Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Assess Sufficiency Of Provided Sources

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Assess Sufficiency Of Provided SourcesQuestion 1 of 12

An associate must determine whether, under State A law, a plaintiff seeking damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress must prove physical symptoms that manifested contemporaneously with the distress. The associate has gathered the following sources:

Source 1: Moore v. General Hospital, State A Supreme Court (2004): 'A plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress only if the plaintiff suffered physical symptoms that manifested contemporaneously with the emotional distress.'

Source 2: Rivera v. County Transit, State A Court of Appeals (2021): 'We decline to require the physical-symptom manifestation described in Moore; a plaintiff may recover for serious emotional distress proved by competent evidence, without any physical symptom.'

Source 3: Chen, The Future of Emotional Distress Liability, 42 State A L. Rev. 101 (2023): 'State A's courts are divided over Moore, and most other jurisdictions have abandoned the physical-manifestation requirement. The State A Supreme Court's denial of review in Rivera has been read by some commentators as an implicit signal that Moore may be reconsidered.'

The associate must advise whether a client who has no physical symptoms may proceed with a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in a State A trial court.

Which statement best characterizes whether the sources are sufficient for the assignment?

The sources are sufficient to advise that the claim may proceed, because Rivera is the most recent appellate decision and the denial of review, together with the trend described in Source 3, shows that State A trial courts would not apply Moore.

The sources are sufficient to advise that the claim may not proceed, because Moore remains binding State A Supreme Court authority, Rivera cannot overrule it, and the denial of review is not a decision on the merits.

The sources are insufficient because the law review article is a secondary source, and secondary sources may never be relied upon to determine the current law of a jurisdiction.

The sources are insufficient because no source states whether the State A Supreme Court has granted review in a later case raising the physical-manifestation issue, which the associate must verify before advising the client.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Assess Sufficiency Of Provided Sources

Practice Assess Sufficiency Of Provided Sources in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

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This quiz focuses on Assess Sufficiency Of Provided Sources, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

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Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

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Question 1

The associate must advise whether a client who has no physical symptoms may proceed with a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in a State A trial court.

Which statement best characterizes whether the sources are sufficient for the assignment?

The sources are sufficient to advise that the claim may proceed, because Rivera is the most recent appellate decision and the denial of review, together with the trend described in Source 3, shows that State A trial courts would not apply Moore.
The sources are sufficient to advise that the claim may not proceed, because Moore remains binding State A Supreme Court authority, Rivera cannot overrule it, and the denial of review is not a decision on the merits. (correct answer)
The sources are insufficient because the law review article is a secondary source, and secondary sources may never be relied upon to determine the current law of a jurisdiction.
The sources are insufficient because no source states whether the State A Supreme Court has granted review in a later case raising the physical-manifestation issue, which the associate must verify before advising the client.

Explanation: Whenever you evaluate whether research sources are sufficient to predict a court's ruling, start with hierarchy of authority: a state supreme court holding binds every lower court in that state; a lower appellate court cannot overrule it; and a denial of review is not a merits decision. That framework resolves this question. State A's highest court, the Supreme Court, held in Moore that physical symptoms must manifest contemporaneously with the emotional distress. Ur client has no physical symptoms, so under that binding precedent the claim may not proceed. Rivera, a Court of Appeals decision, expressly declined to require physical symptoms—but it cannot overrule Moore, so it is persuasive at most. The Supreme Court's denial of review in Rivera is not a ruling on the merits; it implies nothing binding about Moore's future. Source 3, the law review article, is secondary authority and may be consulted tounderstand trends or scholarly debate, but it cannot overcome controlling precedent. Therefore the sources are sufficient to advise the client that the claim may not proceed—not because later commentary proves the rule, but because Moore remains the law unless the Supreme Court itself overrules itor the legislature changes it. Now the wrong choices: the claim-proceeds view incorrectly treats a lower court decision, a denial of review, and a secondary-source trend as displacing a binding supreme court precedent. The claim that sources are insufficient because secondary sources "may never be relied upon" is overstated—secondary sources may be used for background and persuasive insight, though not as binding authority. And the claim that you must verify whether the Supreme Court has granted review in a later case is unnecessary to the current-law determination; even a granted petition would not change the binding force of Moore until a new decision issues, and nothing in these sources suggests that has occurred. On exam questions, always ask: Who decided the rule, and who is the audience court? If a highest court has spoken, lower court decisions and secondary commentary are commentary, not overrides.

Question 2

An associate is asked to determine whether a successor commercial tenant is liable on the original tenant's 2018 covenant to repair. The associate has located the following sources:

Adams Revised Statutes § 82-114 (2014), the version in effect when the lease was signed: "A covenant in a lease to repair the premises runs with the land and binds assigns and successors of the lessee."
Hall v. Peabody, 451 Adams 212 (2016): "We hold that § 82-114 does not make a tenant's covenant to repair enforceable against a successor; the covenant is personal to the original tenant."
In re Trident Leasing, 603 Adams App. 3d 88 (2019): "Section 82-114 makes a tenant's covenant to repair run with the land. Hall is distinguishable and does not control."
A 2022 law review article: "In 2020 the Adams Legislature amended § 82-114 to abrogate Hall and make repair covenants run with the land. No appellate court has yet construed the amendment." The associate has confirmed that neither Hall nor In re Trident has been overruled by a later decision, but has not obtained the text or effective date of the 2020 amendment.

Which of the following best describes whether these sources are sufficient for the associate to determine whether the successor is liable on the 2018 covenant?

Yes, because Hall is a decision of Adams's highest court and is directly on point; In re Trident and the law review article are not controlling authorities.
Yes, because the 2020 amendment superseded Hall, and the law review article reliably establishes that the amendment makes repair covenants run with the land, so the successor is liable.
No, because the text and effective date of the 2020 amendment are missing, so the associate cannot determine whether the amendment changed the rule for a 2018 covenant; the law review article cannot substitute for the amendment itself. (correct answer)
No, because Hall and In re Trident are conflicting authorities, and no source explains which one a trial court in Adams is bound to follow; additional authority is needed before the issue can be resolved.

Explanation: When you see a research sufficiency question, focus on whether the sources you have are primary, mandatory, current, and complete enough to answer the precise legal question. The lease was signed in 2018, so the associate needs to know what the law was for a 2018 covenant, and whether a later amendment applies retroactively. The correct answer is that the sources are insufficient because the text and effective date of the 2020 amendment are missing. The law review article is only secondary authority; it cannot substitute for the actual statutory language. Even if the article accurately reports that the legislature amended § 82-114 to abrogate Hall, the associate cannot determine whether that amendment applies to a 2018 lease, since amendments generally apply prospectively unless the legislature clearly intends retroactivity. That missing statutory text and effective date are decisive. The choice saying Hall is sufficient because it is the highest court decision overlooks that the legislature may have superseded Hall, so current law may be different. The choice saying the law review article reliably establishes the amendment and makes the successor liable improperly treats a secondary source as sufficient and assumes retroactivity without examining the amendment. The choice saying Hall and In re Trident are conflicting and require more authority is tempting but misidentifies the problem: even if the trial court would follow Hall, the unresolved question is whether the 2020 amendment overrode Hall and whether it applies to this earlier covenant. That requires the amendment itself. Remember: cite the statute, not an article about the statute.

Question 3

An associate must determine whether the term 'motor vehicle' in the State A Recreational Trail Act includes an electric bicycle. The Act does not define the term, and no State A court has construed it. The associate has gathered:

Source 1: State A Recreational Trail Act § 7: 'No motor vehicle shall be operated on a recreational trail designated under this Act.'

Source 2: Bandy v. City of Kelso, State B Supreme Court (2018): 'An electric bicycle is a "motor vehicle" under a statute that uses the term without defining it, because the bicycle is propelled by a motor.'

Source 3: In re Dowd, State C Court of Appeals (2021): 'An electric bicycle is not a "motor vehicle" under a comparable trails statute, because the statute was enacted before electric bicycles existed and the legislature intended to regulate only traditional automobiles and motorcycles.'

Source 4: Lang, Electric Bicycles and Trail Access, 70 State L. Rev. 310 (2023): 'Courts should treat electric bicycles as motor vehicles for purposes of trail-access statutes.'

The associate must predict how a State A court would resolve the question.

Which statement best characterizes whether the sources are sufficient to predict how a State A court would resolve the question?

Sufficient: the out-of-state decisions split on the issue, and the law review article recommends treating electric bicycles as motor vehicles, so the associate can advise that State A would likely follow the better-reasoned decision.
Sufficient: Source 1 is the controlling statute, and because an electric bicycle is plainly propelled by a motor, a State A court would treat it as a motor vehicle without needing further authority.
Insufficient: the associate must first retrieve the legislative history of the Recreational Trail Act, because a court may not interpret an undefined statutory term without examining legislative intent.
Insufficient: no State A court or other authority controls the interpretation of the undefined term, and the out-of-state decisions conflict, so the associate cannot reliably predict how a State A court would rule. (correct answer)

Explanation: When you are asked whether research is sufficient to predict a court's interpretation of an undefined statutory term, the key question is whether the associate has found controlling authority—a state statute directly on point, binding precedent, or at least an unmistakable interpretive signal. Persuasive sources can help, but conflicting ones cannot produce a reliable prediction. Here, the sources are insufficient because State A has no court decision construing the term "motor vehicle" in its Recreational Trail Act. The two out-of-state decisions split directly: one treats an electric bicycle as a motor vehicle, the other does not. A law review article recommending one view is persuasive commentary, but it is not controlling and does not resolve the conflict. Without a State A court decision, statutory definition, or other binding authority, the associate cannot confidently predict the outcome. The choice saying the sources are sufficient because the out-of-state decisions split and the article recommends treating e-bikes as motor vehicles misses the point: a "better-reasoned" selection is not a legal basis for prediction. The choice claiming the statute alone controls because an electric bicycle is plainly propelled by a motor ignores that plain meaning is only the first step and that the term is genuinely ambiguous, especially given the contrary decision. The choice insisting the associate must first retrieve legislative history overstates the law; courts may consider legislative intent, but they are not required to start there, and no single missing source is automatically dispositive. On exam day, look for whether persuasive authority is merely split or one-sided—a split means insufficient prediction unless a higher court or statute controls.

Question 4

An associate must prepare a suppression memo on whether a handgun found in a car's glove compartment after the driver's arrest will be suppressed. The facts: the driver was arrested for driving with a revoked license and was handcuffed in the back of a patrol car when an officer searched the glove compartment; the officer also smelled burning marijuana when he approached the vehicle. The associate has gathered:

Source 1: Williams v. State, State A Supreme Court (2019): 'A warrantless search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant is permissible only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the search or the officer reasonably believes that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.'

Source 2: State A Code § 52-7: 'A law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime may search the vehicle, including any closed container within it, without a warrant. For purposes of this section, probable cause may be established by the officer's detection of the odor of a controlled substance.'

The associate must advise whether the gun is admissible.

Which statement best characterizes whether the sources are sufficient for the suppression memo?

The sources are sufficient to advise that the gun will not be suppressed: Source 2 authorizes the warrantless search because the odor gave probable cause, and Source 1's arrest-based limits do not restrict the independent automobile exception. (correct answer)
The sources are sufficient to advise that the gun will be suppressed: Source 1 invalidates the search because the driver was handcuffed in the patrol car and a revoked-license offense would not produce evidence in the vehicle.
The sources are insufficient because neither source addresses whether the automobile exception permits a vehicle search after the driver has been arrested, handcuffed, and removed from the car.
The sources are insufficient because Source 2 does not state whether the odor of marijuana, standing alone, establishes probable cause, and that question must be resolved before the search can be upheld.

Explanation: When you see a suppression-memo question involving both a vehicle search and an arrest, separate the two legal bases. Source 2 is the key: it creates an independent automobile exception in State A, allowing a warrantless search of a vehicle and its containers if the officer has probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is inside. The odor of a controlled substance—here, burning marijuana—expressly establishes that probable cause under the statute. Because Source 2 authorizes the search on its own, Source 1's limits on searches incident to arrest are irrelevant; the officer did not need to rely on the arrest at all. The handgun is therefore admissible. Turning to the wrong answers, the claim that the gun will be suppressed misreads Source 1 as imposing a universal vehicle-search rule—it governs only searches incident to arrest, which this is not. The insufficiency claim about whether the automobile exception applies after the driver is handcuffed in a patrol car confuses the arrest-incident doctrine with probable-cause searches; Source 2 imposes no such timing restriction. Finally, the suggestion that Source 2 fails to say whether odor alone establishes probable cause is contradicted by its plain text, which states that probable cause "may be established" by the officer's detection of the odor. That misconception would ignore the legislature's clear answer. Your study tip: when multiple sources are given, ask whether the search stands on an independent basis. If one source validates the search, you do not need to resolve potential defects in the other. Focus on the statutory language — it often supplies the definitive rule.

Question 5

An associate must determine the deadline for filing a response to a motion under State A Rule of Civil Procedure 6-302. The motion was served on September 1. The associate has gathered:

Source 1: State A Rule of Civil Procedure 6-302: 'A party shall file any response to a motion within 14 days after service of the motion.'

Source 2: Advisory Committee Note to Rule 6-302 (2018): 'The Committee intends the response period to be 21 days. The 14-day period appearing in the rule text is a drafting error, and the Committee recommends that the Supreme Court correct the text at the next opportunity.'

The associate must advise the client of the filing deadline.

Which statement best characterizes whether the sources are sufficient to determine the response deadline?

Sufficient: the rule text is authoritative, and the Committee note itself acknowledges that the text governs until corrected, so the response is due 14 days after service, on September 15. (correct answer)
Sufficient: the Committee note reflects the drafters' intent, which is the best evidence of the rule's meaning, so the response is due 21 days after service, on September 22.
Insufficient: the conflict between the rule text and the Committee note must be resolved by a court decision or a rule amendment before the deadline can be stated with confidence.
Insufficient: the associate must locate the original rule proposal and the adoption record to determine whether the 14-day text was enacted intentionally or by oversight.

Explanation: This question tests how to weigh a court rule's text against its advisory committee note. When a rule's language is plain, that text controls; committee notes are explanatory commentary, not binding law. Here, Rule 6-302 states a response must be filed "within 14 days after service." The motion was served on September 1, so counting 14 days after service gives a deadline of September 15. The advisory note reveals the committee intended 21 days and calls the 14-day text a "drafting error"—but it also says the committee only recommends that the Supreme Court correct the text. No amendment has occurred. Therefore, the sources are sufficient: the rule text is authoritative, and the note itself acknowledges the text governs until corrected. The answer claiming the committee note controls because it reflects drafters' intent is wrong: even accurate evidence of intent cannot override unambiguous enacted text. The answer saying the conflict must be resolved by a court decision or amendment is also wrong—there is no genuine ambiguity requiring interpretation, because the operative text is clear and the note does not amend it. Finally, the answer demanding the original proposal and adoption record mistakes the role of extrinsic legislative history; it is unnecessary when the current rule is plain and the note confirms the text remains in force. On exam day, separate "what the rule says" from "what drafters wished it said." If the text is clear, apply it—advisory notes are often traps.

Question 6

An associate must determine whether the holding of Leech v. Raintree, a 2005 decision of the United States Supreme Court, remains good law for a brief to be filed in the Sixth Circuit. The associate has gathered:

Source 1: Leech v. Raintree, 545 U.S. 300 (2005): 'A state regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce is invalid unless the state demonstrates that it serves a legitimate local purpose and that no nondiscriminatory alternatives are available.'

Source 2: Voss v. Ohio, 984 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2020): 'Leech remains the governing standard for evaluating state regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce.'

Source 3: Kwan, The Erosion of Leech, 88 State L. Rev. 220 (2024): 'Although the Supreme Court has not overruled Leech, its reasoning is in considerable tension with the Court's later decision in Cross v. Arkansas, and several Justices have questioned Leech's continued vitality.'

The associate has not retrieved Cross v. Arkansas and has not run a citator check on Leech.

Which statement best characterizes whether the sources are sufficient to support a statement in the brief that Leech is controlling law?

Sufficient: Source 2 confirms that the Sixth Circuit continues to apply Leech, and Source 3 confirms that the Supreme Court has not overruled it, so the associate may cite Leech as controlling.
Sufficient: Source 1 is a United States Supreme Court decision, which remains binding on all lower courts until overruled, and scholarly criticism does not affect its authority.
Insufficient: the associate has not retrieved Cross v. Arkansas and has not verified Leech's subsequent history, and Source 3 indicates that a later Supreme Court decision may have undermined or limited its holding. (correct answer)
Insufficient: the law review article is a secondary source and cannot be used to establish that a Supreme Court decision remains good law, so the associate must verify Leech's status with a primary source.

Explanation: Whenever you assess whether sources support a statement that precedent is controlling, verify the chain of precedent—not just collect approving language. Here Source 1 states the Leech rule, Source 2 says the Sixth Circuit still applies it, and Source 3 says the Supreme Court has not overruled Leech but its reasoning is in tension with Cross and several Justices have questioned it. That makes the sources insufficient. Source 3 affirmatively alerts you to a later Supreme Court decision that may have undermined or limited Leech, and the associate has neither retrieved Cross nor run a citator check. Without checking Leech's subsequent history—especially whether Cross overruled, limited, or abrogated it—you cannot responsibly tell the court Leech is controlling. The "Source 2 confirms" choice overreads Source 2; a lower-court opinion cannot cure an unexamined later Supreme Court development. The "Source 1 is a Supreme Court decision" choice confuses original authoritativeness with continuing vitality; Supreme Court decisions bind lower courts until overruled, but that is exactly what must be verified. The "law review article is a secondary source" choice identifies a limitation but misstates the defect: Source 3 is not being used as positive law, it is a red flag, and the missing step is a citator check plus reading Cross, not simply substituting a primary source. Strategy: before citing any case as controlling, run a citator check and read any later case that questions or limits it.

Question 7

An associate must determine whether a noncompetition covenant is enforceable. The facts: when the client sold her medical practice to a hospital group, she signed an asset-purchase agreement containing a covenant not to practice medicine within 15 miles of the practice's former main office for 18 months. The client continues to work for the hospital group as an employee, and the practice's patient base is concentrated within that 15-mile radius. The purchase agreement allocated $50,000 of the purchase price to the covenant. The associate has gathered:

Source 1: State A Revised Code § 1331.01 (enacted 2020): 'A covenant not to compete is void and unenforceable except when the covenant is entered into as part of a sale of a business or of substantially all of its assets, the covenant is no broader in duration and geographic scope than necessary to protect the goodwill of the business sold, and the seller receives fair consideration for the covenant; a specific allocation of consideration to the covenant in the sale agreement is presumed fair.'

Source 2: Hsu v. Patel, State A Supreme Court (2021): 'The sale-of-business exception in § 1331.01 applies to a covenant in an asset-purchase agreement even if the seller continues to work for the buyer as an employee, so long as the covenant is ancillary to the sale and consideration is allocated to it.'

Source 3: Ngo v. Ramirez, State A Court of Appeals (2022): 'A covenant not to practice medicine within 30 miles of the seller's former office for two years is not broader than necessary to protect the goodwill of a medical practice whose patient base is concentrated in that area.'

Which statement best characterizes whether the sources are sufficient to determine the covenant's enforceability?

Sufficient: the covenant is enforceable because it is ancillary to the sale with a presumed-fair allocated consideration, Source 2 removes any bar from continued employment, and the 15-mile, 18-month restriction is no broader than the 30-mile, two-year restriction upheld in Source 3. (correct answer)
Sufficient: the covenant is void because § 1331.01 permits sale-of-business covenants only when the seller has completely withdrawn from the business, and the client's continued employment takes the covenant outside the exception.
Insufficient: no source addresses whether a 15-mile, 18-month restriction is reasonable in scope, because Source 3 upheld a different 30-mile, two-year restriction and the associate may not analogize to it.
Insufficient: the sources do not establish that the $50,000 allocation is fair consideration for the covenant, and fair consideration is a statutory prerequisite that the associate must verify with additional evidence.

Explanation: Whenever you see a noncompete question, start by matching the facts to the statute and then ask whether any precedent or presumption fills the gaps. Here,the sources are sufficient. Under §1331.01,the covenant qualifies for the sale-of-business exception: it is part of an asset-purchase agreement, ancillary to that sale, and the agreement specifically allocated $50,000 to it. That allocation triggers the statute’s presumption that the consideration is fair. Source 2 eliminates the continued-employment problem, because it holds the exception applies even when the seller stays on as an employee. As for scope, Source 3 upheld a 30-mile,two-year restriction as necessary to protect a medical practice goodwill concentrated in that area; a 15-mile,18-month restriction is no broader than the restriction already upheld, so it fits within the statute’s requirement. The contention that continued employment takes the covenant outside the exception fails — Source 2 expressly rejects that reading. The claim that no source addresses whether the 15-mile,18-month restriction is reasonable because Source 3 involved a different restriction misunderstands analogical reasoning: if a broader restriction is necessary, a narrower one is necessarily no broader. And the concern that $50,000 was not established as fair consideration ignores the statutory presumption — an allocation in the sale agreement is presumed fair, with nothing in the sources rebutting it. Remember: statutory presumptions shift the burden,and when a broader restriction has been upheld, a narrower restriction usually takes care of itself.

Question 8

An associate is preparing a motion to dismiss filed on behalf of a defendant in federal court. The plaintiff's claim arises under state law, and the defendant's motion asserts two grounds: lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction. The supervisor asks only for the portion of the brief on subject-matter jurisdiction. The associate has gathered:

Source 1: 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a): 'The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states.'

Source 2: Meridian Holdings, LLC v. Ferris, U.S. Supreme Court (1996): 'For diversity purposes, a limited liability company has the citizenship of each of its members; a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and of the state where it has its principal place of business.'

Source 3: Riverside Industries v. Coppola, U.S. Supreme Court (2010): 'A corporation's principal place of business is the place where the corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities, commonly called its nerve center.'

The facts: the plaintiff is a citizen of State A. The defendant is an LLC whose sole member is a corporation incorporated in State A with its nerve center in State A. The amount in controversy is $100,000.

Which statement best characterizes whether the sources are sufficient for the assigned portion of the brief?

Sufficient: the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and the parties are diverse because an LLC's citizenship is determined by its principal place of business, so the court has subject-matter jurisdiction and the motion should be denied.
Sufficient: applying Sources 1 through 3, the LLC is a citizen of State A because its sole member is a corporation incorporated and nerve-centered in State A, so complete diversity is lacking and the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction; no personal-jurisdiction source is needed because the assignment was limited to subject-matter jurisdiction. (correct answer)
Insufficient: because the motion also asserts lack of personal jurisdiction, the associate must include argument on both grounds or the personal-jurisdiction challenge will be deemed abandoned.
Insufficient: Source 2 addresses only unincorporated associations and does not state whether the citizenship of an LLC's corporate member is imputed to the LLC for diversity purposes, so the associate cannot complete the diversity analysis.

Explanation: Whenever you see a diversity-jurisdiction question, start with two requirements: amount in controversy over $75,000 and complete diversity between the parties. But for LLCs, do not stop at the LLC itself—look through to each member. Here, the amount is $100,000, so that prong is met. Under Source 2, the LLC's citizenship is the citizenship of its sole member, the corporation. Under Sources 2 and 3, that corporation is a citizen of State A because it is incorporated there and its nerve center is there. Therefore the LLC is a citizen of State A, the plaintiff is also a citizen of State A, and complete diversity is lacking. The sources are sufficient for the assigned subject-matter jurisdiction argument; no personal-jurisdiction source is needed because the supervisor requested only that portion of the brief. The choice saying the parties are diverse because an LLC's citizenship is based on its principal place of business is wrong: LLC citizenship is based on its members, and the conclusion of diversity is backwards. The choice claiming the brief is insufficient because the associate must also address personal jurisdiction misunderstands the assignment—limited to subject-matter jurisdiction does not waive the other ground. Finally, the choice claiming Source 2 only addresses unincorporated associations and fails to impute a corporate member's citizenship misreads Source 2: it expressly provides that an LLC takes the citizenship of each member, and the corporation's citizenship is settled by Sources 2 and 3. On exam day, remember the "look-through" rule for LLCs: identify every member, and if a member is a corporation, determine both its incorporation state and nerve center. Complete diversity fails if any plaintiff shares a state with any member.

Question 9

An attorney in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts is opposing a motion to transfer a contract case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The only disputed issue is the weight to give the plaintiff's choice of forum. The attorney has gathered the following sources:

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a): "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented."
Norcross v. MidAtlantic, 598 U.S. 112 (2023): "A district court must consider all relevant private and public interest factors under § 1404(a), but we express no opinion on what weight, if any, a plaintiff's choice of forum should receive."
Barnes v. Pharma, 801 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015): "A plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to substantial deference and may be overcome only if the balance of convenience strongly favors the defendant."
Okafor v. Logistics, 955 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2020): "A plaintiff's choice of forum is just one factor and receives no special weight in a § 1404(a) transfer analysis." The attorney has verified that Barnes has not been overruled or limited by the First Circuit or the Supreme Court.

Which of the following best describes whether these sources are sufficient to support the attorney's opposition to the motion?

Yes, because Barnes is directly controlling in the District of Massachusetts and requires substantial deference to the plaintiff's choice; Okafor and Norcross do not displace it. (correct answer)
No, because Norcross left the issue open and the conflict between Barnes and Okafor means no court of appeals decision is controlling on this question.
No, because the Supreme Court has not resolved the circuit split, so the district court must independently weigh the competing circuit views.
Yes, because Okafor is the more recent circuit decision and reflects the better-reasoned approach; the district court may follow it as persuasive authority.

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about which authority governs a federal district court, think about vertical and horizontal stare decisis. A district court in Massachusetts must follow U.S. Supreme Court precedent and binding First Circuit precedent, but it may only treat other circuits' decisions as persuasive. Here, Norcross is the Supreme Court case, but it expressly declined to decide the weight of a plaintiff's choice of forum, so it doesn't resolve the issue. That leaves Barnes, a First Circuit decision holding that a plaintiff's choice receives substantial deference. Because you've verified Barnes has not been overruled or limited, it is directly controlling in the District of Massachusetts. Therefore, the attorney can rely on it to oppose transfer, and neither Okafor nor Norcross displaces it. The first wrong choice suggests the conflict between Barnes and Okafor means no court of appeals decision is controlling—that's incorrect because only First Circuit precedent controls here; Okafor from the Ninth Circuit has no binding force. The second wrong choice says the district court must independently weigh the competing circuit views because the Supreme Court hasn't resolved the split—this ignores that a district court must follow its own circuit's precedent, not resolve a national split. The third wrong choice says Okafor is more recent and better-reasoned, so it may be followed as persuasive authority—but persuasive authority cannot override binding First Circuit precedent. Your study tip: on questions about multiple sources, always identify the court's position in the hierarchy first. Binding precedent wins; persuasive authority fills gaps only when no binding law exists.

Question 10

An associate must determine whether a client's breach-of-contract claim, which accrued on March 1, 2021, is timely if filed on April 1, 2024. The associate has gathered:

Source 1: State A Code § 101, as amended effective January 1, 2026: 'An action upon a written contract shall be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues.' Before the amendment, § 101 required commencement within two years after accrual.

Source 2: State A Code § 103: 'When a limitations period is amended, the amended period applies to causes of action that have not been barred as of the amendment's effective date; a cause of action already barred is not revived by the amendment.'

Source 3: Reznick v. Bauer, State A Supreme Court (2020): 'A cause of action for breach of contract accrues for limitations purposes when the breach occurs, regardless of when the plaintiff learns of the breach.'

The client discovered the breach in February 2025.

Which statement best characterizes whether the sources are sufficient to determine whether the claim is timely?

Sufficient: the claim is time-barred, because it accrued in March 2021, the former two-year period expired in March 2023, and Source 2 provides that the 2026 amendment does not revive a claim already barred. (correct answer)
Sufficient: the claim is timely, because the amended four-year period runs from the March 2021 accrual date, so the claim filed in April 2024 is within the extended limitations period.
Insufficient: Source 3 addresses only when a claim accrues under the former two-year version of § 101, and no source states when a claim accrues under the amended four-year version.
Insufficient: the sources do not reveal whether the legislature intended the 2026 amendment to apply to claims that accrued before its effective date, so the associate must locate the amendment's legislative history.

Explanation: Whenever you see a limitations-period question involving an amendment, your first move is to check the accrual date and the old period, then apply the new statute's effective date and any saving/revival rule. Here, the claim accrued in March 2021 under Source 3's rule—breach occurs regardless of discovery—so the original two-year period expired in March 2023. The 2026 amendment lengthened the period to four years, but Source 2 expressly says an amended period applies only to claims not already barred, and a barred claim is not revived. Since the claim was already barred in March 2023, the 2026 amendment cannot help, even though the client discovered the breach in February 2025. Therefore the sources are sufficient and the claim is time-barred. The "claim is timely" choice misses the critical fact that the old limitations period expired before the amendment took effect; the four-year period does not restart from accrual for already-barred claims. The choice claiming insufficiency because Source 3 addresses only the former two-year version misunderstands that accrual rules are not version-specific—Source 3 defines when the cause of action accrued, and that date governs both versions. The legislative-intent choice is also wrong because Source 2 is the legislative statement of intent: it tells you precisely how amended periods apply and bars revival. Your takeaway: when a limitations period changes, always calculate whether the claim was already barred before the amendment's effective date. If it was, no extension can revive it unless the statute explicitly says otherwise.

Question 11

An associate must determine whether 'knowingly' is an element of the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm that the prosecution must prove at trial. The associate has gathered:

Source 1: State A Pattern Jury Instruction 45.2: 'To find the defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm.'

Source 2: State A Code § 31-101: 'A person who has been convicted of a felony and who thereafter possesses a firearm is guilty of a class C felony.'

Source 3: Barnes v. State, State A Supreme Court (2017): 'When a criminal statute does not specify a culpable mental state and its legislative history is silent, the legislature did not intend to require one; this court will not read a mental state into such a statute.'

The legislative history of § 31-101 contains no indication that the legislature intended to require knowledge.

Which statement best characterizes whether the sources are sufficient to determine whether 'knowingly' must be proved?

Sufficient: the pattern instruction is the authoritative statement of the elements approved for use by State A courts, so the prosecution must prove knowing possession.
Sufficient: § 31-101 is silent on mental state and its legislative history is silent, and Source 3 directs that no mental state be read into the statute, so 'knowingly' is not an element the prosecution must prove. (correct answer)
Insufficient: no State A case has applied § 31-101, so the associate cannot determine whether the prosecution must prove knowledge in a prosecution under that statute.
Insufficient: the pattern instruction and the statute conflict, and the associate must find a decision reconciling them before advising whether 'knowingly' is an element.

Explanation: When you see a question about whether sources "sufficiently" establish an element, remember that the hierarchy of authority matters: statutes are the primary source of elements, pattern jury instructions are secondary aids, and judicial precedent can fill gaps only when appropriate. Here, the sources are sufficient to answer no. Source 2 is the statute itself, § 31-101, and it is silent as to mental state. Source 3, Barnes v. State, supplies the governing interpretive rule: when a criminal statute does not specify a culpable mental state and its legislative history is silent, the legislature did not intend to require one, and courts must not read one in. Because Source 1 says the statute's legislative history contains no such indication, Source 3 directs you to conclude that knowingly is not an element. Thus the prosecution need not prove knowing possession. The choice saying the pattern instruction "is the authoritative statement of the elements" confuses a pattern instruction with a statute; pattern instructions are not law and cannot override the statute's silence. The choice saying "no State A case has applied § 31-101" misses that Source 3 is a governing case establishing the interpretive principle; you do not need a case applying this exact statute when the statute and precedent together resolve the question. The choice saying "the pattern instruction and the statute conflict" also fails: they are not actually in conflict because the pattern instruction, unlike the statute, is not authoritative, and no further reconciliation is needed when the supreme court's rule resolves the ambiguity. Remember: on bar exam questions, distinguish between sources of law—a pattern jury instruction can illustrate, but a statute plus applicable judicial construction controls whether an element exists.

Question 12

An associate must determine whether State B or State C law governs a contract dispute pending in federal district court in State A under diversity jurisdiction. The contract contains a choice-of-law clause selecting State B law. The associate has gathered:

Source 1: Steel City Industries v. Grayson, U.S. Supreme Court (1945): 'A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state.'

Source 2: Valdez v. Orion Industries, State B Supreme Court (2020): 'A contractual choice-of-law clause is enforceable if the chosen state has a substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and application of its law would not violate a fundamental public policy of this state.'

Source 3: In re Sunrise Shipping, State C Court of Appeals (2021): 'A choice-of-law clause will not be honored if the chosen state's law would deprive a party of a remedy provided by State C law.'

The associate has not located any State A case or statute on the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses.

Which statement best characterizes whether the sources are sufficient to advise which state's law the federal court will apply?

Sufficient: Source 1 directs the court to apply State A's choice-of-law rules, and because the contract selects State B law and the transaction has a substantial relationship to State B, the court will apply State B law under Source 2.
Sufficient: Sources 2 and 3 both treat choice-of-law clauses as enforceable in at least some circumstances, so the court will apply State B law regardless of which state's choice-of-law rules govern.
Insufficient: the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause is governed by federal common law, and none of the sources addresses whether the clause is valid under that standard.
Insufficient: under Source 1 the federal court must apply State A's choice-of-law rules, but none of the sources provides those rules, so the court's approach to the choice-of-law clause cannot be determined. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests the intersection of diversity jurisdiction and choice of law. The key rule, from Erie and Klaxon, is that a federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the forum state—including that state's choice-of-law rules. So when the associate sees a contract dispute pending in federal court in State A, the first question is not "what does the contract say?" but "what would a State A court do with this choice-of-law clause?" Source 1 supplies that foundational rule: apply State A's choice-of-law rules. But that is all it supplies. The associate has found no State A case or statute about enforcing choice-of-law clauses, so the court's actual approach cannot be known. State A might follow the Restatement, might require only a good-faith connection, or might refuse to honor such clauses entirely. Therefore, the sources are insufficient. The answer saying it is sufficient because the contract selects State B and has a substantial relationship to State B is flawed: that "substantial relationship" test comes from State B's Supreme Court, not from State A, and State A's rules have not been shown to adopt it. Similarly, the answer relying on Sources 2 and 3 as showing choice-of-law clauses are "enforceable in at least some circumstances" misses the point—those are the laws of State B and State C, not the forum's choice-of-law rules. And the answer invoking federal common law is wrong: in diversity, federal courts do not apply federal common law to decide state-law contract issues; they apply forum state choice-of-law rules. Your takeaway: in any diversity case, start with the forum state's choice-of-law rules, and do not substitute the law of another interested state as if it controlled.