Bar Exam (Uniform) Quiz: Confession Admissibility

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Confession AdmissibilityQuestion 1 of 20

A woman was arrested for embezzling funds from her employer. At the station, she was read her Miranda rights and stated, "I don't want to talk about this. I want a lawyer." All questioning ceased. The woman was held in a cell overnight. The next morning, she was brought before a magistrate for her initial appearance. After the proceeding, as a bailiff was escorting her back to her cell, she said to the bailiff, "That embezzlement charge is all a misunderstanding. What do I have to do to clear my name?" The bailiff replied, "You should probably talk to the detectives."

Based on this exchange, can the detectives now re-initiate interrogation of the woman about the embezzlement? Select one.

Yes, because the woman initiated a conversation about the substance of the criminal investigation.

Yes, because more than 14 days have passed since she was returned to the general jail population.

No, because the bailiff is a state agent, and his response constituted impermissible interrogation.

No, because the woman's question was not a clear waiver of her previously invoked right to counsel.

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Bar Exam (Uniform) Quiz

Bar Exam (Uniform) Quiz: Confession Admissibility

Practice Confession Admissibility in Bar Exam (Uniform) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Confession Admissibility, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Uniform).

How to use this quiz

Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

Based on this exchange, can the detectives now re-initiate interrogation of the woman about the embezzlement? Select one.

Yes, because the woman initiated a conversation about the substance of the criminal investigation. (correct answer)
Yes, because more than 14 days have passed since she was returned to the general jail population.
No, because the bailiff is a state agent, and his response constituted impermissible interrogation.
No, because the woman's question was not a clear waiver of her previously invoked right to counsel.

Explanation: Under Edwards v. Arizona, once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, police cannot re-initiate questioning until counsel is present or the suspect initiates further communication. The suspect's question, "What do I have to do to clear my name?", evinced a desire to discuss the investigation and therefore constituted initiation. This allows the police to seek a new waiver and resume questioning. (D) is incorrect because the question is about initiation, not waiver itself; initiation opens the door for police to then seek a waiver. (B) misstates the 14-day rule from Maryland v. Shatzer, which applies after a break in custody, not to continuous custody. (C) is incorrect because the bailiff's response was a neutral suggestion, not interrogation.

Question 2

A suspect in a hit-and-run case voluntarily agreed to come to the police station for an interview. The interview took place in a standard interrogation room. Before starting, the detective told the suspect, "You are not under arrest, and you are free to leave at any time." The detective questioned the suspect for three hours. During the questioning, the suspect's answers became increasingly inconsistent. The detective then said, "Your story isn't adding up. I don't think you're telling the truth." The suspect then broke down and confessed to the crime.

The suspect's attorney moves to suppress the confession, arguing it was obtained in violation of Miranda. Is the motion likely to succeed? Select one.

Yes, because the lengthy, accusatory interrogation in a station house room transformed the encounter into a custodial situation.
Yes, because the detective's accusation that the suspect was lying was the functional equivalent of an arrest.
No, because a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave. (correct answer)
No, because the suspect came to the police station voluntarily, which automatically makes any subsequent interrogation non-custodial.

Explanation: The key issue for Miranda is whether the suspect was in "custody." Custody is determined by whether a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. Here, despite the lengthy and accusatory nature of the questioning, the detective's explicit and unrebutted statement that the suspect was not under arrest and was free to leave is a powerful factor weighing against a finding of custody. (A) is incorrect because while those factors are relevant, they are likely outweighed by the 'free to leave' admonition. (B) is incorrect because confronting a suspect with disbelief is a standard interrogation tactic and does not constitute an arrest. (D) is incorrect because voluntariness in arriving at the station does not preclude a later finding of custody if circumstances change.

Question 3

Police conducted a custodial interrogation of a suspect without providing Miranda warnings. During the unwarned interrogation, the suspect confessed to a murder and told police where he had hidden the murder weapon. Forty-five minutes later, at a different location, a second officer gave the suspect proper Miranda warnings. The suspect waived his rights and gave a second, more detailed confession. The police had not said anything to the suspect that would have rendered the first confession involuntary.

You are a prosecutor deciding whether the second, warned confession is admissible. Its admissibility will most likely depend on whether: Select one.

the second confession was a fruit of the first inadmissible confession.
the two-step interrogation process was a deliberate tactic to circumvent Miranda. (correct answer)
the suspect's second confession was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt free to leave during the first interrogation.

Explanation: This fact pattern involves a two-step interrogation technique addressed in Missouri v. Seibert. When police obtain an unwarned confession and then give warnings to obtain a second confession, the admissibility of the second confession depends on whether the technique was a deliberate circumvention of Miranda. If it was a deliberate tactic, the second confession is likely inadmissible unless curative measures were taken. If the initial failure to warn was an oversight, the second confession is more likely admissible under Oregon v. Elstad, provided it was knowingly and voluntarily made. Therefore, the deliberateness of the police tactic is the key inquiry. (C) is a necessary but not sufficient condition. (A) uses general fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree language, which is not the specific test used for sequential Miranda-defective confessions. (D) addresses custody, which is already established as the interrogation was 'custodial'.

Question 4

A defendant was arrested and interrogated about a bank robbery. He was properly Mirandized and waived his rights. During the interrogation, he confessed. He was then formally charged and counsel was appointed. A week later, police placed an undercover informant in the defendant's jail cell to listen for any information about the location of the stolen money. The informant did not ask any questions but engaged in general conversation with the defendant. The defendant, seeking to impress the informant, bragged about the robbery and described where he had hidden the money.

Are the defendant's statements to the informant admissible? Select one.

Yes, because the informant did not actively question the defendant, so there was no interrogation.
Yes, because the defendant's first confession, given after a valid Miranda waiver, was already sufficient to convict him.
No, because the government deliberately created a situation likely to induce the defendant to make incriminating statements without counsel present. (correct answer)
No, because any post-indictment statement made by a defendant to a government agent is inadmissible.

Explanation: The defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached when he was formally charged. The government violates this right when, after indictment and outside the presence of counsel, it deliberately elicits incriminating statements from a defendant. Placing an informant in a cell to listen is a deliberate elicitation. The fact that the informant did not ask direct questions is irrelevant; merely stimulating conversation about the crime is enough. This is the rule from United States v. Henry. (A) is incorrect because 'interrogation' is a Fifth Amendment concept; the Sixth Amendment test is 'deliberate elicitation'. (B) is irrelevant to the admissibility of the second statement. (D) is too broad; a defendant can waive his Sixth Amendment rights and agree to speak with agents.

Question 5

Police obtained a confession from a defendant after a 24-hour interrogation during which he was deprived of food and sleep. The judge ruled the confession was involuntary under the Due Process Clause and suppressed it. The confession described the location of the stolen goods from a burglary. Based solely on the information in the coerced confession, police went to the location and recovered the stolen property.

The prosecution now seeks to introduce the stolen property at the defendant's trial for burglary. Is the physical evidence admissible? Select one.

Yes, because the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to physical evidence discovered as a result of a coerced confession.
Yes, because physical evidence is considered non-testimonial and its admission does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
No, because the stolen property is the direct fruit of a confession obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause. (correct answer)
No, unless the prosecution can prove that the police would have inevitably discovered the property through independent means.

Explanation: The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies to constitutional violations. While it is limited in the context of Miranda violations (United States v. Patane), it fully applies to confessions that are involuntary under the Due Process Clause. A coerced confession taints all evidence derived from it. Because the stolen property was found as a direct result of the involuntary confession, it is inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. (D) describes the inevitable discovery doctrine, which is an exception, but there are no facts to support its application here; thus (C) is the most direct and correct answer based on the facts provided. (A) and (B) incorrectly state the law regarding involuntary confessions.

Question 6

Police arrested a suspect for assault. An officer read the suspect his Miranda warnings. The suspect did not say anything in response. The officer then placed a photograph of the victim's bruised face on the table in front of the suspect. The suspect looked at the photo, put his head in his hands, and said, "I'm so sorry. I lost my temper." The entire interaction after the warnings were read took less than a minute.

The prosecutor seeks to admit the suspect's statement at trial. The defense moves to suppress. What is the likely outcome? Select one.

The motion will be granted, because the suspect did not explicitly waive his Miranda rights before making the statement.
The motion will be denied, because the suspect's statement constituted an implied waiver of his Miranda rights. (correct answer)
The motion will be granted, because the suspect's silence after the warnings was an invocation of his right to remain silent.
The motion will be denied, because showing the suspect a photograph is not considered 'interrogation' under Miranda.

Explanation: Miranda rights questions test whether you understand the waiver doctrine and what constitutes "interrogation." When a suspect receives Miranda warnings, they can waive their rights either explicitly (saying "I understand and want to talk") or implicitly through their conduct. The suspect's statement is admissible because he made an implied waiver of his Miranda rights. After being properly Mirandized, he voluntarily spoke in response to seeing the photograph. Courts recognize that a suspect can waive Miranda rights through conduct that shows a knowing and voluntary decision to speak. Here, the suspect wasn't coerced—he chose to make an incriminating statement after seeing evidence. Answer A is wrong because Miranda doesn't require an explicit waiver. The Supreme Court has consistently held that waivers can be implied from a suspect's conduct and the totality of circumstances. Answer C misunderstands invocation rules. Silence alone after Miranda warnings doesn't constitute an invocation of the right to remain silent. The suspect must make an unambiguous statement like "I want to remain silent" to invoke this right. Mere silence is insufficient. Answer D focuses on the wrong issue. While showing a photograph might not constitute direct interrogation, this doesn't matter here because the suspect voluntarily spoke. The key issue is waiver, not whether the police conduct constituted interrogation under Rhode Island v. Innis. Remember: Miranda waivers don't require magic words. Focus on whether the suspect's conduct demonstrates a voluntary decision to speak after receiving proper warnings, considering the totality of circumstances.

Question 7

Police had a warrant to arrest a woman for fraud. They went to her office to execute the warrant. Upon arresting her in the middle of a busy open-plan office, she loudly exclaimed, "This is ridiculous! I never forged those documents!" Before this outburst, the police had not asked her any questions or read her the Miranda warnings.

Is the woman's statement admissible? Select one.

No, because the public nature of the arrest was inherently coercive, rendering her statement involuntary.
Yes, because the woman was not yet in custody for Miranda purposes as she had not been removed from her office.
No, because she was under arrest and any statement made before receiving Miranda warnings is inadmissible.
Yes, because the statement was a spontaneous utterance not made in response to any police interrogation. (correct answer)

Explanation: When you encounter Miranda rights questions, focus on two key elements: custody and interrogation. Miranda warnings are only required when police conduct a custodial interrogation - both elements must be present. The correct answer is D because this was a spontaneous statement made without any police questioning. The woman voluntarily blurted out her exclamation immediately upon being arrested, before any interrogation occurred. Since Miranda protections only apply to responses given during custodial interrogation, spontaneous utterances fall outside this protection and remain admissible. Let's examine why the other options are incorrect: Option A incorrectly suggests that public arrests are inherently coercive enough to make statements involuntary. While the circumstances of an arrest can affect voluntariness, the public setting alone doesn't automatically render a spontaneous statement inadmissible. Option B misapplies the custody analysis. The woman was clearly in custody once formally arrested - being physically removed from the location isn't required to establish custody. However, this option reaches the right conclusion (admissible) for the wrong reason. Option C reflects a common misconception about Miranda. It assumes any statement made post-arrest without warnings is inadmissible, but this overstates Miranda's scope. The warnings are only required before interrogation begins, not immediately upon arrest. Remember this key distinction: Miranda protects against compelled self-incrimination during questioning, not against voluntary statements. Look for whether police asked questions or used tactics designed to elicit incriminating responses - if not, spontaneous statements typically come in regardless of Miranda warnings.

Question 8

A woman was arrested for driving under the influence. At the police station, during the standard booking process, the booking officer asked her for her name, address, date of birth, and occupation. In response to the question about her occupation, the woman slurred, "I sell cocaine to college kids." The woman was not suspected of any drug crimes at the time, and she had not yet been given her Miranda warnings.

The district attorney later charges the woman with distribution of a controlled substance based on her statement. Is her statement admissible in the drug case? Select one.

Yes, because the question about her occupation falls under the routine booking question exception to Miranda. (correct answer)
Yes, because at the time of the question, she was not a suspect in the drug case, so the question was not intended to incriminate her.
No, because she was in custody and had not been given Miranda warnings before the officer asked a question that elicited an incriminating response.
No, because her intoxicated state prevented her from making a voluntary statement.

Explanation: The routine booking question exception allows police to ask questions to secure biographical data necessary for booking and custody without providing Miranda warnings. Questions about name, address, and occupation are standard booking questions. The woman's answer was unresponsive and incriminating, but the question itself was permissible. Therefore, the statement is admissible under this exception. (B) is incorrect because the officer's intent is not the test; the test is whether the question is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, unless it is a routine booking question. (C) is incorrect because it fails to account for the exception. (D) addresses voluntariness; while her intoxication is relevant, it does not automatically make a statement involuntary unless it was so severe that it overbore her will, and there is no evidence of police coercion exploiting her state.

Question 9

A college student was suspected of selling prescription drugs. A police officer approached the student in a public park and said, "I'd like to ask you a few questions." The student agreed. For 15 minutes, the officer asked the student about his activities on campus. The student denied any wrongdoing. The officer had not given the student Miranda warnings. The officer then said, "Look, we know you've been selling. Your roommate told us everything." The student, believing his roommate had betrayed him, immediately confessed.

The student is charged with illegal distribution of prescription drugs and moves to suppress his confession. What is the prosecution's best argument for its admissibility? Select one.

The student implicitly waived his rights by voluntarily speaking with the officer.
The officer's use of deception by lying about the roommate was a permissible interrogation tactic.
The student's confession was a spontaneous utterance not made in response to a direct question.
The student was not in custody when he made the statement, so no Miranda warnings were required. (correct answer)

Explanation: This question tests your understanding of when Miranda warnings are required - specifically the "custody" requirement that triggers the need for these warnings. Miranda warnings are only required when a suspect is subjected to "custodial interrogation." This means the person must be both (1) in custody and (2) being interrogated. Custody doesn't just mean formal arrest - it refers to any situation where a reasonable person would not feel free to leave due to police restraint or coercion. Here, the officer approached the student in a public park, politely asked if he could ask questions, and the student voluntarily agreed. The student was free to walk away at any point during their 15-minute conversation. This consensual encounter doesn't constitute custody, so Miranda warnings weren't required before the confession. Answer A is wrong because there's no need to analyze waiver when Miranda doesn't apply in the first place. Answer B incorrectly focuses on the deception tactic - while police deception can be problematic, it's not the strongest argument here since the real issue is whether Miranda applies at all. Answer C mischaracterizes the confession as spontaneous when it was actually a direct response to the officer's accusation about the roommate's alleged statements. The key is recognizing that Miranda only applies to custodial interrogation. When you see confession suppression questions, always analyze whether the suspect was truly in custody first. If not, Miranda warnings aren't required, regardless of what interrogation tactics police used.

Question 10

A man was arrested on suspicion of car theft. At the station, an officer read him his Miranda rights. The man responded, "I'm not talking." The officer noted the refusal and left the interrogation room. Four hours later, the same officer returned and said, "We found your fingerprints all over the stolen car's steering wheel. Do you want to reconsider talking to us?" Before the officer could re-read the Miranda warnings, the man confessed.

The man's attorney files a motion to suppress the confession. What is the most likely outcome? Select one.

The motion will be denied, because four hours was a sufficient break in time before re-approaching the suspect.
The motion will be granted, because the officer failed to provide a fresh set of Miranda warnings before re-initiating questioning.
The motion will be denied, because confronting the suspect with new evidence is a permissible interrogation technique.
The motion will be granted, because the officer failed to scrupulously honor the man's invocation of his right to remain silent. (correct answer)

Explanation: When you encounter Miranda rights questions on the bar exam, focus on how suspects invoke their rights and whether police properly honor those invocations. The key here is understanding what "scrupulously honoring" an invocation means under Michigan v. Mosley. When the man said "I'm not talking," he clearly invoked his right to remain silent. Under Mosley, police must "scrupulously honor" this invocation, which requires: (1) immediately ceasing interrogation, (2) waiting a reasonable time, and (3) providing fresh Miranda warnings before any resumed questioning. While the officer did stop questioning initially, he failed the third requirement by resuming interrogation without re-reading Miranda warnings. Answer D is correct because the officer violated the Mosley standard by failing to scrupulously honor the invocation. The four-hour gap and cessation of questioning weren't enough—fresh warnings were mandatory before any renewed interrogation. Answer A is wrong because time alone doesn't cure the Miranda violation; fresh warnings are always required after an invocation of the right to remain silent. Answer B identifies a real problem (no fresh warnings) but misses the deeper issue—this violates the Mosley scrupulously honor standard, not just a general re-warning requirement. Answer C incorrectly suggests that presenting evidence can override Miranda protections; while confronting suspects with evidence is generally permissible, it doesn't excuse the failure to honor a clear invocation. Remember: After any invocation of Miranda rights, police must both stop questioning and provide fresh warnings before resuming—time gaps alone never cure the violation.

Question 11

You are a prosecutor deciding whether the second, warned confession is admissible. Its admissibility will most likely depend on whether: Select one.

the second confession was a fruit of the first inadmissible confession.
the two-step interrogation process was a deliberate tactic to circumvent Miranda. (correct answer)
the suspect's second confession was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt free to leave during the first interrogation.

Question 12

During a custodial interrogation regarding a robbery, a suspect was read her Miranda rights and agreed to speak with detectives. After an hour of questioning, she stated, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." The lead detective responded, "You have the right to a lawyer, but if you get one, we can't talk anymore and we'll have to book you on the robbery charge based on what we have. It's your choice." The suspect then sighed and said, "Fine, let's keep talking." She subsequently confessed.

What is the defendant's strongest argument for suppressing the confession? Select one.

The suspect's statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," was an unambiguous invocation of her right to counsel, requiring all questioning to cease.
The detective's response to the suspect's statement was coercive and vitiated the voluntariness of her subsequent confession. (correct answer)
The detective improperly failed to clarify whether the suspect's ambiguous statement was an actual request for counsel before continuing the interrogation.
The suspect's initial waiver of Miranda rights was invalid because she did not understand the consequences of speaking with the police.

Explanation: The suspect's statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," is an ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. Under Davis v. United States, police are not required to stop questioning when an invocation is ambiguous. Therefore, (A) is incorrect. While police are permitted to clarify, they are not required to, so (C) is a weaker argument. (D) is not supported by the facts. The strongest argument is (B). Even if the police can continue questioning after an ambiguous invocation, their response cannot be coercive. Threatening the suspect with immediate booking and implying that asking for a lawyer is a negative choice could be seen as coercion that renders the subsequent waiver and confession involuntary under the totality of the circumstances.

Question 13

A defendant was charged with robbery. Prior to trial, the court held a hearing and determined that the defendant's confession was coerced by police threats and was therefore involuntary under the Due Process Clause. At trial, the defendant took the witness stand and testified that he was nowhere near the scene of the crime. The prosecutor now seeks to introduce the involuntary confession to impeach the defendant's credibility.

Can the prosecutor use the involuntary confession for impeachment purposes? Select one.

Yes, because defendants who testify open themselves up to impeachment with prior inconsistent statements.
No, because a truly involuntary confession cannot be used for any purpose at trial. (correct answer)
Yes, but only if the judge instructs the jury to consider it solely for credibility and not as substantive evidence of guilt.
No, because the confession's prejudicial effect would substantially outweigh its probative value for impeachment.

Explanation: When you encounter questions about involuntary confessions, focus on the fundamental constitutional principle at stake: the Due Process Clause absolutely prohibits the use of coerced confessions because they undermine the reliability and fairness of the entire judicial process. The correct answer is B because a truly involuntary confession is considered so fundamentally tainted that it cannot be used for any purpose at trial, including impeachment. The Supreme Court has held that involuntary confessions are completely inadmissible due to their inherent unreliability and the constitutional violation involved in their procurement. This rule is absolute and doesn't allow for limited use exceptions. Answer A is wrong because while defendants who testify do generally open themselves to impeachment, this general rule doesn't override the specific constitutional prohibition against involuntary confessions. The involuntary nature of the confession creates an absolute bar to its use. Answer C is incorrect because no limiting instruction can cure the constitutional defect of an involuntary confession. The Supreme Court has rejected attempts to allow involuntary confessions for limited purposes, even with jury instructions, because the constitutional violation is too severe. Answer D focuses on the wrong analysis. This isn't a matter of weighing probative value against prejudicial effect under evidence rules—it's an absolute constitutional prohibition. The involuntary confession fails to meet the threshold requirement for admissibility entirely. Remember: involuntary confessions are categorically inadmissible for all purposes. Unlike other evidence issues that involve balancing tests, this is a bright-line constitutional rule with no exceptions.

Question 14

A detective had probable cause to arrest a suspect for murder. The suspect was located at his home and arrested. Immediately after the arrest, and before any Miranda warnings were given, the suspect's attorney called the detective's cell phone and stated, "I represent the suspect. Do not question him." The detective acknowledged the call but did not inform the suspect that his attorney had called. The detective then transported the suspect to the station, read him his Miranda rights, and obtained a written waiver. The suspect then confessed to the murder.

The suspect's attorney files a motion to suppress the confession. What is the likely ruling on the motion? Select one.

Granted, because the detective's failure to inform the suspect that his attorney had called invalidated the Miranda waiver.
Granted, because once an attorney states they represent a suspect, all questioning must cease whether the suspect knows about the representation or not.
Denied, because the suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights was valid since the police are not required to inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts to reach him. (correct answer)
Denied, because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached at the time of the interrogation.

Explanation: This fact pattern is based on Moran v. Burbine. The Supreme Court held that police failure to inform a suspect that his attorney is trying to contact him does not invalidate a subsequent Miranda waiver, as long as the waiver was otherwise knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The events occurring outside the suspect's presence and knowledge have no bearing on his capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right. (A) and (B) are therefore incorrect statements of federal constitutional law (though some states may provide greater protection). (D) is a true statement—the Sixth Amendment right had not attached—but the issue here is the validity of the Fifth Amendment Miranda waiver, making (C) the most direct and accurate answer.

Question 15

Are the defendant's statements to the informant admissible? Select one.

Yes, because the informant did not actively question the defendant, so there was no interrogation.
Yes, because the defendant's first confession, given after a valid Miranda waiver, was already sufficient to convict him.
No, because the government deliberately created a situation likely to induce the defendant to make incriminating statements without counsel present. (correct answer)
No, because any post-indictment statement made by a defendant to a government agent is inadmissible.

Question 16

The suspect's attorney files a motion to suppress the confession. What is the likely ruling on the motion? Select one.

Granted, because the detective's failure to inform the suspect that his attorney had called invalidated the Miranda waiver.
Granted, because once an attorney states they represent a suspect, all questioning must cease whether the suspect knows about the representation or not.
Denied, because the suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights was valid since the police are not required to inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts to reach him. (correct answer)
Denied, because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached at the time of the interrogation.

Question 17

Can the prosecutor use the involuntary confession for impeachment purposes? Select one.

Yes, because defendants who testify open themselves up to impeachment with prior inconsistent statements.
No, because a truly involuntary confession cannot be used for any purpose at trial. (correct answer)
Yes, but only if the judge instructs the jury to consider it solely for credibility and not as substantive evidence of guilt.
No, because the confession's prejudicial effect would substantially outweigh its probative value for impeachment.

Question 18

A man was arrested and charged with grand larceny. At his arraignment, he requested and was appointed a lawyer. While being transported from the courthouse to the jail, the man was in a van with two police officers. The officers began a conversation between themselves, with one saying, "It's a shame about this case. The stolen money was for a sick kid's charity. I hope we can recover it before it's all spent." The man, who had not been addressed directly, blurted out, "The money is in a locker at the bus station. Here's the key."

Is the man's statement admissible in court? Select one.

Yes, because the statement was volunteered and not the result of direct questioning by the officers.
Yes, because the man had not yet met with his appointed lawyer, so the Sixth Amendment right had not fully effectuated.
No, because the officers' conversation constituted a deliberate elicitation of incriminating information in violation of the man's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (correct answer)
No, because any statement made by a represented defendant in custody without his lawyer present is per se inadmissible.

Explanation: The man's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached at his arraignment. The issue is whether the police 'deliberately elicited' the statement in violation of that right. The test is whether the officers should have known their actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The officers' conversation about the specific details of the crime, staged in front of the defendant, was the functional equivalent of interrogation designed to elicit a response, similar to the facts of Brewer v. Williams. This constitutes a deliberate elicitation. (A) is incorrect because a statement can be elicited without direct questioning. (B) is incorrect because the right attaches at the initiation of formal proceedings, regardless of whether the defendant has met the lawyer. (D) is an overstatement of the rule; a defendant can waive the right and volunteer statements.

Question 19

A man was arrested on suspicion of armed robbery. At the police station, an officer read the man his Miranda rights from a standard card. The man stated, "I understand my rights." The officer then began questioning him. For thirty minutes, the man denied any involvement. The officer then said, "Your accomplice is in the next room and has already confessed, implicating you as the shooter. If you cooperate now, I can tell the prosecutor you were helpful." In fact, the accomplice had not been arrested and had not confessed. Hearing this, the man confessed to driving the getaway car but denied being the shooter.

The man's attorney has filed a motion to suppress the confession. What is the likely outcome of the motion? Select one.

Granted, because the officer's deception about the accomplice's confession rendered the confession involuntary.
Granted, because the officer's suggestion that cooperation would be beneficial constituted an improper promise of leniency.
Denied, because the confession was voluntary as the police deception was not likely to overcome the man's free will. (correct answer)
Denied, because the man had made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights before any questioning began.

Explanation: The confession is likely admissible. For a confession to be involuntary under the Due Process Clause, the police conduct must be coercive and overbear the suspect's will. Police deception, such as falsely claiming an accomplice has confessed, is generally permissible and does not automatically render a confession involuntary, unless it is the type of deception that would produce a false confession. Here, the deception and the vague suggestion of telling the prosecutor about his cooperation are not coercive enough to render the confession involuntary. (D) is incorrect because while a valid waiver occurred, the motion to suppress is based on the events during the interrogation, not the initial waiver. (A) and (B) are incorrect because neither the deception nor the vague offer of potential benefit rises to the level of coercion required to make a confession involuntary under the totality of the circumstances.

Question 20

Police arrested a man for kidnapping. After receiving Miranda warnings, the man said, "I'm not saying anything." The officers immediately ceased questioning. The man was placed in a holding cell. Two hours later, a different officer, who was investigating a string of unrelated bank robberies, approached the man. This officer was unaware that the man had previously invoked his right to silence. The officer gave the man a fresh set of Miranda warnings, and the man agreed to talk about the robberies, eventually making incriminating statements.

A court is asked to rule on the admissibility of the man's incriminating statements about the robberies. The statements are most likely: Select one.

Admissible, because the second interrogation concerned a different crime, was conducted by a different officer, and followed fresh warnings. (correct answer)
Admissible, because the second officer was acting in good faith and was unaware of the prior invocation of rights.
Inadmissible, because once a suspect invokes the right to silence, all questioning must cease permanently while he remains in custody.
Inadmissible, because the police failed to scrupulously honor the suspect's invocation of his right to remain silent.

Explanation: Under Michigan v. Mosley, police may re-initiate questioning after a suspect has invoked the right to remain silent, provided they "scrupulously honor" the invocation. Factors include the passage of significant time, giving fresh warnings, and questioning by a different officer about a different crime. Here, two hours passed, a different officer questioned him about a different crime, and fresh warnings were given. This meets the Mosley standard. Therefore, the statements are admissible. (D) states the correct legal standard but reaches the wrong conclusion. (B) is incorrect because the good faith of the second officer is not the dispositive factor. (C) is an incorrect statement of the law; the right to silence is not as robust as the right to counsel, which does have a stricter rule against re-initiation (Edwards).