Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Adverse Possession

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Adverse PossessionQuestion 1 of 12

Orin owns undeveloped land. In January 2010, Piper entered without permission, built a small cabin, and lived there continuously. In July 2018, Piper moved out, left all her belongings in the cabin, and told a friend, 'I am never coming back.' In February 2019, she changed her mind, returned, and lived in the cabin continuously through January 2026. In February 2026, Orin sued to eject Piper. The state's 10-year adverse possession statute provides: 'An action to recover real property must be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrued. Possession is continuous if not interrupted by the owner or abandoned by the possessor. An abandonment occurs when the possessor leaves the land with the intent not to return, even if the possessor later changes her mind and resumes possession. A temporary absence, with the intent to return and without an intent to abandon, does not interrupt continuity. If possession is interrupted, the statutory period begins anew.'

Will Piper prevail?

Yes, because her absence lasted less than one year and she left belongings in the cabin, showing that she intended to return.

Yes, because her possession from January 2010 to July 2018, plus February 2019 to January 2026, totals more than ten years, and a temporary absence does not break continuity.

No, because her 2018 departure with intent not to return was an abandonment that broke continuity, and her resumed possession lasted only about seven years.

No, because Piper's 2018 abandonment permanently ended her adverse possession, and her later return cannot restart the statutory period.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Adverse Possession

Practice Adverse Possession in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Adverse Possession, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

Will Piper prevail?

Yes, because her absence lasted less than one year and she left belongings in the cabin, showing that she intended to return.
Yes, because her possession from January 2010 to July 2018, plus February 2019 to January 2026, totals more than ten years, and a temporary absence does not break continuity.
No, because her 2018 departure with intent not to return was an abandonment that broke continuity, and her resumed possession lasted only about seven years. (correct answer)
No, because Piper's 2018 abandonment permanently ended her adverse possession, and her later return cannot restart the statutory period.

Explanation: Whenever you see an adverse possession question, check the continuity requirement carefully: the possessor must occupy continuously for the full statutory period, and any abandonment or interruption restarts the clock. Here the statute defines abandonment as leaving the land with intent not to return, even if the possessor later changes her mind. Piper loses because her July 2018 departure was an abandonment, not a temporary absence. She said, "I am never coming back," which is exactly the intent not to return the statute describes. That broke continuity, so the time she had already accumulated—January 2010 to July 2018—cannot be tacked onto her later possession. When she returned in February 2019, the statutory period began anew. She then possessed continuously only from February 2019 to January 2026, roughly seven years, less than the required ten. By the time Orin sued in February 2026, her new period had not yet matured. The wrong answers each misread the statute. The choice claiming her absence lasted less than one year and that leaving belongings showed intent to return ignores that belongings do not matter when her own statement proves intent not to return. The choice adding both possession periods treats her absence as temporary, but temporary absence requires intent to return, which she lacked. The choice saying her abandonment permanently ended adverse possession and later return cannot restart the period overstates the rule: the statute says the period begins anew, so a later return can start a fresh claim, but here it was too short. Study tip: on adverse possession questions, always identify the exact date continuity broke and recalculate the statutory period from that date.

Question 2

Lena owns a house on a large lot. In 2005, Lena orally allowed her neighbor Ned to use a 12-foot strip of Lena's land as a driveway. In 2008, Ned paved the strip, installed a locked gate at its entrance, and used it as his only access. Ned never told Lena he claimed the strip as his own. In 2026, Lena demanded that Ned stop using the strip, and Ned sued to quiet title. In Reyes v. Calder, the state supreme court held: 'Where possession began with the owner's permission, the burden is on the possessor to prove a clear, unequivocal, and notorious repudiation of the owner's title, communicated to the owner or evidenced by recording a claim of ownership. Continued use, enclosure, paving, or improvements, without such repudiation, do not start the adverse possession period.'

Will Ned prevail?

Yes, because his paving, gate, and exclusive use for 18 years were open, notorious, and hostile acts that placed Lena on notice of his claim.
Yes, because Lena's oral permission was revocable and terminated when Ned's use became exclusive and inconsistent with her ownership.
No, because Ned's use began with permission and he never clearly repudiated Lena's title or communicated a claim of ownership to her. (correct answer)
No, because an oral license cannot be the basis for adverse possession, but Ned may continue using the driveway until Lena revokes permission.

Explanation: When you see an adverse possession question, check how possession began first. If it began with the owner's permission, the usual open-and-notorious analysis is not enough—the possessor must also prove a clear repudiation of the owner's title. Here, Ned's use started in 2005 with Lena's oral permission. Under Reyes, that permissive use is presumed to remain subordinate to Lena's title unless Ned clearly, unequivocally, and notoriously repudiated her ownership and communicated that claim to her or recorded it. Paving the strip, installing a locked gate, and using it exclusively for 18 years may have been visible, but visible use is not repudiation. Because Ned never told Lena he claimed the strip as his own, the adverse possession clock never started, so he cannot quiet title. The choice saying "paving, gate, and exclusive use for 18 years were open, notorious, and hostile" is wrong because it confuses notoriety with hostility; permission defeats the hostility element. The choice saying "oral permission was revocable and terminated when Ned's use became exclusive" is wrong because revoking a license does not transform permissive use into adverse possession—exclusivity alone is not repudiation. The choice saying "an oral license cannot be the basis for adverse possession" is wrong because the problem is not the oral license itself; it is the absence of repudiation, and after Lena revoked permission Ned has no continuing right to use the driveway. Strategy: whenever possession began with permission, ask immediately: did the possessor clearly repudiate and communicate that claim? If not, adverse possession fails.

Question 3

Elena and Maya inherited a beach house as tenants in common. Elena has lived in the house year-round for the past twenty-five years, paid all property taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs, and rented out one room, keeping the rent. Maya never visited, contributed, or demanded possession. Elena now seeks a declaratory judgment that she owns the house outright, claiming Maya's interest was extinguished by adverse possession.

Which issue is most important in determining Elena's claim?

Whether Elena paid the property taxes for the entire twenty-five-year period
Whether Elena's possession of the house was continuous and exclusive
Whether Elena's use was sufficiently open and notorious to put Maya on notice
Whether Elena's occupancy was accompanied by an ouster of Maya's co-tenancy right (correct answer)

Explanation: When a co-tenant claims adverse possession against another co-tenant, the ordinary checklist is not enough. Because every co-tenant has a right to possess the whole property, one co-tenant's exclusive use is presumed permissive, not hostile. Before any adverse-possession clock can run, the claiming co-tenant must have ouster—an unequivocal act that denies the other co-tenant's right to possess, such as refusing entry or locking them out. Here, Maya's interest is not extinguished just because Elena lived there for twenty-five years, paid costs, and kept rent. The decisive question is whether Elena's occupancy was accompanied by an ouster of Maya's co-tenancy right. Without ouster, Elena's possession is treated as amicable, so time does not run against Maya.

Paid property taxes for the full period is not the key: paying taxes supports adverse possession generally, but it does not create hostility between co-tenants and can even raise a right to contribution.
Continuous and exclusive possession is a general requirement, but one co-tenant's "exclusive" physical use is legally exclusive only after an ouster.
Open and notorious use may give notice, but notice is not the missing link; the missing link is an act that clearly repudiates Maya's co-tenancy right.

Study tip: On adverse possession questions involving co-tenants, always scan for an ouster fact. If the facts show only one co-tenant living there or paying expenses, the claim fails—unless that co-tenant actively excluded or repudiated the other.

Question 4

In 2003, Petra began using a fenced flower garden on an unused strip of Art's land, mistakenly believing the strip was included in her deed. She tended it openly and exclusively. In 2013, Petra sold her home to Quinn. Their deed described only Petra's lot and did not mention the strip, but Quinn continued to maintain and enclose the flower garden exactly as Petra had. Art did not object until 2024, when he demanded Quinn remove the garden. The jurisdiction's limitations period for adverse possession is twenty years. Quinn claims she has acquired title.

Which issue is most important in determining whether Quinn acquired title?

Whether Quinn had color of title to the disputed strip
Whether Art had actual notice of Petra's and Quinn's use of the strip
Whether Quinn may tack Petra's possession onto her own to satisfy the limitations period (correct answer)
Whether Petra's mistaken belief about the boundary was reasonable

Explanation: Whenever an adverse possession claim spans two users, the central question is whether their periods of possession can be added together. Petra possessed the garden for ten years before selling to Quinn; Quinn maintained it for about eleven years before Art objected. The limitations period is twenty years, so Quinn wins only if she can tack Petra's ten years onto her own. Tacking requires privity—a non-hostile transfer of possession from one possessor to the next. Quinn's deed did not mention the strip, so the key issue is whether the transfer nevertheless carried with it the possessory interest in the garden, making the possession continuous for the full statutory period. That is why the ability to tack is the most important issue. The other choices miss the point. Color of title is not required for adverse possession; it can help define the extent of a claim, but a mistaken belief about a deed is not the decisive issue. Art's actual notice is likewise unnecessary—the standard is open and notorious use, which the facts already suggest. And the reasonableness of Petra's mistaken boundary belief matters less than whether her use was hostile; many jurisdictions allow adverse possession even for an honest mistake. So focus on continuity across possessors: identify how long each occupant used the land, check whether the statutory period is met, and ask whether privity allows their times to be combined.

Question 5

For more than twenty years, Dana treated a narrow strip at the rear of her neighbor's lot as part of her own residential property. She enclosed it with a fence, planted vegetables and flowers there, stored her lawn equipment inside the enclosed area, and paid the real property taxes that the county assessed against the strip. Her neighbor never entered the strip or objected to her use. Last year, her neighbor sold his lot to a developer, whose new survey showed that the strip falls within the developer's deed. The developer has demanded that Dana remove her fence. Dana seeks to establish that she owns the strip.

Which claim should Dana most likely assert against the developer?

An action to quiet title based on adverse possession of the strip (correct answer)
A claim for a prescriptive easement to use the strip for gardening and storage
An action to reform the developer's deed for mutual mistake
A claim for an easement by necessity over the strip

Explanation: Whenever you see a dispute over land use that has continued for many years, first distinguish between adverse possession and a prescriptive easement. The critical question is whether the user claims exclusive ownership or merely a right to use. Here, Dana's long history of fencing, gardening, storing equipment, and paying property taxes on the strip demonstrates that she treated it as her own — not just as a convenience. That exclusivity, combined with open and notorious use, continuous possession for over twenty years, and the neighbor's failure to object, establishes the elements of adverse possession. Therefore, Dana's strongest claim is an action to quiet title, asking the court to recognize her as the true owner of the strip. A prescriptive easement is the wrong choice because it would only grant her the privilege to continue gardening and storing items, not ownership. Her claim is for title itself, and the facts support that stronger remedy. Reformation of the developer's deed for mutual mistake fails because Dana was not a party to that deed, and the deed accurately describes the property; any mistake was the seller's about what he owned, not a mutual error between Dana and the developer. Finally, an easement by necessity is inapplicable because it requires a landlocked parcel with no reasonable access — Dana's strip is simply part of the neighbor's lot, not a necessary route. For the exam, remember: exclusive possession like fencing and paying taxes points to adverse possession; mere permissive use without exclusion points to a prescriptive easement. Spot the difference and you'll pick the right claim.

Question 6

In 2001, Victor began occupying an unused residential lot that he did not own. He fenced it, installed a small greenhouse, kept the lawn, and paid the property taxes after the county began sending him tax bills. The record owner, Wilma, had been adjudicated incompetent and placed in a care facility in 2000. She remained under that guardianship until her death in 2023. Victor's occupation continued through her death. Wilma's estate now seeks to evict Victor. The jurisdiction's limitations period for adverse possession is twenty years. Victor claims that he acquired title before Wilma died.

Which issue is most important in determining whether Victor acquired title?

Whether Victor's possession was open and notorious enough to alert Wilma's guardian or agents
Whether Wilma's legal incapacity tolled the running of the limitations period (correct answer)
Whether Victor paid the property taxes for the entire statutory period
Whether Victor's initial belief that he was entitled to occupy the lot was reasonable

Explanation: Whenever you see an adverse possession problem, start with the statutory clock: continuous, open and notorious, actual, exclusive, and hostile possession for the limitations period. Here, Victor possessed from 2001 through 2023, roughly 22 years, so you might assume the 20-year period expired. But Wilma was adjudicated incompetent in 2000 and remained under guardianship until death in 2023. Many jurisdictions toll the limitations period while the owner is legally incapacitated, meaning the clock does not run against her during that incapacity. The decisive issue is whether Wilma's legal incapacity tolled the running of the limitations period. If it did, Victor never completed the required 20 years before she died, so his claim fails. Possession being open and notorious enough to alert Wilma's guardian or agents is relevant to notice, but if the clock is tolled, notice alone cannot ripen into title. Victor's payment of the property taxes for the entire statutory period may support a claim and is required in some jurisdictions, but it is not the central issue when tolling applies. Finally, whether Victor initially believed he was entitled to occupy the lot is a trap: adverse possession generally requires hostility, not a reasonable belief, and good-faith mistake cannot overcome tolling. On exam day, when the owner is under a legal disability when the claim begins, check tolling first—the statutory clock may never start running against that owner.

Question 7

Twenty-two years ago, Rosa's neighbor, Sam, asked if he could plant crops on a five-acre corner of Rosa's farm while her fields were fallow. Rosa replied that Sam could use it as long as he wanted. Sam has farmed that corner ever since, enclosed it with fencing, kept it in cultivation, and paid no rent. He now claims that he owns the five acres by adverse possession. Rosa has demanded that he vacate.

Which issue is most important in determining whether Sam acquired title?

Whether Sam's fencing made his possession sufficiently visible to satisfy the open-and-notorious requirement
Whether Rosa's original permission meant that Sam's possession was never adverse to Rosa (correct answer)
Whether Sam's cultivation and fencing of the corner were exclusive for the full statutory period
Whether Rosa's failure to object for twenty-two years amounted to an abandonment of her title

Explanation: This question tests adverse possession, specifically the requirement that possession be "hostile" or adverse to the true owner. Whenever a claimant began using land with the owner's permission, the clock usually does not run: permissive use can never be adverse unless the user clearly repudiates the owner's title and puts the owner on notice. Here, Sam asked Rosa if he could plant crops on the corner, and she said he could use it "as long as he wanted." That express permission makes his initial possession nonhostile, so the most important issue is whether Rosa's original permission meant Sam's possession was never adverse to Rosa. Even if Sam's fencing made his possession sufficiently visible, and even if his cultivation and fencing were exclusive for the full statutory period, those elements cannot cure the lack of hostility. The fencing question misses the point: visibility matters only for an already-adverse possessor, but Sam's claim began in permission. Similarly, exclusive farming for twenty-two years may satisfy exclusivity and continuity, but a permissive use remains permissive regardless of duration. Rosa's failure to object for twenty-two years also does not amount to abandonment; an owner's silence or inaction does not transfer title, and adverse possession does not require the owner to abandon anything—it requires the possessor's hostile use. The trap here is focusing on Sam's physical acts while overlooking the legal relationship that began the possession. Remember: permission is poison to an adverse possession claim.

Question 8

Vera owns Greenacre. In March 2010, while Vera was 16 years old, Paul entered Greenacre without permission and began possessing it openly, exclusively, and continuously. In March 2014, Vera turned 18. Paul continued possessing Greenacre. In April 2024, Vera brought an action to eject Paul. The state's adverse possession statute provides: 'An action to recover real property must be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrued. If the person entitled to bring the action is under a disability—infancy, insanity, or imprisonment—when the cause of action accrues, the action may be brought within five years after the disability ceases or within ten years after the cause of action accrued, whichever is later. In no event may the period be extended more than twenty years after the cause of action accrued.'

Is Vera's action timely?

Yes, because she was a minor when Paul entered, so the ten-year limitations period was tolled until she turned 18 in 2014 and did not expire until 2024.
Yes, because the disability extension gave her five years after reaching 18 in addition to the ordinary ten-year period, making the deadline 2024.
No, because the deadline was March 2019, five years after her disability ceased, and she filed more than five years later.
No, because the deadline was March 2020, the later of the ordinary ten-year period and the five-year disability extension, and she filed in April 2024. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests how a disability—here, infancy—affects the adverse possession limitations period. When you see a disability-savings statute, do not assume the clock simply stops. Instead, compute the ordinary deadline and the disability extension separately, then apply the statute's "whichever is later" rule. Paul entered in March 2010, so the cause of action accrued then. Vera was 16, so she was under the disability of infancy. The ordinary ten-year period ran from March 2010 to March 2020. Because Vera was disabled when the cause accrued, the statute also gave her five years after her disability ceased: she turned 18 in March 2014, so that period ended in March 2019. The statute says the action may be brought within the later of those two periods, which is March 2020. The twenty-year cap (March 2030) does not change the result. Vera filed in April 2024, after the March 2020 deadline, so her action is untimely. The first choice says the limitations period was "tolled until she turned 18" and expired in 2024—that misreads the statute. The period was not tolled; the ordinary ten-year deadline still applied, and the disability extension was not added on top. The second choice similarly treats the five-year extension as cumulative with the ten-year period, creating a 2024 deadline, but the statute uses "whichever is later," not "in addition to." The third choice correctly notices the five-year disability period ended in March 2019, but it ignores that the ordinary ten-year period ended later, in March 2020. Remember: for adverse possession with a disability, calculate both deadlines and pick the later one.

Question 9

A vacant lot came into county ownership through a tax foreclosure proceeding nearly thirty years ago. The county never developed or used it. Twenty-two years ago, Tom began maintaining a portion of the lot as his own yard: mowing, planting, fencing, and erecting a storage shed. He has paid no rent or taxes on it to the county. The county now proposes to sell the entire lot at public auction. Tom has filed an action to quiet title, claiming he owns the portion by adverse possession.

Which issue is most likely to determine Tom's claim?

Whether Tom's possession was open, notorious, continuous, and exclusive for twenty-two years
Whether the lot's status as publicly owned county land bars adverse possession (correct answer)
Whether Tom's shed and fence gave the county constructive notice of his claim
Whether Tom's failure to pay taxes on the lot defeated his claim

Explanation: Whenever you see an adverse possession question, start with the elements—actual, open and notorious, exclusive, hostile, continuous for the statutory period. But before applying them, ask who holds title. That threshold question controls here, because a county's public ownership can completely bar adverse possession. Many jurisdictions protect government-held land from being divested by a private trespasser. So the most likely determining issue is whether Tom can even assert adverse possession against publicly owned county land. If the county land is immune, his 22 years of mowing, fencing, and building a shed are irrelevant; no private possessor can acquire title to public land. If not immune, then the ordinary elements decide the case. The other choices are traps because they invoke familiar private-land elements, but none addresses the threshold bar. Tom's possession being open, notorious, continuous, and exclusive for twenty-two years goes to the standard adverse-possession elements; it would matter only if the land were private. The shed and fence giving constructive notice is really just evidence of the open-and-notorious element—notice cannot cure a public-ownership bar. And his failure to pay taxes is not generally a common-law element of adverse possession; unless a special tax-payment statute applies, it does not defeat an otherwise valid claim. That issue is a distractor for test-takers who confuse tax foreclosure with adverse possessionWhenever you see an adverse possession question, start with the elements—actual, open and notorious, exclusive, hostile, continuous for the statutory period. But before applying them, ask who holds title. That threshold question controls here, because a county's public ownership can completely bar adverse possession. Many jurisdictions protect government-held land from being divested by a private trespasser. So the most likely determining issue is whether Tom can even assert adverse possession against publicly owned county land. If the county land is immune, his 22 years of mowing, fencing, and building a shed are irrelevant; no private possessor can acquire title to public land. If not immune, then the ordinary elements would decide the case. The other choices are traps because they invoke familiar private-land elements, but none addresses the threshold bar. Tom's possession being open, notorious, continuous, and exclusive for twenty-two years goes to the standard adverse-possession elements; it would matter only if the land were private. The shed and fence giving constructive notice is really just evidence of the open-and-notorious element—notice cannot cure a public-ownership bar. And his failure to pay taxes is not generally a common-law element of adverse possession; unless a special tax-payment statute applies, it does not defeat an otherwise valid claim. That issue is a distractor for test-takers who confuse tax foreclosure with adverse possession动作.

Question 10

Grant owned a 100-acre tract. A stranger, Milo, signed and recorded a deed purporting to convey the tract to Chloe, even though Milo had no interest in it. Chloe knew Milo had no title. She nonetheless entered the tract and fenced, farmed, and occupied its southwest 10 acres. The remaining 90 acres were unoccupied forest. The jurisdiction's adverse possession statute provides: 'Color of title means a written instrument, however defective, that purports to convey title and is recorded. A person holding color of title who actually possesses part of the land described in the instrument constructively possesses the entire tract described, except land in the actual possession of another. Good faith is not an element of constructive adverse possession under this section.'

After the statutory period, what may Chloe acquire?

Only the southwest 10 acres, because adverse possession is limited to land actually possessed and the remaining 90 acres were not occupied.
The entire 100 acres, because her recorded deed is color of title, actual possession of part gives constructive possession of the rest, and no one else occupied the remaining land. (correct answer)
The entire 100 acres, because any recorded instrument purporting to convey land gives constructive possession of the entire tract even if the claimant has not actually possessed any part.
Nothing, because Chloe knew the deed was not from the true owner and therefore cannot claim in good faith.

Explanation: Whenever you see an adverse possession question involving "color of title," pause to separate the two ways possession can count: actual possession and constructive possession. The statute defines color of title as a recorded written instrument that purports to convey title—even though defective—and then says actual possession of part can extend constructive possession to the entire tract described. Here, Milo's deed was recorded and purported to convey the entire 100 acres, so Chloe held color off title even though Milo had no interest. Her fencing, farming, and occupying the southwest 10 acres was actual possession of part. Because the statute does not require actual possession of every acre, and the remaining 90 acres were unoccupied forest, her actual possession of the 10 constructively possessed the other 90. Thus after the statutory period she acquires the entire 100 acres. The "only the southwest 10 acres" answer misses the constructive-possession doctrine: actual possession of part is enough when the deed covers the larger tract. The"any recorded instrument ... even if no actual possession" answer overstates the rule: the recorded deed must be accompanied by actual possession of some part before constructive possession attaches. And the"nothing, because Chloe knew the deed was defective" answer assumes a good-faith requirement, but the statute expressly says good faith is not an element—knowledge of the defect does not defeat her claim. On exam day, when you see color of title, check for three things: a recorded written instrument purporting to convey land, actual possession of part, and no third-party actual possession of the rest. Apply those mechanically, and do not import a good-faith requirement unless the statute includes one.

Question 11

Rosa owns a lot in a lakeside summer community; the access road is impassable from November through April. In May 2012, Sam entered the lot without permission, built a dock, and used the lot every summer through September. In May 2017, Sam signed and delivered to Tina a writing stating: 'Sam assigns to Tina all of his right, title, and interest in the lot, including his possessory claim, and Tina assumes Sam's possession.' Tina used the lot every summer from 2017 through 2025. In June 2025, Rosa sued Tina to eject her. The state's adverse possession statute provides: 'An action to recover real property must be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrued. Possession is continuous if it is as continuous as the nature of the property and the possessor's use permits and is not interrupted by the owner or abandoned by the possessor. The periods of possession of successive adverse possessors may be tacked only if the successor's possession is connected to the predecessor's possession by a written instrument purporting to transfer an interest in the property or by inheritance or devise. The transferor need not have record title.'

Should Tina prevail?

Yes, because Sam's summer-only use was continuous for this type of property, and the 2017 written assignment of his possessory claim created privity for tacking, making the combined possession exceed ten years. (correct answer)
Yes, because Tina's own eight years of possession and Sam's earlier possession are automatically aggregated whenever successive occupants possess the same parcel, even without a written transfer.
No, because seasonal use can never satisfy the continuity element, so the clock did not run until Tina began using the lot in 2017 and she possessed it for only eight years.
No, because the 2017 assignment transferred only Sam's possessory rights, not record title, so Tina is not in privity with Sam and cannot add Sam's years to her own.

Explanation: Whenever you see an adverse possession question, focus on the elements: actual, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, and continuous for the statutory period. Here, the continuity issue turns on the nature of the property—a lakeside summer community with an impassable road in winter—so summer-only use is continuous because it matches the property's permitted use. Sam's possession from May 2012 through September 2016 (five summers) plus Tina's from 2017 through 2025 (nine summers) totals fourteen years, exceeding the ten-year statute. The 2017 written assignment created privity for tacking; the statute explicitly says the transferor need not have record title, so Sam's transfer of his "possessory claim" is sufficient to connect their periods. That is why the correct answer—the one stating Sam's summer-only use was continuous and the written assignment created privity—is right. The choice claiming "automatic aggregation" for any successive occupants is wrong because tacking requires privity, not mere sequential possession. The choice that "seasonal use can never satisfy continuity" misreads the statute's "as continuous as the nature of the property permits" language—seasonal use can be continuous for seasonal property. The final choice, arguing no privity because Sam lacked record title, ignores the statute's clear instruction that the transferor need not have record title; privity exists if the written instrument purports to transfer an interest in the property. Your takeaway: on tacking questions, check for a written transfer or inheritance—even if the transferor lacks record title—and always evaluate continuity relative to the property's character.

Question 12

Alex and Brooke inherited a 100-acre farm as tenants in common in 2005. Beginning in 2006, Alex alone occupied the farm, planted crops, built fences around the entire boundary, and paid all real estate taxes. Brooke lived in another state, never visited, and received no communication from Alex; she had no reason to know of the fencing or farming. Alex never told Brooke that he was claiming sole ownership. In 2026, Alex sued to quiet title, asserting that his possession for 20 years had extinguished Brooke's interest. The state's limitation period for adverse possession is 15 years. In Harmon v. Loring, the state supreme court held: 'A co-tenant's exclusive possession of commonly owned property is presumed permissive and cannot ripen into title unless the possessing co-tenant has unequivocally repudiated the other co-tenants' ownership and brought that repudiation home to them. Exclusive possession, enclosure, cultivation, and payment of taxes, even for the statutory period, are not enough without such an ouster.'

Will Alex prevail?

Yes, because Alex's open farming, fencing, and tax payments for more than the statutory period put Brooke on constructive notice that he claimed sole ownership.
Yes, because Brooke's total failure to visit or communicate for 20 years constituted an implied ouster and an abandonment of her interest.
No, because one co-tenant can never acquire title by adverse possession against another co-tenant, regardless of ouster.
No, because Alex's exclusive possession was presumed permissive and he did not communicate an unequivocal claim of sole ownership to Brooke. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see adverse possession between co-tenants, flip your default: possession is presumed permissive, not hostile. The court's holding in Harmon v. Loring is exactly that rule—exclusive possession, enclosure, cultivation, and tax payments are not enough unless the occupying co-tenant unequivocally repudiates the other owner's interest and brings that repudiation home to them. Here, Alex did all the classic acts of possession for over 15 years, but he never communicated a claim of sole ownership to Brooke. His farming and fencing are just as consistent with being a co-tenant using the shared property as with claiming ownership. Without an ouster—some clear act that tells Brooke her interest is being denied—the limitation period never starts running. So Alex does not prevail. The wrong answers each hide a misconception. The choice about "constructive notice" confuses open and notorious use with the separate requirement that a co-tenant's repudiation be brought home to the other owner. The choice about Brooke's "implied ouster and abandonment" gets the direction wrong: ouster must be an act by Alex, and Brooke's nonuse is not abandonment, which requires intent to relinquish ownership. And the choice saying a co-tenant can "never" acquire title is too absolute—a co-tenant can, if there is an unequivocal, communicated repudiation. Study tip: in co-tenant adverse possession questions, hunt for the word "ouster" or an explicit repudiation. Ordinary possession plus taxes is never enough.