- Which statement best describes Buyer's rights under the Statute of Frauds?
Answer: Buyer is not entitled to damages but may obtain specific performance because his acts of possession and improvement are unequivocally referable to the oral contract.
Oral contracts for the sale of land are within the Statute of Frauds, but the equitable part-performance doctrine permits specific performance when the buyer's acts are unequivocally referable to the contract, such as taking possession and making improvements. Part performance does not, however, make the contract enforceable at law for damages. A is wrong because the remedy is equitable; C is wrong because the Statute of Frauds makes the contract unenforceable, not void; D is wrong because damages remain unavailable even if the price was accepted.
- Is the administrator's oral promise enforceable?
Answer: No, because the promise was a collateral promise to answer for the estate's debt and was not in writing.
The Statute of Frauds makes unenforceable a promise by an executor or administrator to answer personally for a debt of the estate. The administrator's promise was collateral to the estate's debt and was made personally, and no exception applies. A confuses estate liability with personal liability; B is wrong because past consideration does not create an enforceable promise and, in any event, the Statute of Frauds is not satisfied; D misstates the debt's due date.
- Under the UCC Statute of Frauds, is the agreement enforceable against Buyer?
Answer: Yes, because Buyer's failure to object to a merchant's written confirmation within ten days satisfies the Statute of Frauds as against Buyer.
UCC 2-201(2) provides that between merchants, a written confirmation sufficient against the sender and received by a merchant with reason to know its contents satisfies the Statute of Frauds against the recipient unless written objection is made within ten days. Buyer read Seller's signed confirmation and did not object, so the contract is enforceable against Buyer. A ignores the merchant-confirmation exception; B is wrong because a signed e-mail can be a sufficient writing; D is wrong because the confirmation does not operate as acceptance or completion of the contract.
- Is the oral contract enforceable?
Answer: Yes, because the predominant purpose of the contract is services, and no other Statute of Frauds category applies.
For mixed goods and services contracts, courts apply the predominant-purpose test. Here the contract was predominantly for roofing services, with materials incidental, so the UCC Statute of Frauds does not apply; no common-law Statute of Frauds category is triggered. A and B incorrectly treat the presence or price of goods as controlling. D's acceptance-as-partial-payment theory is not a recognized basis and does not address the correct analysis.
- Is the company's oral promise enforceable?
Answer: Yes, because the consultant's performance could have been completed within one year and in fact was completed within one year.
Under the one-year provision, a contract is within the Statute of Frauds only if it cannot by its terms be performed within one year from the making. Because the consultant could have earned the bonus by obtaining a purchase order within the first year, and did so, the agreement was performable within one year. Choice A incorrectly focuses on the possible two-year outer limit; B wrongly applies the UCC $500 threshold to a services contract; D misapplies the part-performance doctrine, which is not used to satisfy the one-year provision.
- Is the developer's oral promise enforceable?
Answer: Yes, because the developer's primary purpose was to serve its own economic interest, taking the promise out of the Statute of Frauds.
The suretyship provision applies to a promise to answer for the debt of another made to the creditor, but it does not apply when the promisor's main purpose is to protect its own economic interest. The developer's promise was designed to avoid delayed opening and lost leases, so it is enforceable despite the lack of a writing. A ignores the leading-object exception; B incorrectly treats consideration as satisfying the Statute of Frauds; C misstates the rule because promises made to the creditor are the ones normally within the suretyship provision.
