- G. E. Moore's 'open-question argument' holds that for any proposed natural property N (e.g., 'pleasure'), the question 'Is N really good?' is always a meaningful, open question. This argument was primarily intended to challenge:
Answer: naturalistic moral realism, which seeks to identify moral properties with natural properties.
The correct answer is C. The open-question argument is a classic argument against ethical naturalism, a form of moral realism that tries to define or identify 'goodness' with some natural property (like pleasure, survival value, social approval, etc.). Moore argued that since one can always sensibly ask if that natural property is itself good, 'good' must refer to a different, non-natural property. A is incorrect; Moore was a realist, but this argument doesn't prove realism, it just attacks one version of it. B is incorrect; Moore himself was a non-naturalist. D is incorrect as the argument's primary target is within the realist camp, not anti-realist error theory.
- Two philosophers are debating the morality of a new gene-editing technology. Philosopher A argues it is intrinsically wrong, while Philosopher B argues it is morally permissible. They appeal to principles, consequences, and intuitions, but fail to persuade one another. A moral realist would most likely interpret this persistent disagreement as:
Answer: a complex epistemic challenge in discovering an objective moral fact that exists independently of their beliefs.
The correct answer is C. Moral realism holds that objective moral facts exist, but it does not entail that these facts are easy to know or self-evident. A realist would view deep disagreement as a sign of the difficulty of moral inquiry (an epistemic problem), not as proof that there are no facts to be discovered (a metaphysical claim). A is the position of emotivism, a form of anti-realism. B describes subjectivism or relativism, another form of anti-realism. D draws a conclusion that a realist would reject; for a realist, the difficulty of discovery does not negate the existence of a fact, much like disagreements in physics don't negate the existence of physical laws.
- A moral realist who is not a divine command theorist would most likely hold that in this world, the statement 'The rockslide was morally bad' is:
Answer: false, because moral properties like 'badness' depend on the suffering or well-being of sentient creatures.
The correct answer is B. This is a subtle question. While moral realism posits mind-independent moral facts, most forms of realism (especially naturalistic realism) tie moral properties like 'good' and 'bad' to states of the world affecting sentient beings (e.g., well-being, suffering, flourishing). The rockslide is a purely physical event with no impact on any sentient creature, so it has no moral status. Therefore, the statement is false. A represents an extreme Platonism that few realists would hold. C and D represent anti-realist positions. The question tests whether students understand that 'mind-independent' for a realist doesn't necessarily mean 'independent of any possible conscious experience.'
- A moral fictionalist argues that morality is a useful 'fiction'—we should talk and act as if moral realism were true because it helps regulate society, even though all moral claims are, strictly speaking, false. This position shares its metaphysical view of moral claims with which theory, while differing in its recommendation for practice?
Answer: Error Theory
The correct answer is D. This question tests knowledge of a more nuanced anti-realist position. Moral fictionalism starts from the same metaphysical place as error theory: moral claims are propositional but systematically false because there are no objective moral facts. Where they differ is in their practical conclusion. The error theorist might suggest abandoning moral talk, while the fictionalist recommends we continue to use it as a beneficial fiction. A is a form of realism. B and C are other forms of anti-realism, but they do not hold that moral claims are false propositions; B holds they are relatively true, and C holds they are not propositions at all.
- J.L. Mackie's 'argument from queerness' claims that if objective values existed, they would be entities of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe, and requiring a special faculty of moral perception to detect them. This argument is intended to undermine which of the following positions?
Answer: Moral Realism, by arguing that the metaphysical and epistemological commitments of the view are implausible.
The correct answer is B. Mackie's argument from queerness is a direct attack on moral realism. It targets both the metaphysical (what kind of things would objective values be?) and epistemological (how would we know them?) aspects of realism, claiming they are too strange ('queer') to be believable. The argument does not target anti-realist views like relativism, emotivism, or subjectivism (A, C, D), as these views avoid positing the existence of such 'queer' entities and faculties in the first place.
- What is the primary reason a moral realist would object to defining 'morally right' as 'what is approved by my society' (cultural relativism)?
Answer: Because this definition grounds morality in a mind-dependent set of social conventions rather than in objective facts.
The correct answer is D. This gets to the heart of the realist-relativist divide. The fundamental objection from the realist is metaphysical: cultural relativism makes morality a human construct, dependent on the collective minds and conventions of a group of people. For the realist, true morality must be mind-independent. Options A, B, and C are all powerful consequences and common criticisms of relativism that a realist would endorse, but the most fundamental reason for their objection is the metaphysical one described in D—it concerns the very nature and grounding of moral truth.
- If a non-cognitivist theory like emotivism is true, what is the most significant loss for our traditional understanding of moral justification?
Answer: The idea that one can be genuinely mistaken or ignorant about a moral matter would become incoherent.
When you encounter questions about non-cognitivist theories like emotivism, focus on what these theories claim about the nature of moral statements. Non-cognitivists argue that moral claims don't express propositions that can be true or false—instead, they express attitudes, emotions, or prescriptions.
Under emotivism, when you say "murder is wrong," you're not stating a fact about murder that could be objectively true or false. Instead, you're expressing your negative attitude toward murder, essentially saying "murder, boo!" This creates a fundamental problem for traditional moral justification: if moral statements aren't truth-apt (capable of being true or false), then there's no objective moral reality against which our beliefs could be measured. This makes option A correct—the concepts of moral mistake or ignorance become incoherent because there are no moral facts to get right or wrong about.
Option B is backwards—emotivism actually emphasizes the connection between moral claims and emotions, making this central rather than lost. Option C misses the point entirely; emotivism can easily explain cultural moral differences as different groups expressing different attitudes. Option D is also wrong because individuals can certainly change their emotional attitudes and prescriptions over time under emotivism.
When studying metaethics, remember that cognitivist theories treat moral statements like factual claims, while non-cognitivist theories treat them as expressions of attitude. The key test is always: "Does this theory allow moral statements to have truth values?" If not, traditional concepts of moral knowledge and error collapse.
- A philosopher argues: "Moral claims, like 'Lying is wrong,' are genuine propositions capable of being true or false. However, they are all false, because the world simply does not contain the sort of objective prescriptive properties that would be needed to make them true." This philosopher's view is correctly classified as:
Answer: anti-realist, because it denies that any positive moral claims are true.
The correct answer is B. The view described is J.L. Mackie's error theory. It is a form of anti-realism because it denies the existence of the moral reality that would be required for moral claims to be true. A is a classic error; while the view is cognitivist (moral claims have truth values), it is not realist because it claims all such propositions are false. Realism requires that at least some positive moral claims are true. C is incorrect because the view is explicitly cognitivist, which is the opposite of non-cognitivism. D misinterprets the position; it is absolutist in its denial of moral truth, not relativist.
- A society transitions from a system where slavery is morally accepted to one where it is condemned as a grave injustice. What is at stake in the debate between a moral realist and a cultural relativist in interpreting this change?
Answer: Whether the change can be described as genuine moral progress toward a more correct moral view.
The correct answer is C. The concept of 'moral progress' is a key point of contention. A moral realist can say the society has progressed by better aligning its practices with objective moral truth (i.e., the truth that slavery is unjust). A cultural relativist, however, cannot ground this claim to progress. For the relativist, the old code was 'right' for that society then, and the new code is 'right' for this society now; there is no objective standard by which to judge one as better than the other, only as different. The other options describe considerations that are either empirical (A, D) or formal (B) and do not capture the core metaphysical disagreement about the status of the moral change itself.
- A philosopher proposes that the statement 'Stealing is wrong' is equivalent in meaning to the command 'Don't steal!' This view, known as prescriptivism, is a form of anti-realism. What is the most significant consequence for moral discourse if this view is correct?
Answer: The logical rules that apply to factual statements, such as rules of inference, cannot be directly applied to moral arguments.
The correct answer is C. If moral statements are commands (imperatives) rather than descriptions of fact (indicatives), then they are not truth-apt. Standard rules of logic operate on propositions that have truth values. For example, from 'If P then Q' and 'P', we can infer 'Q'. It's not clear how such inferences would work with commands. While philosophers have developed logics for imperatives, the direct application of standard logic is lost, which is a major challenge for understanding the structure of moral reasoning. A is a sociological observation compatible with most theories. B is false; prescriptivism can account for strong feelings. D is also likely false, as commands are inherently action-guiding, arguably strengthening the link to motivation.
- A moral realist would criticize the anthropologist's conclusion by arguing that it improperly:
Answer: infers a metaphysical conclusion about the nature of morality from an observation about cultural disagreement.
The correct answer is B. This question targets the common argument from disagreement used to support relativism. A moral realist would argue that the anthropologist is making a logical leap. The observation that cultures disagree about morality (an empirical, anthropological claim) does not, by itself, prove the metaphysical conclusion that there are no objective moral facts. The realist would say that, just as disagreement about the shape of the earth doesn't mean it has no objective shape, disagreement about morality doesn't mean it has no objective truth. The other options are not the central realist objection. A is not a point of contention. C is irrelevant to the core argument. D is what the realist denies; they would argue that if the cultures hold contradictory views, at least one of them must be mistaken.
- The central claim of moral realism is that moral truths are objective. A common misconception is to equate this objectivity with being:
Answer: uncontroversial or obvious to any sincere inquirer.
The correct answer is D. Moral realists claim that moral facts are objective, meaning they exist independently of what we think or believe (B). They generally hold that these truths are universal (A) and can be discovered through some rational process (C). However, a very common mistake is to think that 'objective' means 'obvious,' 'simple,' or 'uncontroversial.' Realists can and do maintain that objective moral truths can be very complex, difficult to discover, and subject to intense, rational disagreement, similar to truths in fields like theoretical physics or cosmology.
- Which of the following scenarios poses the most significant challenge to a simple cultural relativist position?
Answer: A member of a society who advocates for moral reform based on principles they claim are valid for all people.
When you encounter questions about cultural relativism, focus on identifying scenarios that create internal contradictions or logical problems for the theory itself. Cultural relativism holds that moral truths are relative to particular cultures, with no universal moral standards that apply across all societies.
Option A presents the most significant challenge because it creates a logical paradox. If cultural relativism is true, then moral principles are only valid within specific cultural contexts. However, when a society member advocates for "universal" moral principles that apply to all people, they're essentially rejecting cultural relativism from within their own culture. This forces the cultural relativist into an impossible position: they must either accept that some moral claims can be universal (contradicting their core thesis) or dismiss the reformer's culturally-based advocacy (contradicting their commitment to respecting cultural moral authority).
Option B actually supports cultural relativism by showing moral consensus within a culture. Option C describes different societies with non-conflicting practices, which cultural relativism handles easily since each society's practices are valid within their own context. Option D presents individual moral conflict, but cultural relativism typically defers to societal standards over individual conscience, so this doesn't pose a theoretical problem.
The key strategy here is recognizing that the strongest challenges to philosophical positions are those that create internal contradictions or force the theory to violate its own principles. Look for scenarios where cultural relativism would have to contradict itself to remain consistent.
- An emotivist and an error theorist are observing a heated argument about abortion rights. Which of the following best captures a point of agreement between their meta-ethical views?
Answer: There are no objective moral facts about abortion.
When you encounter meta-ethics questions comparing different theories, focus on what each theory says about the nature and status of moral claims themselves, not just their content.
Both emotivism and error theory are anti-realist positions that deny objective moral facts exist in the world. Emotivists like A.J. Ayer argue that moral statements express emotions or attitudes rather than describing objective features of reality. Error theorists like J.L. Mackie argue that while moral statements attempt to describe objective facts, they systematically fail because no such facts exist. Despite their different explanations, both theories agree that there simply are no objective moral truths about abortion or any other moral issue. This makes A correct.
B is wrong because error theorists believe moral claims are truth-apt (capable of being true or false) - they just think they're all false. Only emotivists deny truth-aptness entirely.
C captures only the error theorist position. While error theorists do believe moral propositions are systematically false, emotivists don't view moral language as making propositions at all, so they can't be false.
D mischaracterizes both theories. This describes prescriptivism (R.M. Hare's view), which treats moral language as fundamentally imperative. Emotivists focus on expressing attitudes, not commanding, while error theorists see moral language as attempting to describe (non-existent) facts.
Remember: when comparing meta-ethical theories, look for their shared commitments about moral ontology (what exists) before getting caught up in their different explanations of moral language and psychology.
- Philosopher Z's view is a form of moral realism, but it is vulnerable to the anti-realist objection that it:
Answer: posits a mysterious faculty for knowing facts that are not empirically verifiable, which is metaphysically extravagant.
The correct answer is C. The view described is moral non-naturalism. A primary objection to this view, often raised by anti-realists and naturalist realists, is that it is metaphysically and epistemologically problematic. It posits a realm of non-natural facts and a special, non-empirical faculty ('rational intuition') to access them, which many find unparsimonious and mysterious (this is a key part of Mackie's 'argument from queerness'). A is an objection to subjectivism, not this view. B is an objection often leveled against forms of realism (the motivation problem), but C is more specific to the non-naturalist version. D is an objection to relativism.
- Consider a utilitarian who believes that the right action is the one that maximizes overall happiness. This person's commitment to utilitarianism as a normative theory is, in itself, neutral on the moral realism vs. anti-realism debate. What further belief would make this utilitarian a moral realist?
Answer: The belief that the statement 'actions maximizing happiness are right' describes an objective, mind-independent fact about morality.
The correct answer is D. This question tests the distinction between normative ethics (like utilitarianism) and meta-ethics (like realism/anti-realism). One can subscribe to a normative theory for different meta-ethical reasons. To be a moral realist, the utilitarian must believe that the principle of utility is an objective truth about the world, not just a useful fiction (B), an expression of attitude (C), or a subjective preference. A is an empirical observation that doesn't settle the meta-ethical question. D correctly identifies the additional commitment needed to move from a normative stance to a realist meta-ethical stance.
- A political debate involves two speakers arguing about the justice of a wealth tax. Speaker A calls it 'a just policy for a fairer society.' Speaker B calls it 'unjust theft.' A non-cognitivist is most likely to interpret this exchange as:
Answer: a clash of non-rational attitudes and attempts to influence emotion, rather than a debate over objective truths.
The correct answer is B. Non-cognitivism (which includes emotivism and prescriptivism) holds that moral statements do not express propositions but rather attitudes, emotions, or commands. From this perspective, the speakers are not debating a factual matter of what is 'just' or 'unjust' in an objective sense. Instead, they are expressing their conflicting feelings or attitudes about the policy and trying to persuade others to adopt their stance. A treats the disagreement as purely empirical, which the non-cognitivist would deny is the whole story for moral terms. C is the moral realist interpretation. D is the error theorist interpretation, which is cognitivist, unlike the non-cognitivist view.
- Consider the claim: "Genocide is morally evil." An error theorist, such as J.L. Mackie, would argue that this statement is:
Answer: a false proposition, because it purports to refer to an objective property of 'evil' which does not exist.
The correct answer is B. Error theory is a cognitivist but anti-realist view. It holds that moral statements are propositions (capable of being true or false) but that they are all systematically false. This is because they make a claim about the existence of objective values or properties (like 'evil') that, according to the error theorist, do not exist in the world. A describes moral non-naturalism, a form of realism. C describes non-cognitivism (like emotivism), which denies that moral statements are truth-apt. D describes cultural relativism.
- The view expressed by Philosopher X is a form of anti-realism because it denies that moral properties are:
Answer: objective and independent of any individual's mental states.
The correct answer is D. The core of moral realism is the claim that moral facts and properties are objective and mind-independent. Philosopher X's view, a form of individualist subjectivism, makes moral properties entirely dependent on an individual's mental states (feelings of approval). Therefore, it is anti-realist precisely because it denies the objectivity and mind-independence of moral properties. A is incorrect because this view explicitly connects morality to emotions. B is incorrect because this view suggests moral properties are knowable through introspection. C is incorrect because on this view, the feeling of approval is directly tied to motivation.
- A key difference between a moral subjectivist and a moral realist concerns the nature of moral fallibility. Which statement accurately represents this difference?
Answer: The realist believes individuals can be wrong about their moral judgments, while the subjectivist believes an individual's sincere moral judgment cannot be wrong for that individual.
The correct answer is A. This question focuses on the implication of each theory for moral error. For a moral realist, a moral fact is objective, so an individual's (or a whole society's) belief can fail to correspond to that fact, making them mistaken. For a simple individual subjectivist, the truth of a moral judgment is constituted by the individual's belief or feeling ('X is wrong' means 'I disapprove of X'). Therefore, if the individual sincerely holds the belief, it is, by definition, true for them, making them infallible in a certain sense. B describes error theory, not subjectivism. C is a mischaracterization; subjectivists and relativists can speak of societal beliefs. D oversimplifies both positions.
