

Question 6

D was arrested for stabbing V. The arresting officer placed D alone in a patrol car but did not read him Miranda warnings until they reached the station about fifteen minutes later. During the ride, D said nothing. At trial, D testified that he had acted in self-defense. The prosecutor, over objection, asked D why he had not told the officer during the ride that he acted in self-defense.

Is the prosecutor's question permissible?

  1. Yes, because without Miranda warnings there was no government assurance that silence would not be used, and D opened the door by testifying. (correct answer)
  2. No, because the officer's failure to give Miranda warnings prevented D from knowingly waiving his right to speak.
  3. No, because the Fifth Amendment privilege protects a person's right to remain silent immediately upon arrest.
  4. Yes, because a defendant's post-arrest silence may always be used as substantive evidence of guilt.
Explanation: Whenever you see post-arrest silence being used at trial, ask two questions: Were Miranda warnings given, and is the prosecution using the silence for impeachment or as substantive evidence? Here D chose to testify, so impeachment is the key. D testified self-defense, thereby opening the door; the prosecutor may ask why he didn't tell the officer during the ride that he had acted in self-defense. The Fifth Amendment privilege protects against compelled self-incrimination, but once a defendant testifies, he waives the privilege as to matters fairly raised by his testimony. The only barrier would be due-process fairness in Doyle v. Ohio. Under Doyle, silence after Miranda warnings cannot be used, because the warnings implicitly assure the defendant that his silence won't be used against him. Here, D had not yet received Miranda warnings when he sat silently in the patrol car. There was no government assurance that silence would be used; therefore, D's pre-warning silence is admissible for impeachment. That makes the question permissible. The wrong answers each miss this distinction. The choice claiming Mirandafailure prevented D from knowingly waiving his right to speak misunderstands the issue:D wasn't being penalized for failing to waive; he was being cross-examined about inconsistent trial testimony. The choice saying the Fifth Amendment protects a right to remain silent immediately upon arrest overstates the doctrine: you need not answer questions, but that does not create a shield against all comment when you later testify in a different story. The choice saying post-arrest silence may always be used as substantive evidence of guilt is doubly flawed: "always" is too broad, because post-Miranda silence cannot be used even for impeachment, and substantive use is far more limited than impeachment use. Remember the takeaway: pre-Miranda silence is usable for impeachment once the defendant testifies; post-Miranda silence generally is not, because of the implied assurances in the warnings.

Question 7

D, a seventeen-year-old with an IQ of 72, was arrested after a break-in. He had prior experience with police. After receiving Miranda warnings, he said he understood and correctly explained that he could stop questioning and have a lawyer. Police then falsely told him that his accomplice had confessed and that DNA placed him at the scene. Forty-five minutes later, D signed a waiver and confessed. D moves to suppress, arguing his waiver was not knowing and voluntary.

Which ruling is most likely correct?

  1. Suppress, because police deception about the evidence automatically makes a waiver involuntary.
  2. Suppress, because a juvenile cannot validly waive Miranda rights without a parent or guardian present.
  3. Admit, because the totality of circumstances shows a knowing waiver and the false-evidence tactic did not overcome D's will. (correct answer)
  4. Admit, because age, intelligence, and police deception are irrelevant to the validity of a Miranda waiver.
Explanation: Whenever you see a Miranda waiver challenge, remember the test is the totality of circumstances: was the waiver knowing, intelligent, and voluntary? For juveniles, courts weigh age, education, experience, and whether a parent was present—but no single factor is automatic. Here, D correctly restated his rights, showing he understood them, so the waiver was knowing. The police's false-evidence tactic is a relevant factor, but deception alone does not make a confession involuntary unless it overbore D's will. Given his prior police contact and ability to explain the rights, his will was not overcome, so the waiver stands. Why the wrong answers fail: The choice saying police deception automatically makes a waiver involuntary is wrong—deception is just one factor, not a per se rule. The choice that a juvenile cannot waive without a parent is also wrong; no absolute requirement exists. The choice that age, intelligence, and deception are irrelevant flips the rule—these are exactly the factors courts must consider, but here they do not tip the balance against admissibility. Finally, the correct answer acknowledges both the knowing waiver and the limited effect of the false-evidence tactic. On exam day, watch for absolutes like "automatically" or "cannot" in Miranda questions—they're usually traps. Instead, apply the totality test and ask whether the defendant understood the rights and was not coerced. For juveniles, note that a parent's absence hurts but does not invalidate a waiver.

Question 8

D was stopped by a department store security guard who was a retired police officer employed by the store. In a locked office, the guard told D he would be held until the police arrived and said, 'Just tell me what you took, and it will go easier for you.' D admitted stealing a watch. When the police arrived, the guard gave them D's statement. D moves to suppress it.

Should the court suppress D's statement?

  1. No, because the guard was a private actor, not a law-enforcement officer or agent, and Miranda does not govern private security questioning. (correct answer)
  2. Yes, because the guard's promise that it would go easier for D made the confession involuntary.
  3. Yes, because D was in custody and was interrogated by a security guard without Miranda warnings.
  4. No, because a private citizen who detains a suspect for the police stands in the same position as a police officer and may question the suspect without warnings.
Explanation: Whenever you see a Miranda question, your first instinct should be to ask: who is doing the interrogating? Miranda's warning requirement applies only to government actors—police officers or their agents. This question tests that "state action" threshold. Here, the guard is a retired cop, but he is employed by the store and acting in a private capacity. Because he is not a law-enforcement officer or an agent of the police (there is no evidence of police direction or pre-arrangement), Miranda simply does not apply. The statement is admissible, so the court should not suppress it. Now examine the traps. The choice claiming the promise that "it would go easier" makes the confession involuntary is wrong: a mere promise of leniency is not sufficiently coercive to render a confession involuntary under the Due Process totality-of-circumstances test—the guard's vague reassurance falls far short of a threat or physical coercion. The choice arguing suppression because D was in custody and interrogated without warnings misapplies Miranda—custody alone is insufficient; the interrogator must be a state actor, and this guard is not. Finally, the choice stating a private citizen who detains a suspect stands in the same position as a police officer is the exact opposite of the law; private citizens are not automatically converted into law enforcement merely by detaining someone for the police. Your study tip: always identify the interrogator's status first. If they are private, Miranda is off the table—focus instead on whether the statement was physically coerced or made under a true threat, not a vague promise of leniency.

Question 9

A grand jury witness was granted use and derivative-use immunity before testifying about a robbery. She nevertheless refused to answer, arguing that the grant was insufficient because the prosecutor could still charge her if he later found independent evidence. The court ordered her to testify, and she again refused.

Should the witness be held in contempt?

  1. No, because only a grant of transactional immunity can overcome the Fifth Amendment privilege.
  2. No, because use immunity does not protect the witness from prosecution based on leads derived from her testimony.
  3. Yes, because a grand jury witness has no Fifth Amendment privilege in a criminal investigation.
  4. Yes, because use and derivative-use immunity removes the compelled self-incrimination that the privilege forbids. (correct answer)
Explanation: Whenever you see a grand jury witness refusing to testify after being granted immunity, think about the Fifth Amendment and the scope of protection needed to compel testimony. The Supreme Court held in Kastigar that use and derivative-use immunity is sufficient: it places the witness in substantially the same position as if they had claimed the privilege, because the prosecution cannot use the compelled testimony or any leads derived from it. Here, the witness was granted exactly that protection. Her fear of prosecution based on independent evidence is not a valid objection—independent evidence is always permissible. Because she was ordered to testify and still refused, contempt is proper. The correct answer is yes, because use and derivative-use immunity removes the compelled self-incrimination the privilege forbids. Why the others fail: "Only transactional immunity" is wrong because the Constitution requires use immunity, not the broader transactional immunity. "Use immunity does not protect from leads" misstates the law—derivative-use immunity specifically bars leads from the testimony. "A grand jury witness has no Fifth Amendment privilege" is wrong; grand jury witnesses may invoke the privilege unless immunity is granted. The question tests whether you know that immunity, not its absence, is what makes refusal contemptible. Study tip: remember Kastigar—use/derivative-use immunity is enough; transactional immunity is a bonus, not a requirement.

Question 10

D was arrested and jailed on a charge of aggravated assault. While awaiting arraignment, an undercover police officer was placed in D's cell, dressed as an inmate. The officer said only, 'Rough night? What are you in for?' D replied, 'I didn't assault anyone, but I did kill a man in the park two months ago.' D had not been given Miranda warnings. At trial for the park murder, D moves to suppress the statement.

Should the court grant D's motion to suppress?

  1. Yes, because D was in custody and the officer's question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
  2. No, because D did not know he was speaking to a police officer, and the coercive atmosphere that Miranda was designed to counteract was absent. (correct answer)
  3. Yes, because once D was in custody on one charge, the state was required to give Miranda warnings before any agent questioned him about a separate crime.
  4. No, because the statement concerned a different crime from the one for which D was being held, so Miranda did not apply.
Explanation: Whenever a Miranda suppression motion arises, first determine whether the suspect was subjected to "interrogation" by someone the suspect knew to be a police officer. Miranda guards against coercion inherent in custodial police questioning. Here D was in custody, and the officer's question—"What are you in for?"—could be likely to elicit an incriminating response. But D did not know he was speaking to an officer; from his perspective, he was just talking to a fellow inmate in a jail cell. In that setting, the coercive pressure Miranda was designed to counteract is absent. So the statement is admissible, and the motion should be denied. The "yes" answer based on custody plus the officer's question being likely to elicit incrimination is tempting, but it ignores D's lack of awareness that he was speaking to the police. Similarly, the other "yes" answer—that once D was in custody on one charge, the state had to warn him before any agent questioned him about another crime—is too broad; an undercover officer is not "any agent" for Miranda purposes, and custody alone does not trigger the requirement. The "no" answer based on the statement concerning a different crime also misses the mark: Miranda can apply to questioning about unrelated crimes when the suspect knows he is dealing with the police; the different crime is not what makes D's statement admissible. The proper rationale is that D did not know his listener was an officer, so no police-dominated interrogation occurred. Remember for the exam: when a defendant confesses to an undercover officer, generally no Miranda warning is required. Ask whether the suspect perceived the listener as law enforcement—Miranda is about protecting against known police power, not preventing voluntary confessions to apparent cellmates.

Question 11

D was arrested for abducting a child and, after receiving Miranda warnings, said, 'I want a lawyer.' Questioning stopped. While two detectives drove D to jail, one remarked to the other, 'It's freezing out here. If the girl's coat is lying in those woods, some kid could find it and get hurt.' D then said, 'Turn around, I'll show you where I put her.' D moves to suppress.

Did the detective's remark constitute interrogation for Miranda purposes?

  1. Yes, because the detective should have known the remark was likely to elicit an incriminating response, and D had already invoked his right to counsel. (correct answer)
  2. No, because D, not the detective, initiated the exchange by choosing to speak.
  3. No, because the detective was speaking to another officer and did not ask D a question.
  4. Yes, because after a suspect invokes the right to counsel, any statement made in custody is inadmissible even if spontaneous.
Explanation: When you see a Miranda issue after a suspect has asked for a lawyer, focus on two things: Was the suspect in custody, and did the police interrogate? Once a suspect invokes counsel, interrogation must stop—but "interrogation" includes not only direct questions, also the "functional equivalent": words or actions police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Here, the detective's remark about a child possibly finding the girl's coat in the freezing woods was not casual chatter. It was designed to work on D's conscience and make him confess. Because the detective should have known the comment was likely to elicit an incriminating response—and D had already invoked his right to counsel—the statement must be suppressed. That is why the correct answer is the one describing that "should have known" standard. The first wrong answer, "D initiated the exchange by choosing to speak," is a trap. D did not initiate anything; the officer's remark was the deliberate trigger. The second wrong answer, "the detective was speaking to another officer," misses that interrogation does not require a direct question—functional equivalents count. The third wrong answer, "any statement made in custody is inadmissible even if spontaneous," is overbroad: truly spontaneous statements, not resulting from police pressure or interrogation, may be admissible. The key distinction is causation—police conduct reasonably likely to prompt the statement. Study tip: anytime police "talk to each other" within a suspect's hearing, suspect interrogation—the courts view that as a deliberate ploy.

Question 12

During a custodial interrogation, after receiving and waiving his Miranda rights, D said, 'Maybe I should talk to a lawyer or something, but I mean, I don't know.' The detective replied, 'I can't decide that for you. Do you want a lawyer now?' D said no and continued answering questions, eventually confessing. D moves to suppress the confession.

How should the court rule?

  1. Suppress, because D's reference to a lawyer was an invocation of his right to counsel and all questioning should have stopped immediately.
  2. Admit, because D's request was ambiguous and the detective properly asked a clarifying question before proceeding after D declined counsel. (correct answer)
  3. Suppress, because once D mentioned a lawyer while in custody, any subsequent waiver of Miranda rights is presumptively invalid.
  4. Admit, because a request for counsel made after a valid waiver is ineffective unless made in writing and signed.
Explanation: When you see a Miranda question about a request for counsel, the key is to ask whether the suspect made an unambiguous invocation. If the suspect clearly asks for a lawyer, all questioning must stop. But if the statement is ambiguous, the detective is allowed to clarify — and if the suspect then waives counsel, the statement may be admitted. Here, D said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer or something, but I mean, I don't know." That is not a clear, definite request for counsel; it is speculation. Because the detective properly responded by asking the clarifying question, "Do you want a lawyer now?" and D said no, D's continued answers were voluntary. The court should admit the confession. The incorrect answers are traps. "Suppress, because D's reference to a lawyer was an invocation" ignores the ambiguity — an equivocal mention is not an automatic invocation. "Suppress, because once D mentioned a lawyer any subsequent waiver is presumptively invalid" is wrong because there is no such presumption; what matters is whether the invocation was clear and whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary. "Admit, because a request for counsel made after a valid waiver is ineffective unless written and signed" is also wrong: a suspect can invoke counsel orally at any time, including after waiver, but D did not make a clear request here. Strategy: On the bar exam, distinguish "Maybe I should get a lawyer" / "I don't know" from "I want a lawyer" — vague expressions allow clarifying questions; clear expressions require stopping.