- Libertarianism faces an explanatory challenge often framed as a dilemma. The position must articulate a conception of free action that is robust enough to ground moral responsibility. Which pair of alternatives does the libertarian seek to navigate between?
Answer: An action being necessitated by antecedent events and an action being a matter of mere chance.
When you encounter questions about libertarian free will, you're dealing with one of philosophy's most persistent puzzles: how can human actions be truly free in a world that seems governed by causation? Libertarians believe in robust free will that grounds genuine moral responsibility, but they face a fundamental dilemma.
The libertarian must thread the needle between two problematic extremes. On one side lies determinism - the view that all actions are necessitated by prior causes stretching back through an unbroken causal chain. If your choice to help someone is simply the inevitable result of brain states caused by earlier events, then you don't seem truly responsible. On the other side lies pure randomness - if your action springs from quantum indeterminacy or sheer chance, you're equally not responsible since the action wasn't really "yours" in any meaningful sense.
Answer A correctly identifies this classic dilemma: avoiding both causal necessity and mere chance while preserving genuine agency.
Answer B confuses the libertarian problem with debates about internal versus external motivation, which isn't the core issue. Answer C focuses on the distinction between reason and emotion, but libertarians don't typically frame their challenge this way - both rational and emotional actions can be free or unfree. Answer D mistakes the epistemological question of predictability for the metaphysical question of causation.
Remember: libertarian free will questions usually center on the "consequence argument" - the tension between causal determinism and moral responsibility. Look for answers addressing causation and necessity rather than motivation, emotion, or knowledge.
- This line of reasoning describes logical fatalism. How does this argument fundamentally differ from an argument for causal determinism?
Answer: Causal determinism argues that the past and the laws of nature necessitate the future, while this fatalist argument relies on the timeless nature of truth.
The crucial difference lies in the basis of the argument. Causal determinism is a metaphysical thesis about the structure of causality: every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature. Logical fatalism, as presented here, is a logical or semantic argument: it derives its conclusion from properties of truth and propositions (i.e., that propositions about the future must be either true or false right now). Causal determinism says the future is fixed because of the past's causal power. Fatalism says the future is fixed regardless of causes, simply because it is a fact that it will happen. This distinction is captured in the idea that for a fatalist, the sea battle would happen no matter what you tried to do, whereas for a determinist, the battle happens because of what you and others are causally determined to do.
- A philosopher is a skeptic about free will, believing that no one ever acts with the kind of freedom required for 'basic desert' moral responsibility. However, this philosopher argues that we should not dismantle our criminal justice system. What is the most plausible justification for this seemingly contradictory position?
Answer: The philosopher believes that practices of holding people accountable can be justified on forward-looking grounds of social utility, such as deterrence and incapacitation.
This position is common among free will skeptics (such as Derk Pereboom, a hard incompatibilist). The argument is that while we must abandon backward-looking justifications for punishment like retribution (which depend on just deserts), we can maintain a system of consequences based on forward-looking justifications. We can still incapacitate dangerous individuals to protect society (analogous to quarantining someone with a contagious disease), and we can still use the prospect of consequences to deter future harmful behavior. These justifications do not require that the offender 'deserves' punishment in a deep metaphysical sense. (A) is a direct contradiction of the skeptic's premise. (B) introduces an unrelated metaphysical claim. (C) is incorrect, as these philosophers believe their view has profound implications for reforming, not ignoring, our practices.
- According to Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical theory of free will, how should this agent's action be assessed?
Answer: The agent acts freely and is morally responsible because his effective first-order desire conforms to his second-order volition.
For Frankfurt, freedom of the will (the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility) consists in the conformity of one's will (the first-order desire one acts on) to one's second-order volitions (the second-order desires about what one wants one's will to be). The 'willing addict' is Frankfurt's key example of someone who acts freely despite their addiction, because they endorse the very desire that moves them to act. In contrast, an 'unwilling addict' would have a second-order desire not to act on the first-order desire for the drug, and would thus be acting unfreely. (B) is incorrect because Frankfurt's theory allows for a free addict. (C) is incorrect because Frankfurt's theory explicitly denies that the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom. (D) raises an incompatibilist objection that Frankfurt's compatibilist theory is designed to set aside.
- A hard determinist, who accepts both that every event is causally necessitated and that this is incompatible with free will, would argue that traditional systems of retributive justice are fundamentally misguided. What is the most accurate reason for this conclusion?
Answer: Because retribution requires that offenders deserve punishment for their actions, a concept that is incoherent if they could not have acted otherwise.
The core of retributive justice is the concept of 'just deserts'—that is, punishing offenders because they deserve it. This desert is grounded in their moral responsibility for their actions. For a hard determinist, since our actions are determined and we could not have done otherwise, we are not morally responsible in the way required to deserve praise or blame. Therefore, the foundation of retributive justice collapses. (A) is too strong; one can still judge an action as wrong or harmful without blaming the agent. (C) is a misunderstanding; determinism is often seen as supporting the possibility of rehabilitation through causal intervention. (D) is also a misunderstanding; laws can function as causal influences on behavior even in a deterministic world.
- A common objection to libertarianism is the 'luck' or 'randomness' problem. Which of the following statements best articulates this specific objection?
Answer: If an agent's choice is not determined by prior events, it must be a random occurrence, and a random event is not something the agent controls.
This statement captures the dilemma libertarianism faces. To secure freedom from determinism, libertarians introduce indeterminism into the process leading to an action. The objection is that this indeterminism, if it means the action is not determined by anything (including the agent's character, reasons, and values), seems to make the action a matter of pure chance or luck. An action that is merely random is not controlled by the agent and thus cannot be a basis for moral responsibility. (B) is a general argument against all forms of free will, not specific to the problem of indeterminism for libertarians. (C) is an empirical objection, not the philosophical problem of luck/control. (D) makes a questionable claim that responsibility requires predictability, which a libertarian would deny.
- Some libertarians posit the existence of 'agent-causation' to solve the problem of randomness and secure control for the agent. Which of the following best describes the concept of agent-causation?
Answer: An agent, as an enduring substance, can originate new causal chains that are not themselves determined by prior events.
When you encounter questions about libertarian free will, focus on how different theories attempt to reconcile freedom with causation. The central challenge is explaining how our choices can be both free and controlled by us, rather than either predetermined or random.
Agent-causation theory proposes a unique solution: agents themselves, as enduring substances or beings, can initiate entirely new causal chains without those actions being determined by prior events. This means you, as an agent, can be the ultimate source of your actions in a way that gives you genuine control. Answer A correctly captures this concept—the agent originates causation rather than merely transmitting it from previous causes.
Answer B describes compatibilist causation, where actions flow from character and values shaped by past experiences. This maintains deterministic causation rather than agent-origination. Answer C refers to quantum indeterminacy theories that rely on random events being amplified, but this creates randomness rather than agent control—the opposite of what agent-causation seeks. Answer D describes Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical theory about higher-order desires, which is a different approach to free will that doesn't involve agent-causation at all.
The key insight is that agent-causation breaks the chain of event-causation by making the agent itself—not prior events or random occurrences—the ultimate source of action. Remember: when you see "agent-causation" on philosophy exams, look for answers emphasizing the agent as an originating cause rather than a link in a causal chain.
- A philosopher makes the following two claims: (1) The free will required for moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism. (2) This same type of free will is also incompatible with indeterminism, as random events are outside an agent's control. Based on these two claims, what is the philosopher's ultimate position on moral responsibility?
Answer: Hard Incompatibilism, because the philosopher concludes that since free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, we lack it.
This position is known as hard incompatibilism, most famously defended by Derk Pereboom. A hard incompatibilist accepts the incompatibilist argument against compatibilism (claim 1) and also accepts the argument that indeterminism reduces to luck or randomness, which also undermines control and responsibility (claim 2). Since determinism and indeterminism represent the only logical possibilities, the hard incompatibilist concludes that the kind of free will required for 'basic desert' moral responsibility is impossible. This differs from hard determinism (C) because it does not require that determinism actually be true; we would lack free will even if the universe were indeterministic.
- Philosophers distinguish between 'leeway' and 'sourcehood' conceptions of free will. Leeway focuses on having alternative possibilities, while sourcehood focuses on an action originating from the agent in the right way. Which of the following views most clearly relies on a sourcehood, rather than a leeway, condition for moral responsibility?
Answer: A Frankfurt-style compatibilist view that an agent is responsible if they act on a desire they endorse, even if they could not have avoided acting on it.
Frankfurt-style views are the paradigmatic example of 'source' compatibilism. They explicitly reject the need for alternative possibilities (leeway) and instead locate the conditions for responsibility in the internal structure of the agent's psychology—i.e., whether the agent is the proper 'source' of their action by identifying with or endorsing the desire that moves them. (D) is the definition of a leeway view. (A) is a compatibilist view, but it often relies on a conditional analysis of 'could have done otherwise,' thus retaining a connection to the leeway concept. (B) discusses the ultimate source only to deny responsibility, not to ground it.
- The ethical principle 'ought implies can' states that for it to be true that an agent has a moral obligation to perform an action, it must be possible for them to perform that action. This principle is most often used to support which conclusion in the free will debate?
Answer: That free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with causal determinism, as determinism implies agents are never able to do otherwise.
Incompatibilists frequently use the 'ought implies can' principle as a premise in their arguments. The reasoning is as follows: If a person is blameworthy for doing Action X, they ought to have done something else instead. According to 'ought implies can,' this means they could have done something else. However, if causal determinism is true, the agent could not have done anything other than Action X. Therefore, if determinism is true, the agent is not blameworthy. This establishes an incompatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. Compatibilists typically must offer a special interpretation of 'can' to get around this argument.
- How would a compatibilist and an incompatibilist most likely disagree about the agent's moral responsibility for the donation?
Answer: The compatibilist would affirm responsibility because the action stemmed from the agent's own values, while the incompatibilist would deny it because the agent could not have done otherwise.
The core of the disagreement is captured in choice B. A compatibilist holds that free will (and thus moral responsibility) is compatible with determinism. What matters is how an action is caused, not that it is caused. Since the action originated from the agent's own values and desires, the compatibilist would affirm responsibility. An incompatibilist, by contrast, believes free will is incompatible with determinism. They argue that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise (the Principle of Alternate Possibilities). Since the action was predictable with 100% accuracy, the agent could not have done otherwise, so the incompatibilist would deny responsibility.
- This argument, a version of Peter van Inwagen's Consequence Argument, aims to establish which direct conclusion?
Answer: Compatibilism is false.
The Consequence Argument argues that if determinism is true, we do not have free will (defined as our actions being 'up to us'). This means that determinism and free will are incompatible. The philosophical position that claims they are compatible is compatibilism. Therefore, the direct conclusion of the argument is that compatibilism is false. The argument does not claim that determinism is true (A), so it doesn't lead to hard determinism on its own. It is perfectly consistent with libertarianism (B), which also holds that free will and determinism are incompatible. While a hard determinist might use this argument as a step toward concluding that moral responsibility is an illusion (D), that is a further conclusion, not the direct aim of the argument itself.
- This scenario illustrates the problem of 'moral luck.' How does this phenomenon challenge traditional accounts of moral responsibility?
Answer: It suggests that responsibility is contingent on factors outside the agent's control, undermining the principle that people should only be judged for their voluntary actions.
The problem of moral luck arises because the amount of blame (or praise) we assign to people often depends on factors beyond their control. In this case of 'resultant luck,' Alex and Ben perform the same negligent action with the same intentions, but due to the chance event of a child drowning, Alex is judged more harshly. This clashes with the 'Control Principle,' a deep-seated intuition that people are only morally assessable for what is within their control. The phenomenon thus poses a serious challenge to any theory that grounds responsibility solely in an agent's will, intentions, or voluntary actions.
- The hesitation to blame the person, despite the action reflecting their character, highlights the distinction between which two concepts of moral responsibility?
Answer: Responsibility as attributability and responsibility as accountability.
When you encounter questions about moral responsibility, especially involving mental health conditions, you're typically being asked to distinguish between different ways philosophers understand what makes someone responsible for their actions.
The passage illustrates a crucial distinction in moral responsibility theory. The person's cruel remark clearly flows from their character - even though depression influences that character, the action is still attributable to them as the source. However, we hesitate to hold them accountable through blame or demands for apology because their mental condition affects their capacity for moral agency. This exemplifies the difference between responsibility as attributability (tracing an action back to someone as its source) and responsibility as accountability (being an appropriate target for moral demands like blame or praise). Answer D captures this distinction perfectly.
Answer A confuses moral responsibility with causal responsibility, but the passage isn't about whether the person caused the remark - they clearly did. It's about the type of moral responsibility involved. Answer B addresses different approaches to justice after wrongdoing occurs, not the foundational question of when someone is responsible in the first place. Answer C concerns philosophical debates about what makes reasons for action valid, which doesn't relate to the blame and attribution issues in the passage.
Remember that moral responsibility questions often test whether you can identify these two levels: attribution (did this person do it?) versus accountability (should we hold them morally answerable for it?). Mental health conditions frequently create gaps between these two concepts.
- Galen Strawson's 'Basic Argument' concludes that ultimate moral responsibility is impossible, regardless of whether determinism is true or false. The argument hinges on a specific line of reasoning about self-creation. Which statement below best captures the core premise of the Basic Argument?
Answer: To be responsible for one's actions, one must be responsible for how one is, mentally speaking. To be responsible for how one is, one would have to have created oneself, which is impossible.
The Basic Argument relies on a regress. (1) You do what you do because of the way you are. (2) To be ultimately responsible for what you do, you must be ultimately responsible for the way you are. (3) But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are, because you did not create yourself from nothing. Any attempt to show that you shaped your own character relies on pre-existing principles or values that you did not choose, leading to an infinite regress. Therefore, ultimate responsibility is impossible. (A) is a simpler determinist argument. (C) is an argument from personal identity. (D) is the standard dilemma for free will, which the Basic Argument seeks to bypass by showing responsibility is impossible even if that dilemma were solved.
- Which of the following represents the most philosophically robust compatibilist response to this claim?
Answer: The 'decision' to flex a wrist at a random moment is not a paradigm of free will, which involves conscious deliberation and responding to reasons.
Many philosophers, especially compatibilists, argue that the Libet experiment is irrelevant to the free will debate. They contend that the kind of 'freedom' at stake in discussions of moral responsibility is not the ability to make spontaneous, arbitrary movements (like flexing a wrist). Instead, it is the capacity for rational self-governance: deliberating about reasons, forming intentions, and acting in accordance with one's values. The Libet experiment does not test this more robust form of agency, so its results cannot be used to conclude that free will is an illusion. This response is more robust than (A), which relies on a controversial dualist metaphysics, or (B), which is a weak empirical critique, or (D), which is a less critical interpretation.
- How would a classical compatibilist (e.g., Thomas Hobbes or David Hume) most likely analyze the teller's action?
Answer: The teller acted unfreely because the threat of death is a form of coercion that prevents the action from originating in the agent's will in the appropriate way.
When you encounter questions about free will and moral responsibility, you need to distinguish between different philosophical positions on what makes an action truly "free." Classical compatibilists like Hobbes and Hume believe that free will is compatible with determinism, but they have specific criteria for what counts as a free action.
For classical compatibilists, an action is free when it flows from the agent's own desires and will without external coercion or constraint. The key insight is that they focus on the source and manner of action rather than whether alternative possibilities exist. In this scenario, while the teller consciously chooses to hand over money, this choice doesn't originate from their authentic will—it's forced upon them by the robber's threat.
Option A incorrectly suggests that conscious choice alone makes an action free, ignoring the coercive circumstances. Option B makes the mistake of assuming classical compatibilists reject determinism—they actually embrace it while arguing free will can coexist with causal determination. Option C confuses classical compatibilism with libertarian free will; classical compatibilists don't require alternative possibilities for freedom, and even if they did, the alternatives here (compliance or death) aren't genuine choices.
Option D correctly identifies that classical compatibilists would view the death threat as coercion that prevents the action from flowing naturally from the agent's will, making it unfree despite being conscious and deliberate.
Remember: Classical compatibilists care about whether actions stem from internal desires without external coercion, not whether you could have done otherwise or whether determinism is true.
- Manipulation arguments, such as Alfred Mele's 'Zygote Argument,' present a scenario in which an agent is covertly programmed from the beginning of her life to perform a specific action later on. These arguments pose a significant challenge primarily for which philosophical position?
Answer: Compatibilism, because they create a scenario where an agent meets all standard compatibilist conditions for freedom but is intuitively not responsible.
Manipulation arguments are designed to attack compatibilism. They work by describing an agent who is manipulated (e.g., by neuroscientists or a deity) in such a way that she still satisfies all the typical conditions for compatibilist freedom—she acts according to her values, is not coerced at the moment of action, is reasons-responsive, etc. However, our strong intuition is that because she was manipulated, she is not morally responsible. The challenge for the compatibilist is to explain what relevant difference exists between this manipulated agent and an ordinary agent in a deterministic world. If there is no relevant difference, then either the compatibilist must accept the counterintuitive conclusion that the manipulated agent is responsible, or they must concede that their conditions for responsibility are insufficient.
- This thought experiment, known as a Frankfurt-style case, is primarily intended to be a counterexample to which philosophical principle?
Answer: The principle that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if they could have done otherwise.
This scenario targets the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), which states that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. In the scenario, Jones seems intuitively responsible for choosing Candidate A because he did so on his own. However, due to the device, he could not have done otherwise. If our intuition that he is responsible is correct, then the PAP must be false. The case doesn't challenge determinism itself (A), compatibilist conditions (C), or the notion of ultimate sourcehood (D) as directly as it challenges the necessity of alternative possibilities for responsibility.
- According to P.F. Strawson's theory of reactive attitudes, what best explains this shift in your feelings toward Mark?
Answer: You have suspended your 'participant stance' and adopted an 'objective stance' toward Mark, viewing him as an object of treatment rather than a fellow agent.
This question uses P.F. Strawson's specific terminology. For Strawson, our moral lives are defined by 'reactive attitudes' like resentment, gratitude, and blame, which arise from our 'participant stance'—seeing others as fellow agents in the moral community. However, certain conditions (like infancy or, in this case, a specific psychological abnormality) can lead us to suspend this stance and adopt an 'objective stance,' where we see the person not as a target for resentment but as an object to be managed, treated, or explained. This is precisely what happens when you learn of Mark's condition. The shift is not about determinism in general (A) or forgiveness (D), but about a fundamental change in how you view the agent.
