- According to a Parfitian view of what matters in survival, which statement most accurately analyzes Anya's situation?
Answer: Anya has survived completely, because what matters, psychological continuity (Relation R), has been fully preserved through the functional equivalence of the new parts.
The correct answer is C. Derek Parfit's view, particularly his concept of 'Relation R,' prioritizes psychological continuity and connectedness. In this scenario, the gradual replacement of neurons with functionally identical synthetic ones ensures a seamless, overlapping chain of psychological states. Therefore, psychological continuity is perfectly preserved, meaning what matters for survival has been fully maintained.
(A) is incorrect because this describes a version of the Bodily Criterion (or perhaps a Brain Criterion) focused on functional organization, not the Parfitian psychological view.
(B) is incorrect because this represents the strict, substance-based view of identity that Parfit argues against. Parfit's point is that survival can occur even if strict numerical identity (in this material sense) does not.
(D) is incorrect because while Parfit distinguishes between continuity and connectedness, the gradual nature of the replacement is designed to preserve the strong, overlapping chains that constitute full continuity. There is no reason to believe connectedness has weakened in a way that would diminish survival.
- Bishop Butler's objection to Locke's memory theory of identity is that the theory is circular. Which of the following statements best captures the circularity being alleged?
Answer: To distinguish between a genuine memory of doing something and a mere seeming memory, one must already presuppose that they are the person who did the action.
The correct answer is B. This is the classic formulation of the circularity objection. Locke wants to use memory as the criterion for personal identity. However, there is a difference between actually remembering doing X and merely seeming to remember doing X (e.g., I could have a vivid, delusionary 'memory' of signing the Declaration of Independence). To know a memory is genuine, we must know that the person having the memory is the same person who had the original experience. But that is precisely what the memory was supposed to establish. Thus, the criterion of genuine memory presupposes the very identity it is meant to prove.
(A) is a general statement of circularity, but (B) explains the specific mechanism of the circularity in this context.
(C) describes the problem of amnesia or forgotten events (like in Reid's paradox), which is a different objection.
(D) describes a different line of criticism against psychological theories, not the specific circularity objection from Butler.
- From a purely Parfitian perspective on rational self-interest, what should Kai do?
Answer: Choose the procedure, as it leads to better outcomes for his psychological successors, which is what a rational agent should want for their future selves.
When you encounter questions about personal identity and survival, you need to understand Derek Parfit's revolutionary view that psychological continuity matters more than strict numerical identity. For Parfit, what makes survival rational isn't maintaining one continuous body or soul, but preserving the psychological connections that constitute your ongoing mental life.
From a Parfitian perspective, Kai should choose the procedure because rational self-interest extends to all his psychological successors. Since both Kai-A and Kai-B will have his memories, personality, and mental patterns, they represent genuine continuations of his psychological life—they are his future selves in the only sense that matters. A rational agent should want the best possible outcomes for these future psychological states, making option D correct.
Option A reflects a traditional view of identity that Parfit explicitly rejects—the idea that strict one-to-one survival is necessary for rational self-concern. Option B misunderstands Parfit's position by suggesting mere indifference; Parfit argues we should actively care about our psychological successors' well-being. Option C makes the mistake of thinking Kai must choose between successors, when the scenario allows for both, and Parfit would say both successors have equal claim to being Kai's continuation.
Remember that Parfitian questions test whether you can abandon intuitive notions of personal identity in favor of psychological continuity. When you see branching identity scenarios, ask yourself: "What would maximize well-being for all psychological successors?" rather than "How can strict identity be preserved?"
- What fundamental logical principle of identity is this thought experiment designed to challenge when applied to the memory criterion?
Answer: The principle of transitivity, because if A is identical to B, and B is identical to C, then A must be identical to C.
The correct answer is B. Identity is a transitive relation. The thought experiment shows that Locke's memory criterion is not transitive. According to the criterion: General = Officer (due to memory link), and Officer = Boy (due to memory link). By transitivity, it should follow that General = Boy. However, the memory criterion implies General ≠ Boy, because the general does not remember being the boy. This violation of transitivity is the core of Reid's objection.
(A) is related, as the differing properties (like memories) are what lead to the violation, but the fundamental logical principle being violated is transitivity.
(C) is incorrect because symmetry is not at issue in this specific paradox.
(D) describes a different, also famous, objection to Locke's theory (the circularity objection), but it is not the point demonstrated by the Brave Officer paradox.
- Most people, including proponents of psychological continuity, would agree that the person on Earth is the original and the one on Mars is a copy. What does this intuition reveal about what matters in survival?
Answer: It shows that psychological continuity is not a sufficient condition for identity, as a 'no branching' or 'non-rival' condition is also intuitively required.
The correct answer is A. This scenario, a variation of fission, highlights a major problem for the simple view that psychological continuity is sufficient for identity. Both the person on Earth and the person on Mars are psychologically continuous with the original person. Yet, our strong intuition is that you are the one on Earth. This suggests that psychological continuity isn't the whole story. An additional condition, such as spatiotemporal continuity or a 'no-rivals' clause (i.e., identity only holds if there isn't more than one candidate), seems necessary to capture our intuitions about identity.
(B) is too strong a conclusion. While the scenario supports the importance of the body, it doesn't definitively prove it's the only thing that matters. The key logical point is the challenge to the sufficiency of the psychological criterion.
(C) introduces the unrelated problem of consciousness and p-zombies.
(D) states Parfit's conclusion, but the question asks what the common intuition in this case reveals. That intuition is that you have not traveled, which is a problem for simple psychological theories and motivates the need for a more complex account like Parfit's or a 'closest continuer' view.
- Derek Parfit distinguishes between psychological connectedness (direct psychological links, like memory and intention) and psychological continuity (overlapping chains of connectedness). How does this distinction allow Parfit's theory to overcome Reid's Brave Officer paradox?
Answer: It claims that while the general is not psychologically connected to the boy, he is psychologically continuous with him, and continuity is what constitutes identity.
The correct answer is A. Reid's paradox shows that direct memory links are not transitive. Parfit's solution is to define a new relation, psychological continuity, which is transitive. Continuity exists when there is a series of overlapping direct connections. In the paradox, the General is connected to the Officer, and the Officer is connected to the Boy. This creates an overlapping chain of connectedness, which means the General is psychologically continuous with the Boy, even if he is not directly connected to him via memory. By making continuity the criterion for identity, transitivity is preserved.
(B) is incorrect; Parfit argues continuity is the basis for identity/survival, while connectedness is a matter of degree that grounds our special concern.
(C) is incorrect because the distinction is introduced specifically to save the psychological criterion from this objection.
(D) is incorrect because the distinction doesn't redefine memory; it builds the new concept of continuity on top of existing connections like memory.
- According to Parfit, psychological connectedness (direct links like memory and intention) is a matter of degree and typically lessens over time. A 70-year-old has fewer direct psychological connections to their 20-year-old self than to their 60-year-old self. What is the most significant philosophical implication Parfit draws from this observation?
Answer: That a person's rational egoistic concern for their own future should also be a matter of degree, potentially weakening for the distant future.
The correct answer is B. Parfit argues that what matters in survival and what grounds our special, egoistic concern for our future is psychological connectedness and continuity (Relation R). Since connectedness, a key component of R, comes in degrees and weakens over time, the rational justification for our special concern should also weaken. It may be fully rational to care less about the well-being of your distant-future self than your near-future self, in much the same way you care less about a stranger than a close friend.
(A) is an overstatement. Parfit is a reductionist (identity just consists in these other relations), not an eliminativist (identity doesn't exist at all).
(C) is a possible practical application, but it's not the central philosophical implication Parfit is known for drawing.
(D) is incorrect because Parfit maintains that identity, which relies on continuity (the all-or-nothing ancestral relation of connectedness), does persist over a whole life. The more radical claim is about what matters, which comes in degrees.
- A judge must decide whether to punish this person. Which statement best reflects the dilemma created by the conflict between different theories of identity?
Answer: The Bodily Criterion would support punishment because the same human organism committed the crime, while a strict Lockean view would argue against it, as the person who committed the crime no longer exists.
The correct answer is A. This scenario perfectly illustrates the practical conflict between identity criteria. According to the Bodily Criterion, personal identity consists in the persistence of the same living body. Since the body that committed the crime is present in the courtroom, that person should be punished. According to a strict Lockean (memory-based) Psychological Criterion, the person is constituted by psychological continuity. Since that continuity has been completely severed, the person who committed the crime no longer exists, and it would be unjust to punish this new, different person.
(B) is incorrect because a strict psychological view would not support punishment.
(C) is a possible interpretation of the narrative view, but it's not the most direct conflict presented, and one could also argue from a narrative perspective that the story was irrecoverably broken.
(D) confuses a metaphysical question about identity with a legal question about the conditions for culpability (mens rea). While related, the core philosophical dilemma here is about who this person is.
- This argument relies on an analogy to the Ship of Theseus paradox. What must be true for this analogy to be effective in challenging Sam's identity over time?
Answer: Psychological traits must be viewed as discrete, replaceable parts, and personal identity must depend on the persistence of a majority of these original parts.
The correct answer is A. The Ship of Theseus paradox works by conceptualizing an object as a collection of parts and then questioning identity when those parts are replaced. For the analogy to apply to Sam, his psychological profile must similarly be treated as a collection of discrete components (beliefs, values, traits). The argument's force comes from the claim that since all (or most) of these 'parts' have been replaced, the original entity no longer exists.
(B) refers to the second part of the paradox (reassembling the old planks), which creates a conflict over which ship is the original. While this would strengthen the analogy, it's not necessary for the initial challenge to the identity of the continuously-modified person/ship.
(C) is incorrect because the argument can still be made even if Sam-70 remembers being Sam-20. The claim would be that the person he remembers having been is no longer him, due to the radical change in constituent psychological parts.
(D) is incorrect because the cause of the change is irrelevant to the logical structure of the analogy, which concerns only the replacement of parts.
- According to a strict Lockean memory criterion of personal identity, which conclusion follows?
Answer: David is a different person from his pre-accident self, as there is no chain of memory connecting the two.
The correct answer is B. John Locke's criterion for personal identity is the continuity of consciousness, which he primarily links to memory. If person B can remember the experiences of person A, then B and A are the same person. In this case, there is a complete break in the chain of memory. The post-accident David has no conscious link to the pre-accident David. Therefore, according to a strict interpretation of Locke's criterion, he is a new person.
(A) applies the Bodily Criterion, not the Lockean one.
(C) suggests a modification to the Lockean view to deal with cases of forgetting, but the question specifies a strict Lockean criterion based on actual memory links.
(D) shifts the criterion from memory to brain states, which is a different version of a psychological or physical theory.
- Proponents of a narrative view of personal identity argue that a person is constituted by the story they tell about their life, integrating past, present, and future. Which of the following scenarios presents the most significant challenge specifically for this narrative conception of the self?
Answer: An individual who is a pathological liar, constantly fabricating and retelling a life story that bears no resemblance to the actual events of their past.
The correct answer is C. The narrative view grounds identity in the self-told story. This raises a crucial question: must the story be true? A pathological liar who constructs a compelling but entirely false narrative about themselves poses a direct challenge. If the narrative constitutes the self, is this person's selfhood constituted by a fiction? This forces the narrative theorist to address the relationship between narrative, truth, and identity in a way other scenarios do not.
(A) is not a problem for the narrative view; in fact, the continuity of the story despite the bodily change is something the theory handles well.
(B) is a general problem of distinguishing individuals, but not a specific challenge to the internal constitution of the self via narrative.
(D) is a problem for any theory of identity that relies on memory or psychology, including Locke's and Parfit's, not one unique to the narrative view.
- A teleportation device scans a person, destroys them, and creates a molecule-for-molecule perfect replica at a destination. A proponent of the Bodily Criterion of identity argues against this being a method of survival. Their argument hinges on the distinction between two types of identity. Which of the following best articulates their objection?
Answer: The replica is only qualitatively identical to the original person but not numerically identical, as there is no spatiotemporal continuity of the body.
The correct answer is A. This distinction is crucial in metaphysics. Qualitative identity means 'being exactly alike,' sharing all the same properties. Numerical identity means 'being one and the same object.' The Bodily Criterion requires the persistence of the same body through a continuous path in space and time. The teleportation process breaks this spatiotemporal continuity. Therefore, while the replica is a perfect copy (qualitatively identical), it is a new object, not the same one (numerically identical).
(B) incorrectly reverses the terms; the replica is, by definition, qualitatively identical.
(C) is an objection from the perspective of narrative identity, not the Bodily Criterion.
(D) is an objection from the perspective of a soul-based view, not the Bodily Criterion.
- Which statement represents the most significant point of disagreement between a proponent of the Bodily Criterion and a proponent of the Psychological Criterion?
Answer: Whether the person with B's body is numerically identical to the original Scientist A.
The correct answer is C. The core of the debate on personal identity is about the conditions for numerical identity over time. A proponent of the Psychological Criterion would argue that the continuity of memories, personality, etc., is sufficient for identity, so the person with B's body is Scientist A. A proponent of the Bodily Criterion would argue that spatiotemporal continuity of the body (or at least the brain) is necessary, so the person with B's body is not Scientist A, but rather Scientist B with A's memories. Their fundamental disagreement is over which individual is numerically the same as the original Scientist A.
(A) is incorrect because both would likely agree that the resulting person is psychologically very similar, or qualitatively identical in that respect.
(B) is a side issue; the main philosophical question is about the identity of the person, not the biological status of the braindead body.
(D) is irrelevant, as thought experiments in philosophy stipulate the scenario is possible in order to probe our concepts.
- Which of the following social practices would be most rationally justified according to this Parfitian framework?
Answer: Viewing branching as a desirable form of survival, where the pre-fission person has a rational self-interest in the well-being and projects of all their future successors.
The correct answer is D. If what matters for survival is Relation R, and branching (fission) allows Relation R to hold between the original person and multiple successors, then branching is a way of multiplying what matters. A person's rational self-interest, which is grounded in Relation R, would naturally extend to all successors. Therefore, wanting them to flourish is the most rational stance.
(A) is contrary to the Parfitian view, as it tries to preserve the old framework of one-to-one identity that Parfit argues is not what truly matters.
(B) is incorrect because the successors, being psychologically continuous with the original, have good reason to see themselves as bound by prior commitments.
(C) is a plausible but problematic solution to responsibility. Since both successors are fully psychologically continuous at the start, they would both seem to inherit the responsibility. Parfit's view makes assigning responsibility complex, but this option oversimplifies it and may not be the most rational approach.
- Which philosophical position does this argument most directly support?
Answer: Parfit's Reductionist View, where personal identity is not a deep further fact and what matters is Relation R (psychological continuity/connectedness).
The correct answer is C. This argument is a concise summary of Derek Parfit's central thesis in Reasons and Persons. He argues that personal identity is not some deep, further fact beyond physical and psychological continuity. He uses fission (branching) cases to argue that what grounds our rational concern for our future is Relation R (psychological continuity and connectedness), and that this relation is what matters, not a strict, one-to-one identity relation.
(A) and (B) are incorrect as the argument explicitly bases future concern on psychological relations, not a body or soul.
(D) is related, as narrative is a psychological phenomenon, but the specific focus on the one-to-one vs. branching issue is the hallmark of Parfit's analysis.
- Some philosophers argue that Ship A is the true Ship of Theseus. Which of the following principles provides the strongest support for this conclusion?
Answer: The principle of spatiotemporal continuity and causal history, which emphasizes the gradual, unbroken path of an object's existence through space and time.
The Ship of Theseus paradox tests your understanding of personal identity theory - specifically, what makes an object remain "the same" object over time despite changes. When approaching identity puzzles like this, focus on which philosophical principle best explains our intuitions about continuous existence.
The principle of spatiotemporal continuity and causal history (D) provides the strongest support for Ship A being the true Ship of Theseus because it emphasizes the unbroken, gradual transformation process. Ship A maintains an uninterrupted presence in space and time - it never ceases to exist, and each plank replacement follows causally from the previous state. This continuous path of existence, with each change building on the last, preserves identity through gradual transformation.
Option A fails because the principle of material constitution would actually support Ship B, since Ship B contains the original matter that once constituted the Ship of Theseus. Option B, functional persistence, doesn't distinguish between the ships - both Ship A and Ship B can perform the same sailing functions, so this principle can't determine which is the "true" ship. Option C, the principle of majority, creates an arbitrary threshold and would suggest the ship loses its identity once 51% of parts are replaced, regardless of continuity.
When tackling identity paradoxes, remember that spatiotemporal continuity often trumps material composition in philosophical arguments. The key insight is that gradual change preserving causal connections tends to maintain identity better than reassembly or replacement that breaks the continuous existence chain.
- According to Derek Parfit's theory, what is the most plausible conclusion about what has happened to Zara?
Answer: Zara has survived, and what matters for her survival exists in both Zara-A and Zara-B, even though their psychological lives will diverge over time.
The correct answer is C. This is a classic fission case, which Parfit uses to distinguish survival from strict identity. For Parfit, what matters is Relation R (psychological continuity and/or connectedness). At the moment of fission, Zara stands in Relation R to both Zara-A and Zara-B. Therefore, she has survived through both successors. The fact that their lives will diverge does not change this fact.
(A) is incorrect because it arbitrarily privileges one successor over the other. For Parfit, the survival relation holds equally with both at the point of creation.
(B) correctly describes why fission is a problem for strict identity, but it misses Parfit's main point, which is that survival can happen without strict identity. He would say this shows identity is not what matters.
(D) is an interesting metaphysical speculation but is not Parfit's central claim. Parfit's analysis focuses on the relations between the individuals, not on positing a new kind of distributed entity.
- This objection primarily targets the soul-based theory on what grounds?
Answer: Epistemological grounds, by highlighting the lack of criteria for re-identifying an immaterial substance.
The correct answer is B. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. The objection is fundamentally about our ability to know or verify that a soul persists. It points out that we lack any public, empirical criteria for identifying and re-identifying an immaterial soul over time. The problem is one of evidence and justification for belief.
(A) is incorrect because the objection does not claim souls are impossible, it grants their possible existence for the sake of argument ('Even if...').
(C) is incorrect as the objection doesn't point to an internal contradiction in the theory, but to its inability to be applied in practice.
(D) is incorrect because while one could make ethical objections to the soul view, this specific argument is about the problem of knowledge.
