- Will a court agree with Dara?
Answer: No, because isolated prior violations do not establish an intent to abandon the covenant.
Whenever you see a covenant enforcement question with prior violations, the key issue is abandonment or waiver. Courts are reluctant to find that a homeowners association gave up its right to enforce a covenant; that requires clear intent, not just sporadic past violations. Here, three blue houses among forty, even over many years, are isolated violations. The association's failure to act against them does not show an intent to abandon the earth-tone requirement. So Dara loses: isolated prior violations do not establish an intent to abandon the covenant.
The first wrong choice, that failure to enforce a covenant against any prior violation waives it for all owners, overstates the doctrine. Even waiver is limited and requires intent, not any violation. The selective-enforcement argument is also flawed: equal protection applies to government action, and a private homeowners association is generally not a state actor. Plus, unequal enforcement does not automatically make the covenant unenforceable. Finally, the actual-notice answer is a trap: notice matters for whether a subsequent purchaser is bound by a covenant, but it does not help Dara here—if anything, notice supports enforcement of the covenant against her.
Study tip: when a defendant argues nonenforcement, ask whether the violations are isolated or widespread, and whether the association's conduct shows deliberate abandonment. Sporadic violations rarely suffice; a pattern of nonenforcement or a changed neighborhood might.
- Which of the following is Chris's best defense?
Answer: Chris is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the unrecorded servitude.
Whenever a promise restricts land use but is unrecorded, and the property is sold, your first thought should be the recording act and notice. This is a real covenant/equitable servitude question, but the twist is that Chris is a subsequent purchaser with no actual knowledge. For a successor to be bound, they must have notice—actual, inquiry, or constructive. Since the writing was unrecorded and Chris paid full value, he is a bona fide purchaser (BFP) without notice. Therefore, his best defense is that he takes free of this unrecorded servitude. The promise is enforceable against Alex (the original promisor) regardless of recording, but against Chris, the lack of notice blocks Beth's injunction.
Now, the distractors: the claim that "the writing was unrecorded, so the promise is unenforceable even against Alex" is wrong—recording only affects third-party notice, not the original promisor's personal liability. The statement that "a covenant cannot be enforced against a successor who did not sign the original writing" is a trap; covenants run with the land to successors if they touch and concern the land and the successor has notice—signing isn't required. Finally, the assertion that "the promise is an affirmative covenant and does not touch and concern the land" is doubly flawed: this is a negative covenant (restrictive), and it clearly touches and concerns because it restricts use and affects value.
Study tip: always separate the original promisor from a subsequent purchaser. The original is always bound; a purchaser is only bound with notice. Spotting a "BFP without notice" is your key to defeating an unrecorded servitude.
- Will Cara prevail?
Answer: Yes, because the residential-use restriction is an equitable servitude that binds Ben, who had notice of the common scheme.
Whenever you see a subdivision with a recorded declaration and later owners, think equitable servitudes. Even if a deed does not repeat the restriction, a later purchaser is bound in equity if the restriction was part of a common scheme and the purchaser had notice. Here the declaration was in the chain of title for all lots, and Ben actually knew about it before buying. That notice is enough to make the residential-use restriction enforceable. Cara, as another lot owner under the same scheme, is a benefited party and can seek an injunction.
The "reformation" answer fails because Ben's deed does not need to be reformed: the recorded declaration plus his notice already create an equitable servitude. The "purchaser whose deed does not contain a restriction is not bound" answer is the classic trap; it confuses legal covenants with equitable servitudes, which can bind successors through notice alone. The "only against the original grantor" answer is also wrong: fellow lot owners under a common scheme can enforce restrictions against later owners, not just the original promise.
Study tip: for servitudes, ask about intent and notice above all. A recorded declaration in the chain of title gives constructive notice, and actual knowledge is even stronger.
- What is the likely result?
Answer: An injunction should be granted; the developer's common scheme and Tara's notice created an implied equitable servitude on her lot.
This question tests implied equitable servitudes in a common scheme. When a developer sells lots under a uniform residential plan and the earlier deeds contain a restriction benefiting all lots, later purchasers whose deeds omit the restriction may still be bound if they had notice of the common scheme.
Here the first 20 deeds contained the residential-only covenant and were recorded. The brochure also promised a residential-only community, and Tara walked into a neighborhood where every home was a house. She saw the recorded deed for Lot 1 before buying. Even though Tara's deed lacked the restriction, she had inquiry notice of the common scheme. Equity will enforce the servitude because it would be unfair to let her buy into a residential neighborhood and then open a business—she knew enough to investigate.
The "recorded restriction automatically binds every later lot" choice is overbroad: a restriction binds only if it is in the purchaser's chain of title or otherwise gives notice, not merely because it exists somewhere in subdivision records. The "Statute of Frauds" choice misunderstands the doctrine: an equitable servitude can bind Tara through notice of the earlier deeds, so she need not have signed a writing herself. Finally, the "no actual notice" choice fails because actual notice is not required; the brochure and recorded deed supplied inquiry notice, which is enough.
On exam day, look for common-scheme facts: uniform development plan, recorded or visible restrictions, and purchaser notice. That equals an implied equitable servitude even if the current deed is silent.
- Which of the following best describes the court's likely response?
Answer: It will refuse the injunction but may award damages because the covenant is a real covenant running with the land.
Whenever you see a covenant case, separate the legal remedy from the equitable one: a valid real covenant can still support money damages even when a court refuses to order someone to stop violating it. Here, the covenant was written in every deed, expressly "ran with the land," and touched and concerned the use of the lots, so Dana took her lot bound by it as a real covenant.
That is why the court likely refuses the injunction but may award damages. The neighborhood's change to commercial use is an equitable defense: when changed conditions defeat the covenant's purpose, a court may decline injunctive relief because enforcing it would be oppressive or inequitable. But that defense does not erase the covenant at law, so neighbors can still seek damages for breach.
The choice saying the court refuses both because changed conditions "extinguished" the covenant goes too far—changed conditions limit equity, not legal enforceability. The choice saying the court grants the injunction because changed conditions never excuse breach ignores the court's equitable discretion. And the choice saying the court awards damages and also issues the injunction because the covenant's purpose was defeated gets the equity result backwards: a defeated purpose makes an injunction less likely, not more.
Study tip: on real covenants, ask two questions separately—is the burden valid at law, and is equitable relief appropriate? Changed conditions usually kill the injunction, not the damages claim.
- What should the court do?
Answer: Deny the injunction, because judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant is state action that violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Whenever you see a covenant that would exclude a buyer based on race, immediately think of the state action doctrine. A racially restrictive covenant is not unconstitutional merely because private parties signed it—but the moment a court is asked to enforce it, that judicial decree becomes state action. Here, the neighbor is asking the court to enjoin the sale, and enforcing the covenant would be exactly the kind of state-sponsored discrimination the Equal Protection Clause forbids. So the court should deny the injunction.
The choice that says judicial enforcement is state action violating the Equal Protection Clause is correct. The key is that the covenant's existence is not the problem; the court's power is what would make the discrimination effective, and the state cannot lend its authority to racial discrimination.
The choice saying the covenant is a valid private agreement ignores the crucial role of the court—private agreements may be valid, but they cannot be judicially enforced if enforcement violates constitutional rights. The choice saying the buyer has no rights under the covenant misses the point: the buyer is the one being discriminated against, and the Equal Protection Clause protects everyone from state action, not just parties to a covenant. The choice saying the covenant was not intended to run with the land is factually wrong and distracts from the constitutional issue; even if the covenant ran with the land, it still could not be enforced.
Remember: on the bar exam, racially restrictive covenants are never enforceable in court, no matter how clearly drafted. Spot the request for judicial enforcement and answer "deny—state action."
- If the Association sues Tom for unpaid assessments, which of the following is its best argument?
Answer: The covenant is a servitude that runs with Tom's land because it touches and concerns the land, was intended to run, and Tom had notice.
This question tests real covenants and equitable servitudes. When you see an HOA assessment, your first instinct should be to run through the requirements for a covenant running with the land: writing, intent to run, touch-and-concern, privity, and notice.
Here, the recorded declaration satisfies the writing requirement and expressly states the covenant "runs with the land and binds all successors," so intent is clear. The $100 monthly maintenance fee touches and concerns the land because it supports common areas that benefit every lot. Tom's deed came from a chain of title containing the declaration, so he had notice. Thus, the best argument is that the covenant is a servitude running with Tom's land.
"Tom's acceptance of the deed made him a party to the declaration" is tempting but wrong: acceptance does not make him a contract signatory, and contract privity alone would not bind later owners. The "negative easement appurtenant" choice confuses an affirmative payment obligation with a negative easement, and the Association does not hold a dominant estate in the common areas. The "third-party beneficiary" choice is also wrong: Tom made no promise in his deed to the Association; the Association's rights come from the recorded servitude, not from third-party beneficiary law.
Study tip: for any HOA-fee question, test "writing, intent, touch-and-concern, privity, notice" before choosing an answer. That checklist separates valid servitudes from contract and easement traps.
- Which of the following best explains the court's likely response?
Answer: It will deny the injunction because Amy has unclean hands by virtue of her own ongoing violation.
Whenever you see a restrictive covenant dispute where the plaintiff seeks an injunction, remember that equity is discretionary. A court will not aid a plaintiff who is themselves violating the same rule—this is the doctrine of unclean hands. Amy built an identical tool shed in violation of the covenant. Because she asks for equitable relief to stop Bill from doing exactly what she is doing, the court will deny the injunction due to Amy's unclean hands. The choice stating that the court will deny because Amy has unclean hands by virtue of her own ongoing violation is correct. Now consider the other options. The choice stating that the court will grant the injunction because one owner's violation does not excuse another's reflects a legal truth for damages, but it misses the key fact that Amy seeks an injunction, where her own misconduct disqualifies her. The choice that Bill is entitled to equal treatment under the covenant is a misconception—no one has a right to violate a covenant merely because a neighbor does. Finally, the choice that the court will grant the injunction because the covenant is enforceable against all owners is technically correct about enforceability, but it ignores the plaintiff-specific defense of unclean hands that blocks Amy's request. Study tip: On bar exam questions, immediately flag when a plaintiff seeking an injunction is themselves breaching the agreement—this triggers the unclean hands defense and overrides the otherwise valid enforcement of the covenant.
- Which statement best describes the likely outcome?
Answer: The covenant is enforceable; the changed conditions were mostly outside the subdivision and have not defeated its residential character.
Whenever you see a covenant enforcement question, think about two things: who is entitled to enforce, and whether changed circumstances have made the restriction obsolete. Here, the covenant's purpose is to keep the subdivision residential, and that purpose still holds.
The covenant is enforceable because the changed conditions are mostly outside the subdivision. A nearby airport and commercial rezoning may affect the surrounding area, but 38 of 40 lots remain single-family homes, so the subdivision's residential character is intact. The covenant still provides a real benefit to the homeowners, and one owner's warehouse would directly violate its plain language.
The wrong answers each miss a key point. "Enforceable only if all other owners support enforcement" is wrong because covenants are enforced by any benefited owner; unanimity is not required. "Unenforceable; changed conditions in the vicinity have destroyed the benefit" overstates the change — the vicinity changed, but the subdivision itself did not. "Zoning change to commercial use supersedes the private covenant" confuses public zoning with private agreements; a zoning change does not automatically invalidate a covenant. Finally, "changed conditions were mostly outside the subdivision" is actually the correct reasoning, not a reason to deny enforcement.
Your study tip: distinguish covenants from zoning and remember the changed-conditions doctrine focuses on whether the restriction's purpose can still be achieved inside the benefited area. If the neighborhood still looks residential, the covenant lives.
- Who is likely to prevail in the lawsuit?
Answer: Rachel, because the covenant was intended to run, the restriction touches and concerns both lots, and privity exists through the later successions.
This question presents a land-use restriction dispute—a classic real covenants problem. Whenever you see a damages suit based on a promise about land, distinguish enforcement at law (real covenant) from enforcement in equity (equitable servitude).. Damages require the original promise to qualify as a real covenant: the parties must intend the burden and benefit to run, the promise must touch and concern both parcels, horizontal privity must exist between the original covenanting parties, and vertical privity must exist between each original party and her successor.
Here all requirements are met. Dana and Paul were in horizontal privity as grantor/grantee; Paul's deed expressly said "for himself, his heirs and assigns" and "for the benefit of Dana, her heirs, successors, and assigns, as owners of Lot 2"—showing intent to bind and benefit successors. The residential-use restriction touches and concerns both Lot 1 (burdened) and Lot 2 (benefited).. Paul conveyed his entire fee to Nina, and Dana conveyed her entire fee to Rachel, creating vertical privity in both chains. So Rachel may sue for damages; Nina's actual knowledge was a bonus, not a prerequisite to a legal real covenant.
The "only if she proves actual knowledge" answer fails because notice is required for equitable servitudes, not real covenants. The answers favoring Nina both assume Rachel could not enforce absent being an original party, or that Nina could not be bound absent restatement in her deed—but a covenant that runs with the land passes automatically to successors as part of the estate. Watch for this pattern: express language that a covenant binds "heirs and assigns" signals a running-covenants question, so run the four requirements instead of demanding a new agreement.
- What is the neighboring owner likely to obtain?
Answer: An order to remove the garage, but no damages for the period before Priya bought the lot.
This question tests the distinction between real covenants (which give rise to damages) and equitable servitudes (which give rise to injunctions), specifically how these remedies apply to a successor in title. When you see a recorded covenant and a sale, you must analyze whether the burden runs to the new owner (intent, touch and concern, privity, and notice) and then separate remedies for past harms from prospective compliance.
The correct outcome is an order to remove the garage, but no damages for the period before Priya bought. The covenant runs because it was recorded, states it benefits every lot, and Priya's deed expressly said "subject to all covenants." Thus, she is bound to comply, so removal is proper. However, damages for the period while Dane owned the lot are a personal liability of Dane. Priya did not commit that breach and did not assume Dane's liability; she is only liable for her own period of ownership.
"Damages only for the period after Priya bought the lot, because equity will not order removal of a structure she did not build" is wrong because equity will order removal of a violating structure from the land, even if the current owner didn't build it, as the burden runs with the land. "Neither an order to remove the garage nor damages, because Priya did not build the garage" is wrong for the same reason—it conflates personal liability for past damages with the land-bound obligation to comply. "Both an order to remove the garage and damages for the entire violation period, because she took subject to the covenant" is wrong because taking "subject to" does not make her personally liable for a prior owner's breach; it only subjects her land to enforcement.
Study tip: Always separate legal damages (personal, based on one's own wrongdoing) from equitable injunctions (run with the land). A successor is liable for an injunction to stop a continuing violation, but not for damages accruing before they took title.
- Who is likely to prevail?
Answer: Nina, because the promise is an equitable servitude binding Carl, who took with notice.
When you see a land-use restriction and a suit for an injunction, your first move is to distinguish between a real covenant (legal remedy, damages) and an equitable servitude (equitable remedy, injunction). Because Nina seeks to enjoin Carl's commercial use, the analysis centers on equitable servitudes.
Nina prevails because the recorded agreement stated the promise was "for the benefit of Paula's lot, her heirs and assigns," clearly demonstrating intent that the burden and benefit run with the land. Carl read that recorded agreement before buying, giving him actual notice. For an equitable servitude, notice is the decisive factor in binding a subsequent purchaser. Nina, as Paula's assignee, can enforce it.
The choice claiming the promise wasn't in Owen's deed to Carl fails because an equitable servitude need not be in the deed; a separate recorded agreement suffices, and notice, not the deed, is what binds Carl. The choice saying the promise was made to Paula personally is wrong because the explicit "heirs and assigns" language shows the parties intended the benefit to run with the land, not remain personal. The choice identifying it as a real covenant is a trap: while a real covenant's burden can run, it is enforced with money damages, not an injunction. Since Nina seeks equitable relief, the correct classification is an equitable servitude.
On the exam, when the plaintiff asks for an injunction, think "equitable servitude." Remember that notice is the key to binding a successor in equity, and that real covenants give damages, not injunctions.
