- Who owns Greenacre after Ann's death?
Answer: Oscar owns Greenacre in fee simple, because Ben's contingent remainder was conditioned on survival, did not pass to his heirs, and Oscar's reversion became possessory when Ann died.
Whenever you see a contingent remainder with language like "to Ben if Ben survives Ann," the survival condition is doing crucial work. The Revised Property Code says a contingent remainder is descendible and devisable unless the condition requires the remainderman to survive until the end of the preceding estate. That exception is exactly this case: Ben must survive Ann, so his interest dies with him.
Because Ben died before Ann, the condition precedent failed. Ben had nothing to leave to Clara, and his estate acquired no interest at Ann's death. The original conveyance gave Ann a life estate and gave Ben only a contingent remainder; when that remainder failed, the property never left Oscar's hands as a reversion. Once Ann died, Oscar's reversion became possessory, so Oscar owns Greenacre in fee simple.
Each wrong answer reflects a common trap. "Clara owns Greenacre in fee simple because Ben's contingent remainder passed to his heirs" mistakes a contingent remainder for an unconditional one, but the survival condition blocks descent. "Ben's estate owns Greenacre because a contingent remainder vests in the remainderman's estate regardless of death" directly ignores the survival requirement. And "Clara and Oscar own as tenants in common because Clara inherited and Oscar retained a reversion" wrongly assumes both interests survived; Clara inherited nothing, and there is no co-tenancy.
For the exam, read future-interest language literally: if the gift says "if survives," death before the triggering event destroys the interest unless a statute says otherwise.
- Lena owns a life estate in Blackacre, remainder to Miles. Lena executed and delivered a deed to Nina that purported to convey Blackacre to Nina 'in fee simple,' with covenants that Lena was lawfully seized of a fee simple and had the right to convey. Miles did not consent.
Answer: A life estate pur autre vie measured by Lena's life, because Lena had only a life estate and the warranty covenants could not convey a greater estate than she owned.
Whenever you see a life tenant purporting to convey a fee simple, remember the central rule: a conveyor cannot transfer a greater estate than the one he actually owns. Here, Lena owns only a life estate measured by her own life, with remainder to Miles. Her deed to Nina, even if it says "fee simple" and includes warranty covenants, cannot cut off Miles's remainder or enlarge her own estate. The most Nina receives is a life estate pur autre vie—measured by Lena's life, not Nina's. When Lena dies, Nina's estate terminates naturally and Miles, as remainderman, takes possession.
The "fee simple absolute" choice fails because Maya's ability to sue on the warranty covenants does not give her the estate itself; a warranty creates a personal claim for damages, not title. It cannot transform a life estate into a fee. The life estate pur autre vie "measured by Nina's own life" is also wrong: the measuring life remains the original tenant, Lena—"pur autre vie" means held for the life of another. A life tenant's grantee takes exactly the estate the life tenant had, measured by the same life. And"no interest" is wrong because a life tenant absolutely may transfer her life estate without the remainderman's consent; she simply cannot transfer more than that life estate.
admit. So when a deed contains warranties, ignore them for title purposes: warranties may compensate for loss, but they do not enlarge an estate. Look for the measuring life; if the grantor held a life estate, the grantee's estate is measured by that same life, and the remainder passes untouched.
- Who owns Redacre after the school ceases using it?
Answer: The Lambton School Board owns Redacre in fee simple absolute, because Rita's possibility was not expressly devised and was extinguished when the school use ceased.
Whenever you see a future interest based on durational language like "so long as," recognize a fee simple determinable with a possibility of reverter in the grantor. The key issue here is how that possibility passes at death. Rita's will contained only a general residuary clause. Under DeMarco, a possibility of reverter is not an estate and does not pass through such a clause; it passes only if the will expressly identifies and describes it. Rita did not do that, so her possibility was not devised to Paul. When the school use ceased, the limiting event occurred, the possibility was extinguished, and the Board's fee simple determinable became a fee simple absolute.
Paul does not own Redacre in fee simple; the residuary clause did not carry the possibility. Paul does not even own a possibility of reverter; an unmentioned possibility does not wait for the limiting event to pass to devisees — it must be expressly devised to anyone, including a residuary beneficiary. And the Board does not hold a fee simple determinable subject to Paul's possibility, because the limitation was automatic; no one needed to elect to enforce it, and Paul had no interest to enforce.
Remember: a general residuary clause devises your existing estates, not mere expectant interests. If a will fails to expressly mention a possibility of reverter, it dies with the occurrence of the condition.
- Which of the following issues is most significant in deciding whether Chloe owns Greenacre?
Answer: Whether the condition requiring Ben's survival remained attached to the assigned interest and was not satisfied.
Whenever you see a future-interest question like this, focus on what the conveyor actually owned and whether that interest ever vested. Ben held a contingent remainder: it would vest only if he survived Ann. By deed, Ben transferred "all present and future right, title, and interest in Greenacre," but he could transfer no more than he actually possessed. What he possessed was a contingent remainder, and that contingency—survival—remained attached to the interest. Because Ben died before Ann, his condition failed, his interest never vested, and nothing passed to Chloe. Ann's death triggered the conveyor Parker's reversion, so Parker's devisee wins.
The other answers miss the core point. It is not most significant whether Ben's contingent remainder could be assigned before it became possessory; modern law generally allows assignment of contingent remainders, but transferability does not cure a failed condition. It is also not about whether Chloe gave value and took without notice, because she received exactly the interest Ben held, subject to its survival condition; no recording-act or bona fide purchaser issue changes that. Finally, it is not decisive whether Ben's deed operated as a present transfer or only as a promise to transfer a future interest; either way, the transferred or promised interest was contingent on Ben's survival, and that contingency was not satisfied.
On future interests, always ask: what exactly was transferred, and did every condition attach to it occur? A grantee cannot receive more than the grantor had, and unfulfilled contingencies doom the transfer.
- Who owns Blackacre after Ann's death?
Answer: Elena, because Carl's contingent remainder was freely alienable; Beth's condition precedent failed, and the default remainder passed to Carl's transferee.
This question tests how future interests are transferred and what happens when a condition precedent fails. Start by classifying the interests: Beth has a contingent remainder conditioned on graduating before Ann's death; Carl has the alternative contingent remainder if Beth fails to do so. Under the rule stated in the passage, contingent remainders may be conveyed by deed, but the transferee takes subject to the same condition.
Beth conveyed her interest to David, but her condition never occurred — she had not graduated when Ann died. Therefore Beth's contingent remainder never vested, so David takes nothing. Because that condition failed, the alternative remainder in favor of Carl became possessory. However, Carl had already conveyed his contingent interest to Elena. Since Carl's interest was transferable, Elena stepped into his position and now owns Blackacre.
The choice saying David owns Blackacre because Beth's remainder was freely alienable misses the key point: David acquired only Beth's contingent interest, subject to its condition, and that condition failed. The choice saying Carl owns Blackacre incorrectly claims Carl could not convey a contingent remainder before the condition occurred — the passage expressly says he could. The choice saying David and Elena are tenants in common is wrong because the two remainders were alternative, not concurrent; David's interest failed entirely.
Study tip: when a future interest is contingent, track who bears the risk of the condition. Conveyance transfers that risk, but it does not change the condition. Here, Elena simply had the winning risk.
- Which issue is most significant in determining whether Tina owns the farm?
Answer: Whether Ray's transfer of his remainder to Paula merged the life estate and remainder, giving Paula a fee simple before she conveyed to Tina.
This question tests the doctrine of merger in estates in land. Whenever you see a life estate followed by a remainder, and the remainderman later transfers his interest to the life tenant, your first instinct should be to ask whether the two estates have merged into a fee simple. Here, Ray held a vested remainder in fee simple ("to Ray and his heirs"). When Ray executed a deed to Paula conveying "all of Ray's right, title, and interest," he transferred that vested remainder to her. Because Paula already held the life estate, the life estate and the remainder merged, giving Paula a fee simple absolute before she conveyed to Tina. Therefore, Paula had full title to give Tina via warranty deed.
The choice about whether Ray's remainder was vested or contingent is a trap—it is vested, and this is precisely what makes the merger possible; a contingent remainder might not be transferable, but that is not the issue here. The recording choice is irrelevant because Tina claims through Paula, and Ray's deed to Paula is part of that chain; recording only matters between competing conveyances from the same grantor. The choice about a present interest versus a mere expectancy is also wrong because a vested remainder is a present, alienable interest, not a mere expectancy.
Study tip: Merger occurs when a life tenant acquires the remainder (or vice versa). Always check the timing of the conveyance—if the merger happened before the later transfer, the grantor had fee simple title to convey.
- Which issue is most significant in determining whether the Museum owns the tract?
Answer: Whether Grantor's retained possibility of reverter was transferable to the Museum before the Society's use changed.
This question tests future interests, specifically the distinction between a defeasible fee and whether a grantor's retained future interest can be conveyed before the defeasible event occurs. The deed's language "so long as the tract is used as a botanical garden" creates a fee simple determinable, not a fee simple subject to condition subsequent. That means the Society's estate would end automatically if theuse changed, and Grantor automatically retained a possibility of reverter.
At the time Grantor delivered the quitclaim deed to the Museum, the Society was still compliant; Grantor did not own the tract possessorily—he owned only a possibility of reverter. A quitclaim deed conveys only "all right, title, and interest" the grantor actually has. So the Museum's claim depends on whether Grantor could transfer that possibility of reverter before the Society's use changed. If it was not transferable inter vivosat common law, the Museum got nothing and the later automatic reversion went to Grantor. If it was transferable, the Museum stepped into Grantor's shoes and owns once the determinable estate failed. That is why the transferability issue is the most significant.
The automatic-termination-versus-reentry issue misses the point: "so long as" signals a determinable estate, and even if reentry were required, transferability of the Grantor's retained future interest would still have to be resolved first. The Rule Against Perpetuities is irrelevant—it does not apply to a grantor's possibility of reverter, and a change of use is not a vesting event. Recording the deed before termination also does not help the Museum: recording statutes protect bona fide purchasers against later claimants, not cure an invalid transfer between Grantor and Museum.
Study tip: when you see a future-interest question, first classify the estate, identify what future interest the grantor retained, then ask whether that interest could be transferred before the event that triggered it.
- Which issue is most significant in determining whether Debra takes the tract?
Answer: Whether Brian's death before Alice divested Brian's remainder before it could pass under Brian's will.
Whenever you see future interests combined with a will, start by asking: what did the testator actually own at the moment of death? A will can pass only the interest the testator had when he died—if that interest was already divested, it cannot be devised.
Here Owen created a life estate in Alice, a remainder in Brian, and a gift over to Carol if Brian dies before Alice. Brian died before Alice and devised everything to Debra. The decisive issue is whether Brian's death before Alice divested Brian's remainder before it could pass under Brian's will. Brian's will operates only at his death. If the condition "if Brian dies before Alice" terminated or divested his remainder at that instant, then he had nothing to leave Debra, and Carol takes. If his death did not trigger the divestment, Debra could have a claim.
The other choices are not the central issue. Whether Brian's remainder was vested at the time of Owen's conveyance or only when Alice died does not decide the case: even a vested remainder subject to divestment is lost when the divesting event occurs. Whether Alice's life estate terminated automatically or only when the remainderman entered is irrelevant; a life estate ends at death without any entry. Whether Carol's interest is classified as an executory interest or a contingent remainder is a label that may follow from the same language, but it does not tell you whether Brian had a devisable interest at death.
Study tip: in future-interest will contests, focus on the timing of divesting events, not just on naming the interest.
- Oscar, owner of Greenacre, conveyed Greenacre 'to Paula for life, then to Quentin, but if Quentin shall ever contest Paula's life estate, then to Rhoda.' While Paula was alive, Quentin conveyed all his remainder interest to Stuart, and Stuart knew of the condition. Later, while Paula was still alive, Quentin filed a lawsuit contesting Paula's life estate; Stuart did not join. Paula has now died.
Answer: Rhoda, because Quentin's conveyance transferred only the remainder subject to the divesting condition, and Quentin's later conduct triggered the condition, causing Rhoda to take.
This question tests the alienability of vested remainders subject to divestment. When you see a statute provided, apply its exact terms—not your general instincts. Under Section 9(a), a transfer does not extinguish a condition attached to the remainder. Under Section 9(b), a condition personal to the original remainderman continues to apply after a transfer and may be triggered by the original remainderman's own conduct after the transfer. Here, Quentin's condition is personal—contesting Paula's life estate. Quentin transferred his remainder to Stuart, but that conveyance merely passed the remainder subject to the same divesting condition. Quentin's later filing of the lawsuit triggered the condition, divesting Stuart's interest and causing Rhoda to take. Stuart's knowledge is irrelevant because the statute doesn't require it. The claim that Stuart cannot be divested by Quentin's later conduct is wrong because Section 9(b) explicitly allows the original remainderman's later conduct to trigger the condition. The claim that the condition is extinguished if not in Stuart's deed is wrong because Section 9(a) says a transfer does not extinguish the condition. The claim that Rhoda takes only if Stuart knew of the condition is wrong because the statute makes no exception for bona fide purchasers; the condition persists unless the creating instrument says otherwise. For strategy, always read provided statutes literally—the test is whether the statute carves out an exception for knowledge or BFP status, and here it does not.
- Which issue is most significant in determining whether Beth may terminate Amy's estate?
Answer: Whether Owen's reserved right of entry for condition broken could be transferred to Beth before any reentry by Owen.
When you see "may re-enter and terminate" in a deed, recognize a fee simple subject to condition subsequent: Amy holds the estate, and Owen holds a right of entry for condition broken. The decisive issue is transferability. At common law, a right of entry is not assignable inter vivos. Owen's quitclaim deed to Beth was made before he had reentered and terminated the estate, so it could not transfer the right to Beth. A quitclaim deed conveys only whatever interest the grantor actually has, and an unexercised right of entry is not a freely conveyable interest. Thus Beth lacks the power to terminate.
The "breach of a covenant" answer misses the difference between a promise and a condition; a covenant would support a damages claim, not a power to divest. The "automatic termination" answer confuses a fee simple determinable with a condition subsequent; termination requires reentry, but even requiring reentry does not solve Beth's inability to exercise Owen's right. The "recording before retail use" answer is a recording-statute trap; recording affects priority against other takers, not whether a future interest can be assigned.
Remember the pattern: before reentry, a right of entry cannot be transferred by deed. Whenever a grantor tries to assign a right of reentry before reclaiming the land, that is your exam red flag.
- Who owns Whitearce after the library closes?
Answer: The City of Lakewood owns Whitearce in fee simple absolute, because Opal's right of entry was not effectively transferred or inherited and was extinguished upon the breach.
When you see a future interest like "right of entry for condition broken," remember that it is not freely transferable—statutes often restrict its devisability and descendibility. Here, the key is timing: the condition must be broken before the holder dies for the right to pass by intestacy. Opal died while the library was still open; the breach occurred two years later. Thus, under Section 6(b), the right of entry did not pass to Ned. Section 6(c) then applies: because the right was not effectively transferred or inherited, it is extinguished, and the possessory estate becomes a fee simple absolute upon the breach. So the City owns Whitearce in fee simple absolute after the library closes—that's why the correct answer is the one stating the City owns in fee simple absolute because the right was not effectively transferred and was extinguished upon breach.
The other choices each miss this timing rule. The choice saying Ned owns in fee simple because the right passed to his heirs at death and the later breach made it possessory incorrectly assumes the right passes even if the condition is unbroken at death—the statute requires breach before death. The choice claiming the right is extinguished immediately at Opal's death misstates the statute: it extinguishes only upon the later breach, not automatically at death. And the choice saying Ned owns a possibility of reverter confuses a right of entry (which requires re-entry) with a possibility of reverter (which automatically reverts); Opal created a right of entry, and it never passed to Ned anyway. Study tip: for future interests, always ask when the condition was broken relative to the transferor's death—that timing determines whether the interest descends.
