Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Competency Of Witness
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Competency Of WitnessQuestion 1 of 12

In a fraud trial, the plaintiff calls a fact witness, Grace, who states that she is willing to testify but refuses to swear or affirm an oath on a Bible because it conflicts with her religious beliefs. She says she will promise to tell the truth, and the judge asks her to make a solemn affirmation instead. Defendant objects, arguing that Grace has not been sworn and therefore is incompetent.

Which of the following is the most significant legal issue raised by the defendant's objection?

Whether requiring Grace to take the stand would violate her rights under the Free Exercise Clause if she refuses to swear on a Bible.
Whether Grace's credibility may be attacked by evidence of her religious beliefs.
Whether Grace may testify after making a nonreligious solemn affirmation instead of swearing on a Bible.
Whether Grace's testimony must be excluded because she refuses to take an oath or affirmation at all.
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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Competency Of Witness

Practice Competency Of Witness in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Competency Of Witness, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

In a fraud trial, the plaintiff calls a fact witness, Grace, who states that she is willing to testify but refuses to swear or affirm an oath on a Bible because it conflicts with her religious beliefs. She says she will promise to tell the truth, and the judge asks her to make a solemn affirmation instead. Defendant objects, arguing that Grace has not been sworn and therefore is incompetent.

Which of the following is the most significant legal issue raised by the defendant's objection?

  1. Whether requiring Grace to take the stand would violate her rights under the Free Exercise Clause if she refuses to swear on a Bible.
  2. Whether Grace's credibility may be attacked by evidence of her religious beliefs.
  3. Whether Grace may testify after making a nonreligious solemn affirmation instead of swearing on a Bible. (correct answer)
  4. Whether Grace's testimony must be excluded because she refuses to take an oath or affirmation at all.
Explanation: When a defendant objects to a witness's competence based on how the oath was administered, the key is Federal Rule of Evidence 603: every witness must declare that they will testify truthfully, "by oath or affirmation" in a form designed to impress that duty. The rule does not require a Bible, a specific religious ceremony, or even a belief in God. Here, Grace is willing to testify and has promised to tell the truth; she simply objects to swearing on a Bible because of her religious beliefs. The judge's request for a solemn affirmation directly addresses that concern, so the real issue is whether a nonreligious solemn affirmation satisfies the oath requirement. It does. The Free Exercise Clause argument is not the most significant issue because the court is accommodating Grace's beliefs, not forcing her to violate them. Evidence of her religious beliefs is also beside the point: under Rule 610, religious beliefs are not admissible to attack or support credibility. And the final option—that Grace must be excluded because she refuses to take any oath or affirmation—misreads the facts: she is willing to affirm, so she is not refusing to make a truth-telling declaration. When you see a witness-competency objection about oaths, remember: the form can be religious or nonreligious, as long as it is a solemn promise to tell the truth.

Question 2

After a federal jury convicts Diaz of bank robbery, Diaz moves for a new trial. In support, Diaz offers an affidavit from Juror Bell. Bell states that during deliberations Juror Chen said, 'I saw on the news last night that Diaz had been arrested for a bank robbery in another county.' Bell also states that this information 'was the main reason I changed my vote.' The government moves to strike the affidavit, and Diaz asks to call Bell to testify at the hearing on the motion.

Which issue is most directly raised by Diaz's attempt to call Bell at the hearing?

  1. Whether Bell may testify about the external information Chen said she had seen, rather than about how that information affected any juror's vote. (correct answer)
  2. Whether Bell's testimony about Chen's statement is barred by the hearsay rule because it repeats an out-of-court assertion.
  3. Whether Bell is incompetent to testify because she served as a juror in Diaz's trial and may not be called as a witness.
  4. Whether Chen's statement about Diaz's prior arrest is inadmissible because prior bad acts may not be used to prove propensity.
Explanation: Whenever a question asks about juror testimony after a verdict, anchor yourself in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b): a juror may not testify about internal deliberations or the effect of anything on any juror's vote, but may testify about extraneous prejudicial information introduced to the jury. Here, Bell's proposed testimony has two parts: Chen said she saw a news report about Diaz's prior arrest, and that information was "the main reason I changed my vote." The first part is exactly the kind of external information a juror may establish—the existence of outside information. The second part crosses the line into subjective effect, which 606(b) prohibits. Thus the direct issue is the scope of Bell's testimony: external information yes, impact on voting no. The hearsay choice misses the point because Chen's statement is not offered to prove the prior arrest happened; it is offered to show what outside information entered deliberations. The juror-incompetence choice is wrong because jurors are not categorically incompetent; 606(b) limits the subject matter of their testimony, not their capacity. Finally, the prior-bad-acts/propensity choice is an evidence-admissibility issue about proving Diaz's character, not about whether Bell may testify—and that rule is not the procedural barrier here. Study tip: on 606(b) questions, split the testimony into "what happened outside" versus "how it affected votes." The first is admissible; the second is barred.

Question 3

Rule 601 of this jurisdiction's Evidence Code provides: 'Competency Generally. (a) Every person is competent to be a witness unless these rules provide otherwise. (b) A witness is not competent if the court finds that the witness lacks the capacity to perceive, remember, communicate, or understand the duty to testify truthfully. (c) The burden of establishing incompetency is on the party challenging the witness. (d) A mental disease, defect, or intellectual disability is a factor to consider but does not by itself render a witness incompetent.'

In a robbery prosecution, the only eyewitness is the victim, who has been diagnosed with dementia. At a pretrial hearing, the victim testifies that she remembers the robber wore a red jacket and pointed a gun at her, but she cannot recall the date, the street address, or the prosecutor's name, and she sometimes calls the prosecutor 'my son.' She also states, 'I know I must tell the truth.' The defendant moves to exclude her testimony. What should the court do?

  1. Exclude the testimony, because a witness who cannot recall the date, street address, or prosecutor's name lacks the capacity to remember the event accurately.
  2. Admit the testimony, because the victim can perceive, remember, and communicate the core event and understands the duty to testify truthfully. (correct answer)
  3. Exclude the testimony, because dementia is a mental disease that renders a witness incompetent to testify in a criminal case.
  4. Admit the testimony, because the victim is the complaining witness and a crime victim is always competent to testify about the crime.
Explanation: Wheneveryou see a witness-competency question, your first move is to put aside concerns about credibility. Under Rule 601, the only question is whether the witness has the basic capacity to perceive, remember, communicate, and understand the duty to testify truthfully—not whether her story is accurate or complete. Here, the victim clearly recalls the robber's red jacket and the gun, and she affirmatively says she knows she must tell the truth. That satisfies the rule. Her inability to recall the date, address, or the prosecutor's name is a matter of the weight and credibility of her testimony, not her competency. The court should admit the testimony. The first wrong answer—that failure to recall those peripheral details shows a lack of capacity to remember the event accurately—conflates the capacity to remember with the quality of memory. The rule requires capacity, not perfect recall. The third wrong answer treats dementia as automatically disqualifying, but the rule explicitly says a mental disease is only a factor to consider, not a bar. The fourth wrong answer claims a crime victim is always competent, but competency never turns on status; it turns on the four capacities. The party challenging the witness bears the burden, and here the defendant has not met it. Your takeaway: distinguish competency from credibility. Gaps, confusion, or even misidentifications go to weight, not admissibility, unless they reveal a true lack of capacity to perceive or remember the core event.

Question 4

Rule 605 of this jurisdiction's Evidence Code provides: 'Competency of Judge as Witness. (a) The judge presiding at a trial may not testify as a witness in that trial. (b) No objection is necessary to preserve the point. (c) If the judge nevertheless testifies, the verdict or judgment may be set aside only if the complaining party demonstrates that the judge's testimony likely affected the outcome.'

While a personal-injury action was being tried before a jury, the judge happened to have been on the sidewalk when the collision occurred. Over no objection, the judge later took the witness stand in that trial and testified that the defendant ran a red light. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant moves for a new trial. What is the defendant's entitlement?

  1. The defendant is not entitled to a new trial because the judge had personal knowledge of the collision and was competent to testify.
  2. The defendant is not entitled to a new trial because the defendant failed to object when the judge testified, and the issue is therefore waived.
  3. The defendant is entitled to a new trial, but only if the defendant can show that the judge's testimony was false or the product of bias.
  4. The defendant is entitled to a new trial because the judge's testimony concerned the central disputed issue and no objection was necessary to preserve the issue. (correct answer)
Explanation: Whenever you see a judge testifying in a trial they are presiding over, your mind should immediately go to the absolute prohibition in Rule 605. This question tests the intersection of witness competency and error preservation. The rule creates a bright-line bar: the judge may not testify, period. Critically, it also creates an automatic exception to the requirement of a contemporaneous objection. The defendant is indeed entitled to a new trial. The judge testified that the defendant ran a red light, which is the exact central disputed issue in a personal-injury action. Because the judge's testimony went to the heart of the case, it likely affected the outcome, satisfying the rule's requirement for setting aside the verdict. Since the rule explicitly states that "no objection is necessary to preserve the point," the defendant's failure to object is irrelevant. Let's look at the distractors. The choice saying the judge had personal knowledge and was competent to testify is a trap—personal knowledge does not override the absolute incompetency created by Rule 605. The choice saying the defendant waived the issue by failing to object misreads the rule, which expressly dispenses with the objection requirement. Finally, the choice requiring a showing that the testimony was false or the product of bias is incorrect; the standard is whether it likely affected the outcome, not whether it was untruthful or biased. Your study tip here is to memorize the three prongs of Rule 605: (1) the absolute bar, (2) the automatic preservation, and (3) the "likely affected the outcome" remedy standard. On the exam, if a judge testifies, do not look for an objection—look for the impact on the verdict.

Question 5

Elena, an 86-year-old woman with dementia, was present when a car backing out of a parking space struck a pedestrian. At the time, she gave a detailed statement to police. Two years later, at trial, Elena sometimes cannot recall what she had for breakfast but says she clearly remembers the accident. The defendant moves to exclude her testimony, arguing she is incompetent.

Which of the following is the most significant legal issue raised by the defendant's motion?

  1. Whether Elena's prior statement to police is admissible as a present sense impression.
  2. Whether Elena may refresh her recollection with her prior police statement before testifying.
  3. Whether Elena's dementia and intermittent memory loss render her incompetent to testify at trial. (correct answer)
  4. Whether Elena's age-related dementia makes her testimony inherently unreliable as a matter of law.
Explanation: Whenever a defendant challenges a witness as incompetent, your focus should be on Federal Rule of Evidence 601 and the judge's gatekeeping role under Rule 104(a). Competency asks whether the witness has the capacity to perceive, recall, and communicate honestly—and whether she understands the duty to tell the truth. The most significant issue here is exactly that: whether Elena's dementia and intermittent memory loss render her incompetent to testify at trial. Her inability to remember breakfast does not automatically disqualify her; the court must assess whether, at the time of testimony, she can understand questions and relate what she remembers. If she can, her confidence and accuracy go to credibility, not admissibility. The distractor about Elena's prior statement as a present sense impression misses the point: that is a hearsay exception, not a competency inquiry. Similarly, refreshing recollection with the police statement is a technique used after a witness is on the stand and has a memory lapse; it does not resolve the threshold competency question. Finally, the suggestion that age-related dementia makes testimony inherently unreliable as a matter of law is a trap: no such automatic exclusion exists. Dementia may affect the weight a jury gives her testimony, but it does not make her legally incompetent. On questions like this, separate competency (for the judge) from credibility (for the jury). If the motion says "incompetent," the issue is capacity, not hearsay or reliability.

Question 6

Rule 603 of this jurisdiction's Evidence Code provides: 'Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation in a form designed to impress on the witness the duty to testify truthfully. No particular form, words, or religious belief is required. The form is sufficient if the witness expressly and unequivocally undertakes to testify truthfully. A witness who refuses to give any oath or affirmation may not testify.'

At trial, the defendant calls W, a proposed witness. When the judge asks W whether she will tell the truth, W answers: 'I don't swear or affirm because those words have religious meaning to me, but I will tell the truth, and I know I can be punished if I lie.' The plaintiff objects, arguing W has refused to take an oath or affirmation and is therefore incompetent. How should the court rule?

  1. Sustain the objection, because Rule 603 requires the witness to use the words 'oath' or 'affirmation' and W refused to do so.
  2. Overrule the objection, because W expressly and unequivocally undertook to testify truthfully, and no particular words or religious belief are required. (correct answer)
  3. Sustain the objection, because the form of the oath or affirmation is for the judge, not the witness, to decide, and W cannot dictate a different form.
  4. Overrule the objection, because a party may not object to the competency of an opposing party's witness; objections go only to the weight of the testimony.
Explanation: When you see an oath-or-affirmation issue under Rule 603, focus on whether the witness expressly and unequivocally committed to tell the truth, not on whether particular words were used. Here, W declined to say "swear" or "affirm" because those words had religious significance, but she immediately said she would tell the truth and knew she could be punished for lying. That is exactly what Rule 603 requires: no particular form, words, or religious belief is necessary, and an express unequivocal undertaking suffices. Thus the objection must be overruled. The plaintiff's contention that W refused to take any oath or affirmation is really about refusing to use those labels, but the rule does not mandate those words; an unequivocal undertaking is enough. The judge does control the oath process, but that does not mean a witness must use a prescribed formula; W was not dictating a different form, she was truthfully explaining why she could not use certain language while still committing to testify truthfully. Finally, the suggestion that a party cannot object to opposing witness competency is incorrect: a party may raise a Rule 603 objection because a witness who refuses to give any oath or affirmation may not testify, though here there was no refusal to give a sufficient affirmation.

Question 7

Priya filed a federal diversity action against the estate of Mateo, a former client. Priya alleges that, one month before Mateo died, Mateo orally promised to pay her $50,000 for bookkeeping services she would perform for his business during the next month. Priya performed the services, but Mateo died before paying her. Priya is the only living person who says she heard the promise. At trial, Mateo's estate objects when Priya begins to testify about her conversation with Mateo.

Which issue is most directly raised by the estate's objection?

  1. Whether Priya is an interested person whose testimony about a communication with a decedent is barred by the applicable state dead man's statute. (correct answer)
  2. Whether Priya's testimony about Mateo's promise is hearsay because it repeats an out-of-court statement by a declarant who is now unavailable.
  3. Whether Priya has personal knowledge of Mateo's promise when no writing or other witness corroborates her account.
  4. Whether Priya's testimony is barred by the best evidence rule because the alleged agreement was not reduced to a signed writing.
Explanation: When you see a party objecting to testimony about a conversation with someone who has died, immediately think: is this a dead man's statute issue? In federal diversity cases, state law supplies the rule of decision on witness competency, so a state statute may bar an interested person from testifying about a communication with a decedent. Priya is the plaintiff, she stands to benefit directly, and the estate is adverse—so the objection most directly raises whether she is an "interested person" barred from testifying about Mateo's oral promise. That is the key issue. The hearsay objection is a trap: Mateo's promise is a verbal act—the words themselves create the alleged contract—so it is not hearsay, and unavailability does not change that. The personal-knowledge objection also misses the mark: Priya has firsthand knowledge of the conversation; lack of corroboration affects credibility and weight, not admissibility. Finally, the best evidence rule applies only when proving the contents of a writing, not an oral agreement, and there is no writing requirement here. Your strategy: whenever a decedent's statement is at issue in a diversity case, check the state dead man's statute before considering hearsay or evidence rules. The objection is about the witness's interest in the outcome, not the reliability of the memory.

Question 8

Section 8 of this jurisdiction's Evidence Code provides: 'Competency — Transactions with Decedents. (a) In a civil action by or against a personal representative, heir, legatee, assignee, or other person claiming through a decedent, a party or any other person who has a direct financial interest in the outcome may not testify to a communication or transaction with the decedent. (b) This section does not disqualify a witness who is called by a party whose interest is adverse to the witness. (c) This section does not disqualify a witness who testifies about facts observed or statements made in the witness's presence that were not communications with the decedent.'

Decedent died, leaving her entire estate to her daughter, P. P, as personal representative, sues X to recover a valuable painting, claiming Decedent had loaned it to X. X claims Decedent gave it to her as a gift. At trial: (1) P testifies that Decedent told P, 'I am letting X borrow the painting; it is not a gift.' (2) X testifies that Decedent told X, 'I want you to have the painting.' (3) X calls her neighbor N, who was in the room when Decedent handed X the painting and said, 'It's yours.' N has no financial interest in the case. Which testimony is admissible under Section 8?

  1. Only N's testimony is admissible; P's and X's testimony is barred. (correct answer)
  2. P's and N's testimony is admissible; X's testimony is barred.
  3. X's and N's testimony is admissible; P's testimony is barred.
  4. All three witnesses are competent because Section 8 does not apply to actions to recover personal property.
Explanation: When you see a dead man's act question, your first step is to identify who is disqualified. The statute bars testimony from parties and anyone with a direct financial interest regarding communications or transactions with the decedent. Here, P is the personal representative and heir—she has a direct financial interest and is a party, so her testimony about Decedent's statement to her is barred. X is also a party with a direct financial interest, so her testimony about Decedent's gift statement is likewise barred. Now look at N. N is not a party and has no financial interest. Because the disqualification in subsection (a) applies only to parties and interested persons, N is automatically competent. Subsection (c) is a red herring: it provides an exception for witnesses who would otherwise be disqualified (e.g., those with an interest) to testify about observed facts or statements made in their presence, but N doesn't need that exception because she isn't disqualified in the first place. Therefore, only N's testimony is admissible. The choice claiming P's and N's testimony is admissible while X's is barred fails because P is barred. The choice claiming X's and N's testimony is admissible while P's is barred fails because X is barred. The choice claiming all three are competent because Section 8 doesn't apply to actions to recover personal property is incorrect—the statute applies to all civil actions by or against a personal representative, regardless of the property type. The key takeaway: always check the witness's status first—if they lack a financial interest, the dead man's act simply doesn't apply to them.

Question 9

Rule 606(b) of this jurisdiction's Evidence Code provides: 'Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a juror may not testify as to any statement made or incident occurring during the jury's deliberations, or as to the effect of anything on the juror's or another juror's mind, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.'

After a verdict for the defendant in a personal-injury action, the plaintiff moves for a new trial and submits an affidavit from Juror 5. The affidavit states: 'During deliberations, Juror 3 said that she had personally driven through the intersection at the same time of day and had timed the traffic light, and she told us the light was yellow when the plaintiff entered. Several jurors then said that this resolved the case.' Which portion of the affidavit, if any, is admissible under Rule 606(b)?

  1. The entire affidavit is admissible because it describes an outside influence improperly brought to bear on a juror.
  2. The entire affidavit is inadmissible because it describes statements made during deliberations and the effect of those statements on the jurors.
  3. The portion describing Juror 3's out-of-court experiment is admissible as extraneous prejudicial information; the portion describing the other jurors' reactions is inadmissible as deliberative process. (correct answer)
  4. The portion describing Juror 3's statement is inadmissible because it was made during deliberations; the portion describing the other jurors' reactions is admissible because it shows the effect of extraneous information.
Explanation: Rule 606(b) draws a sharp line between the jury's internal deliberative process—statements, arguments, and the effect they had on jurors' minds—and external contamination, such as extraneous prejudicial information or outside influences. When you see a juror affidavit, first classify each statement: does it describe information that came from outside the trial, or does it describe the jury's internal reasoning? Here, Juror 3's personal trip to the intersection and timing of the traffic light was an out-of-court investigation. That is classic extraneous prejudicial information: it injected new evidence into deliberations that the plaintiff never had the chance to confront or cross-examine. Therefore, the portion recounting Juror 3's experiment is admissible to show that extraneous information was improperly brought to the jury's attention. However, the rest of the affidavit—that several jurors then said "this resolved the case"—is exactly what Rule 606(b) protects: the effect of that information on the jurors' minds and the course of deliberations. That portion is inadmissible. The first wrong answer, claiming the entire affidavit is admissible as an outside influence, mislabels the source: a juror's own investigation is extraneous information, not an outside influence, and the deliberative reactions remain barred. The second wrong answer, excluding the entire affidavit, ignores the explicit exception for extraneous prejudicial information. The final wrong answer reverses the rule: Juror 3's statement is admissible as extraneous information, while the reactions are inadmissible deliberative process. On exam day, ask: is this evidence about what outsiders or experiments brought in, or about how the jury processed it? The former is admissible; the latter is not.

Question 10

Judge Morrow was standing at a street corner when she saw a delivery van run a red light and collide with a bicyclist. She later was assigned to preside over the resulting civil negligence trial. At trial, plaintiff's counsel asks to call Judge Morrow as a fact witness to describe what she observed. Defense counsel objects.

Which of the following is the most significant legal issue raised by the defense objection?

  1. Whether Judge Morrow has personal knowledge of the accident sufficient to testify as a lay witness.
  2. Whether Judge Morrow, as the presiding judge, may testify as a witness in the trial. (correct answer)
  3. Whether Judge Morrow's testimony must be excluded because it is cumulative of other eyewitness testimony.
  4. Whether Judge Morrow's testimony about the accident is barred by the best evidence rule.
Explanation: When you see a question about a judge as a witness, stop thinking about ordinary evidentiary rules and focus on the judge's role. The most significant issue here is not whether Judge Morrow saw the accident, but whether she—as the presiding judge—may testify at all. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 605, the presiding judge may not testifyas a witness in the trial. That rule is absolute: it protects judicial impartiality andthe appearance of fairness, even when the judge has relevant personal knowledge. So why not the other choices? Whether Judge Morrow has personal knowledge is a legitimate lay-witness requirement, but she actually has personal knowledge—she saw the crash. Rule 605 overrides that; she cannot testify regardless. Whether her testimony is cumulative is also a distraction: under Rule 403, cumulative evidence can be excluded, but that is discretionary and secondary. The judge-as-witness bar is a complete prohibition, not a balancing call. Whether the best evidence rule applies is a classic trap: that rule concerns proving the content of a writing, not describing an observed accident. Eyewitness testimony about the collision has nothing to do with the best evidence rule. Therefore, when defensecounsel objects, the threshold legal problem is whether the presiding judge can be both judge and witness—and under Rule 605, she cannot. On an evidence question like this, immediately identify the role of the witness; if the witness is the presiding judge, Rule 605 is your answer.

Question 11

Rule 601 of this jurisdiction's Evidence Code provides: 'Competency — Personal Knowledge. (a) A witness may testify only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness personally perceived the matter through one of the five senses. (b) The witness's own testimony that the witness perceived the matter is sufficient evidence of personal knowledge. (c) A witness may testify in the form of an inference or opinion if the inference is rationally based on the witness's perception and would be helpful to the trier of fact.'

In a negligence action arising from a two-car collision at an intersection, the plaintiff calls W. W testifies that he was inside a coffee shop near the intersection when he heard screeching tires and a loud crash. He ran outside and saw two damaged cars: one stopped just past the intersection and the other in the crosswalk. W admits he did not see either car before or during the collision. The plaintiff asks W, 'In your opinion, was the car that ended up in the crosswalk traveling above the speed limit when it entered the intersection?' The defendant objects on the ground that W lacks personal knowledge. How should the court rule?

  1. Sustain the objection, because W's proposed opinion is not rationally based on what W perceived; he did not observe the car in motion and the opinion would be speculative. (correct answer)
  2. Sustain the objection, because W did not see the collision and is therefore incompetent to testify about any aspect of the accident.
  3. Overrule the objection, because W's own testimony that he heard the crash and saw the aftermath is sufficient to establish personal knowledge, and the opinion would be helpful.
  4. Overrule the objection, because Rule 601 permits lay witnesses to give any opinion that would help the trier of fact determine negligence.
Explanation: Whenever you see a lay-opinion question, focus on Rule 601's two-part test: the witness must have personal knowledge, and any opinion must be rationally based on that personal knowledge. Here, W's proposed opinion about the car's speed when entering the intersection fails the second part. He perceived only sounds and the post-collision positions of the cars, not the car traveling into the intersection. Estimating speed from the aftermath would be pure speculation, so the objection should be sustained. That is also why the choice saying W's own testimony and a helpful opinion are enough is wrong: helpfulness cannot replace the rational-basis requirement. Similarly, the choice saying Rule 601 permits any opinion that would help the trier of fact overstates the rule and ignores the perception requirement. The remaining wrong choice—that W is incompetent to testify about any aspect because he did not see the collision—is too broad. W can competently testify about what he did perceive: the screeching tires, crash, and final positions of the cars. He just cannot offer an opinion about speed before impact. On exam day, separate "personal knowledge to testify" from "rational basis to opine"; a witness can be competent on some topics and still lack an adequate foundation for a particular opinion.

Question 12

After a jury verdict for the plaintiff in a civil fraud case, the defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, attaching an affidavit from a juror. The affidavit said that during deliberations, another juror said he had read an internet posting about the defendant's unrelated fraud lawsuit. The plaintiff moved to strike the affidavit.

Which of the following is the most significant issue raised by the plaintiff's motion to strike?

  1. Whether the internet posting is admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule.
  2. Whether a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be supported by affidavits.
  3. Whether the defendant's alleged unrelated fraud is admissible as character evidence.
  4. Whether a juror may testify by affidavit about extraneous prejudicial information brought to the jury's attention. (correct answer)
Explanation: Whenever you see a juror affidavit or testimony about jury deliberations, your mind should go to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). That rule generally bars jurors from testifying about statements made during deliberations, but it creates a key exception: a juror may testify about extraneous prejudicial information brought to the jury's attention. Here, the affidavit describes another juror reading an internet posting about the defendant's unrelated fraud lawsuit. That is exactly the kind of outside information the exception covers, so the central dispute is whether a juror may testify by affidavit about extraneous prejudicial information. That is why the correct answer is framed that way. The public records exception is a red herring: the affidavit is not hearsay offered to prove the truth of the internet posting, and the posting's admissibility is not what the plaintiff moved to strike. Whether a JNOV may be supported by affidavits also misses the point, because JNOV generally tests the legal sufficiency of the trial evidence, not jury misconduct. The unrelated fraud as character evidence is similarly irrelevant; the affidavit is about what a juror read, not about proving the defendant's propensity. Remember the 606(b) roadmap: distinguish internal deliberations from outside information. If the juror reveals extraneous prejudicial information, the affidavit may be considered—but not to show how that information affected the jurors' votes.