- Is Dr. Ortiz liable for malpractice?
Answer: No, because casting is accepted by a respectable segment of the profession, and he performed it with due care.
When a profession recognizes more than one acceptable method, a physician who chooses one accepted by a respectable segment of the field and performs it carefully meets the standard of care. Casting is supported by the literature and preferred by a substantial minority, including leading academic surgeons, and Dr. Ortiz applied and monitored the cast properly. He is not liable. The majority-practice answer misstates the standard, which is set by what a reasonable practitioner may do, not by a vote. The outcome answer judges care by hindsight; a poor result, and even proof that another method would probably have done better, does not show negligence when the chosen method was acceptable. The good-faith answer reaches the right result for the wrong reason: the standard is objective and professional, and Dr. Ortiz prevails because his choice was a recognized one, not because he sincerely believed in it.
- Which statement best describes the standard of care the court should apply to Clayton?
Answer: The court should apply the adult standard of care, and Clayton's age, boating course completion, and junior license are not considered in deciding whether he met that standard.
This question tests the "adult activity" exception to the reasonable-child standard in negligence. Whenever you see a minor operating a motorized vehicle or power-driven machine, check the rule's three-part test: customarily undertaken by adults for recreation or business, involves a foreseeable risk of serious harm, and demands mature judgment. Operating a 22-foot pontoon with a 90-horsepower motor plainly qualifies—it is a power-driven machine, customarily used for recreation, and poses a foreseeable risk of serious harm. Therefore, the adult standard applies. The rule explicitly states that the child's age, training, and experience are not considered, so Clayton's age, boating course completion, and junior license are irrelevant to whether he met the standard. That confirms the correct answer.
The choice saying the adult standard applies but his course and license are relevant is wrong because the rule expressly excludes those factors from the inquiry. The choice arguing for the child standard because Clayton acted at his father's direction and not for his own recreation is also wrong—the rule focuses on the nature of the activity itself, not the child's purpose or who directed him. Finally, the hybrid standard (adult physical care but child judgment) is a classic trap; this rule applies the adult standard to the whole activity, not piecemeal.
Study tip: On bar-exam negligence questions, if a minor is driving a boat, car, or tractor, the adult standard almost always applies—and any answer that weighs the child's training or age is usually wrong.
- Is Nora's violation of the statute negligence per se?
Answer: No, because walking on the left side would have exposed her to a greater risk of harm, so the violation is excused.
A statutory violation that would otherwise be negligence per se is excused when compliance would create a greater risk of harm. The left side of the road ran along a blind curve with no shoulder and an open trench, while the right side had a wide shoulder. Walking on the left would have been more dangerous, so Nora's violation is excused and is not negligence per se. The jury may still consider whether her conduct was reasonable. The answer applying per se because Nora is in the protected class omits the excuse doctrine. The ignorance answer misstates the excuses; not knowing the law is not a recognized excuse, and the facts do not suggest Nora was unaware of it. The answer claiming the statute protects only drivers reaches the right result for the wrong reason; a facing-traffic rule exists mainly to protect pedestrians.
- Which issue is most important in determining whether Marco should be held to an adult standard of care?
Answer: Whether operating a motorboat is an adult activity that creates a significant risk of harm to others.
Whenever you see a minor defendant in a negligence case, your first instinct should be to identify the general rule (a subjective standard of a reasonable child of similar age and experience) and its critical exception: the adult-activity doctrine. The question tests whether that exception applies to Marco.
The adult-activity exception hinges entirely on the nature of the activity itself. If operating a motorboat is classified as an adult activity—one typically undertaken by adults that poses a significant risk of harm to others—then the law abandons the subjective child standard and holds Marco to the objective reasonable-person standard. That is exactly what the choice about operating a motorboat being an adult activity addresses. This is the dispositive issue.
The other choices are tempting but test different concepts. Whether Marco was mature enough to appreciate the risks is the test for the minor standard, not the adult exception; if the adult activity applies, his subjective maturity is irrelevant. Whether his aunt was negligent is a separate claim of negligent entrustment against the aunt—it does not change the standard of care imposed on Marco for his own actions. Whether the kayaker could have avoided the collision concerns the plaintiff's comparative or contributory negligence, which is a defense to liability but does not alter the defendant's standard of care.
On the bar exam, when you see a minor, ask yourself: "Is this a dangerous adult activity?" If yes (driving a car, flying a plane, operating a boat), apply the adult standard. If it's an everyday activity (like playing baseball), apply the child standard. Watch for this exact trap—questions will try to lure you into discussing the child's maturity when the activity type is actually the key.
- What is the effect of the wiper statute on Delia's standard of care?
Answer: The violation is not negligence per se because the cyclist's injury did not result from the hazard the statute was designed to prevent, although the violation may be some evidence of negligence.
Whenever you see a statute and a negligence claim, think negligence per se: a statutory violation can establish duty and breach only if the plaintiff is in the class the statute protects and the injury is of the type the statute was designed to prevent. Here, the statute's purpose is to ensure clear visibility during precipitation—so the hazard it targets is rain-obscured windshields, not all collisions. Delia's violation (broken wipers) did not cause the cyclist's injury; she crashed because she was looking at her phone. Therefore, the injury does not result from the hazard the statute addresses, so negligence per se does not apply. The violation can still be some evidence of negligence, but it doesn't automatically set the standard of care.
Now the wrong answers: The first choice claims negligence per se because the statute protects cyclists and other highway users from collisions during rain. That misreads the statute's scope—it protects against impaired visibility, not every rain-related collision, and the actual cause was distraction, not rain. The second choice asserts an "absolute duty" and says the violation "caused" the collision, but causation fails because the phone, not the wipers, caused the accident. The last choice says statutory violations "may never" establish the standard of care—that's false; they can under proper conditions.
Study tip: Always ask what specific hazard did the statute intend to prevent, and whether that hazard actually led to the injury. If the accident would have happened regardless of the violation, negligence per se fails.
- Which issue is most important in determining the standard of care Rhea owed Theo at the time of the injury?
Answer: Whether Theo was on the premises primarily for Rhea's business benefit or for a purely social visit.
Whenever you see a premises liability question on the bar exam, your first step is to classify the entrant's status—invitee, licensee, or trespasser—because that status sets the standard of care. Here, Theo's status is ambiguous: he returned a lawnmower (social) but was then led to the office to discuss bookkeeping (potential business). The linchpin is why Theo was on the premises. If he was there primarily for Rhea's business benefit, he is an invitee, and Rhea owes a duty to inspect and warn of hidden dangers. If he was purely social, he is a licensee, and Rhea only owes a duty to warn of known, concealed dangers. Therefore, the issue of whether the visit was for business benefit or purely social is the most important for setting the standard of care.
The other choices are traps. Rhea's actual knowledge of the loose rug addresses breach—whether she violated her duty—but it does not determine what that duty is; the standard is fixed by status first. Whether Theo was aware of the rug is relevant to comparative negligence or assumption of risk, which might reduce his recovery, but it does not alter the duty Rhea owed. Finally, whether Rhea's bookkeeping business was operated for profit is irrelevant; an invitee is defined by the owner's business purpose, not profitability, and a home office can still make someone an invitee even if the business is a side venture.
Study tip: On the bar exam, when a question asks about the standard of care, immediately ask "what is the entrant's status?"—don't get distracted by knowledge or causation facts, which belong to the breach or defense elements.
- Is Paul liable to Vera?
Answer: No, because a sudden incapacity that the driver had no reason to anticipate is not a failure to exercise reasonable care.
Negligence requires a failure to exercise reasonable care. A driver who suffers a sudden incapacity, such as a heart attack or seizure, without any reason to anticipate it, has not been careless, because a reasonable person in the same condition, without warning, could not have prevented the loss of control. Paul had no history of heart trouble and had just been cleared by his doctor, so he is not liable. The strict-liability answer misstates the standard for driving, which is negligence. The answer refusing any allowance for a medical condition overextends the rule for mental deficiency; a sudden, unforeseeable physical incapacity is part of the circumstances against which reasonableness is judged. The act-of-God answer reaches the right result for the wrong reason: the issue is breach, not superseding cause, and the answer assumes Paul was negligent in the first place.
- Does the sudden-emergency doctrine protect Kim?
Answer: No, because her own excessive speed helped create the emergency, so the doctrine is unavailable to her.
The sudden-emergency doctrine lets a jury consider the pressure of an emergency in judging the reasonableness of the actor's response, but it does not apply when the actor's own negligence helped create the emergency. Kim was driving 25 miles per hour over the limit, and at the lawful speed she could have stopped in time. Her speeding created the emergency, so the doctrine does not protect her, even though her swerve was the best available choice at that moment. The answer focusing on the swerve evaluates only the response and ignores the limit on the doctrine. The superseding-cause answer misapplies the concept: a child running into a residential street is a foreseeable hazard and the very risk that speed limits guard against. The answer declaring swerving onto a sidewalk unreasonable as a matter of law reaches the right result for the wrong reason; in a true emergency not of the actor's making, it could be reasonable.
- Under the rule, was the railroad negligent in failing to build the fence?
Answer: No, because the expected loss of $50,000 is less than the $200,000 burden of building the fence.
The rule compares the burden of the precaution with the expected loss, which is the probability of harm multiplied by its gravity. A 1 percent chance of a $5,000,000 loss is an expected loss of $50,000. The fence would cost $200,000, four times the expected loss, so under the rule the railroad was not negligent in failing to build it. The answer comparing $200,000 with $5,000,000 forgets to multiply the gravity of the loss by its probability, the most common error with the formula. The answer requiring every reasonable precaution whenever serious injury is possible restates the conclusion without applying the rule; the formula is the measure of what is reasonable here. The answer relying on a less-than-50-percent probability confuses the burden of proof with the risk analysis; a small probability of a large harm can justify a precaution, and the issue is how the numbers compare.
- Which standard should the jury apply?
Answer: That of a reasonable 11-year-old of Theo's intelligence and experience, which takes his unusual maturity and riding experience into account.
A child is held to the standard of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience. The standard accounts for the particular child's intelligence and experience, so Theo's unusual maturity and long riding experience raise the care expected of him. The adult-activity exception does not apply because riding a bicycle is not an activity characteristically undertaken by adults; children commonly ride bicycles. The adult-standard answer overextends the exception to any activity that could hurt someone. The average-child answer ignores that the standard incorporates the child's own intelligence and experience. The subjective answer misreads the child standard, which, while individualized, still asks what a reasonable child with those characteristics would do, not what Theo personally understood.
- Which issue is most important in determining whether Priya may rely on the emergency doctrine?
Answer: Whether Priya's own excessive speed contributed to the emergency she faced.
When a question involves the emergency doctrine, your first move should be to ask whether the defendant was himself responsible for the danger. The doctrine recognizes that a person confronted with a sudden emergency is not held to the same standard of careful reflection, but that leniency only applies if the emergency was not caused by the defendant's own negligence. Here, the most significant issue is whether Priya's excessive speed—driving 40 in a 35 zone on a wet road—contributed to the emergency. If her speed made it impossible to stop or avoid the cyclist, she cannot claim the protection of the doctrine because a negligent defendant may not benefit from a crisis she helped create.
The driver ahead's reason for stopping is not central; even a squirrel-caused stop can create a genuine emergency, but Priya's response is judged in light of her own prior conduct. Brake maintenance could matter to ordinary negligence, but it is not the key issue for invoking the emergency doctrine unless her brakes were the reason she could not stop. The cyclist's location in the bicycle lane proves she was in the lane of danger, but it does not determine whether Priya may rely on the emergency doctrine.
On exam day, when you see emergency doctrine, ask: did the defendant's own negligence contribute to the emergency? If yes, the doctrine is unavailable.
- Which statement best describes Marcus's standard of care and potential liability?
Answer: Marcus is held to the standard of a reasonable person with epilepsy, and his decision to drive after missing his medication may be a breach because he had reason to know a seizure was more likely.
Whenever you see a sudden incapacitation or loss-of-consciousness defense in a negligence question, your task is to separate the defendant's conduct before the event from the event itself. The rule from Nelson v. Kramer creates two distinct inquiries: first, the standard of care (which is that of a reasonably prudent person with the same physical disability), and second, whether the sudden event was foreseeable. Here, Marcus has epilepsy, so you must measure him against a reasonable person with epilepsy—not a person without it. The sudden seizure itself would ordinarily excuse him if it were truly unforeseeable. However, he missed his medication and was explicitly told by his neurologist that he must never miss a dose. That gives him direct reason to anticipate a possible seizure. Therefore, the correct statement is that Marcus is held to the standard of a reasonable person with epilepsy, and his decision to drive after missing his medication may be a breach because he had reason to know a seizure was more likely.
The choice saying he is held to the standard of a reasonable person without epilepsy is wrong because the rule expressly uses the same-disability standard. The choice saying he is not negligent because he had been seizure-free for nine years and had no warning signs ignores the missed medication—that fact alone gives him reason to anticipate the event, making his decision to drive potentially negligent. The choice saying anyone who suffers a sudden seizure is automatically excused regardless of missed medication is too broad; it ignores the exception for when the person knew or should have known the event was likely.
Your takeaway: in these questions, always ask whether the defendant had advance notice—a missed dose, a prior symptom, or a doctor's warning—that the incapacitation could occur. If yes, the act of driving itself is the negligent act.
- Which statement is most accurate regarding Victor's ability to use the sudden emergency doctrine?
Answer: Victor may use the doctrine because his expired license was not a substantial factor in creating the emergency; his emergency response is judged by a relaxed standard, and the license violation is a separate matter.
When you see a sudden emergency doctrine question, focus on whether the defendant's pre-emergency negligence caused the emergency itself. The doctrine lowers the standard of care for reactions during the crisis—it does not excuse separate, unrelated negligence. Here, Victor's expired license is unrelated to the child darting out; it did not create the emergency. Thus, his response (braking, swerving) is judged by a relaxed standard, while the license violation remains a separate issue—he can still be liable for that, but it doesn't bar the doctrine.
Why the others fail: The claim that "a negligent driver may never invoke the doctrine" overstates the rule—the doctrine only excludes negligence that substantially contributed to the emergency, not any prior negligence. The suggestion that it "replaces the reasonable-person standard with a subjective good-faith standard" is wrong; it still uses an objective standard, just relaxed for emergency conditions, and it does not excuse all conduct. Finally, the idea that the emergency was "foreseeable" because children play in residential neighborhoods misapplies foreseeability—the doctrine applies to sudden, unexpected emergencies; anticipation of a general risk doesn't make the specific darting child non-emergency.
Strategy tip: On bar exam questions, always separate the cause of the emergency from the reaction to it. Ask: "Did this defendant's negligence help create the crisis?" If not, the doctrine is available—even if the defendant had other unrelated negligence.
- Is the pharmacy's violation negligence per se?
Answer: No, because the regulation guards against drug theft, not injuries from a cabinet door.
A statute or regulation sets the standard of care only if it was meant to protect the plaintiff's class against the kind of harm that occurred. This regulation targets theft and diversion of controlled substances. A cabinet door striking a customer is a different kind of harm, so the violation is not negligence per se. Ruth may still prove ordinary negligence, for example by showing that a reasonable pharmacy would secure a heavy cabinet door. The answer treating any safety violation that precedes an injury as per se negligence omits the type-of-harm requirement. The answer focusing on the class of persons addresses only half the test, and even that half is doubtful, since the regulation protects the public from drug diversion rather than customers from the cabinet. The answer barring all recovery overstates the consequence; failing the per se test removes the shortcut, not the ordinary negligence claim.
- Is Dr. Wells's conduct measured by her knowledge as an engineer?
Answer: Yes, because she actually knew the corrosion signaled a risk of collapse, and an actor must use superior knowledge she possesses.
The reasonable-person standard sets a floor, not a ceiling. An actor who actually has superior knowledge or skill must use it, so the question is whether a reasonable person with Dr. Wells's knowledge would have recognized the risk. She did recognize it and still let twenty guests onto the deck. The answer limiting her to the standard of an ordinary homeowner because she was off duty misunderstands the rule, which turns on what she actually knows, not on the capacity in which she acts. The answer measuring her against a reasonable homeowner states the floor and ignores the requirement to use superior knowledge. The answer applying the professional standard reaches the right result for the wrong reason: she is not held to everything a reasonable engineer would know in all circumstances, only to the knowledge she actually has.
- Is Earl's intellectual disability a defense to the negligence claim?
Answer: No, because an adult's mental deficiency does not lower the standard of care, which Earl's conduct failed to meet.
The law treats physical and mental limitations differently. A physical disability adjusts the standard to that of a reasonable person with the same disability, but an adult's mental deficiency does not. Earl is held to the standard of a reasonable person, who would not leave a lit candle beside curtains and leave the apartment. His disability is not a defense. The answer extending the physical-disability rule to mental deficiency ignores the express distinction, the error this item tests. The answer about conscious disregard applies the definition of recklessness; negligence does not require awareness of the risk. The no-duty answer converts an argument about breach into one about duty; Earl owed his neighbor a duty of reasonable care in using fire, and his inability to understand the risk does not eliminate it.
- Is Cole liable to Dana?
Answer: No, because his lack of a license does not show that his work fell below the standard of care, and the work met every code requirement.
Violating a licensing statute does not by itself establish negligence. A license reflects the state's general judgment about qualifications, but the question in a negligence case is whether the actor's conduct fell below the standard of care. Cole's wiring met every code requirement, and the fire came from an undetectable manufacturing defect, so his conduct was not negligent, licensed or not. The per se answer treats a licensing requirement as a standard of conduct for the particular work; courts generally decline to do so, because the absence of a license says nothing about how the work was done. The answer shifting the burden to Cole has no basis; the plaintiff must prove negligence. The assumption-of-risk answer adds a fact not in the record, since nothing shows Dana knew the license had lapsed, and it misstates the reason Cole prevails.
- Which issue is most important in determining the standard of care Elliot owed the pedestrian?
Answer: Whether Elliot's mental condition should be considered in determining the standard of care.
When you see a negligence question asking about the standard of care, remember that the law generally applies an objective "reasonable person" test. A defendant's mental characteristics—including dementia, intellectual disability, or insanity—do not lower that standard. The key issue is exactly what the correct answer states: whether Elliot's mental condition should be considered at all. It should not. He is held to the same standard as a reasonable person without dementia, so his confusion does not excuse running a red light.
The daughter's belief that he should not drive is not the central issue; it might be evidence of notice or foreseeability in a different context, but it does not define the standard of care Elliot owed. Whether Elliot understood that running a red light could injure someone sounds like a subjective-awareness test, but negligence is judged objectively—he is expected to know the risks a reasonable person would know. Finally, whether his confusion had caused prior red-light running goes to habit or notice, not to the governing standard. The standard is fixed by law, not by Elliot's personal history.
On exam day, when a defendant argues "my condition should lower the standard," immediately recall the objective standard and its limited exceptions. The best answer is the one that frames the legal question correctly, not the facts that make the defendant sympathetic.
- Should Ana's recovery be reduced for her own negligence?
Answer: No, because Ana acted as a reasonable person with her disability would act by using her cane on a familiar route.
A person with a physical disability is held to the standard of a reasonable person with the same disability. The question is not whether a sighted person would have avoided the trench but whether a reasonable blind pedestrian would have. The expert testimony shows that Ana used a long cane on a familiar route, which is accepted practice, so she was not negligent and her recovery should not be reduced. The answer measuring Ana against a sighted person applies the objective standard without the adjustment the law makes for physical disabilities. The assumption-of-risk answer invents a rule that a blind person must use a guide dog or bear all undetectable hazards. The answer excusing Ana from any standard overcorrects; a person with a disability must still exercise the care a reasonable person with that disability would use, such as using a cane.
- Is the transit authority liable?
Answer: Yes, because the highest degree of care required waiting a few seconds for Gina to sit.
Common carriers owe their passengers the highest degree of care consistent with practical operation, and are liable for slight negligence. The driver saw an elderly passenger with a cane walking to her seat and could, without practical difficulty, have waited a few seconds. Pulling away before she sat down falls short of the elevated standard, even if an ordinary driver might do the same. The ordinary-driver answer applies the general reasonable-person standard instead of the carrier's heightened duty. The insurer answer overstates the rule; a carrier is not liable for every injury, only for failing to exercise the highest practicable care, which is what happened here. The assumption-of-risk answer would let a carrier escape its heightened duty for exactly the risks that duty is meant to address.
