- Is D guilty of robbery?
Answer: Yes, because D used force during immediate flight from the theft to overcome V's resistance to the retention of the wallet, and the statute includes such flight within 'in the course of committing a theft.'
Whenever you see a robbery question, focus on the exact statutory language defining force and when force must occur. Here, the statute defines "in the course of committing a theft" to include immediate flight after the taking, and it lists "retention of the property" as a stage at which force can satisfy robbery.
D is guilty because the shove happened during immediate flight from the theft, and its purpose was to overcome V's resistance to D's retention of the wallet. The fact that the wallet was already taken does not matter; the statute expressly extends robbery liability to force used while retaining stolen property during immediate flight.
The first wrong answer—that D had completed the taking and force used only to escape cannot support robbery—misreads the statute: "retention" and "immediate flight" are explicitly included. The third wrong answer, that robbery requires force to obtain possession and D's removal involved no force, ignores that force after the taking still counts under this statute. The final wrong answer, that any force during theft or flight regardless of purpose satisfies robbery, overstates the law: the statute requires force for the purpose of preventing or overcoming resistance, not simply force incidental to escape. D's shove was precisely to overcome resistance, so it fits.
On similar questions, read the definition of "in the course of" carefully—many jurisdictions broaden robbery beyond the initial taking, so don't assume completion of the taking defeats the charge.
- Should D be convicted of theft by false pretenses?
Answer: No, because V did not actually believe D's representation,ande the offense requires thatthe victim's reliance on the false representation caused the transfer.
False pretenses is a property crime built on fraud, but the fraud must actually work on the victim's mind. The key is subjective reliance: did this victim believe the false representation and transfer title because of it? In the passage, V is a professional art dealer who immediately recognizes the painting as a forgery. So even though D lied and intended to defraud, V did not believe the lie. V bought the painting for a different reason—to resell it profitably to a collector who wants good forgeries. That means D's misrepresentation did not cause V to part with the $10,000, so the conviction cannot stand.
The answer choice saying D should be convicted because D knowingly made a false representation of a material fact with intent to defraud and V paid fails because it ignores the victim's actual reliance. A guilty state of mind on D's part is not enough.
The choice saying a reasonable person would have been deceived misses the rule squarely: the prosecution must prove the actual victim believed the representation, not that an objective reasonable person would have. V's plan to resell does not matter because V was never deceived.
Finally, the choice blaming V for negligently failing to verify authenticity is wrong on both facts and law. V did verify—by recognizing the forgery—and the failure to investigate is not a defense when the victim genuinely believes. Here, there was no genuine belief.
Remember: for false pretenses, always ask, "What did the victim actually think?" If the victim was undeceived, there is no reliance, no matter how dishonest the defendant.
- Is D guilty of extortion?
Answer: Yes, because V's consent was induced by fear of accusation of a crime, and the statute provides that the truth of the accusation is not a defense.
Whenever you see an extortion question, your first move should be to check the statutory definition: Did the defendant obtain property with consent that was induced by a wrongful use of fear? Here, D used V's fear of being reported for theft to obtain $2,000. The statute expressly lists "fear of accusation of a crime" as a covered fear, and it says the truth of the accusation is not a defense. D also had no honest claim of right to V's money—he was not owed $2,000—so the threat was wrongful. Therefore, D is guilty.
The answer claiming D is not guilty because he only threatened to report an actual crime, and that is a lawful means of redress, misses the statute's explicit rule: truth is not a defense when the fear is used to obtain property to which the actor has no honest claim. The answer saying V consented and voluntary consent negates extortion unless force is threatened is also wrong: consent induced by wrongful fear is exactly what the statute forbids, and it does not require force or threat of force. Finally, the answer saying extortion requires a threat of immediate physical harm misreads the statute—it covers fear of accusation and exposure of secrets, not just physical harm.
For the exam, remember this pattern: extortion turns on the wrongfulness of the fear and lack of honest claim, not on whether the threatened disclosure is true or whether physical harm was threatened.
- Which offense is the prosecutor most likely able to charge against Tom?
Answer: Larceny, because Tom knew the owner could be identified from the license
Whenever you see a property crime involving found property, ask whether the defendant knew or had any way to identify the owner. That single question separates a theft from an innocent taking.
Tom's conduct is larceny. Larceny requires a trespassory taking — a wrongful deprivation of another's possession — with intent to permanently deprive. When property is merely lost, the owner does not give up ownership. But if a finder can reasonably identify the owner, keeping the property becomes wrongful. Here, the wallet contained a driver's license with the owner's name and address. Tom removed the cash and abandoned the wallet, knowing the owner could be found. That is the trespassory taking with intent to keep the cash, so larceny is the right charge.
The "no crime, because the wallet was lost and not abandoned" choice misunderstands lost property. Lost does not mean ownerless; only abandoned property has no owner. Since the license gave Tom a means to identify the owner, he had a duty to return the wallet.
"Embezzlement" is wrong because embezzlement requires lawful possession first, usually through a trust or employment relationship, followed by fraudulent conversion. Tom obtained possession wrongfully from the start — he never had lawful possession.
"False pretenses" is wrong because that offense requires obtaining title through a false representation of fact. Tom made no misrepresentation; he simply took the cash.
For the exam, remember the found-property rule: if the owner can be identified from the object itself, the finder's taking is larceny; if not, it is likely no crime.
- Is D guilty of theft of the car?
Answer: Yes, because the statute defines 'property of another' to include jointly owned property,and D knew the sale was unauthorized by V.
Whenever you see a theft question involving co-ownership, do not assume that owning an interest immunizes you. The statute is the starting point: it expressly says "property of another" includes joint or common interests, and a co-owner can be guilty of theft if he controls the property without every other owner's consent and knows that consent was not given.
Here, D and V each own the car, so the car is property of another under the statute. D sold it without telling V, knowing V had not consented. That unauthorized control over the car is enough to convict D of theft of the car — the fact that he kept the proceeds or lied afterward only confirms his intent.
The first wrong answer claims a person cannot steal property in which he has an ownership interest. That reflects the old common-law rule, not this statute, which specifically overrides it for joint owners. The answer claiming the sale transferred title to the buyer, leaving V only a claim to proceeds, misses the timing: the theft occurred when D exercised control over the car without V's consent, before any title question matters. The answer focusing on D's false statement as theft by deception confuses the theory of the offense; he is charged with theft of the car by unauthorized sale, not with defrauding V, and the lie is evidence of knowledge, not the act of taking.
Study tip: when a statute defines a term broadly, read it literally — co-owner theft is a classic exam trap that catches students relying on intuition instead of the statutory definition.
- Which offense is the prosecutor most likely able to charge against Dana?
Answer: Larceny
Whenever you see a property crime question, map who had what kind of control over the property. That distinction—custody versus possession versus title—decides the offense. Dana had only custody of the register drawer: her job was to operate it and hand it over intact. She was not authorized to open the safe or deposit money, so the store never entrusted her with possession in the legal sense. By removing the $200 from the drawer, she committed a trespassory taking and carried it away with intent to keep it—that is larceny. Even though she later handed the drawer to the manager, the cash was already taken.
Embezzlement is the trap here. It applies when a person is lawfully entrusted with possession of property and later converts it. A cashier with mere custody does not have possession, so taking from the drawer is larceny, not embezzlement. False pretenses would require Dana to obtain title to the money through a false representation to the owner; she simply took cash, no deception induced the transfer. Robbery requires taking from a person's presence by force or intimidation; no victim was confronted or threatened. So the prosecutor can most likely charge larceny.
Study tip: ask "How did the defendant get control?" If lawful possession then conversion = embezzlement; if mere custody then taking = larceny; if force = robbery; if fraud causing title transfer = false pretenses.
- Which fact, if true, would most likely provide Isabel with a defense to larceny?
Answer: Isabel honestly believed that she, not Julia, owned the bracelet
Larceny requires a trespassory taking of someone else's property with intent to permanently deprive. Whenever you see a larceny question, check the mental state: did this person believe they had a right to the property? An honest claim of right is a defense because it negates the "intent to steal" element.
matter how mistaken the belief is, the crime is not larceny.
Here, Isabel's honest belief that she, not Julia, owned the bracelet is decisive: even if she was wrong about title, she lacked the required larcenous intent when she retrieved it. That is why this factprovides a defense.
The other factsmiss the point. Isabel's lack of force isirrelevant because larceny, unlike robbery, does not require force or fear—it is a stealth or trespassorytaking crime, so its absence does not negate any element. Julia's standing invitation to visit merely meant Isabel could enter the apartment; it did not authorizetaking the braceletwithout Julia's consent, and larceny'strespassory-takingrequirement concerns the property, not just the premises. Finally,the bracelet'svalue under $500 might reduce the degreeof theft (petty vs grand larceny) but it does not eliminate the crime itself; value is a grading factor, not a substantive defense. For any larceny question, ask first: did the defendant honestly believe they alreadyowned the property or had the right to take it? That belief is the strongest defense—it attacks the very core of the crime's intent requirement.
- Which offense is the prosecutor most likely able to charge against Frank?
Answer: Larceny by trick
Whenever you see a property crime based on deception, ask two questions: Did the victim give up possession or title? And did the taking involve force? That distinction drives this question.
Helen handed Frank the coin only so he could confirm the sale and return with the money. She did not sell the coin or transfer ownership to him. Frank gained possession of the coin through a false promise—he had no buyer—and he intended to keep the coin from the start. That is the classic definition of larceny by trick: fraud induces the victim to part with possession, and the defendant immediately carries the property away with intent to steal.
False pretenses is the tempting distractor, but it requires the victim to pass title, not merely possession. Helen had no intent to transfer ownership, so this is not false pretenses. Embezzlement also fails because Frank never had lawful possession of the coin; his possession was obtained by fraud. Robbery is wrong because there was no force, intimidation, or taking from Helen's person—she voluntarily handed him the coin.
Your study tip: on the bar exam, when possession is obtained by deception, larceny by trick and false pretenses are separated by title—portable title means false pretenses; mere possession means larceny by trick. And remember that embezzlement always begins with lawful possession, which Frank never had.
- Is D guilty of embezzlement?
Answer: Yes, because D's later gambling of the money was a use substantially inconsistent with the owner's rights,andthe earlier intent to restore does not negate the fraudulent conversion at that later time.
Whenever you see an embezzlement question, the key is timing: the defendant's intent at the initial taking is not the whole story. Under State v. Lindgren, a taking is not fraudulent if the actor intends to restore the identical property and has a reasonable prospect of doing so. Here, D initially took the $4,000 intending to replace the identical bills from savings, so that first taking was not yet fraudulent.
But the rule does not stop there. If the actor later uses the property in a manner substantially inconsistent with the owner's rights, he commits a fraudulent conversion at that later time, and his earlier intent to restore does not protect him. By gambling away the money on Saturday, D used the employer's property in exactly such a way. The owner is entitled to the identical property, not substitute funds, and after the gambling loss D cannot return those bills. So D is guilty — not because every temporary taking is always fraudulent, but because his later gambling created a fraudulent conversion.
Choice A ignores the later gambling and treats only the initial intent as dispositive. Choice B overstates the rule: a temporary taking with intent to restore identical property and reasonable prospect is not always fraudulent. Choice C wrongly assumes no permanent loss; D could have restored only before he gambled, and substitution with his own funds would not satisfy the owner's right to identical property.
Study tip: watch for the "later conversion" trap — an initially innocent taking can become embezzlement when the defendant later does something inconsistent with the owner's rights.
- Which offense is the prosecutor most likely able to charge against Andre?
Answer: Extortion
Whenever a defendant obtains property through a threat, ask one threshold timing question: was the threatened harm immediate or future? That distinction separates robbery from extortion. Here Andre says he will break Carla's arm "tomorrow," not "right now." Carla hands over the wallet because she believes that future threat, and Andre takes the cash. Because the harm was postponed, this is extortion: obtaining property by means of a wrongful threat of future harm.
Robbery also involves intimidation, but the force or threat must put the victim in fear of immediate bodily injury; a future threat is not enough. Larceny is a trespassory taking, and although consent obtained by threat is not truly voluntary, larceny is the general theft offense while extortion is the more specific crime when property is obtained through threats. False pretenses is not right because Andre made no false representation of past or present fact—he threatened to inflict harm rather than tricking Carla into transferring title.
Study tip: on bar-exam theft questions, first identify the method—force, trick, threat, or fraud. If it is a threat, check whether the harm is immediate (robbery) or future (extortion).
- Should D be convicted of receiving stolen property?
Answer: No, because the laptop ceased to be 'stolen' when the police recovered it and regained dominion over it, before D received it.
A conviction under Section 617.4 requires two things to exist at the moment D receives the property: D must know it was stolen, and the property must actually still be "stolen" under the statutory definition. Whenever a statute defines when property ceases to be stolen, trace the property's status through every transfer before the defendant's receipt.
Here, the laptop was stolen when B burglarized V's home. But the statute says property ceases to be "stolen" when law enforcement, acting on the owner's behalf, recovers it and regains dominion. The police recovered the laptop, took custody, and later had the undercover officer sell it. Therefore, before D ever bought it, the laptop was no longer "stolen" in the legal sense. D cannot be convicted, despite knowing it had originally been stolen.
The choice "No, because D paid $300 and therefore lacked the intent to deprive the owner" is wrong: paying for stolen goods does not negate intent to deprive, and the real defect is the property's status, not D's intent. The choice "Yes, because D knew the laptop was stolen and purchased it with intent to deprive" is wrong because it ignores the statutory cessation; knowledge and intent alone cannot satisfy a definition that requires the property to be "stolen" at receipt. Finally, "Yes, because the laptop was stolen when B took it and that status was not affected by later police recovery" directly contradicts the statute's explicit rule that police recovery ends stolen status.
Strategy: when a statute defines terms or ending points, always apply those definitions to the exact time of the defendant's act — here, receipt.
