Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Comparative Negligence And Assumption Of Risk

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Comparative Negligence And Assumption Of RiskQuestion 1 of 20

§ 31-7 Comparative Fault.

(a) In any action for personal injury, the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of fault of the claimant and of each defendant.

(b) A defendant is liable for damages in proportion to the percentage of fault attributed to that defendant only if that defendant's percentage of fault is greater than the claimant's percentage of fault.

(c) The claimant bears the claimant's own percentage of fault, and no defendant is liable for damages attributable to the fault of any other person.

P was injured when D1's car rear-ended D2's car, which then struck P. At trial, the jury found P 40% at fault, D1 45% at fault, and D2 15% at fault. P's damages were $200,000. The court applied § 31-7.

Under § 31-7, what total amount may P recover from D1 and D2?

$90,000 from D1 and $30,000 from D2, because each defendant pays its assigned percentage.

$90,000 from D1 only, because D1's fault exceeds P's but D2's fault does not.

$120,000 jointly and severally from D1 and D2, because P's fault is less than the defendants' combined fault.

Nothing, because P's fault is greater than D2's fault and therefore the entire action is barred.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Comparative Negligence And Assumption Of Risk

Practice Comparative Negligence And Assumption Of Risk in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Comparative Negligence And Assumption Of Risk, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

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Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

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Question 1

§ 31-7 Comparative Fault.

(a) In any action for personal injury, the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of fault of the claimant and of each defendant.

(c) The claimant bears the claimant's own percentage of fault, and no defendant is liable for damages attributable to the fault of any other person.

Under § 31-7, what total amount may P recover from D1 and D2?

$90,000 from D1 and $30,000 from D2, because each defendant pays its assigned percentage.
$90,000 from D1 only, because D1's fault exceeds P's but D2's fault does not. (correct answer)
$120,000 jointly and severally from D1 and D2, because P's fault is less than the defendants' combined fault.
Nothing, because P's fault is greater than D2's fault and therefore the entire action is barred.

Explanation: This question tests modified comparative fault with an individual comparison rule: a defendant pays only if that defendant's own fault percentage exceeds the claimant's. So the key is to compare each defendant separately with P, not to combine defendants. Here, P was 40% at fault, D1 45%, and D2 15%. Since D1's 45% is greater than P's 40%, D1 is liable for its proportional share: 45% of $200,000 = $90,000. D2's 15%, however, is not greater than P's 40%, so D2 is not liable at all. Also, because the statute says no defendant is liable for damages attributable to any other person, liability is several, not joint. Thus P's total recovery is $90,000 from D1 only. The choice saying “$90,000 from D1 and

30,000 from D2” is wrong because it assumes every defendant automatically pays its assigned percentage; but the statute conditions liability on exceeding the claimant’s fault. The choice offering “

120,000 jointly and severally" is wrong because it incorrectly compares P's fault to the defendants' combined fault (60% > 40%) and then imposes joint liability; the statute requires individual comparison and disallows shifting another defendant's share. The choice saying "nothing" is wrong because P's fault being greater than D2's does not bar recovery from D1; this isn't contributory negligence. The remaining choice, the one limiting recovery to $90,000 from D1, is correct. Study tip: when a comparative-fault statute says a defendant is liable only if its fault is greater than the claimant's, compare each defendant individually to the claimant — never combine defendants' fault and never assume all at-fault parties pay.

Question 2

Reyes v. City: In this jurisdiction, comparative negligence is pure: a plaintiff's damages are reduced by the plaintiff's percentage of fault, and a plaintiff may recover even when the plaintiff's fault exceeds the defendant's. The separate defense of implied assumption of risk is abolished. If a plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily encounters a known risk created or increased by the defendant's breach of duty, that conduct is included in the plaintiff's percentage of fault. Primary assumption of risk, where the defendant owed no duty, remains a complete bar.

P went to D's municipal pool. D posted a 'No Diving' sign, but no lifeguard was on duty, in violation of a state regulation requiring one. P saw the sign and dove headfirst into the shallow end to retrieve a dropped phone. P struck his head and, because no lifeguard was present, remained underwater for several minutes before being rescued, worsening his injury. The jury found P 75% at fault and D 25% at fault and determined P's damages to be $1,000,000.

Under the rule in Reyes, what amount should P recover?

Nothing, because P's 75% fault is greater than D's 25% fault.
Nothing, because P knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risk of diving into shallow water.
$250,000, because P's recovery is reduced by his 75% fault and implied assumption of risk is not a separate bar. (correct answer)
$750,000, because D's violation of the lifeguard regulation requires D to pay the full amount despite P's fault.

Explanation: Whenever you see a comparative negligence question, first identify whether the jurisdiction applies pure or modified rules. Under pure comparative negligence, any percentage of fault assigned to the defendant keeps the door open to recovery, even if the plaintiff is mostly at fault. In Reyes, that is exactly the rule: P's damages are reduced by P's own fault percentage, but not eliminated. Here, the jury assigned P 75% fault and D 25%, with damages of $1,000,000. Pure comparative negligence reduces P’s recovery by 75%, leaving $250,000. The key is that implied assumption of risk is abolished, so P's decision to dive despite the "No Diving" sign does not act as a separate complete defense. Instead, that knowing conduct is simply included in the 75% fault calculation. Primary assumption of risk is not at issue because D owed P a duty and breached it by failing to provide a lifeguard. The "nothing because P's fault exceeds D's" answer describes the old contributory negligence or modified comparative fault rule, not the pure rule stated. The "nothing because P knowingly assumed risk" treats implied assumption of risk as an independent bar, which Reyes explicitly abolishes. The "$750,000 because D violated the regulation" ignores comparative fault; a statutory violation may establish breach, but it does not erase P's own negligence. For the exam, remember: when implied assumption of risk is merged into comparative fault, never use it as a separate bar — simply fold the plaintiff's conduct into the percentage and reduce damages.

Question 3

Velazquez v. Service Center: A defendant who negligently creates a peril owes a duty to a plaintiff who reasonably attempts to rescue a person endangered by that peril. A plaintiff's knowing and voluntary exposure to danger is treated as comparative fault only if the plaintiff's decision to encounter the risk was unreasonable. A reasonable rescue is not fault and does not reduce damages.

P was walking past a parking lot when a car burst into flames because D's mechanic had negligently repaired the car's fuel line. The driver was trapped inside. P ran to the car and pulled the driver to safety, but P suffered burns. P knew the car was on fire and that entering it was dangerous. D raised the defense of implied assumption of risk.

Under the rule in Velazquez, which statement best describes P's recovery?

Nothing, because P knowingly assumed the risk of being burned by the fire.
Nothing, because rescuers are owed no duty when they voluntarily enter a dangerous situation.
P's damages will be reduced by the percentage of fault attributed to his decision to enter the burning car.
P may recover full damages, because his voluntary encounter with the risk was a reasonable rescue and not fault. (correct answer)

Explanation: When you see a rescue-injury question, start by asking whether the defendant negligently created the peril and whether the plaintiff's rescue attempt was reasonable. Here, D's mechanic negligently repaired the fuel line, causing the car to burst into flames and trapping the driver—so D created the peril. The rescue doctrine makes a rescuer a foreseeable plaintiff, meaning D owes a duty. P's recovery is full because his decision to enter the burning car was a reasonable rescue. The rule in Velazquez says knowing and voluntary exposure to danger is treated as comparative fault only if the decision to encounter the risk was unreasonable. P knew the fire was dangerous, but the driver was trapped and P pulled him to safety—that is a classic reasonable rescue, not fault. The "nothing, because P knowingly assumed the risk" choice misreads knowledge as consent. But implied assumption of risk is not an absolute bar when the rescue is reasonable. The "nothing, because rescuers are owed no duty" choice contradicts the rescue doctrine: voluntarily entering danger does not extinguish the duty; it is exactly the foreseeable harm the rule protects. The "damages reduced by percentage of fault" choice also fails because comparative fault applies only to unreasonable risk decisions, and P's choice was reasonable. Study tip: on bar-exam torts questions, separate knowledge of danger from unreasonable assumption of risk. A rescuer's awareness of fire does not bar recovery—the pivotal question is whether the rescue itself was reasonable.

Question 4

§ 15-9 Comparative Fault.

(a) The trier of fact shall determine the percentage of fault of the claimant and of every other person who contributed to the injury, whether or not that person is a party or has settled with the claimant.

(b) A claimant is barred from recovery only if the claimant's percentage of fault is greater than the combined percentage of fault of all other persons who contributed to the injury.

(c) A defendant is liable only for the percentage of fault attributed to that defendant. Fault attributed to a settling person shall not be reallocated to any defendant.

P was injured when D1's truck collided with D2's car. Before trial, P settled with D1 for $70,000 and dismissed the claim against D1, then proceeded against D2. The jury found P 40% at fault, D1 35% at fault, and D2 25% at fault. P's damages were $200,000.

Under § 15-9, what amount may P recover from D2?

Nothing, because P's 40% fault is greater than D2's 25% fault, so the action against D2 is barred.
$50,000, because D2 is severally liable for its 25% share and P's fault is compared with the combined 60% fault of D1 and D2. (correct answer)
$120,000, because D2 must pay the combined 60% fault of D1 and D2 after D1's settlement.
$200,000, because D1's settlement leaves D2 as the only defendant and comparative fault no longer applies.

Explanation: When you see a comparative fault statute alongside a settlement, your brain should immediately lock onto two distinct rules: the barring threshold (comparing the claimant to everyone else combined) and the several liability rule (each defendant pays only their own percentage, with no reallocation of settled shares). Here, P's 40% fault is not greater than the combined 60% fault of D1 and D2, so the claim against D2 is not barred. Because the statute explicitly states that fault attributed to a settling person is never reallocated, D2 is liable only for its own 25% share. Calculating that share gives you

200,000 \times 25\% = \$50,000

, which D2 must pay. The fact that P already settled with D1 for $70,000 is irrelevant to D2's several liability calculation under this statute. Now, address the traps. The choice saying "Nothing, because P's 40% fault is greater than D2's 25% fault" misreads the statute—it compares P against the combined fault of all others, not just the remaining defendant. The choice claiming D2 must pay the combined 60% ($120,000) directly violates subsection (c)'s prohibition on reallocating the settled person's fault. Finally, the choice for the full $200,000 wrongly assumes comparative fault evaporates when one defendant settles; the statute specifically contemplates settlements and still applies the jury's fault percentages. Your study tip: when a comparative fault statute has a settlement, always run two separate calculations—first check if P is barred (P vs. all others), then calculate the defendant's share (defendant % × damages). Never let a settlement inflate a non-settling defendant's liability.

Question 5

Copeland v. Fairgrounds: This jurisdiction applies pure comparative fault. An express assumption of risk requires an explicit agreement or written waiver acknowledging the specific risk; a general warning such as 'ride at your own risk' does not by itself bar recovery. If no express agreement exists, implied assumption of risk is either primary or secondary. Primary implied assumption applies when the defendant owes no duty because the risk is inherent in the activity and was not increased by the defendant; it bars recovery. Secondary implied assumption applies when the defendant's negligence created or increased the risk and the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily encountered that risk; it is merged into comparative fault and only reduces recovery.

P rode D's roller coaster. At the entrance, a sign read 'Warning: This ride has sharp turns and sudden drops. Ride at your own risk.' P also knew from news reports that the coaster had derailed twice in the past because of loose bolts, but he chose to ride anyway. During the ride, the coaster derailed because D's maintenance crew had failed to tighten a bolt. P was injured and sued D, who raised assumption of risk.

Under the rule in Copeland, which statement best describes D's liability?

D is not liable because the derailment was an inherent risk of the ride and P assumed that risk.
D is not liable because P expressly assumed the risk by choosing to ride after reading the sign.
P's recovery will be reduced, but not barred, if the jury attributes fault to P for knowingly riding despite the prior derailments. (correct answer)
P may recover full damages because the sign did not specifically warn of loose bolts.

Explanation: When you see an assumption-of-risk question, first classify the waiver: is it an express agreement with specific risk, or a general warning? Under Copeland, only an explicit waiver acknowledging the specific risk bars recovery. The sign here is a general warning—it doesn't mention loose bolts or derailments—so it cannot be express assumption. That eliminates the second choice. Next, determine whether implied assumption is primary or secondary. Primary implied applies when the defendant owes no duty because the risk is inherent and not increased by the defendant. But D's maintenance crew failed to tighten a bolt—that is negligence that created the risk. So primary implied does not apply; the derailment wasn't an inherent risk of roller coasters—it was a product of D's carelessness. That eliminates the first choice. Because D's negligence increased the risk, and P knowingly rode despite knowing about prior derailments from loose bolts, this is secondary implied assumption. Under pure comparative fault, secondary implied is merged into fault allocation—it reduces recovery but does not bar it. Thus, the correct answer is that P's recovery will be reduced, not barred, if the jury attributes fault to him. The last choice is wrong because full recovery is barred? Actually no—full recovery would be allowed only if P had no fault, but here he knowingly encountered the risk, so reduction is appropriate. And the sign's lack of specificity doesn't give full recovery; it just means no express bar. Study tip: Always separate the duty question (primary) from the comparative-fault question (secondary). Primary is a complete defense; secondary is just a reduction. Also, a warning sign alone never creates express assumption unless it identifies the exact risk.

Question 6

A man bought an all-purpose cleaner and began using it in a small bathroom with the door closed and the window shut. The label instructed: 'Use only in well-ventilated areas.' The man did not read the label. He became dizzy and fell, injuring his shoulder. He sues the manufacturer, claiming the cleaner was defective because the warning was not prominent enough.

Which defense is most likely to reduce the man's recovery?

Express assumption of risk, because the label contained a warning.
Secondary implied assumption of risk, because he voluntarily used the cleaner in a closed room.
Comparative negligence, because his failure to read the label contributed to his injury. (correct answer)
Contributory negligence, because the warning was on the label.

Explanation: Whenever you see a product-defect claim based on an inadequate warning, separate two issues: was the warning defective, and did the plaintiff's own conduct contribute? In a comparative-fault jurisdiction, even if the warning was too weak to make the cleaner defective, the man's failure to read the label he did see can reduce his recovery proportionately. The most likely defense is comparative negligence, because his injury occurred after he ignored an express instruction to use the product only in well-ventilated areas. His admitted failure to read the label was a cause of his dizziness and fall, so a jury could allocate a percentage of fault to him, reducing damages. Express assumption of risk fails because he did not read the label, so he never knowingly agreed to accept the danger. Secondary implied assumption of risk also requires actual knowledge of the risk plus voluntary exposure; using a cleaner in a closed bathroom without reading warnings is not an informed choice. Contributory negligence is the old bar-to-recovery rule, and merely having a warning on the label does not automatically constitute contributory negligence—especially when the alleged defect is that the warning was not prominent enough. Study tip: on torts questions, ask first whether the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the risk. If not, assumption of risk cannot apply; the likely defense is comparative negligence based on unreasonable failure to read or investigate.

Question 7

A driver was injured in a collision caused by another driver running a red light. The driver was not wearing a seatbelt, and the evidence shows the collision would have caused only minor injuries if the seatbelt had been worn. The driver sues the other driver for negligence.

Which legal issue is most directly raised by the evidence about the seatbelt?

Avoidable consequences, because the driver failed to mitigate damages after the collision.
Comparative negligence, because the driver's failure to wear a seatbelt contributed to the severity of her injuries. (correct answer)
Assumption of risk, because the driver knew seatbelts reduce the risk of injury.
Superseding cause, because the lack of a seatbelt caused the injuries rather than the collision.

Explanation: Whenever you see evidence about the plaintiff's own conduct in a tort case, ask two questions: Did the conduct contribute to the accident itself, or only to the injuries? And did it happen before or after the collision? Here, the seatbelt evidence raises the issue of plaintiff fault before the accident: the driver's failure to wear a seatbelt did not cause the collision, but it made her injuries worse. That makes comparative negligence, because the driver's failure to wear a seatbelt contributed to the severity of her injuries, the correct choice. Under comparative negligence, a plaintiff's recovery is reduced by the percentage her own fault contributed to the harm. Many jurisdictions apply this "seatbelt defense" to reduce damages when the failure to buckle up worsened the injury. Avoidable consequences, because the driver failed to mitigate damages after the collision is wrong because avoidable consequences concerns post-accident conduct, like failing to seek medical treatment or unreasonably increasing damages after the injury occurred. Not wearing a seatbelt is pre-accident conduct. Assumption of risk, because the driver knew seatbelts reduce the risk of injury is wrong because assumption of risk requires knowingly and voluntarily encountering a known danger—not merely knowing that seatbelts protect you. Superseding cause, because the lack of a seatbelt caused the injuries rather than the collision is wrong because the defendant's negligence was still the cause of the collision; the lack of a seatbelt aggravated the injuries but did not break the causal chain. Study tip: distinguish "failure to mitigate after" from "contributing fault before"—that timing is the key to this exam trap.

Question 8

§ 23-4 Comparative Negligence.

(a) The trier of fact shall determine the percentage of negligence of the plaintiff and of each defendant.

(b) The plaintiff may not recover if the plaintiff's percentage of negligence is not less than the combined percentage of negligence of all defendants.

(c) If the plaintiff is not barred under subsection (b), the plaintiff's damages shall be diminished in proportion to the plaintiff's percentage of negligence.

P was injured when D1's car and D2's car both struck P. The jury found P 50% negligent, D1 30% negligent, and D2 20% negligent. P's damages were $100,000. D1 and D2 are severally liable for their own percentages of fault.

Under § 23-4, what amount, if any, may P recover from D1 and D2?

Nothing, because P's 50% negligence is not less than the defendants' combined 50% negligence. (correct answer)
$50,000, because P's negligence is equal to, not greater than, the defendants' combined negligence.
$30,000 from D1 and $20,000 from D2, because each defendant is severally liable for its own percentage.
$50,000, jointly and severally from D1 and D2, because P's negligence is no greater than the defendants' combined negligence.

Explanation: This question tests the threshold bar in a comparative negligence statute. When you see a comparative fault question, first compare the plaintiff's negligence to the combined negligence of all defendants before doing any damages math. Here, the jury assigned P 50% and D1 and D2 a combined 50%. Under § 23-4(b), the plaintiff may not recover if his percentage "is not less than" the defendants' combined percentage. "Not less than" includes equal to, so P's 50% is exactly at the bar. Therefore P cannot recover anything, regardless of the $100,000 damages or how fault is allocated. The choice proposing $50,000 because P's negligence is "equal to, not greater than" the defendants' misses the statutory language: equality is disqualifying. The choice proposing $30,000 from D1 and $20,000 from D2 ignores that several liability only applies after the plaintiff clears the subsection (b) threshold. Likewise, the choice proposing $50,000 jointly and severally fails for the same reason and also imports a joint-and-several rule not stated in the statute. The first choice—nothing, because P's 50% is not less than the combined 50%—is the only one that enforces the threshold correctly. Your study tip: on comparative negligence questions, circle "not less than," "greater than," or "equal to" phrases. A 50/50 split usually bars recovery when the statute says "not less than," but would allow it if it said "greater than."

Question 9

A cyclist was struck by a car when she rode through a stop sign. The driver was exceeding the speed limit. At trial, the jury finds the cyclist 60% at fault and the driver 40% at fault. The cyclist sues the driver for her medical expenses.

Which legal issue is most significant in determining whether the cyclist can recover any damages?

Whether the driver's speeding was a proximate cause of the collision.
Whether the jurisdiction's comparative negligence law is pure or modified. (correct answer)
Whether the cyclist's failure to stop was a criminal offense.
Whether the driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision.

Explanation: Whenever you see a jury apportioning fault between a plaintiff and defendant, your first instinct should be to ask how that jurisdiction's comparative negligence system handles the assigned percentages. That is exactly the pivotal issue here. The jury found the cyclist 60% at fault and the driver 40% at fault. If the jurisdiction applies pure comparative negligence, the cyclist can recover damages reduced by her own percentage of fault—meaning she would recover 40% of her medical expenses. However, if the jurisdiction applies modified comparative negligence (which often bars recovery when the plaintiff is 50% or more at fault), her 60% fault completely bars any recovery. Thus, the distinction between pure and modified rules is the most significant legal issue in determining whether she gets any damages. The other choices are distractors. Whether the driver's speeding was a proximate cause is already established by the jury's 40% fault finding; causation is not the barrier to recovery here. Whether the cyclist's failure to stop was a criminal offense is irrelevant to civil damages—while it could support a negligence per se claim against her, the question is about her recovery, not criminal liability. Finally, whether the driver had the last clear chance is a doctrine used to defeat a contributory negligence bar, but it does not apply to override a comparative fault allocation. Study tip: On bar exam torts questions, whenever you see specific fault percentages, immediately check the jurisdiction's rule. Look for clues like "pure" or "modified" and the exact threshold (e.g., 50% vs. 51%) to determine if the plaintiff is completely barred or just proportionally reduced.

Question 10

A pedestrian was struck by a delivery van while crossing a four-lane road at 11:30 p.m. The pedestrian was wearing dark clothing, was outside a marked crosswalk, and was looking at her phone. The driver was talking on a hands-free phone and did not see her until impact. The driver's employer admits that the driver was negligent but argues that the pedestrian's own conduct should reduce any damages award.

Which legal doctrine is most directly raised by the employer's argument?

Comparative negligence, because the pedestrian's carelessness contributed to her injuries. (correct answer)
Contributory negligence, because the pedestrian violated the rules of the road.
Express assumption of risk, because the pedestrian voluntarily walked into traffic.
Last clear chance, because the driver could have avoided the collision if attentive.

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about apportioning fault in a negligence case, ask: Does the jurisdiction reduce the plaintiff's recovery based on their own carelessness, or does it bar recovery entirely? That distinction is the heart of comparative versus contributory negligence. Here, the employer admits the driver was negligent but argues the pedestrian's conduct—wearing dark clothing, jaywalking, using her phone—should reduce damages. That argument most directly raises comparative negligence, because it asserts the pedestrian's own carelessness contributed to her injuries, and the doctrine reduces recovery in proportion to fault. The facts clearly show the pedestrian breached her duty of reasonable care, and the employer is not claiming a complete bar but a reduction. Contributory negligence is wrong because it would completely bar recovery, not merely reduce it—and many jurisdictions have replaced it with comparative negligence. The pedestrian's violation of rules of the road is evidence of negligence, but it doesn't automatically trigger a different doctrine. Express assumption of risk fails because that requires a voluntary, knowing waiver of a specific risk (e.g., signing a waiver)—walking into traffic while distracted is not an express agreement. Last clear chance is also incorrect: that doctrine lets a negligent plaintiff recover if the defendant had the final opportunity to avoid harm. Here, the driver could have avoided the collision if attentive, but that doctrine applies after the defendant is negligent and usually overcomes contributory negligence—not the employer's argument, which seeks to reduce, not rescue, the plaintiff's claim. Study tip: On the bar, watch for words like "reduce" versus "bar"—they signal comparative vs. contributory negligence. Also, distinguish "express" assumption of risk (contract/waiver) from "implied" (voluntary exposure). Practice spotting which doctrine the defendant is invoking, not just the general theory.

Question 11

A factory worker was injured when a conveyor belt malfunctioned because its safety guard was missing. The worker had complained about the missing guard, and the supervisor said a replacement had been ordered and told the worker to keep working until it arrived. The worker continued to work near the belt because she was afraid she would be fired if she refused. She sues the factory.

Which issue is most significant in evaluating the factory's defense that the worker assumed the risk?

Whether the worker knew the guard was missing.
Whether the worker had complained to anyone other than the supervisor.
Whether the supervisor's promise to replace the guard was written or oral.
Whether the worker's continued work was voluntary or compelled by fear of losing her job. (correct answer)

Explanation: When you see an assumption-of-risk defense, focus on its two required elements: knowledge of the risk and voluntary acceptance of it. Here, the worker clearly knew the guard was missing—she complained about it—so the real dispute is whether she freely chose to keep working. That is why the most significant issue is whether her continued work was voluntary or compelled by fear of losing her job. If fear of termination left her no reasonable choice, a court is unlikely to find voluntary assumption of risk, and the defense fails. The fact that she knew the guard was missing is necessary but not enough, because knowledge alone does not prove consent. Whether she complained to anyone other than the supervisor is not central; complaints matter only as evidence of knowledge, and her knowledge is already established. Whether the supervisor's promise was written or oral is also irrelevant, since the defense turns on her choice and state of mind, not contract formalities. Finally, the choice framed as "voluntary or compelled" is the true crux: economic pressure can negate voluntariness, whereas a mere preference not to stop working would not. On the bar exam, whenever "assumed the risk" appears, separate knowledge from voluntariness and ask whether the plaintiff had a meaningful choice. That split will lead you to the most significant disputed issue.

Question 12

Dana, an experienced participant, visited Adventure Woods, a recreational park with a high-ropes course. Before entering, she watched a safety video stating that the course involves inherent risks of slips and falls. While crossing a narrow wooden bridge, Dana noticed that one of the support boards was rotted and cracked. She paused, but then decided to continue across the bridge. The board broke, and Dana fell, fracturing her ankle. Dana sued Adventure Woods, alleging that it negligently failed to inspect and maintain the bridge. Adventure Woods responded that Dana saw the damaged board and chose to cross anyway.

Which of the following is the most significant legal issue raised by Adventure Woods's response?

Whether the risk of falling from a high-ropes course is an inherent risk for which Adventure Woods owed Dana no duty.
Whether Dana's decision to cross the bridge, rather than the damaged board, was the sole cause of her injury.
Whether Adventure Woods's safety video adequately warned Dana of the specific condition of the bridge.
Whether Dana's recovery should be reduced or barred because she saw the damaged board and chose to cross the bridge anyway. (correct answer)

Explanation: When you see a defendant arguing that the plaintiff knowingly encountered a danger, your mind should jump to comparative negligence or assumption of risk—both doctrines that can reduce or bar recovery. Here, Adventure Woods is not denying that the bridge was damaged; it is pointing to Dana's own decision to cross after seeing the rot. That raises the question of whether her conduct should affect her damages. The correct issue is the one about Dana's recovery being reduced or barred because she saw the damaged board and chose to cross. This is the heart of the defendant's response: it invokes plaintiff's own fault. Under comparative negligence, her recovery would be reduced by her percentage of fault; under assumption of risk, it could be barred entirely (in some jurisdictions). The other choices miss that point.

"Inherent risk" is wrong because the danger here is not an inherent risk of a high-ropes course (like a natural slip) but a specific, observable defect—the rotted board. Also, the defendant's response is not about the general nature of the activity but about Dana's specific knowledge.
"Sole cause" misstates causation. Even if Dana saw the board, the board breaking was still a cause of her fall; her decision does not negate the defective condition. The issue is fault, not but-for causation.
"Adequacy of the safety video" is a red herring. The video warned generally of slips and falls, but the real dispute is what Dana did with her actual observation, not whether the video covered the specific condition.

On exam day, remember: when a defendant emphasizes the plaintiff's knowledge and voluntary choice, you're almost certainly looking at comparative negligence or assumption of risk—not duty, causation, or warning adequacy.

Question 13

Rae, an experienced skier, was skiing down a marked intermediate run when she struck a snowmaking pipe that a resort employee had negligently left lying across the trail, partly covered by fresh snow. The jurisdiction applies primary assumption of risk to bar claims for injuries arising from risks inherent in a sport, and it treats a plaintiff's knowing encounter with any other risk as a factor in comparative fault. The jury finds that Rae was 20 percent at fault for skiing too fast for the conditions and that her damages are $100,000.

What effect does the assumption-of-risk doctrine have on Rae's claim?

It bars her claim, because colliding with objects on the trail is an inherent risk of skiing that every skier accepts.
None that bars it: a negligently abandoned pipe is not an inherent risk of skiing, and her recovery is reduced only by her 20 percent fault. (correct answer)
It bars her claim, because an experienced skier knowingly accepts the risks that come with skiing too fast for the conditions.
It has no effect on her recovery at all, because assumption of risk has been abolished in jurisdictions that adopt comparative fault.

Explanation: Primary assumption of risk bars recovery only for risks inherent in the sport, those that cannot be eliminated without changing its nature, such as trees, moguls, and changing snow conditions. A pipe that a resort employee negligently left across a marked trail is not inherent in skiing; it is a hazard the resort created. Rae's claim is not barred, and her own carelessness is handled through comparative fault, which reduces her recovery by 20 percent to $80,000. The inherent-risk answer classifies a negligently created hazard as inherent. The experienced-skier answer confuses Rae's own fault with assumption of a risk that bars recovery; her speed is a comparative-fault factor. The abolished answer overstates the change: comparative fault absorbs secondary assumption of risk, but primary assumption of risk for inherent risks survives, and Rae's own fault still reduces her recovery.

Question 14

In a state that has adopted pure comparative negligence by statute, Ned negligently fell asleep in his car while it was stopped across a lane of a rural road at night with its lights off. Ola, driving faster than was safe, saw Ned's car from 500 feet away and had ample time to stop, but she did not brake until it was too late and hit the car. The jury finds Ned 30 percent at fault and Ola 70 percent at fault, and finds Ned's damages to be $50,000. Ned argues that because Ola had the last clear chance to avoid the collision, his own negligence should not reduce his recovery.

How much may Ned recover from Ola?

$50,000, because Ola had the last clear chance to avoid the collision, which makes Ned's earlier negligence legally irrelevant.
Nothing, because Ned's negligence in leaving his car across the lane contributed to the collision.
$35,000, because last clear chance does not survive the adoption of comparative negligence. (correct answer)
$50,000, because Ola's share of fault was greater than Ned's.

Explanation: Last clear chance developed to soften the harshness of contributory negligence, which barred any plaintiff whose negligence contributed to the injury. Once a state adopts comparative negligence, the reason for the doctrine disappears, and courts apportion damages by fault instead. Ola's later opportunity to avoid the collision is reflected in the jury's allocation of 70 percent of the fault to her. Ned recovers $50,000 reduced by his 30 percent, or $35,000. The last-clear-chance answer applies the doctrine in a system that has replaced it. The no-recovery answer applies contributory negligence, which the state has abandoned. The greater-fault answer confuses comparative negligence with a rule that gives full recovery when the defendant is more at fault; under pure comparative negligence, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced by his share however the shares compare.

Question 15

A state statute prohibits employers from permitting anyone under 16 to operate a power-driven meat slicer. The legislature enacted it after finding that young workers are especially likely to injure themselves through inexperience and carelessness when using such machines. Deli Co. hired Kip, 15, and assigned him to operate the slicer. Kip carelessly reached over the moving blade to retrieve a dropped knife and severely cut his hand. The state follows pure comparative negligence. The jury finds Deli Co. negligent per se for violating the statute, finds that Kip's own carelessness contributed 40 percent to his injury, and finds his damages to be $200,000.

Should Kip's recovery be reduced by 40 percent?

No, because the statute was meant to protect young workers like Kip against their own carelessness, so his negligence is not a defense. (correct answer)
Yes, because under pure comparative negligence, a plaintiff's recovery is always reduced by the plaintiff's own share of the fault.
Yes, because Kip is held to the standard of a reasonable adult when operating dangerous power-driven machinery.
No, because a child under 16 is incapable of negligence as a matter of law.

Explanation: Ordinarily, a plaintiff's negligence reduces recovery under comparative negligence. But when a statute is designed to protect a class of persons against their own inability to protect themselves, the plaintiff's negligence of the very kind the statute anticipates is not a defense; otherwise the statute's purpose would be defeated. The legislature banned minors from slicers precisely because they tend to injure themselves through carelessness, so Kip's carelessness does not reduce his recovery. The always-reduced answer applies the general rule and ignores this exception. The adult-standard answer imports the rule for children engaged in adult activities, which concerns how a child's conduct is measured, not whether the statute bars the defense; and the statute treats operating the slicer as something Kip should not have been doing at all. The incapable answer misstates the law; a 15-year-old can be negligent, and the reason his negligence does not count is the statute's purpose.

Question 16

Abe was a passenger in a car driven by his friend Cy that collided with a truck driven by Dee. Abe was not negligent, and there was no joint enterprise or agency relationship between Abe and Cy. The jury found Cy 40 percent at fault and Dee 60 percent at fault for the collision, and found Abe's damages to be $200,000. Abe sued only Dee. The state follows pure comparative negligence and retains joint and several liability for defendants whose negligence causes an indivisible injury.

How much may Abe recover from Dee?

$120,000, because Abe's recovery against Dee is limited to Dee's 60 percent share of the fault.
$120,000, because a driver's negligence is imputed to his passenger, which reduces Abe's recovery by Cy's 40 percent share.
$200,000, because Cy's negligence is not imputed to Abe and Dee is jointly and severally liable for the whole injury. (correct answer)
Nothing, because Abe was required to sue both drivers so that the jury could apportion the damages between them.

Explanation: A driver's negligence is not imputed to a passenger absent a joint enterprise or agency, so Abe, who was not negligent, recovers his full damages. Under joint and several liability, each defendant whose negligence caused an indivisible injury is liable for the entire amount, though a defendant who pays more than its share may seek contribution from the other tortfeasor. Dee is liable to Abe for the full $200,000 and may pursue Cy for contribution. The 60-percent answer confuses the apportionment of fault, which governs contribution between tortfeasors, with several liability, which the state has not adopted. The imputation answer applies an imputed-negligence rule that does not apply to an ordinary passenger. The must-sue-both answer invents a joinder requirement; a plaintiff may sue any jointly and severally liable defendant alone.

Question 17

Rob and Sal collided at an intersection, and each sued the other for negligence. In a state with pure comparative negligence, the jury found Rob 30 percent at fault and Sal 70 percent at fault. It found Rob's damages to be $100,000 and Sal's damages to be $50,000. The court will enter separate judgments on the two claims without setting one off against the other.

What may each party recover?

Rob $70,000 and nothing for Sal, because Sal was more at fault than Rob.
Rob $70,000 and Sal $35,000.
Rob $30,000 and Sal $35,000.
Rob $70,000 and Sal $15,000. (correct answer)

Explanation: Under pure comparative negligence, each claimant recovers its damages reduced by its own percentage of fault, regardless of whether it was more at fault than the other party. Rob's $100,000 is reduced by his 30 percent, so he recovers $70,000. Sal's $50,000 is reduced by her 70 percent, so she recovers $15,000. The nothing-for-Sal answer applies the bar used in modified comparative negligence states, where a party more at fault than the other recovers nothing; pure comparative negligence has no such bar. The $35,000 answer reduces Sal's damages by Rob's 30 percent instead of her own 70 percent. The $30,000 answer multiplies each party's damages by its own percentage of fault instead of reducing the damages by that percentage.

Question 18

Before a skydiving lesson, Sky signed a clearly written and conspicuous release stating that he "releases Jump Co. from all liability for any injury, including injury caused by Jump Co.'s negligence." That morning, Sky's main parachute had failed a safety inspection and had been tagged "DO NOT USE." Sky's instructor, who knew of the failed inspection, removed the tag and packed the parachute for Sky's jump anyway because no other rig was available. The parachute malfunctioned, and Sky was badly injured. Sky sued Jump Co. The jurisdiction enforces clear releases of liability for negligence in recreational activities.

Does the release bar Sky's claim?

Yes, because the release was clear and conspicuous and expressly covered Jump Co.'s negligence, which the jurisdiction enforces.
Yes, because parachute failure is an inherent risk of skydiving, which Sky assumed by choosing to jump.
No, because releases from liability for injuries in recreational activities are void as against public policy.
No, because a release of liability for negligence does not bar liability for reckless conduct. (correct answer)

Explanation: Express assumption of risk, such as a signed release, can bar negligence claims when it is clear and the jurisdiction enforces it. But releases do not bar liability for reckless, willful, or intentional misconduct. The instructor knew the parachute had failed inspection and been tagged "DO NOT USE," removed the tag, and packed it anyway. That is conscious disregard of a known, serious risk, so the release does not bar Sky's claim. The clear-and-conspicuous answer checks the requirements for releasing negligence and stops, without asking whether the conduct went beyond negligence. The inherent-risk answer misidentifies the risk: a parachute's malfunction may be an inherent risk, but using a parachute known to be defective is a risk created by the defendant. The void-release answer contradicts the stated rule that the jurisdiction enforces such releases for negligence.

Question 19

Pia was injured in a three-car collision and sued the other two drivers, Dex and Eli. The jury found Pia 40 percent at fault, Dex 45 percent, and Eli 15 percent, and found her damages to be $100,000. The state's comparative negligence statute provides that a plaintiff's negligence does not bar recovery against a defendant if the plaintiff's negligence is not greater than the negligence of that defendant, but that the plaintiff's damages are reduced in proportion to her own share of fault. The state has abolished joint and several liability, so each defendant is liable only for the share of damages matching its own percentage of fault.

How much may Pia recover, and from whom?

$60,000, from Dex and Eli in proportion to their shares of fault.
$45,000, from Dex only. (correct answer)
$45,000 from Dex and $15,000 from Eli.
$60,000, all from Dex, because his fault exceeds Pia's.

Explanation: Under the statute, Pia's negligence is compared with that of each defendant separately. Her 40 percent is not greater than Dex's 45 percent, so she may recover from Dex, but it is greater than Eli's 15 percent, so she is barred against Eli. Because joint and several liability is abolished, Dex pays only his own 45 percent share of $100,000, which is $45,000. The $60,000-from-both answer compares Pia's fault with the defendants' combined fault, which the statute does not do. The answer adding $15,000 from Eli overlooks the bar that applies to Eli, whose fault is less than Pia's. The all-from-Dex answer would hold Dex liable for Eli's share as well, which is what joint and several liability would do; that rule has been abolished.

Question 20

In a state that retains contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery, Lou was jaywalking mid-block at night while looking at his phone, which the jury finds was negligent. Max, racing a friend at 80 miles per hour on a city street with a 30-mile-per-hour limit, struck and seriously injured Lou. The jury finds that Max's conduct was reckless, not merely negligent, and that both Lou's negligence and Max's recklessness caused Lou's injuries.

Is Lou's claim against Max barred?

No, because contributory negligence is not a defense to a claim based on the defendant's reckless conduct. (correct answer)
Yes, because in a contributory negligence state, any negligence by the plaintiff that contributes to his injury bars recovery.
Yes, because Lou's jaywalking violated a statute and was therefore negligence per se, which is a complete bar to recovery.
No, because Lou's minor negligence was far less than Max's, so the jury may reduce Lou's damages rather than bar them.

Explanation: In jurisdictions that retain contributory negligence, a plaintiff's ordinary negligence bars recovery for the defendant's negligence, but not for the defendant's reckless, willful, or wanton conduct. The jury found Max reckless, so Lou's negligence does not bar his claim. The all-negligence answer states the general rule and ignores its limit for reckless conduct. The negligence-per-se answer changes nothing: per se negligence is still negligence, and it does not bar a claim based on recklessness. The minor-negligence answer applies comparative negligence, which the state has not adopted; in this state, Lou's claim is either barred or not, and it is not barred because Max was reckless.