Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Apportionment Of Responsibility Among Multiple Tortfeasors

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Apportionment Of Responsibility Among Multiple TortfeasorsQuestion 1 of 11

Rex was injured when a truck owned by Delta Lines collided with a car driven by Sam. Rex sued Delta and Sam. Before trial, Rex settled with Delta for $80,000, released Delta, and reserved his claim against Sam. At trial, the jury found Sam 60% at fault, Delta 40% at fault, and Rex 0% at fault. Rex's damages were $500,000, all economic. The state's Uniform Apportionment Act provides:

§ 6(a) A settlement with and release of one tortfeasor discharges that tortfeasor only.

§ 6(b) The claim against a nonsettling tortfeasor is reduced by the settling tortfeasor's equitable share of the damages, as found by the fact-finder.

§ 6(c) If the settlement amount paid exceeds the settling tortfeasor's equitable share, the nonsettling tortfeasor receives a credit for the excess. If the settlement amount is less than the settling tortfeasor's equitable share, the plaintiff bears the shortfall.

What amount may Rex recover from Sam?

$420,000, because the $80,000 settlement is credited against the full $500,000 judgment.

$300,000, because Sam is liable for his 60% share, and the below-share settlement does not increase Sam's liability.

$220,000, because the claim is reduced both by Delta's 40% equitable share and by the $80,000 settlement.

$500,000, because Sam is jointly and severally liable for all damages and the release of Delta does not release Sam.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Apportionment Of Responsibility Among Multiple Tortfeasors

Practice Apportionment Of Responsibility Among Multiple Tortfeasors in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Apportionment Of Responsibility Among Multiple Tortfeasors, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

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Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

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Question 1

§ 6(a) A settlement with and release of one tortfeasor discharges that tortfeasor only.

§ 6(b) The claim against a nonsettling tortfeasor is reduced by the settling tortfeasor's equitable share of the damages, as found by the fact-finder.

What amount may Rex recover from Sam?

$420,000, because the $80,000 settlement is credited against the full $500,000 judgment.
$300,000, because Sam is liable for his 60% share, and the below-share settlement does not increase Sam's liability. (correct answer)
$220,000, because the claim is reduced both by Delta's 40% equitable share and by the $80,000 settlement.
$500,000, because Sam is jointly and severally liable for all damages and the release of Delta does not release Sam.

Explanation: Whenever you see a settlement-and-release question under the Uniform Apportionment Act, focus on the relationship between the settlement amount and the settling tortfeasor's equitable share. Here, Delta's 40% share of $500,000 damages is $200,000. Under § 6(b), Sam's liability is reduced by Delta's equitable share, not by the settlement amount. That gives Sam liability of $300,000 (60% × $500,000). Because Delta's $80,000 settlement is less than its $200,000 share, § 6(c) says the plaintiff bears the shortfall; Sam gets no extra credit and owes no extra amount. The $420,000 answer incorrectly treats the settlement as a simple dollar-for-dollar credit against the full judgment. That is a pro tanto offset approach, not the UAA’s share-based approach. The $220,000 answer double-counts the settlement by subtracting both Delta's 40% share and the $80,000 payment; the shortfall is the plaintiff’s loss, not a further reduction in Sam’s liability. The $500,000 answer wrongly assumes joint and several liability despite § 6(a), which releases only Delta and, combined with § 6(b), limits Sam to his equitable share. Study tip: separate the settling tortfeasor's equitable share from the amount actually paid. If the payment exceeds the share, the nonsettler gets a credit for the excess; if it falls short, the plaintiff eats the loss. Then just apply the nonsettler's percentage to total damages.

Question 2

Prime Construction hired SteelFab, Inc. to erect steel framing. Leon, a delivery driver for an unrelated company, was injured when a beam fell because Prime's site superintendent had failed to secure the area and SteelFab's crew had used improper rigging. Leon sued Prime and SteelFab. The subcontract provides:

'SteelFab shall defend, indemnify, and hold Prime harmless from any claim, loss, or liability for bodily injury arising out of SteelFab's work, even if the injury is caused in part by Prime's negligence. SteelFab shall have no duty to indemnify Prime for a claim caused solely by Prime's negligence.'

A jury found Prime 30% at fault, SteelFab 70% at fault, and Leon 0% at fault. Under the state's several-liability statute, the court entered judgment for $300,000 against Prime and $700,000 against SteelFab. Prime paid its $300,000 share and now seeks indemnity from SteelFab for that amount. The state's Construction Indemnity Statute provides:

'Any provision in a construction contract that requires a party to indemnify another party for bodily injury caused by or resulting from the indemnitee's own negligence is void and unenforceable to that extent.'

Is Prime entitled to indemnity from SteelFab for the $300,000?

Yes, because the claim arose out of SteelFab's work and SteelFab's 70% fault makes it primarily responsible.
Yes, because the clause excludes indemnity for Prime's sole negligence and Prime was only 30% at fault.
No, because SteelFab cannot be required to indemnify Prime for a claim arising out of SteelFab's own work.
No, because the statute voids indemnity for Prime's own negligence, and Prime paid only its own 30% share. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests the interplay between contractual indemnity clauses and anti-indemnity statutes. The key move is to isolate the indemnitee's own fault percentage. The statute here voids any provision requiring a party to indemnify another for injury caused by the indemnitee's own negligence. The jury found Prime 30% at fault, and Prime paid exactly its 30% share—$300,000. That payment represents Prime's own negligence. The contract's "even if caused in part by Prime's negligence" language conflicts with the statute, which voids indemnity to the extent of Prime's own negligence. The "sole negligence" exception does not save it, because the statute voids indemnity for any of Prime's negligence, not just sole negligence. So Prime cannot recover. The first wrong answer—that SteelFab's 70% fault makes it "primarily responsible"—misapplies comparative fault; the statute overrides that. The second wrong answer, relying on the "sole negligence" exclusion, is a trap: that exclusion addresses 100% Prime fault, but the statute goes further, voiding the clause for partial negligence too. The third wrong answer, about claims arising out of SteelFab's own work, is a red herring—the contract explicitly covers that, but the statute only prohibits indemnifying Prime for Prime's own negligence. Strategy: When you see an anti-indemnity statute, check the indemnitee's fault percentage. If it's greater than zero, the clause is void to that extent, regardless of contract language about "sole negligence" or "primary responsibility." Read the statute's exact wording—does it void all negligence or just sole negligence?

Question 3

Nia urged her friend, who was driving, to speed through a yellow light. The car collided with a truck driven by Ben. Nia sued her friend and Ben. Before trial, Nia settled with her friend for $100,000 and dismissed the claim. The case against Ben proceeded. The jury found total damages of $250,000 and also found Nia 20% at fault. Ben asks the court to reduce the $250,000 verdict by the $100,000 settlement. Nia argues the verdict should first be reduced by her 20% fault to $200,000, and the settlement then subtracted, leaving $100,000.

Which legal issue is most central to resolving this dispute?

Whether a passenger may be found comparatively at fault for encouraging the driver to speed through a yellow light.
Whether the settlement credit must be applied before or after reducing the verdict for the passenger's own comparative fault. (correct answer)
Whether the passenger's settlement with the friend released Ben from liability for the collision.
Whether the damages award should have been itemized into economic and noneconomic losses before any reductions.

Explanation: This question tests the interplay between a plaintiff's comparative fault and a settlement credit from one tortfeasor. When you see a settlement plus a fault allocation, the central question is almost always the order of math: does the credit come off the top, or after reducing for the plaintiff's own fault? Here the jury found total damages of $250,000 and Nia 20% at fault. If the court first reduces for Nia’s fault, her recovery is $200,000, and then subtracting the $100,000 settlement leaves $100,000. If the court instead subtracts the settlement first, the verdict becomes $150,000, and then a 20% reduction leaves $120,000. That difference is the heart of the dispute. The question is not whether the passenger can be found comparatively at fault for urging the driver to speed—the jury already did that, so that issue is settled. It is also not whether the settlement released Ben; a settlement with one defendant generally does not release another unless the release says so. And itemizing economic versus noneconomic losses is irrelevant to the order-of-reduction problem. Therefore, the legal issue is whether the settlement credit must be applied before or after reducing the verdict for Nia's comparative fault. Study tip: in multi-defendant cases, always separate the plaintiff's fault reduction from the settlement credit, and ask which statute or rule dictates the sequence—that sequencing often drives the final number.

Question 4

A patron was injured in a crowd surge at a concert. The patron sued the concert promoter and the security company. A jury found the security company 85% at fault and the promoter 15% at fault for the patron's injuries, and assessed damages of $100,000. The security company has no assets. The promoter asks the court to limit its liability to $15,000, its percentage share. The patron asks the court to enter judgment against the promoter for the full $100,000.

Which issue is most central to deciding the promoter's obligation?

Whether the security company's insolvency should be treated as a superseding cause of the patron's inability to collect the full judgment.
Whether the security company's 85% fault should be reallocated to the promoter because it cannot pay.
Whether the promoter is jointly and severally liable for the entire injury or only for its own 15% share. (correct answer)
Whether the promoter's failure to provide adequate security was a substantial factor in causing the patron's injuries.

Explanation: When a tort case ends with a jury allocating fault among multiple defendants, the critical follow-up question is how the judgment will be enforced. That is exactly what this question tests: the difference between several liability, where each defendant pays only its assigned percentage, and joint and several liability, where one defendant can be forced to pay the entire damages even if it was only partly at fault. The promoter's obligation turns on that rule. If the promoter is only several liable, its cap is $15,000; if it is jointly and severally liable, it must pay the full $100,000 and later seek contribution from the insolvent security company. That is why the issue of whether the promoter is jointly and severally liable for the entire injury or only for its own 15% share is central. The wrong answers miss the real legal question. The security company's insolvency is not a superseding cause of the patron's injury—causation concerns how the harm happened, not whether a defendant can pay. Reallocating the security company's 85% fault to the promoter because it cannot pay is not a general rule; reallocation occurs only if a statute provides for it, and that is simply another way of asking the joint-and-several-liability question. Whether the promoter's inadequate security was a substantial factor was already resolved by the jury's fault finding, so it is no longer the contested issue. On exam day, when a question involves multiple tortfeasors and an insolvent defendant, immediately ask: joint and several, several only, or several with reallocation? The answer controls the recovery.

Question 5

Nadia was stopped at a red light when a speeding car driven by Theo rear-ended her car, pushing it into the intersection, where it was struck by a delivery truck driven by Paul. Nadia suffered a broken leg and a traumatic brain injury. Medical experts testified that the broken leg was caused by the first impact but could not determine whether the brain injury occurred in the first impact or when the truck struck Nadia's car. Theo and Paul each argue that he should be liable only for the injuries he caused.

Which issue is most central to determining how liability should be apportioned between Theo and Paul?

Whether Nadia's brain injury and other damages can be reasonably apportioned between the two collisions. (correct answer)
Whether Theo's speeding was the proximate cause of the collision with the delivery truck.
Whether Paul had sufficient time to brake after Nadia's car entered the intersection.
Whether the delivery truck was owned by Paul's employer or by Paul personally.

Explanation: When you see two separate collisions and one plaintiff with multiple injuries, ask whether the harm can be divided. In tort law, a defendant is liable only for the injuries he actually caused, but if an injury is indivisible, each tortfeasor may be held jointly and severally liable for the entire harm. Here, medical experts could attribute the broken leg to the first impact, but they could not determine whether the brain injury occurred in the first collision or in the crash with Paul's truck. So the most central issue is exactly what the correct answer states: whether Nadia's brain injury and other damages can be reasonably apportioned between the two collisions. If they can, Theo and Paul pay only for their respective shares; if not, both may be responsible for the full brain injury. The other choices miss the apportionment problem. Whether Theo's speeding was the proximate cause of the collision with the truck goes to Theo's liability for that later accident, not to how the injuries should be split. Whether Paul had sufficient time to brake tests Paul's negligence, not whether his collision caused the brain injury. And whether the truck was owned by Paul's employer or by Paul personally could matter only for vicarious liability, not for apportionment between two negligent drivers. On exam day, when two tortfeasors and multiple injuries appear, first separate the injury into caused-by-whom categories; only then discuss indivisible harm.

Question 6

Yolanda was injured when a forklift operated by her co-worker Ned struck her at a warehouse. Yolanda received workers' compensation benefits from her employer, WareHouse Co. She then sued the forklift manufacturer, LiftCo, alleging that defective brakes contributed to the injury. LiftCo asked the court to instruct the jury to allocate 60% of the fault to Ned, who was not a party, because Ned's failure to brake was the primary cause. Under state law, WareHouse Co. and its employees, including Ned, are immune from tort suit because workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy. In Tran v. Industrial Supply, the state supreme court held:

'Under our Comparative Fault Act, a defendant may reduce its liability by the fault of a nonparty whose tortious conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. This rule applies to nonparties who are immune from suit, including employers and co-employees covered by workers' compensation, because fault allocation is a damages-apportionment device, not a claim for relief. The only exception is when the nonparty's conduct was not tortious because no duty was owed.'

Should the court allow the jury to allocate fault to Ned?

No, because Ned is immune from tort suit and cannot be made a party or have fault allocated to him.
No, because Yolanda's receipt of workers' compensation benefits forecloses any finding of fault by a co-employee.
Yes, because Ned's alleged negligent failure to brake is tortious and Tran permits allocation to immune nonparties. (correct answer)
Yes, but only if LiftCo first impleads Ned as a third-party defendant so the allocation is binding.

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about allocating fault among multiple tortfeasors, the core issue is whether the defendant must shoulder the full loss or can spread it to others, including nonparties. In comparative-fault states, the key is to distinguish "tortious conduct" from "suitability for suit." Here, Tran v. Industrial Supply explicitly holds that a defendant may reduce liability by the fault of a nonparty whose tortious conduct was a proximate cause—even if that nonparty is immune from suit under workers' compensation. Ned's alleged failure to brake is a classic negligence claim: he owed Yolanda a duty, breached it, and caused her injury. So the court should allow the jury to allocate fault to Ned. The first wrong choice claims Ned's immunity prevents fault allocation. That flips Tran's holding: immunity bars a claim for relief, but fault allocation is only a damages-apportionment device. The second wrong choice says Yolanda's receipt of workers' compensation forecloses co-employee fault. That confuses the plaintiff's remedy against her employer with the defendant's right to apportion fault among all tortfeasors, including immune ones. The last wrong choice insists LiftCo must implead Ned to make the allocation binding. But Tran allows allocation to nonparties directly; no impleader is required, and the jury's allocation can be binding for purposes of reducing LiftCo's liability. Your study takeaway: when you see "immune nonparty" in a comparative-fault question, remember the exception—fault is allocated only if the nonparty's conduct was tortious because a duty was owed. Immunity does not erase fault.

Question 7

A worker was injured in a warehouse when a forklift operated by a temporary employee and a pallet stacked by a warehouse employee both contributed to the accident. The worker sued the warehouse and the temporary staffing agency. A jury assigned 55% fault to the warehouse and 45% fault to the staffing agency, and found no fault on the worker. The warehouse paid the entire judgment. It now asks the staffing agency to reimburse it for the 45% share the jury assigned to the agency.

Which of the following issues is most central to the warehouse's request?

Whether the staffing agency's employee was acting within the scope of employment when the accident occurred.
Whether the warehouse's payment of the full judgment extinguished the worker's remaining claim against the staffing agency.
Whether the warehouse was directly negligent in supervising the temporary employee who operated the forklift.
Whether the warehouse, after paying more than its allocated share, may obtain contribution from the staffing agency. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see one defendant paying an entire judgment after a jury has apportioned fault among multiple tortfeasors, think about contribution. Contribution allows a co-defendant who paid more than its fair share to recover the excess from another co-defendant. Here, the warehouse paid 100% of the judgment even though the jury assigned only 55% fault to the warehouse and 45% to the staffing agency. Because the injury was indivisible and both defendants were jointly liable, the warehouse's payment extinguished the worker's claim against both. The warehouse then has a separate claim against the staffing agency for the 45% share it paid on the agency's behalf. That is why the most central issue is whether the warehouse, after paying more than its allocated share, may obtain contribution from the staffing agency. The other choices miss the real dispute. Whether the staffing agency's employee was acting within the scope of employment could matter to the agency's original liability, but the jury already assigned 45% fault to the agency, so that issue is not central to reimbursement. Whether the warehouse's payment extinguished the worker's remaining claim is true but beside the point: extinguishment bars the worker from suing again, yet it does not answer whether the warehouse can seek contribution. Whether the warehouse was directly negligent in supervising the temporary employee speaks to the warehouse's own fault, which the jury already accounted for in its 55% share. On the exam, when a co-defendant pays more than its apportioned share, immediately ask: is this a contribution claim? That label drives the answer.

Question 8

Troy was riding a motorcycle when a car driven by Elena ran a stop sign and struck him. Elena admits negligence but contends that Troy was partially at fault for speeding and that a delivery van, which had stopped in a way that blocked her view of the intersection, was also at fault. Troy did not sue the van driver. Elena asks the court to instruct the jury that it may assign a percentage of fault to the van driver and reduce her share accordingly.

Which issue is most central to deciding whether the jury may consider the van driver's fault?

Whether the van driver owed Troy a duty to stop in a position that did not block Elena's view.
Whether Troy's speeding was a contributing cause of the collision with Elena's car.
Whether Elena's violation of the stop sign should be treated as negligence per se.
Whether fault may be apportioned to a nonparty who was not sued and is not before the court. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see a question about apportioning fault in a negligence case, the first thing to identify is who is being blamed and whether that person is a party to the lawsuit. The central issue here isn't whether the van driver acted negligently—it's whether the jury can even consider the fault of someone who isn't in the courtroom. The correct answer focuses on this procedural gatekeeping question: whether fault may be apportioned to a nonparty who was not sued and is not before the court. In most comparative-fault jurisdictions, a defendant can assert a nonparty's fault to reduce her own share, but only if she properly pleads it and the nonparty is identified—the van driver's absence doesn't automatically bar apportionment, but the rules for doing so are the real battleground. Now, look at the distractors. The choice about whether the van driver owed Troy a duty to stop in a position that didn't block Elena's view gets at the merits of the van driver's negligence, but that's irrelevant if the procedural law doesn't permit apportionment to a nonparty. The choice about Troy's speeding being a contributing cause is also a merits question—and it concerns Troy's own fault, not the van driver's, so it doesn't answer whether the van driver can be considered. Similarly, whether Elena's stop-sign violation is negligence per se only addresses Elena's liability, not the apportionment of fault to a third party. Your study tip: on bar exam torts questions, separate substantive negligence from procedural apportionment. When a nonparty is involved, ask first: "Can this jurisdiction even assign fault to a nonparty?" before ever analyzing duty or causation.

Question 9

Vic was struck by a bullet while Frank and Gus, two hunters, fired simultaneously in his direction. The two shots were independent; Frank and Gus were not acting in concert. It is impossible to determine which bullet struck Vic. Vic sued both for negligence. At trial, the evidence showed that both had fired negligently and Vic's injury was a single indivisible gunshot wound. The state supreme court in Hernandez v. Rangel held:

'When the tortious conduct of two or more actors has brought about an indivisible injury, each actor is jointly and severally liable for the entire injury unless the actor proves that the injury is capable of apportionment and that the actor caused a distinct portion. The burden of proof on apportionment falls on each defendant. This rule does not require concerted action.'

If neither Frank nor Gus can prove that the other's bullet caused Vic's injury, what is Frank's liability?

Frank is liable only for 50% of the damages, because the evidence is equally balanced between the two shooters.
Frank is liable for the entire injury because the harm is indivisibleand he cannot prove a distinct portion. (correct answer)
Frank is not liable, because Vic cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Frank's bullet caused the injury.
Frank is liable only if Vic proves Frank and Gus were acting in concert.

Explanation: Whenever you see multiple defendants and an indivisible injury, think about burden-shifting. This case tests the "alternative liability" principle as modified by the court's holding in Hernandez: when two negligent actors cause a single indivisible harm, each is jointly and severally liable unless he proves the harm was apportionable and that he caused only a distinct portion. Because Frank and Gus acted independently, Vic need not prove which bullet hit him; the burden falls on each defendant to prove apportionment. Here, Frank cannot prove that Gus's bullet caused the injury, nor can he prove that only a distinct portion of the harm was his. Since the wound is indivisible, Frank is liable for the entire injury. This is not a 50/50 split by fairness, because the court explicitly places the burden on defendants to prove their own share, not on the plaintiff to measure an equal balance. It is also not a case of no liability: Vic's inability to prove factual causation is excused by the rule. And the rule expressly says concerted action is not required, so Vic need not prove Frank and Gus were acting in concert. For your study strategy, remember: when negligent actors fire independently and cause an indivisible injury, the defendants bear the burden of apportionment. If none can meet it, each faces full liability. That burden-shifting is the key to answering similar questions correctly.

Question 10

After a warehouse fire, Quinn sued two contractors, Mason and Naylor, whose negligent work allegedly caused the fire. The jury found Quinn 0% at fault, Mason 55% at fault, and Naylor 45% at fault. Quinn's damages were $1,000,000: $700,000 in economic damages and $300,000 in noneconomic damages. Naylor is insolvent. The state's Civil Liability Act provides:

§ 3(a) The fact-finder shall state the total damages and the percentage of fault of each person who caused the injury.

§ 3(b) Except as provided in § 3(c), a defendant is severally liable only for that defendant's percentage share of the total damages.

§ 3(c) If the plaintiff is without fault and a defendant's percentage of fault is 50% or more, that defendant is jointly and severally liable for all economic damages, but is severally liable only for that defendant's percentage share of noneconomic damages.

What is the most Quinn can recover from Mason?

$865,000, because Mason is liable for all economic damages and for 55% of the noneconomic damages. (correct answer)
$1,000,000, because Mason is jointly and severally liable for the entire judgment.
$700,000, because Mason is liable for all economic damages and is not liable for any of the noneconomic damages.
$550,000, because Mason's liability is limited to his 55% share of the total damages.

Explanation: Whenever you see a damages statute with joint and several liability, your first move is to separate economic from noneconomic damages and check the plaintiff's own fault. Here, Quinn is 0% at fault, so § 3(c) applies. Mason is 55% at fault, which meets the 50% threshold, so Mason is jointly and severally liable for all economic damages: the full $700,000. For noneconomic damages, however, § 3(c) keeps liability several only, meaning Mason owes only his 55% share of the $300,000 noneconomic damages: $165,000. Adding those gives $865,000, the most Quinn can recover from Mason. Naylor's insolvency does not shift Naylor's noneconomic share to Mason. The choice saying Mason owes $1,000,000 is tempting but wrong because it treats the entire judgment as jointly and severally liable; the statute expressly limits noneconomic damages to a percentage share. The choice saying $700,000 wrongly omits Mason's several liability for his 55% of noneconomic damages. The choice saying $550,000 ignores the joint-and-several rule for economic damages and treats Mason as severally liable for everything. Finally, any answer relying only on Mason's 55% share of total damages misses the special statutory trigger for economic damages when the plaintiff is without fault. On exam day, when you see a comparative-fault statute, immediately split damages into economic and noneconomic categories, then apply the threshold rule separately to each.

Question 11

Nia was injured when a car driven by Paolo, who was speeding, collided with a car driven by Quinton, who deliberately swerved into Paolo's lane to force him off the road. Nia sued both. A jury found Paolo 30% at fault, Quinton 70% at fault, and Nia 0% at fault. Nia's damages were $100,000, and the court entered judgment jointly and severally. Nia collected the entire $100,000 from Paolo. Paolo then sought contribution from Quinton for $70,000. The state's Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides:

§ 3(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), a tortfeasor who pays more than that tortfeasor's equitable share of a common liability may seek contribution from any other tortfeasor whose fault contributed to the same injury.

§ 3(b) A tortfeasor's equitable share is the percentage of fault attributed to that tortfeasor by the fact-finder.

§ 3(c) A person whose liability is based on intentional misconduct has no right to contribution, but this subsection does not make that person immune from contribution sought by another tortfeasor.

Should Paolo recover contribution from Quinton?

No, because an intentional tortfeasor is never subject to contribution from a negligent tortfeasor.
No, because Paolo was also at fault and may recover only if he was completely without fault.
Yes, for $70,000, because Quinton's intentional status does not immunize him from Paolo's contribution claim. (correct answer)
Yes, for $50,000, because contribution is divided equally between the two tortfeasors.

Explanation: Whenever you see a contribution claim after one tortfeasor has paid a joint and several judgment, start with the statutory equitable shares. Contribution is not about moral blame; it is about whether the payor paid more than that payor's own percentage of fault. Here, Paolo's equitable share was 30% of $100,000, or $30,000. Because Paolo paid the entire judgment, he paid $70,000 more than his share. Quinton’s fault percentage was 70%, so the amount Paolo seeks matches Quinton’s equitable share exactly. The fact that Quinton acted intentionally matters only under § 3(c): an intentional tortfeasor has no right to seek contribution from others, but that same subsection expressly says the intentional tortfeasor is not immune from contribution sought by another tortfeasor. Thus Paolo can recover the full $70,000 from Quinton. The answer saying "No, because an intentional tortfeasor is never subject to contribution" misreads § 3(c): it strips Quinton of his own contribution claim, not his exposure to Paolo's claim. The answer saying "No, because Paolo was also at fault" confuses contribution with comparative-fault immunity; a negligent tortfeasor who paid more than that tortfeasor's share may still seek contribution. The answer saying "Yes, for $50,000, divided equally" is wrong because the statute uses fault percentages, not equal shares. Study tip: on contribution questions, distinguish "no right to contribution" from "no immunity from contribution." That contrast is the classic intentional-tortfeasor trap.