- Which of the following is the best answer?
Answer: Ace is liable, because the large-scale storage of fireworks in a densely populated neighborhood is an abnormally dangerous activity, and reasonable care is no defense.
When you see a torts question with "strict liability" and "abnormally dangerous activity," remember the focus is on the nature and location of the activity, not on the defendant's care. The core rule: one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is strictly liable for harm it causes, even if they used utmost care. Large-scale storage of commercial fireworks in a densely populated residential area next to a school satisfies that test—the risk is great, cannot be eliminated by reasonable care, and the location makes it inappropriate.
Ace is therefore liable. Its argument about compliance and reasonable care misses the point: in strict liability, negligence is not the basis of liability, so proving care does not defeat liability. The answer claiming compliance with regulations is a defense is wrong—regulations set minimums, not immunity. The answer requiring the parents to prove Ace's failure to exercise reasonable care caused the explosion is also wrong because it imports a negligence standard into a strict-liability claim. Finally, the answer limiting liability to cases where the risk was "substantially greater" in a residential neighborhood is a trap: location is one factor in classifying an activity as abnormally dangerous, but the plaintiff does not have to prove a comparative degree of risk; the concentrated storage of explosives in a populated area is itself the abnormally dangerous activity.
Study tip: for strict liability, ask two things—is the activity abnormally dangerous, and did it cause the harm? Never get distracted by arguments about care or regulation.
- Will Vance recover on his strict-liability claim?
Answer: No, because Vance knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risk of being struck by debris when he entered the fenced zone and refused to leave.
Whenever you see a strict-liability claim based on an abnormally dangerous activity, remember that liability is not absolute: the defendant is liable only for harms within the scope of the abnormal risk, and the plaintiff's voluntary assumption of that risk can bar recovery. Here, implosion is indeed abnormally dangerous, and flying debris is precisely the kind of harm that makes it so. But Vance saw warning signs, climbed a chain-link fence, and was shouted at to leave just before the implosion; he knowingly encountered a highly obvious risk and stayed. That is classic implied assumption of risk: voluntary, with actual knowledge of the specific danger. Contributory negligence, in contrast, is careless failure to recognize or guard against a risk; Vance's deliberate entry was not merely contributory negligence. Because assumption of risk is a complete defense to strict liability, Vance cannot recover.
The choice saying "yes, contributory negligence is not a defense" misses that distinction; that principle applies to negligence-like plaintiff conduct, not to voluntary exposure to a known danger. The choice saying "strictly liable for all harms" is too broad; the defendant is not an insurer for every consequence. And the choice saying the harm from debris was not the kind of risk fails for the opposite reason: debris is exactly the risk that makes implosion abnormally dangerous. For your exam, remember the key distinction: assumption of risk requires knowledge plus voluntary encounter, while contributory negligence is a failure to exercise reasonable care. When you see a plaintiff who climbed a fence or ignored a warning, ask whether he knowingly embraced the risk — if so, strict liability will not save him.
- Is Hardrock's assumption-of-risk defense likely to succeed?
Answer: No, because June had no reasonable alternative way to reach her home, so her encounter with the risk was not voluntary.
Whenever you see an assumption-of-risk defense, remember that it has two elements: knowledge of the risk and voluntary acceptance of it. Both are required. A person can know a risk perfectly well and still not "assume" it if they have no reasonable way to avoid it.
Here, Hardrock's defense fails on voluntariness. June knew blasts occasionally sent rocks onto the bridge, so the knowledge element might exist. But the passage says the bridge was "the only access to her home." With no reasonable alternative route, driving across the bridge was not a free choice; it was a necessity. The law does not treat encountering a risk under such compulsion as voluntary assumption of risk. Thus, the correct answer is no, because June had no reasonable alternative way to reach her home, so her encounter with the risk was not voluntary.
Now the wrong answers thy show the trap. "Yes, because June knew that rocks occasionally landed on the bridge and voluntarily chose to drive across it" undervalues the voluntariness requirement—choosing the only available route is not voluntary in the required sense. "Yes, because the danger was open and obvious, and June had known of it for years" similarly treats openness and knowledge as enough, but open-and-obvious is a different concept, usually used in premises liability, and still does not excuse the absence of a reasonable alternative. "No, because assumption of risk is a defense to negligence claims but is not a defense to strict liability" is simply wrong as a legal rule: assumption of risk can be asserted against strict liability claims, including for abnormally dangerous activities, when voluntariness is established. The problem here is not the type of claim, but the lack of voluntariness.
Study tip: when analyzing assumption of risk, always ask two questions—"Did the plaintiff actually know the specific risk?" and "Could the plaintiff reasonably have avoided it?" If the answer to the second is no, the defense fails even where knowledge is clear.
- Will the homeowner recover on a strict-liability theory?
Answer: No, because the distribution of natural gas to consumers by a utility is a matter of common usage and is not an abnormally dangerous activity.
Whenever you see a strict-liability claim for an abnormally dangerous activity, remember the key is not simply how dangerous the activity is. Courts weigh whether the activity involves a high risk of serious harm, whether that risk can be eliminated with reasonable care, whether it is a matter of common usage, where it occurs, and its value to the community. That last factor—common usage—decides this case.
City Gas's underground system delivers natural gas to thousands of ordinary consumers. That is exactly the kind of widespread, everyday utility service courts regard as a matter of common usage, not as an abnormally dangerous activity. So even though natural gas is flammable and explosive, the homeowner cannot recover on strict liability. The mere existence of a risk does not make an activity abnormally dangerous; otherwise countless ordinary activities would become strict-liability traps. He may have a negligence claim—if the company knew the pipe was corroded and delayed replacement, that could be unreasonable conduct—but that is not strict liability.
The first wrong answer says yes because gas is highly explosive and distributed in a densely populated area. That captures one factor—risk—but ignores the common-usage limitation. An activity can be risky and still not be abnormally dangerous if it is standard, ubiquitous infrastructure. The second wrong answer says yes because the rupture resulted from failure to act on inspectors' recommendation. That is really an argument for negligence: it identifies a failure to exercise reasonable care, not an activity so dangerous that liability attaches without fault. The third wrong answer says no because the homeowner was a customer and voluntarily assumed the risk. Customers do not impliedly consent to explosions by simply using a utility service; moreover, there was no evidence he knew or accepted that specific risk, and assumption of risk is not the reason the claim fails.
Study tip: when evaluating an abnormally-dangerous-activity question, first ask: "Is this activity a common part of everyday lifeor a commercial/industrial outlier?" If it is ordinary, strict liability almost always fails—look for negligence instead.
- Will Fern recover on her strict-liability claim?
Answer: No, because the loss of the mink kits did not result from the kind of risk that makes blasting an abnormally dangerous activity.
This question tests the scope of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. When you see "strict liability" and "abnormally dangerous," remember that the defendant is not an insurer for every consequence. The plaintiff must show both that the activity is abnormally dangerous and that the harm resulted from the specific risk that makes it abnormally dangerous.
Blasting is indeed abnormally dangerous, and Marlowe is strictly liable for the kind of harm that makes blasting dangerous—typically physical damage from explosions, flying debris, or ground vibration causing structural damage. But Fern's loss was not physical damage to property; the vibrations frightened her unusually sensitive mother mink, causing them to kill their kits. That harm flowed from the mink's particular sensitivity, not from the blast-related risk that justifies strict liability. Therefore, the claim fails.
The "Yes, because blasting is abnormally dangerous" choice is wrong because it overstates strict liability as covering "all harm the activity actually causes." The "Yes, because Marlowe knew or should have known" choice is wrong because knowledge and foreseeability sound in negligence, not strict liability, and even foreseeability does not broaden strict liability to this type of harm. The "No, because Marlowe complied with safety regulations" choice is wrong because compliance with care is irrelevant; strict liability applies even to careful defendants.
Study tip: on abnormally dangerous activity questions, always ask two questions—is the activity abnormally dangerous, and is this injury the kind of harm that makes it abnormal? The second question is the classic trap.
- Is Perry liable for the damage to the neighbor's roof?
Answer: Yes, because Perry caused blasting to be performed, and the strict-liability duty for an abnormally dangerous activity cannot be delegated to an independent contractor.
Whenever you see blasting, explosives, or other abnormally dangerous activities, think strict liability. The key question is not whether the actor was careful or independent, but whether the risk-creating activity was authorized and cannot be delegated.
Here, Perry is liable because blasting is an abnormally dangerous activity, and the duty to prevent harm from such an activity is nondelegable. Perry caused the blasting to be performed on his land, so he cannot shift that legal responsibility to Blastco. Even though Blastco had exclusive control and took all reasonable precautions, strict liability does not depend on fault, control, or care.
The first wrong answer, "No, because the blasting was performed by an independent contractor over whom Perry had no control," misses that independent-contractor status normally shields a principal, but not for nondelegable duties arising from abnormally dangerous activities. The second wrong answer, "No, because Blastco exercised reasonable care and Perry was not personally at fault," confuses negligence with strict liability: care and fault are irrelevant. The third wrong answer, "Yes, because Perry is vicariously liable for all torts committed by Blastco," is overbroad—a landowner is not liable for every tort of an independent contractor, and the true basis is the nondelegable strict-liability duty, not general vicarious liability.
Your study tip: when a question combines an independent contractor with an abnormally dangerous activity, the independent-contractor defense almost always fails. The duty is nondelegable, so the person who caused the activity remains liable.
- Is the ride an abnormally dangerous activity?
Answer: No, because the risk of injury from the ride could have been eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care, so the activity is not abnormally dangerous.
Whenever you see a strict liability claim for an abnormally dangerous activity, your core question is whether the risk is unavoidable even with the exercise of reasonable care. An activity isn't abnormally dangerous just because it's risky; the danger must be inherent to the activity itself, like blasting. Here, the ride is safe when operated per the manual, and the accident happened only because the operator skipped the required inspection. Since following the manual would have completely eliminated the risk, this is a case of ordinary negligence, not strict liability. Therefore, the correct answer is the one that states the risk could have been eliminated by reasonable care.
The first wrong answer, claiming the risk is great and cannot be fully eliminated, focuses only on the magnitude of harm. While great risk matters, if reasonable care can eliminate it, the activity isn't abnormally dangerous. The second wrong answer, arguing the operator's failure doesn't defeat strict liability, assumes the conclusion it needs to prove—that the activity is abnormally dangerous. In reality, the operator's negligence demonstrates exactly why the risk was avoidable. The final wrong answer, about the rider voluntarily assuming the risk, confuses the defense of assumption of risk with the definition of an abnormally dangerous activity. Assumption of risk might be a defense, but it does not change the inherent nature of the activity itself.
For the bar exam, remember the classic abnormally dangerous activities (e.g., blasting, storing hazardous waste) are dangerous even with utmost care. If a mishap stems from a failure to follow a safety rule, it's negligence, not strict liability.
- Is Rosa strictly liable to Nina?
Answer: No, because the storage of modest quantities of fuel for ordinary household use is a matter of common usage and is not an abnormally dangerous activity.
Whenever you see a strict-liability claim for an abnormally dangerous activity, focus on the character of the activity, not just the harm it can cause. An activity is abnormally dangerous when it creates serious risk, cannot be made safe through reasonable care, and is not a matter of common usage in the community. Here, Rosa's storage of modest amounts of gasoline and kerosene for routine household equipment fits ordinary common usage. Even though gasoline is flammable, households commonly keep such fuels, so the activity does not meet the abnormally-dangerous threshold. Rosa is therefore not strictly liable.
The choice saying "storage of modest quantities of fuel for ordinary household use is a matter of common usage" captures that key point. The "gasoline is highly flammable" choice overemphasizes risk alone; high risk is necessary but not enough without the common-usage inquiry. The "failure to keep the cap tight" choice describes negligence, not strict liability; negligence involves breach of a duty of care, but the question asks whether strict liability applies. The "only commercial or governmental enterprises" choice is a misconception: individuals can be strictly liable for abnormally dangerous activities like blasting, but Rosa's activity simply is not abnormal.
For the exam, remember the common-usage factor—if the activity is a routine part of ordinary life, strict liability usually will not attach.
- Will Paco recover on a strict-liability theory?
Answer: No, because Paco's injuries resulted from Dana's negligent driving rather than from the risk of explosion that makes transporting dynamite abnormally dangerous.
When you see an "abnormally dangerous activity" question, the key is to focus not just on whether the activity qualifies for strict liability, but on whether the plaintiff's injury arose from the specific risk that makes the activity abnormally dangerous. Here, transporting dynamite on city streets may indeed be abnormally dangerous, and Dana was acting within her employment. But Paco was not injured by an explosion or even by the dynamite itself; he was struck by Dana's negligent driving. That is an ordinary automobile-accident risk, not the extraordinary risk of transporting explosives. Strict liability therefore does not apply, so Paco cannot recover on that theory.
The correct answer is the one stating that Paco's injuries resulted from Dana's negligent driving rather than from the risk of explosion. The first wrong answer—"Yes, because transporting dynamite on city streets is an abnormally dangerous activity, and the dynamite was being transported in the course of Dana's employment"—correctly identifies the activity but ignores the causation requirement. The other "Yes" answer, claiming strict liability covers all harms arising from the activity, is too broad: strict liability covers only harms within the dangerous risk. Finally, the "No" answer about common carriers being specially licensed misunderstands the law; a license does not immunize a common carrier from strict liability for abnormally dangerous cargo, and it is not the reason the claim fails here.
Study tip: always ask, "Did the injury occur from the dangerous propensity that defines the activity?" If the harm is just collateral negligence, strict liability drops away.
- How should the court rule on Bennett's defense?
Answer: Cora's claim is not barred; her careless conduct is not a defense to strict liability, and she did not knowingly and voluntarily assume the risk of debris.
Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity requires you to separate two defenses: ordinary contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Bennett's warnings, sirens, and barriers show it took care, but carefulness is irrelevant; the activity itself creates liability. Cora's own careless conduct cannot bar her claim because a plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable care is not a defense to strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity. Nor did she assume the risk: assumption of risk requires actual knowledge of the specific danger and voluntary acceptance of it. Cora knew an implosion was scheduled and heard the siren, but she says she assumed the barrier would protect her. She did not know debris could fly over it, so she did not knowingly and voluntarily accept that risk. The choice saying her claim is barred because her unreasonable decision to remain near the blast zone after hearing the siren was a contributing cause is wrong: contributing negligence, even if causally relevant, is not a defense here. The choice saying she is barred because she proceeded in the face of a known risk after posted and audible warnings is also wrong: general awareness of danger is not the same as knowingly accepting the specific risk of debris crossing the barrier. Finally, the choice saying recovery would be reduced by her percentage of fault is wrong; ordinary negligence is not compared or apportioned in an abnormally dangerous activity claim under this rule. Remember: for abnormally dangerous activities, negligence is no defense; only knowing and voluntary assumption of the specific risk bars recovery.
- Which of the following is the contractor's strongest argument against strict liability?
Answer: The ranch owner's loss was caused by the mink's unusual sensitivity to noise, not by the sort of blast-related harm that makes blasting abnormally dangerous.
Whenever you see strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity, separate two questions: Is the activity abnormally dangerous? And did the plaintiff's harm arise from the specific risk that makes the activity abnormally dangerous? Blasting is generally treated as abnormally dangerous, but the contractor's strongest argument targets causation and scope. The ranch owner's loss was caused by the mink's unusual sensitivity to noise, not by the sort of blast-related harm—such as flying rock, concussion, or vibration—that makes blasting abnormally dangerous. Strict liability does not extend to harms beyond the characteristic risks of the activity, and the mink's extreme reaction is not a foreseeable blast risk.
The reasonable-care defense fails because strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities applies regardless of how carefully the contractor acted. The rural-location argument also fails: while location is one factor, blasting can still be abnormally dangerous in a sparsely populated area if it poses serious risks to neighboring persons or property. The assumption-of-risk argument fails because keeping sensitive mink nearby did not mean the owner knowingly consented to a blast-related harm; ordinary livestock were undisturbed, which reinforces that the unusual sensitivity, not the blasting risk, caused the loss.
Study tip: in strict liability questions, always check causation—the harm must be the kind of risk that made the activity abnormally dangerous, not merely any harm that happens to follow the activity.
- Is Pioneer liable for Vijay's injuries?
Answer: Yes, because the risk that motorists would collide with rocks or lose control while avoiding them is within the risk that makes blasting dangerous.
Whenever you see a strict-liability claim for an abnormally dangerous activity, focus on the scope of the risk: the harm must arise from the hazard that makes the activity abnormally dangerous. Blasting is a classic abnormally dangerous activity, and its characteristic risk includes hurling rocks and debris onto adjoining highways — which necessarily puts motorists in danger of crashing while swerving to avoid them. So Pioneer is liable.
The choice saying the risk that motorists would lose control while avoiding rocks is within the risk that makes blasting dangerous captures the doctrine correctly. Blasting does not require that debris directly strike the plaintiff; the distinctive danger is exactly that debris can enter a roadway and trigger evasive collisions. Vijay's swerving was not a superseding cause. A superseding cause must be something unexpected and independent that breaks the causal link;here, his reaction was a foreseeable response to the very hazard the blasting created. Similarly,the choice saying his injuries were caused by his own loss of control rather than direct impact is wrong: strict liability does not require direct impact with debris. Foreseeable harm from avoiding the debris counts.
The final "but-for" statement is too broad. Strict liability is not for all harm that would not have occurred but for the activity; it is limited to harm within the distinctive risk that makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
On exam, remember the pattern: blasting + public road + debris/evasive action = liability. Ask not "did debris hit the plaintiff?" but "is this harm within the abnormal risk that made the activity dangerous?"
