Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Acts And Omissions

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Acts And OmissionsQuestion 1 of 20

A woman was the sole caregiver for her three-year-old daughter. She left the child alone in their locked apartment for five days while she traveled out of state. She left no food or water and made no arrangements for anyone to check on the child. The child died of dehydration. The state charged the woman with manslaughter. The prosecution's theory is that her failure to provide care caused the child's death. The defense moved to dismiss, arguing that the woman had not committed any act that caused the child's death.

Which of the following legal issues is most directly presented by the defense's argument?

Whether the woman's failure to provide care can be the required criminal conduct even though she also locked the door.

Whether the woman's act of locking the apartment door was a voluntary act for purposes of the charge.

Whether the child's dehydration was caused by the lack of food and water or by some other condition.

Whether the woman knew that leaving the child alone could result in the child's death.

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Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz

Bar Exam (Next Generation) Quiz: Acts And Omissions

Practice Acts And Omissions in Bar Exam (Next Generation) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Acts And Omissions, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Next Generation).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

Which of the following legal issues is most directly presented by the defense's argument?

Whether the woman's failure to provide care can be the required criminal conduct even though she also locked the door. (correct answer)
Whether the woman's act of locking the apartment door was a voluntary act for purposes of the charge.
Whether the child's dehydration was caused by the lack of food and water or by some other condition.
Whether the woman knew that leaving the child alone could result in the child's death.

Explanation: This question tests the distinction between an act and an omission in criminal law — specifically, when a failure to act can satisfy the actus reus requirement. The defense argues that the woman "committed no act" causing death, so the threshold issue is whether her failure to provide care can be the required criminal conduct even though she also locked the door. It can. An omission supports criminal liability when the defendant has a legal duty to act, and a parent has a legal duty to care for her dependent child. Her failure to provide food, water, and arrangements while leaving for five days is the culpable omission, not merely something the lock did or did not cause. The choice about whether locking the apartment door was a voluntary act is a distraction: the charge is based on her failure to provide care, not on the act of locking. The choice about whether dehydration was caused by lack of food and water or some other condition misses the point — the defense did not dispute the physical cause; it disputed whether an omission can count as criminal conduct at all. The choice about whether she knew leaving the child alone could result in death addresses mens rea, which is a separate element; before reaching her mental state, the court must decide whether her omission satisfies the conduct element. Remember: when a defendant says "I did nothing," check whether a legal duty to act existed. Omissions can be just as criminal as affirmative acts.

Question 2

Dana, a certified nursing assistant, finished her shift at a residential care facility but remained in the break room waiting for a ride. While there, she saw a resident begin to choke on food. No other staff member was nearby. Dana did not call for help and left when her ride arrived. The resident died, and Dana was charged with manslaughter.

Which legal issue is most likely to be dispositive in determining Dana's criminal liability?

Whether Dana had a legal duty to act on the resident's behalf even though she was no longer on duty (correct answer)
Whether Dana's inaction was a but-for cause of the resident's death
Whether Dana's failure to act showed a reckless disregard for the resident's life
Whether Dana understood that the resident faced a substantial risk of death

Explanation: When you see a criminal law question about an omission, your first instinct should be: did the defendant have a legal duty to act? Generally, a person has no criminal duty to rescue another, even if the rescue is easy. Liability for failing to act only arises when a legal duty is imposed by statute, contract, status, relationship, or voluntary assumption of care. Here, Dana was a certified nursing assistant who had finished her shift, but she was still in the facility and witnessed the resident choking. The dispositive issue is whether she still owed the resident a legal duty despite being off duty. If she did not, no amount of causation or bad intent can convict her of manslaughter. If she did, the remaining elements must be examined. The but-for cause choice is tempting because Dana's inaction clearly allowed the death to occur. But causation matters only after a duty to act is established. Similarly, reckless disregard for the resident's life and Dana's understanding of the substantial risk of death relate to her mental state, not to the threshold question of whether her omission was legally punishable at all. A person can foresee harm, choose not to help, and still face no criminal liability if no duty exists. So on exam day, whenever a question involves a failure to act, isolate the duty question first—it is the gateway to every other element.

Question 3

Elena hosted a backyard barbecue. While lighting the charcoal grill, she accidentally knocked over a container of lighter fluid, spilling it onto a dry wooden fence near the grill. She saw the spill but did not clean it up. A short time later, a spark from the grill ignited the wood fence. The fire spread to a neighboring shed, killing a child inside. Elena had her phone with her but left the scene without calling 911. The state charged Elena with involuntary manslaughter.

Which of the following is the most significant legal issue raised by these facts?

Whether Elena's initial lighting of the charcoal grill was a voluntary act supporting criminal liability.
Whether Elena's failure to act after she inadvertently created the fire hazard can be the basis for criminal liability. (correct answer)
Whether Elena intended the fire to spread to the neighboring shed when she left the scene.
Whether the child's death in the shed was a foreseeable consequence of Elena's conduct.

Explanation: Whenever you see an omission in a criminal law question, ask first: did the defendant have a legal duty to act? Criminal liability generally requires a voluntary act, but liability can be based on a failure to act when a duty exists. Elena's act of knocking over the lighter fluid was accidental, but after she realized she had created a fire hazard, she had a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent harm—including calling 911. Her failure to act after creating the danger is the central issue, because that omission, not the initial accident, may supply the required actus reus for involuntary manslaughter. The initial lighting of the grill was a voluntary act, but it is not the most significant issue because Elena's liability hinges on what she failed to do afterward. Whether Elena intended the fire to spread is also beside the point: involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing, so specific intent to spread the fire is not required. And while foreseeability can matter for proximate causation, it is not the key issue here—even a foreseeable death cannot support liability unless Elena had a duty to act and breached it. The real trap is treating her omission as legally irrelevant. Once she unknowingly created the danger, her knowledge of the spill triggered a duty to help, and leaving the scene without calling 911 may be a culpable omission. On exam day, spot omissions and immediately ask: was there a duty, and did the defendant have time and ability to act? That question controls.

Question 4

A woman was hiking when she found an unconscious man on a trail. She told another hiker, 'I know first aid; go for help, I will stay with him.' The other hiker left to call for help. After a few minutes, the woman decided she did not want to miss dinner and left the man alone. The man died before help arrived. The state charged the woman with manslaughter.

Which of the following legal issues is most directly raised by these facts?

Whether the man's death was caused by the woman's failure to perform first aid correctly rather than by his underlying condition.
Whether the woman's statement that she knew first aid was truthful when she made it to the other hiker.
Whether the woman's decision to leave the man was a voluntary act for purposes of criminal liability.
Whether the woman's undertaking to care for the man and sending away other help created a legal duty to continue aiding him. (correct answer)

Explanation: When you see a question about manslaughter, the first question is always whether the defendant owed a legal duty to act. For omissions, liability requires a duty—and one key duty-creating rule is voluntary assumption of care that prevents others from helping. Here, the woman had no initial duty to help. But she told the other hiker to go for help while she stayed, effectively taking control of the situation. That undertaking, plus affirmatively sending away the only person who could save the man, is exactly the kind of reliance that creates a legal duty to continue reasonable aid. Her later abandonment, not her first-aid skill (or lack of it), is the crux of the criminal exposure. That's why the statement about staying and the dismissal of the other hiker are the pivotal facts. Why the others fail? The first choice focuses on whether her first aid was performed correctly—but the facts show she left before performing any first aid, so causation of that type is irrelevant. The second choice attacks her truthfulness about knowing first aid—a lie matters only if it induced reliance that caused harm, but even a truthful expert who abandons a man after sending away help breaches her duty. The third choice asks if her decision to leave was a voluntary act—but criminal liability here is about an omission (failing to continue care), not a voluntary affirmative act; the act that created the duty was her assuming care, which was voluntary. Study tip: On criminal law questions, always separate "did she do something harmful?" from "did she have a duty to act?" If the scenario involves an alleged omission, immediately scan for duty-creating sources: statute, contract, status relationship, or voluntary undertaking with reliance.

Question 5

A man was driving when he suddenly lost consciousness because of a first-time seizure. While unconscious, his foot pressed the accelerator, and the car struck and killed a pedestrian. The man had no history of seizures and no warning before losing consciousness. The state charged the man with vehicular homicide. The defendant argues that he should not be criminally responsible because he was unconscious at the moment of the collision.

Which of the following legal issues is most directly raised by the defendant's argument?

Whether his loss of consciousness was caused by an underlying medical condition.
Whether the pedestrian's death was a foreseeable consequence of driving a car.
Whether his foot pressing the accelerator while he was unconscious was a voluntary act. (correct answer)
Whether he had a legal duty to pull over after recovering consciousness.

Explanation: Whenever you see a criminal law question about a defendant's loss of consciousness, focus on the voluntary act requirement of actus reus. A person can be criminally liable only for a voluntary act, meaning a conscious, willed bodily movement. The man's argument is that he was unconscious at impact, so his foot pressing the accelerator was not a voluntary act. That is exactly the issue raised: whether that movement counts as a voluntary act for criminal liability. The other choices distract from that core issue. Whether his loss of consciousness was caused by an underlying medical condition may matter for why he became unconscious, but the legal question is still whether his subsequent movement was voluntary — and if he had no prior warning, it likely was not. Whether the pedestrian's death was a foreseeable consequence of driving a car goes to causation or mens rea, not to the defendant's claim that he lacked conscious control. Similarly, whether he had a legal duty to pull over after recovering consciousness is irrelevant because the collision happened while he was allegedly unconscious, before any such duty could arise. Study tip: in criminal law questions, separate actus reus from mens rea. An unconscious or reflexive movement is not a voluntary act, unless the defendant was at fault for becoming unconscious, such as by drinking or knowingly skipping seizure medication. Ask first: was the movement willed?

Question 6

Jess is driving a rental car with her friend Manny in the passenger seat. Manny places a small bag of cocaine in the center console, tells Jess to hold it for him, and then gets out of the car. Jess looks at the bag, recognizes it as cocaine, and says to herself that she does not want it. She continues driving for 25 minutes to her apartment, intending to leave the bag in the car for Manny to retrieve later. Police stop her and find the bag. State statute:

§ 3.02. Possession is a voluntary act if the person knowingly procured or received the object or was aware of its presence for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate possession. § 3.03. A person need not have exclusive control; possession may be joint.

Jess is charged with possessing cocaine. Which of the following is the most accurate statement?

Jess is guilty because she was aware of the bag's presence for a sufficient period to terminate possession and did not do so. (correct answer)
Jess is not guilty because she intended to return the bag to Manny and did not intend to possess it.
Jess is not guilty because she did not procure or receive the bag and did not exercise dominion and control over it.
Jess is guilty because she controlled the rental car and control over the vehicle is control over everything inside it.

Explanation: When you see a possession-of-a-controlled-substance question, focus on what the state's statute requires: knowledge, the ability to control, and enough time to act on that knowledge. Here, the statute defines possession as a voluntary act if a person "was aware of its presence for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate possession." Jess recognized the cocaine and drove with it for 25 minutes, so she had both awareness and time to abandon it or call police. Her failure to do so makes her guilty, even though she did not want the bag. The choice saying she is guilty because she controlled the rental car goes too far: control over a vehicle is not automatic control over every object inside it, especially without knowledge. The choice claiming she is not guilty because she intended to return the bag misreads the law — intent to return is not a defense to knowing possession, and possession may be joint with Manny. Similarly, the choice saying she did not "procure or receive" the bag and exercised no dominion or control is wrong because the statute's "awareness" alternative is enough; dominion and control are not required in every form. Finally, while she did not "intend to possess" in the sense of wanting it, legal possession requires knowing control, not a desire to own — and here she knowingly held it for Manny. Study tip: when a statute defines possession by awareness plus time to terminate, ask whether the defendant had knowledge and opportunity to get rid of the item, not whether they wanted it.

Question 7

Victor is standing on a public pier when he sees a swimmer, Theo, caught in a current and calling for help. A life preserver is on the pier, but the section of the pier nearest the water is visibly rotted and would likely collapse if Victor stepped onto it. Victor has no cell phone and there is no one else nearby. He does nothing, and Theo drowns. State statute:

§ 11.01. Any person who knows that another is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm and who can render reasonable assistance without danger to himself or herself or to others has a duty to render reasonable assistance. § 11.02. A person who violates § 11.01 is guilty of manslaughter if the failure to render assistance causes the other person's death.

Victor is charged with manslaughter. Which of the following is the most accurate statement?

Victor is not guilty because he had no special relationship with Theo and therefore no legal duty to rescue him.
Victor is not guilty because he could not render reasonable assistance without danger to himself due to the unsafe pier. (correct answer)
Victor is guilty because he knew Theo was in imminent danger and failed to act.
Victor is guilty because his failure to act was the cause of Theo's death.

Explanation: Whenever you see a criminal omission question, the first issue is always: was there a legal duty to act? A statute can create that duty, but you must read its exact conditions. Here, § 11.01 imposes a duty only on someone who "can render reasonable assistance without danger to himself or herself or to others." The rotted pier means Victor could not do so safely, so the duty never attached. That is why Victor is not guilty: the unsafe pier made rescue dangerous to himself, placing him outside the statute's requirement. His knowledge of Theo's danger and the tragic outcome do not matter because the law does not demand self-sacrifice. The "no special relationship" choice misunderstands the statute—criminal duties can arise from statutes, not only from relationships. The "knew Theo was in imminent danger and failed to act" choice ignores the statute's explicit safety condition. The "failure to act was the cause of death" choice is also incomplete: causation is necessary for manslaughter, but Victor cannot be guilty unless he breached a legal duty, and he did not. Study tip: when a duty-to-rescue statute appears, circle every condition—here, "without danger"—and test the facts against each one. An omission is criminal only when every element of the duty is satisfied.

Question 8

An emergency medical technician was off duty and shopping at a grocery store when another shopper collapsed and stopped breathing. The EMT recognized the signs of cardiac arrest and had the skills to help, but he did nothing. The shopper died. The EMT was not employed by the store and had no on-duty responsibilities there. The state charged the EMT with manslaughter.

Which of the following legal issues is most directly raised by the prosecution's case?

Whether the shopper's death was caused by the EMT's failure to act rather than by the underlying cardiac arrest.
Whether the EMT consciously disregarded a known risk of death by continuing to shop.
Whether the EMT's professional training and off-duty status, without more, imposed a legal duty to render aid. (correct answer)
Whether the EMT's decision not to provide aid was a voluntary omission for purposes of the charge.

Explanation: This question tests criminal liability for omissions. A person can be guilty for failing to act only if they had a legal duty to act; moral or professional expectations are not enough. The critical legal issue raised by the prosecution's case is whether the EMT's professional training and off-duty status, without more, imposed a legal duty to render aid. An off-duty EMT shopping at the store had no employment relationship, no custodial or special relationship with the victim, and did not create the peril. Unless a statute imposes a duty to rescue, his training alone does not trigger criminal liability. The causation option—whether the shopper's death was caused by the EMT's failure to act rather than the cardiac arrest—might seem relevant, but causation is secondary: if there was no duty to act, the failure cannot be a legally cognizable cause of death. The conscious-disregard option asks about his mental state, such as recklessness, but even a knowing, intentional refusal to help is not manslaughter if the law imposeed no duty to act. And the voluntary-omission option is similarly off target: the EMT may have voluntarily chosen not to act, but a voluntary omission is still not criminal without an underlying legal duty to act in the first place. So when you see an omissions-based crime, start by asking whether the defendant owed the victim a legal duty, not whether they acted immorally, recklessly, or with bad motives.

Question 9

Ellis, an off-duty EMT, was at a park pond when he saw a child flailing in the water. A security guard was already at the edge, speaking into his radio to summon help. Ellis told the guard, "I'm an EMT—I'll handle it; stand by." Ellis waded in, briefly reached the child, lost his grip when the child thrashed, and returned to shore. The guard never stopped his radio call, and rescue personnel arrived within minutes, but the child drowned before they could reach him. The guard later testified that he would not have entered the water even if Ellis had not appeared, and there was no evidence that Ellis's attempt worsened the child's position. Ellis was charged with criminally negligent homicide. The jurisdiction's Criminal Code provides:

Section ️2. Conduct. A person is not guilty of an offense unless that person's conduct includes a voluntary act or an omission to perform a legal duty. Section ️9. Legal Duty. (a) A legal duty to act may arise from statute, contract, relationship, creation of the risk of harm, or voluntary assumption of care. (b) A person who voluntarily assumes care of another must continue reasonable efforts if the person's affirmative act has caused others who otherwise would have provided or summoned aid to the victim to refrain from doing so. (c) A person has no legal duty to rescue another solely because the person has special skills or training.

Which of the following is the most accurate statement about whether Ellis's failure to continue the rescue attempt can support the charge?

Ellis had a legal duty to continue because his affirmative statement and his entry into the water created a reasonable expectation that he would complete the rescue,and the guard relied on that expectation by not entering the water.
Ellis had a legal duty to continue because his affirmative act of entering the water created the risk that the child would drown if he abandoned the attempt, regardless of whether any other person would have acted.
Ellis had a legal duty to continue because his attempted rescue caused the guard to refrain from providing aid, since the guard remained on the shoreline rather than wading in after Ellis.
Ellis had no legal duty to continue because the guard did not refrain from summoning aid, Ellis did not create the child's peril,and Ellis's special training did not, by itself, impose a duty. (correct answer)

Explanation: Whenever you see an omission as the basis for criminal liability, locate the legal duty before considering breach. Under Section 9(b), voluntary assumption of care creates a duty to continue only if the defendant's affirmative act caused others who otherwise would have provided or summoned aid to refrain. That causal reliance element is missing. Ellis did not create the child's peril, the guard never stopped summoning aid, and special training alone imposes no duty under Section 9(c). The guard's testimony that he would not have entered the water even without Ellis refutes any claim that Ellis caused the guard to withhold aid. The "reasonable expectation" choice fails because duty requires actual reliance, not mere expectation; the guard continued his radio call and would not have entered anyway. The "created the risk" choice fails because Ellis did not create the child's peril—the child was already drowning—and the record shows Ellis's attempt did not worsen the position. The "caused the guard to refrain" choice misreads the facts: remaining on shore while summoning aid is not refraining from aid, and the guard would not have acted regardless. Study tip: in voluntary-assumption cases, ask whether the defendant's intervention made the victim worse off by discouraging another rescuer. If no would-be rescuer actually refrained because of the defendant, there is no omission liability.

Question 10

Nina was lawfully burning leaves in a metal barrel in her backyard when a sudden gust of wind tipped the barrel over, spreading fire to a neighbor's toolshed. Nina saw the neighbor's child, Leo, trapped inside the shed. She had her cell phone and could have called 911, but she drove away because she was afraid of being cited for violating a local burn ban. Leo died. A firefighter later testified that a prompt 911 call would have saved Leo. State statute:

§ 9.01. A person who creates a risk of death or serious bodily injury to another has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent the risk from ripening into harm. § 9.02. A person who recklessly fails to perform a duty imposed by § 9.01 is guilty of manslaughter if the failure causes the death of another.

Nina is charged with manslaughter. Which of the following is the most accurate statement?

Nina is not guilty because the wind, not her conduct, caused the fire to spread and Leo's death.
Nina is not guilty because manslaughter cannot be based on an omission to act.
Nina is guilty because she created the risk and her conscious failure to call 911 was reckless and caused Leo's death. (correct answer)
Nina is guilty because any person who knows of another's peril has a legal duty to rescue.

Explanation: This question tests criminal liability for omissions: when does a failure to act satisfy the actus reus and mens rea for manslaughter? The statute is the key—it creates a duty that would not otherwise exist. Here, Nina initially created a risk of death or serious injury when her lawful fire spread to the shed. Once she saw Leo trapped, § 9.01 imposed a duty to use reasonable care to prevent the risk from ripening into harm. Her conscious decision to drive away instead of calling 911 was a reckless failure to perform that duty: she knew of the peril, had her phone, and chose to flee to avoid a citation. The firefighter's testimony establishes causation—a prompt call would have saved Leo. So she is guilty under § 9.02. The "wind caused the fire to spread" argument misses that the charge is not for starting the fire, but for failing to rescue after creating the risk. The wind does not excuse her conscious omission once the duty attached. Likewise, "manslaughter cannot be based on an omission" is false when a legal duty exists; statutes like § 9.01 expressly make omissions criminal. Finally, the broad statement that "any person who knows of another's peril has a legal duty to rescue" is the classic trap—generally, no duty to rescue exists absent a special relationship, statute, or risk creation. Here the duty comes from her having created the risk, not from mere knowledge. Study tip: on omission questions, always ask (1) was there a legal duty? and (2) was the failure reckless? The statute usually supplies the answer.

Question 11

Arlo, a commercial truck driver, knows he has a seizure disorder that can strike without warning. His physician has told him not to drive until the condition is controlled. Arlo nevertheless drives his personal car to the grocery store. During the drive, he suffers a seizure, loses consciousness, and his car strikes and kills a pedestrian. The State charges Arlo with negligent homicide. The State's criminal code provides:

§ 2.01(1): A person is not guilty of an offense unless his or her liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or an omission to perform an act of which the person is physically capable. § 2.01(2): A bodily movement during unconsciousness is not a voluntary act unless the unconsciousness was caused by the defendant's prior voluntary act. § 2.01(3): A defendant who causes a result while unconscious may be convicted if the defendant's prior voluntary act was reckless and the result was a foreseeable consequence of that prior act.

Which of the following is the most accurate statement regarding whether Arlo can be convicted?

Yes, because Arlo's prior voluntary act of driving while aware of the risk of a seizure was reckless, and the death was a foreseeable result of that act. (correct answer)
No, because negligent homicide requires that the defendant intentionally cause the victim's death, and Arlo did not intend to hit the pedestrian.
No, because the collision occurred while Arlo was unconscious, and a bodily movement during unconsciousness is not a voluntary act.
Yes, because Arlo had a legal duty not to drive, and his omission to stay home was a voluntary act that caused the pedestrian's death.

Explanation: Whenever you see a statute requiring a voluntary act, and the facts include unconsciousness, ask whether the defendant's prior voluntary act supplies the culpability. Here, Arlo's seizure made the collision itself a bodily movement during unconsciousness, but §2.01(3) creates the key exception: he may be convicted if his prior voluntary act was reckless and the death was a foreseeable result. Arlo knew he had a seizure disorder, had been told not to drive, and drove anyway. That prior act was reckless, and a crash causing death while driving is a foreseeable consequence. So the State can convict. The statement that negligent homicide requires intentionally causing death is wrong: negligent and reckless homicide do not require intent, and the statute here allows conviction for recklessness. The statement that Arlo cannot be convicted because the collision occurred while he was unconscious, and unconscious movements are not voluntary, misunderstands the statute: §2.01(3) specifically overrides that defense when the unconsciousness stems from a prior reckless act. Finally, the statement that he had a legal duty not to drive and his omission to stay home was the voluntary act misframes the case—the relevant conduct is the affirmative act of driving while impaired by risk, not an omission, and the statute's prior-voluntary-act route is the better basis for liability. On exam day, when a voluntary-act statute includes an unconsciousness exception, trace the defendant's actions before the loss of consciousness and ask whether those actions were reckless and made the result foreseeable.

Question 12

Carmen, a single mother, asks her neighbor, Omar, to watch her infant daughter while Carmen attends an all-day court hearing. Carmen tells Omar only that the baby has a stuffy nose and will be fine. She does not mention that the baby has a heart condition requiring daily medication. Omar notices the baby breathing rapidly and looking weak, but he assumes this is caused by the stuffy nose and does nothing. The baby dies. An autopsy shows that the daily medication would have prevented the death. State statute:

§ 7.02. A parent, guardian, or person who voluntarily assumes responsibility for a minor's care has a duty to provide necessary medical care. § 7.03. A person is guilty of child endangerment if he or she knowingly fails to perform a duty imposed by § 7.02 and the failure causes the child's death. § 7.04. In a prosecution under § 7.03, it is a defense that the defendant was not aware of the facts that made the child in need of medical care.

Omar is charged with child endangerment. Which of the following is the most accurate statement?

Omar is guilty because he voluntarily assumed care of the baby and his failure to provide medical care caused her death.
Omar is guilty because a reasonable person in his position would have recognized the baby's condition and obtained help.
Omar is not guilty because he was not the baby's parent or guardian and therefore had no legal duty to provide medical care.
Omar is not guilty because he was not aware of the facts that made the baby in need of medical care. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests how criminal statutes combine a legal duty with a culpable mental state. Whenever you see "knowingly" in a statute, pause: duty alone is not enough; the prosecution must also prove the defendant's awareness of the facts triggering the duty. Here, Omar did voluntarily assume responsibility for Carmen's baby, so under § 7.02 he owed a duty to provide necessary medical care. But § 7.03 requires that he "knowingly fails" to perform that duty, and § 7.04 gives him a defense if he "was not aware of the facts that made the child in need of medical care." Omar knew only about a stuffy nose; Carmen did not tell him about the heart condition or daily medication. He observed rapid breathing and weakness, but reasonably connected those symptoms to the stuffy nose he knew about. Therefore, while he had a duty, he lacked the required awareness that the baby was in need of medical care, so he is not guilty. The choice saying Omar is guilty because he voluntarily assumed care and his failure caused death overlooks the knowledge requirement; voluntary assumption creates a duty but does not impose strict liability for every resulting harm. The choice saying a reasonable person in his position would have recognized the condition also fails, because the statute does not use a negligence/reasonable-person standard — it requires actual knowledge, and the defense expressly protects a defendant unaware of the key facts. Finally, the choice claiming Omar had no duty because he was not a parent or guardian misreads § 7.02: it expressly covers "a person who voluntarily assumes responsibility for a minor's care," so Omar was within the duty provision. The takeaway: on exam questions like this, separate the duty element from the mens rea element — a defendant can owe a duty yet still escape conviction if the statute requires knowledge and the facts show ignorance of the condition creating the need.

Question 13

Carla, driving carefully and within the speed limit at night, struck a pedestrian who darted into the road without warning; the jury finds the accident was entirely the pedestrian's fault. Carla stopped, saw that the man was alive but bleeding heavily, and drove away without calling for help, although she had a working phone. He died of blood loss that prompt medical care would have prevented. A state statute provides that the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury must stop and render reasonable assistance, including summoning medical aid if it is apparent that treatment is needed. Carla is charged with involuntary manslaughter based on her failure to summon aid. She argues that she had no duty to act because she did nothing wrong in causing the accident.

Did Carla have a legal duty to summon aid?

No, because the accident was entirely the pedestrian's fault, and a person who has done nothing wrong has no general duty to rescue another.
Yes, because the statute imposes a duty to render aid on any driver involved in an injury accident, whether or not the driver was at fault. (correct answer)
No, because a duty based on creating a risk arises only when the defendant negligently or intentionally created the risk.
Yes, because any person who sees another in serious danger and can easily help has a legal duty to do so.

Explanation: Criminal liability for an omission requires a legal duty to act, which can arise from a statute. The statute imposes a duty on the driver of any vehicle involved in an injury accident to stop and render reasonable assistance, including summoning medical aid. Carla's car struck the pedestrian, so she was involved in the accident, and the statute's duty applied regardless of whether she was at fault. The no-duty-to-rescue answer states the general rule correctly but overlooks the statutory duty. The creation-of-risk answer addresses a different source of duty that the case does not require; whatever the scope of that doctrine, the statute independently imposes the duty. The easy-rescue answer overstates the law; there is no general duty to aid strangers, and the duty here comes from the statute.

Question 14

Pat, a neighbor, found Ed, an elderly man with dementia, wandering in the street. She brought him into her house and, when Ed's worried niece called, told her that Ed was "fine and staying with me" and that she should not come. Over the next three days, Ed developed a high fever. Pat gave him water but did not call a doctor, and she turned the niece away when she arrived at the door. Ed died of an infection that a doctor could easily have treated. Pat had no family, contractual, or statutory relationship with Ed. She is charged with manslaughter based on her failure to obtain medical care.

Did Pat have a legal duty to obtain care for Ed?

No, because Pat had no family, contractual, or statutory relationship with Ed, and a stranger has no duty to aid another.
No, because taking Ed in was an act of kindness, and the law does not punish a person for failing to do more after voluntarily helping.
Yes, because Pat voluntarily took charge of Ed and kept away others who would have helped him. (correct answer)
Yes, because any person who knows that another is seriously ill and could easily obtain help for him has a duty to do so.

Explanation: A duty to act arises when a person voluntarily assumes the care of another and, by doing so, isolates him so that others cannot help. Pat took Ed into her house, told his niece not to come, and later turned her away, so Ed was dependent on Pat alone. That gave Pat a legal duty to obtain the care he needed. The no-relationship answer states the general rule and the usual sources of duty but omits voluntary assumption of care. The act-of-kindness answer misdescribes the law: a person who assumes care and keeps others away cannot then abandon the person in a worse position. The easy-help answer overstates the law; knowledge plus ability to help does not alone create a duty, and Pat's duty rests on her assumption of care and isolation of Ed.

Question 15

As Lev and his friend Ari walked to Lev's car, Ari slipped a bag of heroin into Lev's backpack without Lev's knowledge. About thirty seconds later, police officers stopped the two men. As an officer approached, Lev reached into his backpack for his wallet, felt an unfamiliar bag, pulled it partly out, and saw what it was. Two or three seconds later, the officer took the backpack and found the heroin. Lev is charged with possession of heroin. The jurisdiction's code provides that possession counts as an act only if the person knowingly obtained the item or knew that he had control of it for long enough that he could have gotten rid of it.

Did Lev commit the act required for possession?

Yes, because the heroin was in Lev's backpack, under his control, and Lev knew it was there before the officer seized it.
Yes, because possession of a controlled substance is a strict-liability offense, so Lev's knowledge does not matter.
No, because Lev did not knowingly obtain the heroin and knew he had it for only seconds, too briefly to have gotten rid of it. (correct answer)
No, because Ari put the heroin in the backpack, and a person cannot possess something that someone else placed in his property.

Explanation: Under the code, possession counts as an act only if the person knowingly obtained the item or knew of his control for long enough to have been able to end it. Lev did not obtain the heroin knowingly; Ari slipped it into his backpack. Lev learned what it was only two or three seconds before the officer seized it, too briefly to have gotten rid of it. He did not commit the act of possession. The control-and-knowledge answer finds knowledge and control but ignores the code's timing requirement. The strict-liability answer misstates the offense and would read the code's act requirement out of existence. The placed-by-another answer overstates the rule; a person who discovers an item someone else put in his property and keeps it long enough to have disposed of it does possess it.

Question 16

Rita, who cannot swim, was at a lake with her six-year-old son when he fell off a dock into deep water and began to struggle. A life ring hung on a post three feet from Rita, and a lifeguard sat in a chair about fifty yards away. Rita shouted at her son to swim but did not throw the life ring, call to the lifeguard, or try to get anyone's attention, and the boy drowned. She is charged with involuntary manslaughter. She argues that because she cannot swim, she was physically unable to save him and cannot be liable for failing to act.

Is Rita's inability to swim a defense?

Yes, because liability for an omission requires that the defendant have been physically able to perform the act that would have prevented the harm.
No, because a parent must attempt to rescue a child in danger, whatever the risk to the parent's own safety.
Yes, because Rita shouted to her son, which was a reasonable effort to help him and satisfied her duty to act.
No, because her duty as a parent required reasonable steps within her ability, such as throwing the life ring or calling the lifeguard. (correct answer)

Explanation: A parent has a legal duty to protect a minor child, and omission liability requires that the defendant have been able to perform the omitted act. But the duty is to take reasonable steps within one's ability, not only the one step the defendant could not perform. Rita could not swim, but she could have thrown the life ring three feet away or called the lifeguard, and she did neither. Her inability to swim is not a defense. The capacity answer states a correct rule but applies it only to swimming, ignoring the steps Rita could have taken. The rescue-regardless answer overstates the duty, which does not require a parent to risk her own life in a futile attempt. The shouting answer treats an ineffective gesture as performance of the duty when obvious, effective steps were at hand.

Question 17

Tim, a chronic alcoholic, was arrested for being intoxicated in a public park, in violation of a statute making it a crime to be drunk in a public place. Undisputed medical testimony establishes that Tim's alcoholism is a disease and that, once he begins drinking, he cannot stop. Tim has a home in which he could have done his drinking. He argues that convicting him would unconstitutionally punish him for the status of being an alcoholic.

Is Tim's conviction constitutional?

No, because punishing a person for the effects of a disease he cannot control is cruel and unusual, as with punishing narcotics addiction.
Yes, because the statute punishes the act of being drunk in a public place, not the status of being an alcoholic. (correct answer)
No, because Tim could not stop drinking once he began, so his intoxication was not the product of a voluntary act.
Yes, because alcoholism, unlike narcotics addiction, is not recognized as a disease for constitutional purposes.

Explanation: The Constitution forbids punishing a person for a status, such as being addicted to narcotics, but it permits punishing conduct. Tim was convicted of being drunk in a public place, which is conduct; he had a home where he could have drunk privately, so his public intoxication was not the unavoidable product of his condition. His conviction is constitutional. The status answer applies the rule against punishing status to a statute that punishes an act. The involuntary-act answer looks at the wrong moment: even if Tim could not stop once he began drinking, his choice of where to drink was his own. The not-a-disease answer reaches the right result for the wrong reason; the evidence that alcoholism is a disease is undisputed, and the conviction stands because the statute punishes conduct, not because of how the condition is classified.

Question 18

Rail Co. hired Dunn under a written contract to lower a crossing gate whenever a train approached a busy road crossing. One evening Dunn left his post for an hour to get dinner, and the gate remained up when a train approached. Fay drove onto the crossing and was killed by the train. Dunn is charged with involuntary manslaughter. He argues that his failure to lower the gate cannot support liability because his contract was only with Rail Co., and Fay was not a party to it.

Can Dunn's failure to lower the gate supply the act element for involuntary manslaughter?

No, because a duty created by contract runs only to the other party to the contract, which here was Rail Co.
No, because Dunn's conduct was an omission, and an omission cannot satisfy the act requirement for a homicide offense.
Yes, because Dunn's leaving his post was an affirmative act, so the case does not involve an omission at all.
Yes, because his contract to operate the gate created a legal duty to act for the protection of the people the gate was meant to protect. (correct answer)

Explanation: An omission can satisfy the act requirement when the defendant had a legal duty to act, and a contract can create such a duty. Dunn's contract required him to lower the gate when trains approached, a task whose whole purpose was to protect people at the crossing. The duty runs to those people, not only to Rail Co., so his failure to lower the gate can supply the act element, with the required mental state a separate question. The privity answer imports a contract-law limitation into criminal law; what matters is whether the contract created a duty to protect the class of persons harmed. The omission answer overstates the act requirement, which omissions satisfy when there is a legal duty. The affirmative-act answer recharacterizes the case to avoid the duty question; the harm resulted from Dunn's failure to lower the gate, and his liability depends on his duty to do so.

Question 19

Joan, 50, lived in her own apartment across town from her mother, May, 78, who lived alone. Joan visited May every Sunday for lunch. During one visit, Joan noticed that May was confused and feverish. Joan left without calling a doctor and did not return or check on her. May died two days later of an infection that prompt treatment would have cured. No statute in the jurisdiction requires adult children to care for their parents, Joan had never agreed to care for May, and she had never taken charge of May's care or kept others from helping her. Joan is charged with involuntary manslaughter.

Can Joan be convicted?

No, because an adult child has no legal duty to care for a parent absent a statute, contract, or voluntary assumption of care. (correct answer)
Yes, because the relationship between parent and child imposes a legal duty on each to protect the other from serious harm.
Yes, because Joan's regular weekly visits amounted to a voluntary assumption of responsibility for May's care.
No, because Joan did not cause the infection that killed May, and omission liability requires that the defendant cause the dangerous condition.

Explanation: Omission liability requires a legal duty. Status relationships that create duties include parent to minor child and spouse to spouse, but the common law does not impose a duty on an adult child to care for a parent. Joan had no statutory or contractual duty, and she never took charge of May's care or isolated her from others, so she had no legal duty and cannot be convicted, whatever the moral judgment. The relationship answer extends the parent's duty to a minor child to the reverse relationship. The weekly-visits answer treats ordinary family contact as an assumption of care; assumption requires taking charge of the person's care, typically so that others are deterred from helping. The causation answer reaches the right result for the wrong reason; omission liability does not require that the defendant cause the dangerous condition, as a parent who lets a child die of an illness the parent did not cause is liable.

Question 20

Vic has epilepsy that causes occasional seizures, and his doctor told him not to drive. One afternoon, while driving, Vic suffered a seizure and lost consciousness, and his car veered onto a sidewalk, killing a pedestrian. Vic is charged with reckless homicide. He argues that the movement of the car during the seizure was not a voluntary act, and that criminal liability requires a voluntary act.

Does Vic's argument defeat the act requirement?

No, because Vic voluntarily chose to drive knowing he was subject to seizures, and that voluntary act can satisfy the act requirement. (correct answer)
Yes, because bodily movements during a seizure are not voluntary acts, and criminal liability requires a voluntary act.
Yes, because the seizure prevented Vic from forming any mental state, so he cannot be guilty of a crime requiring recklessness.
No, because reckless homicide is a strict-liability offense, so the prosecution need not prove a voluntary act.

Explanation: Criminal liability requires conduct that includes a voluntary act, but the voluntary act need not be the last movement before the harm. Vic chose to drive after being told not to because of his seizures. That choice was a voluntary act, and the risk it created is the risk that came to pass, so the act requirement is satisfied; whether Vic was reckless is a separate question. The involuntary-movement answer states a correct rule but focuses only on the final movement. The mental-state answer confuses the act requirement with the mental-state requirement and looks at the wrong moment; Vic's awareness when he decided to drive is what counts. The strict-liability answer misstates the offense, which requires recklessness and, like every crime, a voluntary act.