All questions
Question 1
The plaintiff slipped on a banana peel in the defendant's grocery store and sues for negligence. At trial, the plaintiff, who never saw any recording, testifies from memory about the fall. The defendant objects, arguing that the store's surveillance camera recorded the aisle and that the recording—since destroyed in an accidental fire—is the best evidence of what happened. Should the plaintiff's testimony be admitted?
- No, because the destroyed surveillance recording is the original evidence and its loss must be explained before other evidence can be used.
- Yes, because the plaintiff is testifying from personal knowledge and is not trying to prove the contents of the recording. (correct answer)
- No, because the plaintiff cannot testify about an event when a recording of that event existed and is now unavailable.
- Yes, because the recording was a duplicate and the best evidence rule requires production of a duplicate before a witness may testify.
Explanation: Whenever you see a "recorded event" evidence question, stop and ask: is the witness trying to prove the contents of the recording, or the underlying event itself? That distinction is the heart of the best evidence rule, which applies only when someone seeks to prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph. Here, the plaintiff is testifying from personal memory about the fall itself—not about what the surveillance recording showed. Since the plaintiff never saw the recording and is not relying on it, the best evidence rule does not apply. His testimony is admissible as firsthand observation.
The first wrong choice, "the destroyed surveillance recording is the original evidence and its loss must be explained," misunderstands the rule: it does not require the "best" evidence generally, only the original when content is in issue. Similarly, "the plaintiff cannot testify about an event when a recording existed and is now unavailable" is false—eyewitness testimony is not barred merely because a recording existed. The fourth choice, "the recording was a duplicate and the best evidence rule requires production of a duplicate," is also wrong: the recording is not a duplicate of the plaintiff's memory, and no duplicate is required when the witness is not proving the recording's contents.
Study tip: remember that the best evidence rule is about proving content, not about choosing the most convincing witness. If testimony describes what happened, not what a document or recording says, it should come in.
Question 2
In a drug prosecution, an undercover agent conducted a recorded telephone negotiation with a seller but never saw the seller. At a pretrial hearing, the defendant spoke in court, and the agent recognized the voice as the seller's. The agent had not heard the defendant's voice before that hearing. The defendant objects to the agent's in-court identification of his voice. Is the identification admissible?
- Yes, because the recorded call itself, combined with the defendant's appearance at the hearing, is enough to establish identity.
- Yes, because the agent heard the defendant speak and recognized the voice, even though that familiarity came after the call. (correct answer)
- No, because the agent's familiarity with the defendant's voice was acquired after the call and cannot support identification.
- No, because voice identification must be made by a witness who saw the speaker or by a qualified expert.
Explanation: Whenever you see a voice-identification question, remember that the issue is authentication under rules that allow a witness to identify a voice by opinion. The key is whether the witness became familiar with the voice under circumstances connecting it to the alleged speaker—not when that familiarity happened.
Here, the agent heard the defendant speak in court and recognized that voice as the seller from the recorded negotiation. That is enough. A witness may identify a voice based on hearing it at any time, including after the event, as long as the familiarity connects the voice to the speaker. So the identification is admissible.
The choice saying the recorded call plus the defendant's appearance alone establishes identity is wrong: merely seeing the defendant in court does not connect his appearance to the recorded voice unless the agent also hears him speak. The choice saying familiarity acquired after the call cannot support identification misstates the rule—post-event familiarity is permissible. And the choice requiring a witness who saw the speaker or a qualified expert is also wrong: voice identification may be made by any witness who has heard the voice, and no expert is required.
Your takeaway: don't assume a witness must have known the voice before the crime. What matters is that the witness's later familiarity with the voice is connected to the alleged speaker. On the bar exam, if a witness recognizes a voice after hearing it in a lineup or courtroom, that timing alone does not make the identification inadmissible.
Question 3
In a dispute over a written settlement agreement, the plaintiff offers a photocopy made from the original kept in her attorney's file. The plaintiff testifies that she compared the photocopy with the original and that it is identical. The defendant objects, arguing that the original might have contained handwritten margin notes not visible on the copy, but offers no evidence of that. Is the photocopy admissible?
- No, because the original remains available, and the plaintiff has not explained why it was not produced.
- No, because the defendant's objection raises a genuine question whether the photocopy accurately reflects the original.
- Yes, because the plaintiff's testimony establishes that the photocopy is an original, not a copy that needs a further foundation.
- Yes, because the photocopy is a duplicate and the defendant has offered no evidence that the original is not what it appears to be. (correct answer)
Explanation: Whenever you see a question about proving the contents of a writing, the best evidence rule is in play. That rule requires the original unless a substitute is properly justified. But here's the key: the rule explicitly allows duplicates — photocopies made by a mechanical process — to be admitted just like the original, unless a genuine question is raised about the original's authenticity or admitting the copy would be unfair. The plaintiff's testimony that she compared the photocopy to the original and found it identical provides the necessary foundation for the duplicate. The defendant's mere speculation that the original might have had handwritten margin notes is not evidence; it does not raise a genuine question of authenticity. So the photocopy is admissible.
The wrong answers each miss this framework. The first says the original remains available and no explanation was given for its absence — but a duplicate is admissible even when the original is available; no explanation for nonproduction is required. The second says the objection raises a genuine question — but a genuine question must be supported by evidence, not just argument. The third says the plaintiff's testimony makes the photocopy an "original" — no, it makes it an accurate duplicate; the two are distinct under the rules. On the exam, when you see a copy of a writing, ask: is it a duplicate, and has anyone offered actual evidence of inaccuracy? Unsupported objections will not block admissibility.
Question 4
To prove the contents of a state agency's written order, the plaintiff offers a witness who testifies that she read the order at the agency's office and remembers its terms. The plaintiff also offers a photocopy of the order certified by the agency's records custodian under the agency's seal. The defendant objects to both. How should the court rule?
- Both are admissible, because the certified copy is reliable and the witness's firsthand account of the order is based on personal knowledge.
- Only the witness's testimony is admissible, because the certified copy is hearsay and no clerk or other authenticating witness has testified at trial.
- Only the certified copy is admissible; the witness's oral testimony cannot substitute for it when a certified copy is available to prove the contents of a public record. (correct answer)
- Neither is admissible, because the original order must be produced unless it is shown to be lost or otherwise unavailable.
Explanation: This question tests the best evidence rule—sometimes called the original writing rule—as applied to public records. When a party must prove the contents of a writing, the original is generally required. But public records have a special rule: the contents of a public record may be proved by a copy certified by the records custodian under seal, and that certified copy is self-authenticating. The photocopy here meets those requirements, so the plaintiff may use it without producing the original or calling the custodian to testify.
Therefore, the court should overrule the objection to the certified copy and sustain the objection to the witness's oral testimony. The witness did read the order and has personal knowledge of its terms, but her oral account is secondary evidence. Under the best evidence rule, secondary evidence of a writing's contents is allowed only when the original is unavailable—for example, lost, destroyed, or in the opponent's control. Because a certified copy is available, her testimony cannot substitute for it.
The "both are admissible" choice ignores that oral testimony is secondary and cannot be used when a certified copy of a public record is available. The "only witness's testimony is admissible" choice wrongly treats the certified copy as hearsay; certified public records are self-authenticating and fit the public-records hearsay exception. The "neither is admissible" choice misapplies the rule by demanding the original even though public records may be proved by certified copy.
On the exam, whenever contents of a public record are at issue, look for a certified copy. If one exists, it beats oral testimony.
Question 5
In an embezzlement prosecution, the government offers a spreadsheet summarizing hundreds of credit-card transactions. An FBI agent testifies that she created the spreadsheet by extracting data from the credit-card company's database and compared each entry in the spreadsheet to the database records. The database records, which are voluminous, were made available to the defense before trial. The defendant objects because the agent, not the credit-card company's custodian, prepared the summary and because the database records themselves were not admitted. Is the spreadsheet admissible?
- No, because the underlying records were not admitted and the summary cannot stand alone.
- No, because the agent was not the custodian and did not work for the credit-card company.
- Yes, because the records are voluminous, and that alone is enough to permit the summary.
- Yes, because the agent testified to the summary's accuracy and the underlying records were available to the defense. (correct answer)
Explanation: Whenever you see a summary of voluminous records, think Federal Rule of Evidence 1006. It allows a party to present a summary, chart, or spreadsheet of records that are too bulky to conveniently examine in court—but only if the underlying records would be admissible and are made available to the opposing party for inspection. Here, the credit-card database records were voluminous and were provided to the defense, satisfying that requirement. The FBI agent's testimony that she created the spreadsheet by extracting data and comparing each entry to the database establishes a proper foundation for accuracy. So the spreadsheet is admissible.
Why are the wrong answers wrong? First, the claim that the spreadsheet fails because the underlying records were never admitted misunderstands Rule 1006: the originals do not need to be admitted if they are admissible and available to the opponent. Second, the objection that the agent was not the custodian or an employee of the credit-card company misses the point—Rule 1006 does not require the summary witness to be the original records custodian; anyone who can vouch for the summary's accuracy, such as this agent, may do so. Third, the notion that voluminous records alone are enough ignores the additional requirements of an accuracy foundation and availability to the defense.
Study tip: For summary-evidence questions, remember the three Cs—voluminous records, Custodian not required, and Copies (originals) must be available to the opponent. That pattern will help you reject the tempting but wrong "no custodian/no original" traps.
Question 6
In a breach-of-contract action, the plaintiff offers a printed copy of an email sent by the defendant. The plaintiff testifies that she printed the email directly from her email account and that the printout accurately reflects what she saw on her screen. The defendant objects, arguing that the server copy is the only original and that the printout is a secondary duplicate. Is the printout admissible?
- Yes, because the printout accurately reflects the email and may be treated as an original of the electronic record. (correct answer)
- No, because the server copy is the original and the plaintiff has not accounted for its absence.
- No, because the sender did not testify and the printout is hearsay.
- Yes, because the email came from a computer system and therefore needs no authentication beyond the printout itself.
Explanation: Whenever you see a dispute about whether a printout is an "original" under the best-evidence rule, remember that the rule has special language for electronic records: any printout or other output from electronic storage is treated as an original if it is readable by sight and accurately reflects the data. So the first thing to ask is whether the witness can show the printout is accurate.
Here, the plaintiff testified she printed the email directly from her account and that the printout accurately matches what she saw on screen. That is enough to make the printout an original of the electronic record. The defendant's objection confuses the server copy with a requirement to produce the "best" version; under the rules, the accurate printout itself is an original, so the plaintiff does not need to account for the server copy's absence.
The sender-not-testifying argument misses the mark for two reasons: authentication can be supplied by any witness with knowledge—here, the plaintiff—and the defendant's own email is an opposing party's statement, not hearsay. The last choice is a tempting shortcut, but it goes too far: electronic records do require authentication, and the fact that the email came from a computer does not make the printout self-authenticating.
Study tip: distinguish authentication ("is it what it claims to be?") from the best-evidence rule ("which version counts as original?"). For electronic evidence, an accurate printout satisfies both when a competent witness verifies it.
Question 7
In a criminal case, the prosecutor offers a printout from a state court's public online docket showing the defendant's prior conviction. The printout was downloaded by a paralegal from the court's website and has no seal, stamp, or certification. No witness testifies about how the court's docket is maintained or that the printout is accurate. The defendant objects. Is the printout admissible?
- Yes, because it came from the court's official public website and therefore is self-authenticating.
- Yes, because it is a public record and public records do not need certification.
- No, because the printout is not self-authenticating and no evidence establishes that it is what the prosecutor claims it to be. (correct answer)
- No, because the best evidence rule requires the original judgment of conviction, not a printout from a website.
Explanation: This question tests authentication of public records, not just hearsay. When a party offers a government document, you must ask two things: is the content admissible under a hearsay exception, and has it been authenticated as what it claims to be? Here, the prosecution fails the second requirement.
A printout from a state court's public docket is not self-authenticating merely because it appears on an official website. Under the rules, self-authenticating public records require a seal, signature, or a proper certification. The paralegal's download has none of those, and no witness has explained how the docket is maintained or verified the printout. So there is no evidence the printout really is the defendant's prior conviction. The objection should be sustained.
The wrong choices test common misconceptions. Saying it is admissible because it came from a court's official website assumes online government postings are inherently trustworthy—they are not under the authentication rules. Saying public records never need certification confuses the public-record hearsay exception with authentication; even hearsay-exempt records must be shown to be genuine. Finally, the best evidence rule is not the problem: a printout of an electronic docket can satisfy the original-writing rule if it is a reliable output from stored data, and certified copies of judgments are commonly used. The genuine defect is lack of authentication.
Remember: for a public record, look for the seal or certification—website printouts alone are not enough.
Question 8
The plaintiff sues on a promissory note and cannot find the original. She offers a photocopy and testifies that she signed the original, kept it in her desk, and that it was destroyed in a fire. The defendant testifies that he never signed any note and that the photocopy is a fabrication. The court finds the plaintiff's evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find for her. The defendant asks the court to decide that the original note never existed and to exclude the photocopy. How should the court rule?
- Grant the motion, because the court must decide whether the original note ever existed before allowing the photocopy.
- Grant the motion, because the plaintiff has not proved the original's destruction by clear and convincing evidence.
- Deny the motion, because the jury, not the court, must decide every question about whether a document is genuine.
- Deny the motion, because the defendant's denial puts the existence of the original note in dispute and the evidence is sufficient for a jury to resolve it. (correct answer)
Explanation: Whenever you see a photocopy offered to prove the contents of a lost document, think about the best-evidence rule and who decides what. The original is usually required, but if the original was destroyed in good faith, a photocopy can come in. Here the threshold question is whether the original note ever existed, and the defendant says it did not. Under FRE 1008, when the existence of an original is disputed, that factual question is for the jury—not the judge—if there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to decide it. The plaintiff's testimony that she signed and kept the original, and that it burned, is sufficient.
The choice saying the court must decide whether the original ever existed before admitting the photocopy gets the nature of FRE 1008 wrong; the court only decides whether a reasonable jury could find for the proponent. The choice demanding clear and convincing evidence of destruction misstates the standard—proof of a lost or destroyed original is by a preponderance, not clear and convincing evidence. The choice claiming the jury must decide every question about document genuineness goes too far: judges decide preliminary admissibility questions under FRE 104(a), including some best-evidence issues. The correct response denies the motion because the defendant's denial creates a genuine dispute for the jury on the original's existence.
Study tip: when a document is lost, remember the judge controls admissibility; the jury controls the ultimate facts about the document's authenticity and existence.
Question 9
To authenticate a handwritten letter, the prosecution calls a witness who testifies that, after receiving the letter, she spent two hours comparing it with the defendant's old blog posts and formed the opinion that the defendant wrote it. The witness had no prior familiarity with the defendant's handwriting. The defendant objects. Is the witness's opinion admissible for authentication?
- No, because her familiarity with the defendant's handwriting came only from the comparison she made for this case. (correct answer)
- Yes, because she compared the letter with known samples and formed an opinion about who wrote it.
- Yes, because the trier of fact could compare the letter with the blog posts and reach the same conclusion.
- No, because only a qualified handwriting expert may authenticate a document by comparing samples, and this witness is not an expert.
Explanation: Authentication questions test whether a document is what its proponent claims. For handwriting, a lay witness may give an opinion only if their familiarity with the writer's handwriting was acquired before the litigation—not for the purpose of testifying. That rule is the key here.
The witness's opinion is not admissible because her familiarity came entirely from a two-hour comparison made after receiving the letter, specifically for this case. That is exactly what the authentication rules prohibit for a nonexpert: a lay witness cannot become familiar with handwriting for trial and then authenticate it. The knowledge must predate the dispute.
The tempting answer that she compared the letter with known samples and formed an opinion misses the distinction: while experts may make a litigation-driven comparison, a lay witness may not. The answer suggesting the trier of fact could compare the letter with blog posts and reach the same conclusion is also wrong—even if true, it does not cure the witness's lack of proper familiarity; the trier's independent comparison is a separate method of authentication. Finally, the claim that only a qualified expert can authenticate by comparing samples is too restrictive: a nonexpert with pre-existing familiarity may authenticate, and experts are not the only permissible route.
On exam day, whenever you see a lay witness authenticating handwriting, ask: did the familiarity exist before the case, or was it manufactured for litigation? If it was manufactured, the opinion fails under the authentication rules.
Question 10
In a boundary dispute, the plaintiff offers a deed dated 1975 that was found inside a box of used books bought at an estate sale in another state. The deed appears regular on its face, and no one has questioned its genuineness, but no one knows how it came to be there. The plaintiff asks that it be admitted as an ancient document. Should it be?
- Yes, because the deed is old, appears regular, and nothing suggests it is not genuine.
- Yes, because its age alone is enough to establish its authenticity and no further foundation is needed.
- No, because the deed's discovery in an out-of-state box of used books provides no connection to the disputed land. (correct answer)
- No, because the deed is not old enough to qualify as an ancient document under the applicable rule.
Explanation: When you see an "ancient document" question, remember authentication has three pillars: age, trustworthiness on its face, and location. The ancient-document rule allows authentication if the document is at least 20 years old, appears genuine, and was found in a place where, if authentic, it would likely be kept. The 1975 deed is old enough, and its regular appearance satisfies the facial-suspicion prong. But the third pillar fails: a deed to disputed land found in a random used-book box at an out-of-state estate sale has no connection to the land or to the people who would have kept such a record. It could have come from anywhere, so its location does not corroborate genuineness. Therefore, it should not be admitted as an ancient document.
The tempting choice that the deed is admissible because it is old, appears regular, and nothing suggests it is not genuine forgets the location requirement — that alone is insufficient. Saying age alone is enough strips away both the facial and location requirements. And saying the deed is not old enough misreads the timing: 1975 is well past the 20-year threshold, so that is not the problem. The dispositive issue is provenance.
On exam day, whenever an ancient document appears, immediately ask: How old? Looks genuine? Found where it should be? The "found where expected" prong is the one examiners love to hide in plain sight.
Question 11
In a breach-of-contract action, the plaintiff offers an email allegedly sent by the defendant, a sales manager for a competitor. The plaintiff's employee testifies that two days after she emailed the defendant's business address about a bid, a message arrived from that same address. The message bears the defendant's usual electronic signature, repeats the exact bid figure from the employee's earlier email, and asks the plaintiff to wire a deposit to the competitor's account. The defendant objects, arguing that no witness saw him type the email and no computer expert examined the server. Should the email be admitted?
- Yes, because the email's distinctive content and the circumstances are enough to connect it to the defendant. (correct answer)
- Yes, because email sent from a business account is self-authenticating and needs no further foundation.
- No, because authentication requires testimony from someone who saw the defendant send or authorize the email.
- No, because the email's metadata must be verified by a computer forensic expert before it may be admitted.
Explanation: Whenever you see an authentication question about email or text messages, ask: "Is there enough evidence for a reasonable jury to decide this message came from the defendant?" You do not need a witness who literally watched the defendant type. Here, the message came from the defendant's business address, carried his usual electronic signature, repeated the exact bid from the plaintiff employee's earlier email, and asked for a deposit into the competitor's account. Those distinctive details and surrounding circumstances are strong circumstantial evidence linking the email to the defendant, so it should be admitted.
The choice saying email from a business account is self-authenticating is wrong: no email is self-authenticating just because of its source; Federal Rule of Evidence 902 lists only narrow categories like certified records or notarized documents. The choice requiring testimony from someone who saw the defendant send or authorize it overstates the standard—authentication can be proven by circumstantial evidence. The choice demanding a computer forensic expert to verify metadata also overstates the requirement; metadata can help authenticate, but it is not mandatory when other evidence is sufficient.
On exam day, remember that authentication is only a baseline showing, not proof beyond doubt. Once you see distinctive content plus context, that's usually enough to get the evidence to the jury.
Question 12
The plaintiff cannot find the original of a letter the defendant allegedly wrote to the plaintiff's employer. At trial, the plaintiff offers the defendant's deposition testimony, in which the defendant said, 'I wrote a letter to your employer saying you were fired for theft.' The defendant objects under the best evidence rule, arguing that the original letter must be produced or its absence explained. Is the deposition testimony admissible to prove the letter's contents?
- No, because the plaintiff has not explained the original's loss and is using only secondary evidence.
- Yes, because the defendant's own deposition statement is an admission and may be used to prove what the letter said. (correct answer)
- No, because the defendant's deposition statement is hearsay and cannot be used against her at trial.
- Yes, because a deposition transcript is a duplicate original and the letter's contents are not really being proved.
Explanation: This question tests the best evidence rule—the rule that usually requires an original writing to prove its contents—and, more importantly, its exception for admissions by a party-opponent. When you see a best evidence question, first ask: What is being proved, and is the opponent's own statement involved?
Here, the plaintiff is trying to prove what the letter said, so the best evidence rule is triggered. Normally, the plaintiff would need to produce the original or account for its loss. But the Federal Rules contain a specific exception: a party's own admission—whether made in testimony, a deposition, or a written statement—may be used to prove the contents of a writing without explaining why the original is unavailable. The defendant already said under oath, "I wrote a letter ... saying you were fired for theft." That deposition admission is admissible to prove the letter's contents, even though the original letter is missing.
The choice saying "No, because the plaintiff has not explained the original's loss" misses this exception. The choice saying "No, because the deposition statement is hearsay" is also wrong: an opposing party's own statement is a nonhearsay admission. And the choice saying the deposition transcript is a "duplicate original" of the letter misunderstands the rule—the transcript is evidence of the defendant's admission, not a copy of the letter itself.
Study tip: Whenever a party's own statement proves the content of a lost document, think admission exception first. The best evidence rule yields to party admissions under FRE 1007.