- According to the 'capability approach' to intergenerational justice, our primary duty is not to leave future generations a specific stock of resources or level of utility, but rather to endow them with the capabilities to live flourishing lives. Given this framework, which of the following policies would be the most fundamental expression of our obligation to the future?
Answer: A policy that invests heavily in universal education, scientific research, and robust democratic institutions.
The correct answer is D. The capability approach, associated with Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, focuses on what people are able to do and be. Education, scientific knowledge, and stable, fair institutions are precisely the kinds of things that expand people's capabilities to choose and live a life they value. A, B, and C focus on providing specific things or resources (wilderness, money, minerals). While these resources can be means to achieving capabilities, the capability approach itself would see the development of human potential and just social structures (D) as the more fundamental obligation.
- The disagreement between Philosopher A and Philosopher B is best described as a conflict between which two conceptions of intergenerational justice?
Answer: Sufficientarianism and Egalitarianism
The correct answer is C. Philosopher A is advocating for a sufficientarian view of justice, which holds that justice is satisfied once everyone has 'enough' to meet a certain threshold. Philosopher B is advocating for an egalitarian view, which is concerned with equality of opportunity or outcomes between generations. This is the most precise description of the specific disagreement. A is too broad; while these views can be grounded in utilitarian or deontological frameworks, the core dispute is about the pattern of distribution (sufficiency vs. equality). B is incorrect because the debate is about the just distribution of goods to the future (distributive justice), not about rectifying past wrongs (corrective justice). D is incorrect because the debate is not centered on individual liberty/minimal state (libertarianism) or the importance of community values (communitarianism).
- A society discovers a 'miracle' cure for a common age-related illness. However, the production process creates a byproduct that will slightly increase the atmospheric concentration of a gas that catalyzes the destruction of historical stone monuments and outdoor art. The effect is negligible over one lifetime but will lead to the irreversible loss of most of the world's cultural heritage in 300 years. An advocate for producing the cure argues that a human life saved today is inarguably more valuable than an ancient statue. Which type of harm to future generations is the advocate's argument failing to adequately consider?
Answer: Aesthetic and cultural harm, which impacts the richness and meaning of life for future people.
The correct answer is B. The advocate's argument sets up a false dichotomy between a life and a 'mere statue.' It fails to appreciate that our obligations to the future include more than just bare survival or economic well-being. We also have an obligation to pass on the cultural and historical context that allows for a rich, meaningful human life. The loss of this heritage is a significant, albeit non-physical, form of harm. A is a valid but secondary concern; the primary harm is cultural, not economic. C is speculative and not mentioned in the stem; the argument should be evaluated based on the known consequences. D is highly unlikely and not the central ethical issue.
- Suppose humanity is a 'chain' of generations, each with an obligation to the next. Generation A acts recklessly, consuming resources and leaving Generation B (the current generation) with a depleted world. Generation B now foresees that Generation C will suffer greatly as a result. Furthermore, Generation B reasonably predicts that Generation C will be so preoccupied with survival that they will be unable to fulfill any obligations to Generation D. A philosopher argues that because Generation C will break the chain of obligation, Generation B's own obligations to Generation C are diminished. What is the strongest objection to this line of reasoning?
Answer: Generation B's obligation to Generation C is based on preventing harm and suffering to C, and this obligation is not contingent on what C may or may not do for D.
The correct answer is B. This objection correctly identifies the non-contingent nature of the duty. The obligation of B to C is based on principles of harm and justice applied directly to the relationship between B and C. C's future actions (or inactions) toward D do not negate the fact that B's choices will directly cause or prevent harm to C. A is a plausible but weaker objection; even if the prediction were certain, the argument in B would still hold. C is incorrect as B owes no debt to the reckless A. D shifts the focus to D's rights, but the more direct and fundamental issue is B's primary duty to C.
- Based on a framework of harm and justice, the obligation of the current generation (G2) towards the next generation (G3) is best characterized as an obligation of:
Answer: Corrective justice, to rectify a harmful situation they did not create but have the unique capacity to prevent from causing future harm.
The correct answer is B. This scenario is a classic case for corrective (or rectificatory) justice. Even though G2 did not cause the initial problem, they are now aware of it and are in a position to correct the situation and prevent the harm to G3. Their obligation arises from their capacity to intervene and rectify the injustice, not from their own culpability. A is incorrect because retributive justice is about punishment for wrongdoing, which is not the basis of G2's obligation to G3. C is related but less precise; while cleaning the aquifer contributes to a fair distribution of well-being, the specific duty arises from the need to correct an active harm, which is the core of corrective justice. D is impractical and misdirected; the obligation is on G2 to act now to prevent harm, not to set up a future legal process.
- Geo-engineering proposals to combat climate change, such as seeding the stratosphere with aerosols to block sunlight, come with significant uncertainty. They might cool the planet as intended, but they could also have unforeseen, catastrophic side effects on global weather patterns or ecosystems, which might be irreversible. Applying the precautionary principle to such a technology is intended to protect future generations from what kind of harm?
Answer: Harm that is a result of negligence or a failure to exercise a duty of care regarding potential severe consequences.
The correct answer is C. The precautionary principle is specifically concerned with situations of scientific uncertainty where potential harms are severe or irreversible. Acting without sufficient knowledge of the consequences, especially when those consequences could be catastrophic for future generations, can be framed as a form of negligence—a failure in the duty of care to not impose unreasonable risks on others. A is incorrect because the potential catastrophic harms are not intended. B is incorrect because the core of the problem is uncertainty, not certainty. D mischaracterizes the potential harm, which is catastrophic, not minor.
- Some critics of strong climate action argue that people in the future will be technologically advanced and much richer than we are. They contend that it is unjust to force the relatively poorer present generation to make expensive sacrifices to prevent harms that the much wealthier future generations could easily mitigate or adapt to. What is the most significant challenge this argument poses to conventional harm-based reasoning about our obligations to the future?
Answer: It relies on an overly optimistic and non-guaranteed prediction about the wealth and technological capacity of the future.
The correct answer is D. While all the options touch on relevant issues, the most fundamental flaw in the argument is its reliance on a speculative premise. The entire case for inaction rests on the assumption that future generations will be wealthier and more capable. This is not guaranteed; our actions (e.g., causing climate collapse) could be the very thing that prevents them from becoming wealthy. Basing a moral argument about justice and harm on such a speculative and optimistic projection is a major weakness. A is a controversial ethical claim, but it's not the main flaw in the argument's structure. B describes what the argument does, but not its primary weakness. C is a strong counterargument to the position, but D points out the inherent flaw in the argument's own premises.
- Which principle of intergenerational justice is most directly challenged by the corporation's argument?
Answer: The Lockean Proviso, which requires leaving 'enough and as good' for others when appropriating common resources.
The correct answer is A. The corporation's argument—that future technology will compensate for the loss of a natural resource—is a direct engagement with the Lockean Proviso. They are essentially arguing that while they are not leaving 'as good' of a natural resource (arable land), they are leaving 'enough' overall value (via technology) to compensate. This directly challenges the interpretation and application of the proviso. B is less relevant because the harm is presented as a predictable certainty, not an uncertain one. C is related but less direct; the Just Savings Principle is typically about capital accumulation, whereas this scenario is about the destruction of a specific, irreplaceable natural resource. D is not the primary issue; the debate isn't about who should pay for the damage, but whether the action of causing the damage is permissible in the first place given our obligations to the future.
- A state possesses a massive sovereign wealth fund, built from the extraction of a non-renewable resource. One political party argues the fund should be spent now on tax cuts and social programs to benefit the currently living citizens who endured the disruption of the resource extraction. Another party argues the fund's capital must be preserved, with only the investment returns being spent, to ensure that future citizens benefit from the resource wealth in perpetuity. The second party's argument treats the resource wealth as a form of:
Answer: intergenerational capital, the value of which must be maintained for all future generations.
The correct answer is C. The second party's argument is a clear application of a principle of intergenerational justice. By extracting a non-renewable resource, the current generation is depriving future generations of that specific asset. The creation of a permanent fund that preserves the capital value is an attempt to compensate for this loss and ensure that the wealth from the commons is shared across all generations. This treats the wealth as intergenerational capital. A and D describe the first party's position. B is a possible use for the funds, but it doesn't capture the core principle of preservation for the future that defines the second party's stance.
- A space agency is debating two long-term projects. Project PROTECT involves building a planetary defense system against a potential 'civilization-ending' asteroid; experts estimate a 1-in-10,000 chance of such an impact in the next millennium. Project FLOURISH involves terraforming a nearby planet, which would provide a second home for humanity and untold opportunities, but would not mitigate any risks to Earth. Both projects have the same massive cost, precluding funding for the other. An argument is made that Project PROTECT is the more fundamental obligation to future generations. What principle of harm-based ethics best supports this argument?
Answer: The principle that preventing a great harm is a more stringent duty than promoting a great good.
The correct answer is A. This choice captures a core idea in ethics, often associated with negative utilitarianism or prioritarianism: the duty to prevent harm (especially catastrophic harm) takes precedence over the duty to provide benefits. Project PROTECT is about preventing the ultimate harm (extinction), while Project FLOURISH is about promoting a good (expansion and opportunity). The argument privileges harm prevention. B is the opposite of the reasoning used to support Project PROTECT. C frames the right to exist as a positive right (requiring aid), but the argument for PROTECT is more directly about a negative duty (not allowing them to be harmed by an asteroid impact we could have stopped). D is not the best answer because a utilitarian calculation is complex; one could argue that the 'untold opportunities' of Project FLOURISH could lead to greater total happiness over millions of years than avoiding a low-probability risk. The argument presented is more deontological, focusing on the nature of the duty itself (preventing harm vs. promoting good).
- Consider a country that has historically been a major carbon emitter. Its current government acknowledges this history and is deciding between two climate policies. Policy X focuses on rapid domestic decarbonization to ensure it doesn't harm future generations of its own citizens. Policy Y involves less aggressive domestic cuts but includes a massive technology transfer and aid program to help developing nations adapt to climate change, benefiting the future citizens of those nations most. An argument that the country has a stronger obligation to pursue Policy Y over Policy X is most likely based on which principle of justice?
Answer: A cosmopolitan principle that the scope of justice is global and we have equal duties to all persons, regardless of nationality.
The correct answer is C. The choice between prioritizing one's own future citizens (Policy X) versus all future citizens globally (Policy Y) is a direct test of the scope of justice. A cosmopolitan perspective argues that moral obligations, particularly regarding something as global as climate change, extend to all people, regardless of national borders. Therefore, helping those who are most vulnerable (future citizens of developing nations) is a primary duty. A supports Policy X. B is plausible, but C is more precise because the core conflict is about the scope of the duty (national vs. global), which is the central theme of cosmopolitanism. D would argue against the kind of international aid and intervention proposed in Policy Y.
- A policy decision is made that results in a slightly degraded environment for the next generation. However, this same decision also leads to huge technological and medical breakthroughs. As a result, the next generation, while having a slightly worse environment, has a much higher overall quality of life than the current generation. According to a strict 'worse off' conception of harm, has the current generation harmed the next generation?
Answer: No, because harm is defined as making someone's overall situation worse, and their overall situation is better.
The correct answer is C. This question tests the student's understanding of a counterfactual account of harm, where harm means being made worse off than you otherwise would have been. In this scenario, the next generation's overall quality of life is much higher. Therefore, on balance, they have been benefited, not harmed, by the decision. A is incorrect because it isolates one factor (environment) and ignores the overall state of well-being, which is crucial for a 'worse off' account of harm. B makes a similar mistake; being worse off in one respect is not the same as being harmed overall. D invokes the 'no claimants' problem, but the question asks for an evaluation based on the 'worse off' conception of harm, which assumes we can make sense of harming future people.
- A community has a tradition of electing its leaders from a single family line. This practice has led to stable governance for centuries. However, a new generation argues that this tradition is unjust to future community members because it violates a fundamental principle of political equality. The elders respond that dismantling the tradition would risk instability, which would be a greater harm to future generations than the lack of political choice. The elders' argument implies that our primary obligation to the future is to provide them with:
Answer: the specific institutions and cultural forms that we ourselves have found to be valuable.
The correct answer is B. The elders' argument prioritizes the continuation of a specific institution (hereditary leadership) because of its perceived value (stability). This is a perfectionist or communitarian view where the obligation is to pass down a particular conception of the good life and the institutions that support it, rather than abstract principles of justice or open-ended capabilities. A represents the opposing view (the capability approach) which the youth are implicitly advocating for. C is also the youth's view, prioritizing abstract justice over known outcomes. D is an extreme version of the youth's view that few would endorse, as it ignores the value of any cultural inheritance.
- Consider a society that has the last remaining seed bank for a vast number of unique, non-commercial plant species. Maintaining the seed bank is expensive. A proposal is made to defund the bank and invest the money in developing advanced hydroponic technologies that can grow a few highly nutritious crops with extreme efficiency. The justification is that this will better ensure future generations are fed, even if it means a massive loss of biodiversity. From a perspective of justice that emphasizes preserving a range of opportunities for future generations, what is the primary flaw in this justification?
Answer: It wrongly assumes that economic and technological capital can perfectly substitute for the loss of natural capital.
The correct answer is A. The core issue from an opportunity-based justice perspective is the assumption of perfect substitutability. The seed bank represents a vast range of options and unknown future possibilities (e.g., for medicine, ecological restoration, different food sources). The hydroponics technology provides only one kind of benefit (efficient food production). Destroying the former for the latter closes off countless opportunities for the future, even while providing a different one. This is a classic conflict between 'weak sustainability' (total capital matters) and 'strong sustainability' (natural capital is not fully substitutable). B introduces an environmental ethics concept (rights of non-humans) that is not central to the question of intergenerational justice for humans. C mischaracterizes the proposal; it actually prioritizes the near future's food security over the distant future's options. D raises the issue of consent, which is a common problem in intergenerational ethics (the 'no-claimants' problem), but it's not the primary flaw in the justification's internal logic about providing for the future.
- Choosing Project 2 over Project 1 would be best justified by a harm- and justice-based framework that emphasizes:
Answer: the incommensurable value of natural capital compared to manufactured capital for long-term human flourishing.
The correct answer is C. This choice reflects a 'strong sustainability' perspective, which argues that certain forms of natural capital (like a mature ecosystem) are unique, non-substitutable, and essential for long-term well-being in a way that manufactured capital (like a rail network) is not. Justifying the high initial costs and delayed benefits of the park requires valuing its long-term, potentially incommensurable, ecological and aesthetic contributions over the more immediate, quantifiable economic benefits of the railway. A and B would both strongly favor Project 1. D is a misapplication of utility; while the rail network's benefits are greater in the short term, the park's benefits extend over millennia and would likely create far greater total utility over time.
- A city is built on a fault line and has a 100-year-old dam that protects it from catastrophic flooding. Engineers determine the dam has a 1% chance of failing each year. Reinforcing the dam would cost the city $5 billion now. Not reinforcing it means accepting the ongoing risk. A policy analyst argues against the reinforcement, stating, "A 1% risk per year is small, and future citizens will be much wealthier and can better afford to build a new dam or recover from a flood. We shouldn't impoverish ourselves for a risk they will be better equipped to handle." Which form of reasoning regarding obligations to the future does this analysis most clearly rely upon?
Answer: Temporal discounting, by assigning a lower value to the well-being of future persons compared to present persons.
The correct answer is B. The analyst's argument explicitly devalues a future cost relative to a present cost, based on the assumption of future wealth. This is a classic example of economic or temporal discounting, where future interests (in this case, safety from a flood) are considered less significant than present interests (avoiding a $5 billion expenditure). A is incorrect because the argument isn't about who will exist, but about their economic capacity. C is the opposite of the analyst's reasoning; the precautionary principle would argue for reinforcing the dam because of the potential for catastrophic harm. D is related, but the core of the argument is not about a sufficiency threshold; it's about the comparative value of present costs versus future risks, which is the essence of discounting.
- A government is considering a nationwide energy policy. Policy A, 'Rapid Development,' involves the immediate and intensive extraction of fossil fuels. It will generate immense wealth and high living standards for the current generation but will cause severe, irreversible climate change and resource depletion for all subsequent generations. Policy B, 'Sustainable Transition,' involves significant short-term economic costs and lower living standards for the current generation but will preserve the climate and key resources for the indefinite future. A critic argues against Policy A by stating it harms future people. A defender of Policy A invokes the non-identity problem, correctly noting that the specific people who will exist in the future will be different depending on which policy is chosen. According to this defense, if we choose Policy A, the future individuals who experience its negative effects would not have existed at all if we had chosen Policy B. Given the logic of the non-identity problem, which of the following provides the strongest justice-based reason to still choose Policy B?
Answer: Policy A is unjust because it knowingly creates a world where fundamental rights to a healthy environment will inevitably be violated.
The correct answer is A. This choice effectively sidesteps the non-identity problem by shifting the focus from harming specific individuals (who wouldn't exist otherwise) to violating the rights of future people or creating a situation that is impersonally bad or unjust. The injustice lies in creating a world where fundamental rights are impossible to secure, regardless of who exactly lives in it. B is incorrect because it's not clear that future individuals would rationally prefer non-existence, which is the alternative posed by the non-identity problem. C is weak because it bases the obligation on the current generation's preferences rather than a more robust principle of justice. D dismisses the non-identity problem as a 'trick' without providing a philosophical counterargument, and the claim that causing harm is always impermissible is too strong and doesn't engage with the core of the problem.
- Imagine a Rawlsian original position where the participants are not only unaware of their own social status, wealth, and talents, but also unaware of which generation they belong to. They must agree on a principle of intergenerational savings. Which principle of justice would most likely be chosen from this 'temporal veil of ignorance'?
Answer: A just savings principle, requiring each generation to preserve the gains of culture and civilization, and to set aside a fair amount of real capital for its successors.
The correct answer is C. This is Rawls's own conclusion. Behind a temporal veil of ignorance, no one would want to risk being born into a generation that has been impoverished by its predecessors. Therefore, they would reject A. They also wouldn't want to be born into a generation that is unfairly burdened and cannot use any resources, so they would reject B. The most rational choice is a principle that ensures a fair transfer of capital (both physical and cultural) from one generation to the next, which is the essence of the 'just savings principle'. D is too narrow; while technology is part of the capital to be saved, it is not the only thing. Participants would also care about institutions, culture, and a healthy environment.
- The non-identity problem presents a challenge to the claim that a harmful policy P harms future people, because the very people who would be 'harmed' by P would not exist if P were not enacted. Which of the following statements represents the most successful way to reframe the moral wrong of Policy P without being defeated by the non-identity problem?
Answer: Policy P is wrong because it constitutes acting in a way that is foreseeably detrimental to the quality of life of whatever persons will exist in the future.
The correct answer is D. This formulation successfully sidesteps the non-identity problem. It focuses on the character of the action rather than its effect on specific individuals. The wrongness lies in choosing a policy that one knows will create a bad state of affairs for future people, regardless of who those people are. This is often called a 'non-person-affecting' or 'impersonal' justification. A is the very definition of harm that the non-identity problem directly attacks, as 'they' would not 'otherwise have been'. B is philosophically weak as duties to merely potential people are highly controversial. C is a form of maximizing utilitarianism that is extremely demanding and not widely accepted; it would require us to have as many happy people as possible, which goes far beyond merely avoiding a harmful policy.
