- Is G entitled to recover the additional $40,000?
Answer: Yes, because the rock ledge was an unforeseen condition that the soil report had indicated would not be present, making O's promise to pay the extra amount binding.
A modification of an executory contract generally requires consideration, but an exception permits enforcement without new consideration when the modification is fair and equitable and based on circumstances not anticipated when the contract was made. G's encounter with a granite ledge that the soil report had indicated would not be present was unanticipated, and the extra $40,000 was fair; so O's promise to pay is enforceable. Choice A states the general preexisting-duty rule but ignores the exception. Choice B is wrong because G's threat to stop due to a genuine unforeseen condition was not duress. Choice D is wrong because O's receipt of the house is a benefit, not consideration for the promise to pay extra.
- Is B entitled to recover the remaining $5,000?
Answer: Yes, because B's promise to accept less than the full amount was not supported by any new performance from A.
Under the preexisting-duty rule, part payment of an undisputed debt is not consideration for a creditor's promise to discharge the balance, so B's promise to accept less is unenforceable and B may recover the remaining $5,000. Choice A ignores lack of consideration. Choice B is wrong because A's payment of an already-due debt was not new consideration. Choice D is wrong because an accord and satisfaction requires a disputed claim or new consideration; here the claim was undisputed and A gave no new consideration.
- Is A entitled to the price increase?
Answer: Yes, because A's added cost resulted from a new government rule, and B agreed to the increase in a signed writing.
Under UCC 2-209, a contract for sale of goods may be modified without new consideration, provided the modification is sought in good faith. A's additional $3 cost was caused by a new federal safety regulation, not by a desire to get a better bargain, so the modification is enforceable. Choice A applies the common-law preexisting-duty rule, which UCC displaces. Choice B is wrong because the fact that A was already bound does not bar a UCC modification made in good faith. Choice D is wrong because B's promise to pay more is not needed as consideration, and A's delivery promise was preexisting.
- Is B entitled to the $500 reward?
Answer: No, because B was not aware of the reward when he returned the dog, so his return was not made in exchange for A's promise.
Consideration requires a bargained-for exchange: the promisee's act must be sought by the promisor in exchange for the promise and given in exchange for it. B returned the dog before knowing of A's offer, so his act could not have been given in exchange for A's promise; it was a voluntary benefit, not consideration. Choice A is wrong because B's lack of knowledge defeats the bargain even though A had promised to pay. Choice B is wrong because benefit alone, without bargain, does not create consideration. Choice D is wrong because voluntariness alone is not the defect; lack of bargain is.
- Is B entitled to the $5,000?
Answer: Yes, because B gave up his lawful right to smoke at A's request, despite having previously thought about quitting.
Forbearance of a lawful right can be consideration if bargained for. B had a legal right to smoke; A sought B's abstention as the price of his promise, and B acted accordingly. The fact that B had previously thought about quitting does not show that his abstention was not given in exchange for A's promise; independent motives do not necessarily negate bargain. Choice A is wrong because legal detriment is not measured by whether the conduct is good for the promisee; giving up any legal right suffices. Choice B is wrong because there is no 'but-for' causation requirement when the promised performance was in fact bargained for. Choice D is wrong because the benefit to A was not the bargained-for exchange and cannot by itself supply consideration.
- Is A's revocation effective?
Answer: No, because A's written promise to hold the offer open for 60 days was made by a dealer in the goods and is binding for that period.
Under UCC Article 2, a merchant who signs a written offer to buy or sell goods and gives assurance that it will be held open creates a firm offer irrevocable for up to three months without consideration. A is a merchant, the offer was signed and expressly open for 60 days, so A could not revoke within that period. Choice A states the common-law option rule requiring consideration, which does not apply to merchant firm offers. Choice B is wrong because this offer falls within the firm-offer exception. Choice D is wrong because a common-law option contract requires consideration, and B gave none; the irrevocability comes from the UCC firm-offer rule, not from a common-law option contract.
- Is A's promise to transfer the coin enforceable?
Answer: No, because neither party intended the $1 to be paid, so the recital was a pretense and no bargain occurred.
Consideration must actually be bargained for; a written recital of consideration that neither party intended to be paid is a mere pretense of bargain, not consideration. Because B never paid and both understood $1 as a formality, A's promise was gratuitous and unenforceable. Choice A is wrong because adequacy of consideration is irrelevant only when consideration actually exists. Choice B is wrong because a recital is not conclusive when no consideration was in fact given. Choice D is wrong because inadequacy alone does not defeat consideration; here the absence of any real bargain does.
- Is C's promise enforceable?
Answer: Yes, because A paid B only after C sought that payment as the price of C's promise.
Under the preexisting-duty rule, performance of a duty already owed to the promisor is not consideration. Here A's duty was owed to B, not to C, the promisor. Because A's payment to B was requested by C as the price of C's promise, A's payment was bargained-for consideration. Choice A misapplies the preexisting-duty rule to a duty owed to a third person. Choice B is wrong because a benefit to the promisor is not required. Choice D is wrong because C had no obligation to B that A's payment discharged, and C's emotional interest does not supply consideration.
- Is B's suit barred?
Answer: Yes, because B dropped a disputed claim against A in exchange for $3,000, and the settlement was reached before suit.
Forbearance to assert a claim can be consideration even if the claim would ultimately fail, if the claim is doubtful or honestly believed valid. B's claim, though weak, was not frivolous: A's tree was on A's property and B incurred real damage. B's release was therefore given in exchange for A's $3,000 payment, and the settlement bars further suit. Choice A is wrong because B's claim was colorable, not baseless. Choice B is wrong because adequacy of consideration is irrelevant. Choice D is wrong because a signed writing is not a substitute for consideration; the release was enforceable because of the bargained-for exchange of payment for forbearance.
- Is A entitled to the reward?
Answer: Yes, because A was on vacation, off duty, and outside the city that employed him, so he had no duty to act in Westville.
A public employee generally may not claim a reward for performing acts within the scope of official duties. Here A was off duty, on vacation, outside the city that employed him, and had no legal duty to intervene in Westville; his capture of the robber was therefore not a preexisting public duty, and it was performed in response to Westville's reward offer, making it consideration. Choice A is wrong because the public-duty rule has no application when there is no official duty. Choice B is wrong because the reward was for capture and arrest, not information. Choice D is wrong because a benefit to Westville alone, without a bargain, is insufficient.
- Is B's promise enforceable as consideration for A's promise?
Answer: Yes, because B's promise to buy its 'requirements' carried an implied duty to continue its needs in good faith.
A promise to buy 'all requirements' is not illusory because it implies an obligation to make good-faith purchases of the quantity actually needed. B could not, while continuing to operate thriving stores, simply declare that it had no requirements to avoid the contract; its promise supplied consideration for A's promise. Choice A mischaracterizesa requirements promise as a purely discretionary promise. Choice B is wrong becausea requirements term provides an objective standard. Choice D is wrong because mutuality requires B to be bound; A's fixed-price promise alone is insufficient.
- Is B entitled to the $50 from A?
Answer: Yes, because B drove C at A's request, even though C received the benefit.
Consideration does not require that the promisor receive a benefit; it is enough that the promisee incur a burden or give a performance requested by the promisor. B's act of driving C was bargained for by A and performed by B, even though C received the benefit. Choice A states a common but incorrect 'benefit to promisor' requirement. Choice B is wrong because consideration can be requested by the promisor and furnished to a third party. Choice D is wrong because C's benefit is not imputed to A.
