- Which fact in the guest's matter is most analogous to the dispositive fact in Rivera, making the casino more likely to prevail on the duty issue?
Answer: The guest was standing about 30 feet away, outside the valet canopy, waiting for his car.
On a duty question, the key is foreseeability: was the plaintiff within the zone of danger created by the defendant's negligent act? Rivera and Delgado are contrasting examples. In Rivera, the injury was unforeseeable because the woman was far outside the immediate zone of danger. In Delgado, the injury was foreseeable because the crowded concourse made bystander harm from a taser likely.
Here, the fact most analogous to Rivera's dispositive fact is that the guest was standing about 30 feet away, outside the valet canopy, waiting for his car. That placement places the guest outside the zone of danger created by the shove, just like the woman in Rivera was outside the zone of danger from the package explosion. The casino is therefore more likely to prevail on duty.
The other choices are tempting but not dispositive. The fact that the guard shoved the patron at the casino's outdoor valet entrance is like Delgado's location factor only if the area was crowded; the passage does not say that. The patron being loud and drinking before the ejection may suggest he was a foreseeable source of disturbance, but it does not make injury to a guest 30 feet away foreseeable. The patron stumbling backward into a luggage cart and causing a suitcase to fall is the mechanism of injury, much like the package exploding and toppling the scale in Rivera—dramatic but not the reason the court denied duty.
Remember: on duty questions, ask first where the plaintiff was, not how the injury happened.
- Which fact in the Montana consumer's matter is most analogous to the dispositive fact in Garcia, supporting the exercise of specific jurisdiction in Montana?
Answer: The manufacturer's sales representative visits the Montana store each season and takes orders for that store's inventory.
Whenever you see a specific-jurisdiction question involving products, separate the two frameworks: purposeful direction (Garcia) versus mere stream of commerce (McIntyre). The key is whether the manufacturer deliberately cultivated a sale it knew was destined for the forum, not whether it merely knew its product might get there.
In the Montana case, the most Garcia-like fact is that the sales representative visits the Montana store each season and takes orders for that store's inventory. That is exactly the kind of targeted, forum-specific conduct Garcia involved — the manufacturer's agent went into the forum, worked with the local retailer, and created the very sale that led to the injury. That is purposeful direction.
The fact that the manufacturer sells to a national chain with stores in all 50 states is McIntyre-type stream of commerce: selling into a broad system with knowledge the product might reach Montana is not enough. The consumer bought the knife in Montana and was injured there matters for relatedness, but the injury alone cannot create specific jurisdiction without the manufacturer's forum-directed conduct. The manufacturer being incorporated and headquartered in New Jersey is irrelevant to Montana jurisdiction; it points to general jurisdiction, not specific.
On exam day, ask: did the defendant reach into the forum through its own actions, or just release goods into a stream? That distinction decides the answer.
- Which fact in the homeowner's matter is most analogous to the dispositive fact in Nguyen, and most clearly distinguishes her claim from Field?
Answer: The resort's owner saw the use each summer and never objected; the homeowner never asked permission.
Whenever you see a prescriptive easement question, focus on the five elements: open, notorious, adverse, continuous, and for the statutory period. The hardest element is usually adversity—whether the use was without permission. That is exactly what separates Nguyen from Field: in Nguyen, the neighbor used the road without permission, so the use was adverse; in Field, the farmer's oral permission made the use permissive, so no easement arose no matter how long it lasted.
Here, the homeowner never asked permission, and the resort owner saw the summer use and never objected. That fact is most analogous to *Nguyen*'s dispositive fact: open, known, unpermitted, and therefore adverse. It also distinguishes the claim from Field, because there is no evidence of permission.
The other choices miss the core issue. The 30-year duration shows the statutory period is satisfied, but in Field the use also lasted 25 years—so duration alone does not defeat permissive use. The fact that the homeowner walks only in summer is relevant to continuousness, but seasonal use can still be continuous if it matches the nature of the right claimed; it does not resolve adversity. Finally, the path being the only reasonable route might suggest an easement by necessity, but that is a different theory requiring a common ownership origin, not prescriptive easement.
Study tip: on adverse-use questions, always ask first, "Was the use permissive?" If yes, stop—no prescriptive easement, regardless of time.
- Which fact in the winery's matter is most analogous to the fact that was dispositive in Baxter Freight, supporting Swift's argument that it is not liable for the restaurant-chain loss?
Answer: Sorenson did not tell Swift about its contract to sell a special reserve-cuvée bottling to the restaurant chain.
This question tests the classic rule from Hadley v. Baxendale: consequential damages are recoverable only if the loss was foreseeable at the time of contracting, usually because the plaintiff communicated the special circumstances. In Baxter Freight, the dispositive fact was that the carrier had no notice the factory would be idle—the manufacturer merely said "a machine part." So the fact most analogous in the winery case is that Sorenson did not tell Swift about its contract to sell the special reserve-cuvée bottling to the restaurant chain. That silence is what made the restaurant-chain loss unforeseeable, and it supports Swift's argument that it should not be liable for that specific consequential loss.
The other facts don't carry the same weight. Telling Swift that the tank contained grape must for the annual reserve vintage is like telling the carrier it was a machine part—it gives general context, not notice of a special contractual exposure. Telling Swift the tank had to be kept at or below 40°F shows Swift knew the cargo was temperature-sensitive, but not that a specific restaurant contract depended on it. And the refrigeration unit failing is the breach and cause of the spoilage, but it doesn't address whether the restaurant-chain loss was foreseeable at contracting.
Remember: on bar-exam damages questions, look for what the defendant knew when the contract was made, not what happened later. The hidden-contract fact is the trap—and the key.
- Which fact in the diner's matter is most analogous to the dispositive fact in Chu, supporting the diner's claim?
Answer: The greasy spot was dark and difficult to see against the floor's mottled pattern.
When you see a premises-liability question that asks you to compare two cases, your first move is to identify the dispositive fact in the precedent case. In Chu, the court emphasized that the hazard was not open and obvious, so the proprietor had an ongoing duty to exercise reasonable care. Morales, by contrast, involved an open and obvious puddle plus a warning sign, which discharged the store's duty to warn.
The fact that best matches Chu is that the greasy spot was dark and difficult to see against the floor's mottled pattern. That directly makes the hazard hidden, not open and obvious, so the restaurant's duty remained. This supports the diner's claim in the same way the unremarkable box in Chu supported liability.
The other facts are tempting but miss the analogy. The spot's location near the kitchen door suggests foreseeability because staff frequently walked there, but that is about foreseeability and volume of traffic, not obviousness. The restaurant's 30-minute inspection policy, and the employee walking past two minutes before the fall, both concern actual or constructive notice and whether the restaurant acted reasonably. Those could matter to a negligence claim, but they are not the factor that made the difference in Chu.
On the bar exam, when comparing cases, ask: "What single fact drove that holding?" Then match that fact, not merely any fact that helps the plaintiff.
- Which fact in the day-care matter is most analogous to the fact that was dispositive in Taylor, supporting invalidation of the denial?
Answer: The city cited 'the burden these children place on city services.'
Whenever a question involves differential treatment of a group that is not a suspect class, don't stop at the classification—scrutinize the government's stated reason. In Taylor, the dispositive fact was not that the students had disabilities; it was that the district's justification rested on prejudice and unfounded assumptions about a historically disadvantaged group and served no legitimate state interest.
Here, the city's statement that "these children place a burden on city services" is the exact analogue. It reflects a stereotyped, negative assumption about children with Down syndrome rather than a concrete, evidence-based governmental concern. Like the Taylor rationale, that kind of prejudice cannot survive even rational-basis review.
The increased traffic congestion is different: traffic is a classic legitimate zoning concern, so a denial based on that reason could satisfy rational basis. The fact that the center would primarily serve children with Down syndrome identifies the classification but, by itself, is not the disqualifying fact—rational-basis review permits many classifications unless the motive is illegitimate. And the special-use permit issue is irrelevant; the problem is why the permit was denied, not what kind of permit was sought.
On exam day, when a disability-discrimination claim comes with a stated government reason, look for stereotyping in that reason. A prejudicial rationale is the red flag that turns otherwise deferential review into invalidation.
- Which fact in the officer's report matter is most analogous to the dispositive fact in Brandt, supporting exclusion of the report?
Answer: The report contains a witness's statement that the light was green for northbound traffic.
This question tests the hearsay-within-hearsay problem under the business-records exception. When a document is offered as a business record, every statement inside it must also be admissible; a statement from an outsider is hearsay unless a separate exception applies. In Brandt, the invoice was a valid business record, but the customer's "car was rear-ended" assertion was excluded because the customer had no business duty to report. In your police report, the witness's statement that "the light was green" is the same kind of embedded hearsay. The report may be a proper business record, but the witness—like Brandt's customer—was not a hospital employee or police officer with a duty to make an accurate record. The fact that the report contains the witness's statement is dispositive because the government is offering that statement to prove the light was actually green, and no separate hearsay exception is supplied.
The other choices miss the issue. The officer writing the report after responding that night supports the timing element of the business-records exception. The officer's lack of independent memory affects the witness's ability to testify, but does not make the report's hearsay more or less admissible. The report being prepared in the regular course of police work also supports admission as a business record, not exclusion. The dispositive analogy to Brandt is the outsider's statement embedded within an otherwise admissible record. On the exam, whenever a business record quotes someone outside the business, ask who had a duty to report—if the outsider did not, you have a hearsay problem.
- Which fact in Ruiz's matter is most clearly distinguishable from the dispositive facts in Okafor, such that Ruiz's claim most likely fails?
Answer: Ruiz used the strip for 19 years, less than the 20-year statutory period.
Adverse possession requires the possessor to satisfy every element for the entire statutory period: open and notorious, exclusive, hostile, and continuous use for the required time. Ruiz's situation is a timing failure. Okafor succeeded because Hill used the land for 22 years—more than the 20-year period. Ruiz has used the strip for only 19 years, so she has not yet satisfied the statutory requirement. That is the dispositive distinction, and it is why her claim most likely fails.
The other differences do not undermine her claim. The fact that Ruiz mowed and planted tulips rather than parking vehicles or storing firewood does not matter; adverse possession can be established by many types of visible use, as long as the use is open, notorious, and continuous. Her good-faith belief that the strip belonged to her also does not defeat hostility, because Okafor expressly held that hostility is measured objectively—a sincere but mistaken belief of ownership still counts as hostile. Finally, the neighbor's out-of-state residence and twice-yearly visits do not make Ruiz's use any less open or notorious; the owner's failure to notice or object does not reset the clock or negate adversity, though it may be relevant to whether the use was reasonably discoverable.
On exam day, when adverse possession is tested, first check the chronological facts. If the possession period is shorter than the statutory period, the claim fails immediately—no other element can save it.
