Bar Exam (Uniform) Quiz: Administrative Authority

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Administrative AuthorityQuestion 1 of 20

You are an attorney for a commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC is an independent agency led by five commissioners who serve seven-year staggered terms. The enabling statute, consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Humphrey's Executor, provides that commissioners may be removed by the President only for 'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.' The President removes your client, stating as the sole reason a 'fundamental disagreement with the Commission's recent consumer protection rulemaking priorities.'

What is your client's strongest argument that her removal was unlawful? Select one.

The President lacks any constitutional authority to remove a commissioner of an independent agency.

The removal was unlawful because it violated the statutory 'for cause' standard, as a policy disagreement does not constitute inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance.

The removal violated her procedural due process rights because she was not given notice and a hearing prior to her termination.

The FTC exercises purely executive power, and therefore its commissioners cannot be removed for any reason during their term.

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Bar Exam (Uniform) Quiz

Bar Exam (Uniform) Quiz: Administrative Authority

Practice Administrative Authority in Bar Exam (Uniform) with focused quiz questions that help you check what you know, review explanations, and build confidence with test-style prompts.

What this quiz covers

This quiz focuses on Administrative Authority, giving you a quick way to practice the rules, question types, and explanations that matter most for Bar Exam (Uniform).

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Try each quiz question before looking at the correct answer. Use the explanations to review missed ideas, then come back to similar questions until the pattern feels familiar.

All questions

Question 1

What is your client's strongest argument that her removal was unlawful? Select one.

The President lacks any constitutional authority to remove a commissioner of an independent agency.
The removal was unlawful because it violated the statutory 'for cause' standard, as a policy disagreement does not constitute inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance. (correct answer)
The removal violated her procedural due process rights because she was not given notice and a hearing prior to her termination.
The FTC exercises purely executive power, and therefore its commissioners cannot be removed for any reason during their term.

Explanation: The correct answer is B. The key issue here is the application of a constitutionally valid 'for cause' removal statute. For an agency like the FTC, which performs quasi-legislative (rulemaking) and quasi-judicial (adjudication) functions, Congress may constitutionally limit the President's removal power to specific causes. The client's strongest argument is that the President's action did not meet the statutory standard. A mere policy disagreement is generally not considered to be 'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.' A is incorrect; the President does have the power to remove for the causes listed in the statute. C raises a secondary procedural issue, but the primary claim is that the removal was substantively invalid under the statute. D mischaracterizes the FTC's power; it is precisely because its powers are not purely executive that the for-cause protection is valid.

Question 2

A federal statute, the 'Food and Drug Act,' authorizes the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate the 'labeling of any food, drug, or cosmetic.' The stated purpose of the Act is to ensure consumers are not misled. Based on this authority, the FDA promulgates a regulation requiring all food products containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs) to bear a prominent label stating, 'This product contains genetically modified organisms, which some studies have linked to adverse health effects.' A food producers association challenges the regulation.

What is the association's most persuasive argument that the FDA's regulation is invalid? Select one.

The regulation compels speech in violation of the First Amendment, as there is no scientific consensus on the health effects of GMOs.
The agency exceeded its statutory authority because a GMO disclosure is not a regulation of 'labeling' intended to prevent misleading consumers. (correct answer)
Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to mandate food labeling, so it cannot delegate such authority to the FDA.
The Food and Drug Act is an unconstitutional delegation of power because the term 'misled' is not an intelligible principle.

Explanation: The correct answer is B. An agency's first hurdle is to act within its statutory authority. The association's strongest argument is that the agency has gone beyond its mandate. The statute authorizes regulation of labeling to prevent consumers from being misled. An argument can be made that mandating a GMO label, especially with a contested health warning, is not about preventing deception but about fulfilling a different policy goal, one not granted to the agency by the statute. A is a potential constitutional argument, but courts generally prefer to resolve cases on statutory grounds before reaching constitutional questions. C is incorrect; Congress clearly has the power to regulate food labeling under the Commerce Clause. D is weak; 'preventing consumers from being misled' is likely a sufficient intelligible principle for delegation.

Question 3

Congress enacts the Federal Communications Modernization Act, authorizing the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate internet service providers. The Act includes a provision stating, 'Any rule promulgated by the FCC under this Act shall be submitted to Congress and shall not take effect if, within 60 days, either the House of Representatives or the Senate passes a resolution of disapproval.' The FCC issues a new 'net neutrality' rule. Forty-five days later, the Senate passes a resolution of disapproval. The FCC announces that the rule will take effect despite the resolution.

Is the FCC's position that the rule is effective constitutionally sound? Select one.

No, because the resolution of disapproval was a valid exercise of Congress's authority to oversee the executive branch.
No, because Congress is permitted to reserve for itself the power to review and reject agency rules that it authorized.
Yes, because the President did not sign the Senate's resolution of disapproval, rendering it ineffective.
Yes, because the provision allowing for a one-house veto of an agency rule is an unconstitutional violation of bicameralism and presentment. (correct answer)

Explanation: The correct answer is D. In INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court held that the legislative veto is unconstitutional. For Congress to take an action that has the force of law (like repealing a regulation), it must abide by the constitutional requirements of bicameralism (passage by both houses of Congress) and presentment (presenting the bill to the President for signature or veto). A one-house veto fails both requirements. Therefore, the statutory provision is unconstitutional, the Senate's resolution is a legal nullity, and the FCC's rule takes effect. A and B are incorrect because they endorse the unconstitutional legislative veto. C is partially correct in that presentment did not occur, but D provides the more complete and precise reason, encompassing both the bicameralism and presentment failures inherent in the legislative veto.

Question 4

Congress creates a new agency, the Office of Financial Research (OFR), located within the Treasury Department. The statute provides that the Director of the OFR is appointed by the President with Senate confirmation for a six-year term and can only be removed by the President for cause. The Secretary of the Treasury, who serves at the pleasure of the President, has no authority to direct or supervise the Director of the OFR. The OFR's primary duty is to collect data and report to Congress on financial stability risks.

A bank, required by the OFR to submit sensitive data, challenges the agency's structure. What is the bank's strongest constitutional argument? Select one.

The for-cause removal protection for the OFR Director is unconstitutional because the Director exercises purely executive power. (correct answer)
The OFR's location within the Treasury Department, while being independent of the Secretary's control, violates the separation of powers.
The OFR Director is an inferior officer and therefore cannot be appointed by the President with Senate confirmation.
The Director's six-year term unconstitutionally extends beyond the President's four-year term, limiting the power of future presidents.

Explanation: The correct answer is A. Even though the OFR's duties seem informational (collecting data, reporting), these are still executive functions related to the execution of financial stability laws. Under Seila Law and related cases, a single officer at the head of an agency who exercises executive power cannot be protected by a for-cause removal provision. Such protection unconstitutionally interferes with the President's Article II authority to control the executive branch. B is a plausible but less precise argument; the core issue is the President's lack of control via removal. C incorrectly classifies the Director as an inferior officer; a director appointed by the President with Senate confirmation is a principal officer. D is incorrect; fixed terms that cross presidential administrations are common and constitutional.

Question 5

You are an attorney representing a company subpoenaed by a congressional committee that is investigating an administrative agency's conduct. The committee demands that your client produce all correspondence with the agency over a five-year period. The agency itself, citing executive privilege, has instructed your client not to comply with the subpoena. Your client is concerned about being held in contempt of Congress.

What is the most accurate advice to give your client regarding the agency's instruction? Select one.

The client must comply with the agency's instruction, as executive privilege asserted by an agency is absolute and shields private parties.
The client must comply with the congressional subpoena, as Congress's power of inquiry is absolute and overrides any agency instruction.
The agency's assertion of executive privilege is likely invalid, as the privilege is held by the President and is not typically delegable to agencies to direct third parties. (correct answer)
The client is in an unresolvable legal conflict and should seek a declaratory judgment from a federal court before acting.

Explanation: The correct answer is C. Executive privilege is a constitutional privilege held by the President to protect confidential communications related to the performance of his duties. While it can extend to communications within the executive branch, it is the President's privilege to assert. It is highly unlikely that an agency, on its own, can assert this privilege to prevent a private third party from complying with a congressional subpoena. The instruction is likely an invalid exercise of authority. A and B are incorrect because neither executive privilege nor congressional inquiry power is absolute. D might be a prudent course of action, but C provides the most accurate legal analysis of the agency's authority to issue the instruction.

Question 6

Congress creates the Public Lands Commission, an independent agency responsible for managing federal lands. The enabling statute provides that the commission's five members are appointed by the President with Senate confirmation. The statute further provides that 'the chairpersons of the House and Senate committees with jurisdiction over public lands shall serve as ex officio, non-voting members of the Commission.' A mining company, denied a permit by the Commission, challenges its structure.

What is the company's strongest argument that the Commission's structure is unconstitutional? Select one.

The presence of members of Congress on an executive commission violates the separation of powers. (correct answer)
The non-voting status of the congressional members is a facial violation of the one-person, one-vote principle.
The structure is constitutional because the congressional members are non-voting and their role is purely advisory.
The structure violates the Appointments Clause because Congress cannot appoint its own members to an executive body.

Explanation: The correct answer is A. The Supreme Court has indicated that having members of Congress serve on a body that executes the law violates the separation of powers. Even in a non-voting capacity, their presence and participation in the deliberations of an executive agency could constitute an impermissible entanglement of the legislative and executive branches. This is the core separation of powers issue. D is also a strong argument and closely related, but A is broader, focusing on the functional violation of separation of powers rather than just the appointment mechanism. B is incorrect as 'one-person, one-vote' applies to legislative apportionment, not administrative commissions. C states the argument for constitutionality, not against it.

Question 7

You represent a member of the Federal Antitrust Board (FAB), a newly created independent agency. The FAB's sole function is to investigate and prosecute civil violations of federal antitrust laws, a power previously exercised by the Department of Justice. The enabling statute provides that the five members of the FAB serve seven-year terms and may be removed by the President only for 'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.' The President, frustrated with the FAB's lack of enforcement actions against large tech companies, removes your client without cause to appoint someone with a more aggressive enforcement philosophy. Your client challenges the removal.

Which of the following best supports the President's authority to remove your client? Select one.

The President has inherent authority to remove any executive officer at will, and for-cause protections are always unconstitutional.
The FAB member exercises purely executive power, and Congress cannot insulate such an officer from at-will presidential removal with a for-cause restriction. (correct answer)
The for-cause removal provision is a violation of the nondelegation doctrine because it limits the President's discretion.
The FAB member is an inferior officer who may be removed at will, regardless of statutory protections.

Explanation: The correct answer is B. The President's removal power is greatest over officers exercising purely executive functions (like law enforcement and prosecution). In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court held the President has exclusive power to remove such officers. While Humphrey's Executor v. United States allowed for-cause protections for officers of quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, the FAB's functions are described as purely executive. Therefore, the statutory for-cause restriction likely unconstitutionally infringes on the President's executive power. A is too broad; for-cause protections are permissible for some officers. C misapplies the nondelegation doctrine, which relates to grants of legislative power to agencies. D incorrectly identifies the member as an inferior officer; a board member with these powers is likely a principal officer, but the key distinction for removal is the function of the office, not its classification as principal or inferior.

Question 8

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was appointed by lower-level SEC staff members. This appointment method was later found to be unconstitutional in Lucia v. SEC because ALJs are inferior officers who must be appointed by the President, a court, or a Head of Department. After the Lucia decision, the SEC Commissioners, who are themselves properly appointed, issue an order 'ratifying' all prior decisions made by the improperly appointed ALJs. An investment advisor challenges a fine imposed by one such ALJ before the ratification.

Is the SEC's ratification of the ALJ's prior decision likely to be held valid by a court? Select one.

No, because a decision that was constitutionally defective when made cannot be cured by a later administrative action.
No, because ratification would constitute a retroactive penalty that violates the advisor's due process rights.
Yes, because the properly appointed Commissioners have the authority to make the decision themselves and can therefore ratify a prior decision made on their behalf. (correct answer)
Yes, but only if the advisor is given the opportunity for a completely new hearing before a properly appointed ALJ.

Explanation: The correct answer is C. The general principle of administrative law is that a validly appointed principal can ratify the actions of an agent who acted without authority at the time. Here, the SEC Commissioners (the principal) are properly appointed and have the authority to adjudicate the case. By ratifying the ALJ's decision, they are adopting it as their own. Courts have generally accepted this as a valid cure for an Appointments Clause defect. A is incorrect because ratification is a recognized exception to this idea. B is incorrect because due process is generally not violated by this type of curative administrative action. D describes a possible remedy a court might order, but it is not a prerequisite for ratification to be valid in principle; the ratification itself is often sufficient.

Question 9

Congress is concerned about the solvency of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a government-owned corporation. It passes a law creating a three-member 'PBGC Restructuring Board' with the power to alter pension insurance premiums. The law provides that one member is appointed by the President, one by the Speaker of the House, and one by the President pro tempore of the Senate. The Board is authorized to issue regulations that have the force of law.

A company required to pay increased premiums challenges the Board's authority. What is the company's strongest constitutional argument? Select one.

The Board's members are principal officers exercising significant authority, and their appointment by congressional leaders violates the Appointments Clause. (correct answer)
The Board's authority to set insurance premiums is an unconstitutional delegation of Congress's taxing power.
The structure of the Board violates principles of federalism by interfering with private pension contracts, which are matters of state law.
The creation of a three-member board to oversee a government corporation violates the President's duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

Explanation: The correct answer is A. This scenario presents a clear violation of the Appointments Clause, similar to the facts of Buckley v. Valeo. The members of the Board, who have the power to issue binding regulations, are officers of the United States. Because they appear to be operating with significant independence and authority, they are likely principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Allowing the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate to appoint them is unconstitutional. B is incorrect; setting insurance premiums for a federal program is not a tax. C is incorrect; federal law (ERISA) extensively regulates pensions. D is too vague; the specific Appointments Clause violation is the strongest and most precise argument.

Question 10

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is authorized by statute to issue workplace safety standards. An employer is cited by OSHA for violating a regulation regarding machine guarding. The case is heard by an OSHA Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who imposes a $50,000 fine. The employer appeals the decision to a federal court of appeals, arguing that the imposition of such a significant monetary penalty by an administrative agency violates its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.

Is the employer's Seventh Amendment argument likely to prevail? Select one.

Yes, because any government action seeking a monetary penalty in excess of $20 is considered a suit at common law requiring a jury trial.
Yes, because the penalty is punitive rather than remedial, which transforms the administrative proceeding into a criminal one requiring a jury.
No, because the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial does not apply to administrative proceedings adjudicating public rights. (correct answer)
No, because the employer waived its right to a jury trial by choosing to operate a business in a federally regulated industry.

Explanation: The correct answer is C. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Seventh Amendment, which guarantees the right to a jury trial in 'suits at common law,' does not apply to administrative proceedings. Agency adjudications, particularly those involving the enforcement of a federal regulatory scheme (i.e., 'public rights'), are not considered 'suits at common law.' Therefore, an employer can be subjected to significant civil penalties by an agency like OSHA without a jury trial. A misstates the scope of the Seventh Amendment. B incorrectly equates a civil penalty with a criminal proceeding. D uses the concept of waiver incorrectly; there is no such 'implied waiver' of a constitutional right in this context.

Question 11

Congress establishes a special tribunal within the Department of Justice to adjudicate claims by veterans for disability benefits. The statute provides that the three judges on this tribunal are to be appointed by the Attorney General for 10-year terms. These judges have the authority to issue final decisions on benefits claims, which are binding on the Department of Veterans Affairs. Their decisions are subject to review by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. A veteran whose claim was denied by the tribunal challenges its authority.

Is the appointment of the tribunal's judges constitutional? Select one.

No, because judges with the power to issue final decisions are principal officers who must be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
No, because the Attorney General, as head of the Department of Justice, cannot appoint officers who serve in a different department.
Yes, because the judges are inferior officers, and Congress may vest their appointment in the head of a department. (correct answer)
Yes, because the adjudication of government benefits is a matter of public right, giving Congress broad discretion in structuring the tribunal.

Explanation: The correct answer is C. The judges are likely 'inferior officers' because their work is directed and supervised by a superior officer (the Secretary of Veterans Affairs can review their decisions). The Appointments Clause allows Congress to vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, the courts of law, or the heads of departments. The Attorney General is the head of the Department of Justice. Therefore, vesting the appointment of these inferior officers in the Attorney General is constitutional. A is incorrect because their decisions are not truly final, indicating they are not principal officers. B is a plausible distractor, but inter-departmental appointments are not per se unconstitutional if authorized by statute. D is a correct statement of law about public rights, but it doesn't directly answer the specific Appointments Clause question.

Question 12

Is the SEC's ratification of the ALJ's prior decision likely to be held valid by a court? Select one.

No, because a decision that was constitutionally defective when made cannot be cured by a later administrative action.
No, because ratification would constitute a retroactive penalty that violates the advisor's due process rights.
Yes, because the properly appointed Commissioners have the authority to make the decision themselves and can therefore ratify a prior decision made on their behalf. (correct answer)
Yes, but only if the advisor is given the opportunity for a completely new hearing before a properly appointed ALJ.

Question 13

Congress enacts the 'Major Questions Act,' a statute that says: 'In any instance where a federal agency seeks to promulgate a rule of vast economic and political significance, the agency must first submit the proposed rule to Congress for approval by a joint resolution, which must be signed by the President.' The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) develops a sweeping new rule to regulate carbon emissions from all sectors of the economy. The EPA submits the rule to Congress as required by the Act.

What is the primary constitutional problem with the 'Major Questions Act'? Select one.

It violates the nondelegation doctrine by requiring Congress to make the final legislative decision on major rules.
It violates the separation of powers by creating a process that is functionally equivalent to requiring bicameralism and presentment for agency rulemaking. (correct answer)
It is unconstitutional because it attempts to solve the 'major questions doctrine' problem through a statutory mechanism that is itself constitutionally flawed.
It violates Article I by requiring a joint resolution for an agency rule, a process not enumerated in the Constitution.

Explanation: The correct answer is B. This statute essentially creates a new legislative process. It forces an agency rule to go through the full legislative process (bicameralism and presentment) to become effective. While Congress can amend the underlying law that authorizes the agency, it cannot create a standing requirement for all future 'major' rules to become new statutes. This violates the separation of powers by entangling Congress in the execution of the laws and altering the fundamental process of rulemaking established by the Administrative Procedure Act and enabling statutes. A is incorrect because the nondelegation doctrine is about Congress giving away its power, not taking it back. C is a meta-description of the problem but not the legal reason it is flawed. D is incorrect; Congress can use joint resolutions for many things, but requiring them for agency rules to take effect is the issue.

Question 14

Congress passes a law creating the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) to oversee campaign finance laws. The statute provides for six voting commissioners. To ensure bipartisanship, the statute mandates that the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives each appoint two commissioners, and the President appoints the remaining two. The FEC is empowered to conduct investigations, issue subpoenas, bring civil enforcement actions in federal court, and promulgate binding regulations governing federal elections.

Is the appointment mechanism for the FEC commissioners constitutional? Select one.

Yes, because Congress has broad authority to structure executive agencies, including their appointment processes.
Yes, because the bipartisan appointment structure is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of ensuring electoral fairness.
No, because officers with significant executive authority must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. (correct answer)
No, because the Constitution requires all executive branch officers to be appointed by the President alone.

Explanation: The correct answer is C. The Appointments Clause of Article II requires that principal officers of the United States be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Officers, like the FEC commissioners, who exercise significant authority—including rulemaking and law enforcement—are considered principal officers. Allowing congressional leaders to appoint such officers violates the Appointments Clause. This fact pattern is based on Buckley v. Valeo. A is incorrect because Congress's authority is limited by the Constitution, specifically the Appointments Clause. B presents a policy argument that is irrelevant to the constitutional question of appointment power. D is incorrect because while the President appoints principal officers (with Senate consent), Congress may vest the appointment of 'inferior officers' in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

Question 15

Which of the following best supports the President's authority to remove your client? Select one.

The President has inherent authority to remove any executive officer at will, and for-cause protections are always unconstitutional.
The FAB member exercises purely executive power, and Congress cannot insulate such an officer from at-will presidential removal with a for-cause restriction. (correct answer)
The for-cause removal provision is a violation of the nondelegation doctrine because it limits the President's discretion.
The FAB member is an inferior officer who may be removed at will, regardless of statutory protections.

Question 16

A bank, required by the OFR to submit sensitive data, challenges the agency's structure. What is the bank's strongest constitutional argument? Select one.

The for-cause removal protection for the OFR Director is unconstitutional because the Director exercises purely executive power. (correct answer)
The OFR's location within the Treasury Department, while being independent of the Secretary's control, violates the separation of powers.
The OFR Director is an inferior officer and therefore cannot be appointed by the President with Senate confirmation.
The Director's six-year term unconstitutionally extends beyond the President's four-year term, limiting the power of future presidents.

Question 17

Is the employer's Seventh Amendment argument likely to prevail? Select one.

Yes, because any government action seeking a monetary penalty in excess of $20 is considered a suit at common law requiring a jury trial.
Yes, because the penalty is punitive rather than remedial, which transforms the administrative proceeding into a criminal one requiring a jury.
No, because the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial does not apply to administrative proceedings adjudicating public rights. (correct answer)
No, because the employer waived its right to a jury trial by choosing to operate a business in a federally regulated industry.

Question 18

What is the association's most persuasive argument that the FDA's regulation is invalid? Select one.

The regulation compels speech in violation of the First Amendment, as there is no scientific consensus on the health effects of GMOs.
The agency exceeded its statutory authority because a GMO disclosure is not a regulation of 'labeling' intended to prevent misleading consumers. (correct answer)
Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to mandate food labeling, so it cannot delegate such authority to the FDA.
The Food and Drug Act is an unconstitutional delegation of power because the term 'misled' is not an intelligible principle.

Question 19

Is the appointment of the tribunal's judges constitutional? Select one.

No, because judges with the power to issue final decisions are principal officers who must be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
No, because the Attorney General, as head of the Department of Justice, cannot appoint officers who serve in a different department.
Yes, because the judges are inferior officers, and Congress may vest their appointment in the head of a department. (correct answer)
Yes, because the adjudication of government benefits is a matter of public right, giving Congress broad discretion in structuring the tribunal.

Question 20

To streamline the resolution of patent disputes, Congress creates the Patent Adjudication Board (PAB), an administrative agency within the Commerce Department. The enabling statute gives the PAB the power to hold hearings and issue final, binding decisions in infringement disputes between private patent holders and alleged infringers. The statute provides for judicial review of PAB decisions in the Federal Circuit, but only to determine if the decision was 'supported by substantial evidence.' An alleged infringer, sued before the PAB by a patent holder, moves to dismiss the action.

What is the alleged infringer's strongest constitutional argument for dismissal? Select one.

The statute violates the Seventh Amendment by denying the alleged infringer a right to a jury trial for a private right of action.
The statute unconstitutionally assigns the adjudication of private rights between two parties to a non-Article III tribunal. (correct answer)
The 'substantial evidence' standard of review is too deferential and violates the due process rights of the litigants.
The PAB lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because patent law is a matter of exclusive federal judicial power.

Explanation: The correct answer is B. Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States in federal courts with life-tenured, salary-protected judges. While agencies can adjudicate 'public rights' (disputes between the government and a private party), the Supreme Court has held that Congress generally cannot assign the adjudication of 'private rights' (like a common law tort or contract claim between private parties) to a non-Article III tribunal. A patent infringement action between two private parties is a classic example of a private right. A is a strong argument but is secondary to the Article III problem; the lack of a jury is a symptom of the case being in the wrong forum. C is a due process argument, but the Article III structural problem is more fundamental. D is close, but the core issue is not just that it's a federal question, but that it's a private right being adjudicated by the executive branch.