- Should the court grant the motion?
Answer: No, because a lack of personal jurisdiction defense is waived if not asserted in the first responsive pleading.
Under Rule 12(h)(1), lack of personal jurisdiction is waived if it is not raised by motion or included in the first responsive pleading. The defendant's answer omitted the defense, so the later motion is untimely. Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction is waivable, and the court need not raise it sua sponte.
- Does New York have specific personal jurisdiction over Brenda?
Answer: Yes, because Brenda intentionally aimed her defamatory post at a known New York resident and the brunt of the harm occurred in New York.
Specific personal jurisdiction in an intentional tort case turns on whether the defendant purposefully directed conduct at the forum state—not merely whether their words caused harm there. Think of the Calder effects test: purposeful direction plus knowledge the plaintiff would suffer injury in the forum. Here Brenda knew Maya was a New York entrepreneur, falsely accused her in order to harm her New York business, and the brunt of the lost business occurred in New York. That is enough: Brenda targeted the forum through Maya, making New York the focal point of the tort.
The choice saying no because a website accessible in New York is not by itself a contact is an overstatement: true that mere accessibility alone would not suffice, but here there is far more—intentional aiming at a known New York resident. The choice saying no because effects alone are insufficient also misses the mark: this was not just a foreseeable effect; it was deliberate targeting of Maya's New York business. The choice saying yes because the website was accessible and caused injury there is also wrong: it suggests passive availability plus injury is enough, but due process requires intentional aiming, not just accessibility. Accessibility is not the decisive fact. Therefore specific jurisdiction exists because Brenda intentionally aimed her defamatory post at a known New York resident and the brunt of the injury occurred there. Exam strategy: when you see a specific jurisdiction question, separate "accessibility/foreseeability" from "intentional targeting." If the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant knew where the victim lived or worked and aimed the conduct there, the forum may exercise jurisdiction even if the defendant had no other contacts with the state.
- Is the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dana proper?
Answer: Yes, because Dana is domiciled in Illinois and is therefore subject to general jurisdiction there even though the claim arose in Michigan.
When you see a question about personal jurisdiction over an individual, your first move is to ask whether the claim is related to the forum (specific jurisdiction) or whether the defendant is "at home" in the forum (general jurisdiction). For individuals, "at home" is synonymous with domicile, which requires physical presence plus an intent to remain indefinitely.
Here, Dana satisfies both elements of domicile. She has lived in Chicago for seven years, rents an apartment, files Illinois taxes, and holds an Illinois license. She also considers Chicago her home and has no definite plans to leave. That present intent to remain is what matters. Once she is domiciled in Illinois, general jurisdiction applies, meaning she can be sued there for any claim—including the Michigan boating accident—even though the claim arose elsewhere. So the correct answer is the one stating she is domiciled and subject to general jurisdiction.
Now, why are the others wrong? The choice claiming "physically present in Illinois when Paul filed suit" is a trap: mere presence at the time of filing is not the standard for general jurisdiction, and it does not support jurisdiction over a claim arising outside the state. The choice asserting a Canadian citizen "cannot acquire a domicile" is flatly wrong—domicile is a matter of intent and presence, not citizenship. Finally, the choice citing her "expectation she will one day retire in Canada" confuses a vague future plan with a present intent to leave. Domicile is determined by her current state of mind, not by assumptions about retirement decades from now.
For your exam, remember: domicile looks at present intent to remain indefinitely. A future desire to move elsewhere doesn't defeat it.
- Does Texas have specific personal jurisdiction over Best Brands?
Answer: Yes, because Best Brands purposefully availed itself of Texas by negotiating with and entering a continuing relationship with a Texas company.
When you see a personal jurisdiction question, ask two things: did the defendant purposefully avail itself of the forum, and does the plaintiff's claim arise from those contacts? That is specific jurisdiction. Here, Best Brands' reps made six trips to Texas to negotiate a five-year distribution agreement with a Texas company, creating an ongoing business relationship. Those are deliberate contacts with the forum, and the breach-of-contract claim directly arises from that relationship. So Texas has specific jurisdiction — the correct answer is the one recognizing that negotiation plus a continuing relationship constitutes purposeful availment.
The answer claiming "No, because Best Brands' contacts were made through Texas Distributors" is wrong: the trips and agreement were Best Brands' own actions, not the distributor's. The answer saying "a contract with a Texas resident, without more, is insufficient" misses the "more" — six negotiation trips and a multi-year relationship. Finally, the answer that the "choice-of-law clause automatically subjects Best Brands to jurisdiction" is wrong: a choice-of-law clause is a factor, but it does not by itself waive personal jurisdiction or create minimum contacts.
Study tip: distinguish general from specific jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction, look for the defendant's own purposeful conduct aimed at the forum and make sure the lawsuit arises from that conduct. A single contract is rarely enough, but negotiation trips and a continuing relationship usually are.
- Is Washington's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Victor proper?
Answer: Yes, because Victor impliedly consented to suit in Washington by using its roads, and service under the statute was proper.
This question tests personal jurisdiction under a nonresident motorist statute—a classic example of implied consent. When a nonresident drives into a state and uses its public roads, the state may treat that use as consent to suit for claims arising from that driving, and it may substitute service on it secretary of state for in-hand service.
Here vic tor deliberately drove into Washington and collided with patricia in Seat tle. Because his use of Washington's roads created a direct connection to the lawsuit, Washington may assert specific jurisdiction over him. The state's nonresident motorist statute authorized service on the secretary of state, and the secretary's mailing the summons and complaint to his Oregon address was reasonably calculated to give him notice. So the exercise was proper.**
The "not personally served while in Washington" argument misses the point: substituted service on the secretary plus mailing satisfies due process, the statute deems him to have appointed the secretary as his agent. The "driving through Washington was too incidental" argument also fails:a collision in Seattle is not incidental—the accident arose from exactly that driving, giving Washington a strong regulatory interest. The "general jurisdiction over nonresident motorists" claim is wrong too: general jurisdiction requires systematic and continuous contacts, not one accident; statutory consent creates only specific jurisdiction over claims from the accident.
On exam questions, remember the pattern: nonresident motorist statute = implied consent + substitute service; jurisdiction is specific, not general.
- Should the California court dismiss the action?
Answer: Yes, because GreenCorp is at home only in Delaware and New Jersey, and its California contacts are not exceptional.
Whenever you see a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, separate the inquiry into specific jurisdiction (claim arises from the defendant's in-state contacts) and general jurisdiction (defendant is "at home" in the forum). Because the claim has no connection to California, specific jurisdiction is out immediately: the discharge at GreenCorp's New Jersey headquarters did not arise from any California activity. That eliminates any argument that "GreenCorp purposefully directs products at California and the claim arises from that activity" -- even if such direction existed, the claim does not arise from it.
But should the court dismiss on general jurisdiction grounds? General jurisdiction required a corporation to be "at home." A corporation is ordinarily at home only in its state of incorporation and its principal place of business -- here Delaware and New Jersey. A forum can also be a home in an "exceptional" case, but California contacts must be so substantial that the corporation is essentially at home there. Five sales offices, 150 employees, and 5% of revenue are continuous and systematic, but they are not exceptional. So the argument that "GreenCorp's California sales offices and employees constitute continuous systematic contacts" relies on the old, rejected standard: continuous contacts alone no longer suffice for general jurisdiction. Similarly, "a corporation may be sued only in its state of incorporation" is too narrow -- suit can also lie where the corporation is at home, in its principal place of business, or sometimes where a specific claim arises from forum contacts. Therefore the California court should dismiss: GreenCorp's California presence is ordinary regional business, not the exceptional "at home" circumstance.
Memorize the rule: for general jurisdiction, do not ask "how much business?" ask "is this corporation at home here?" For a corporation, home means incorporation plus principal place of business -- unless the facts are truly extraordinary.
- Is Hawaii's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Derek proper?
Answer: No, because the claim is unrelated to the property and Derek has no other contacts with Hawaii sufficient to satisfy due process.
Under Shaffer v. Heitner, quasi in rem jurisdiction must satisfy the same minimum-contacts test as other assertions of jurisdiction. Derek's ownership of the Hawaii condo is a contact, but it is unrelated to Leila's contract claim and insufficient for general jurisdiction. Presence of property alone no longer supports jurisdiction over an unrelated claim. A long-arm statute would not save the suit because the constitutional requirement fails.
- Is New York's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dmitri proper?
Answer: Yes, because service of process on Dmitri while he was physically present in New York is sufficient to establish general jurisdiction.
Under Burnham, service of process on an individual while physically present in the forum is a traditional and constitutionally sufficient basis for general jurisdiction, even if the presence is transient and the claim is unrelated. Dmitri was present in New York when served, so New York has jurisdiction. Brief presence does not violate due process for individuals, and no effects test is needed.
- Can the federal court exercise personal jurisdiction over the Swiss company?
Answer: Yes, because the claim arises under federal law and the company's aggregate contacts with the United States satisfy due process.
FRCP 4(k)(2) provides a federal long-arm for federal claims when the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state and has sufficient aggregate contacts with the United States as a whole. The Swiss company's nationwide activities and the federal antitrust claim satisfy that rule. The general state-long-arm rule has this exception, and lack of Massachusetts contacts is irrelevant under 4(k)(2).
- Should the court dismiss the action?
Answer: No, because Nadia consented to personal jurisdiction in California by agreeing to the forum selection clause.
Whenever you see a personal jurisdiction question, first ask: is jurisdiction based on contacts, or has the defendant consented? Consent is an independent basis for personal jurisdiction and can waive the constitutional minimum-contacts requirement. Here, Nadia signed a negotiated contract with a clause stating that all disputes must be brought in San Francisco courts. By agreeing to that mandatory forum selection clause, she consented to personal jurisdiction in California. A valid consent to jurisdiction is enough, even if she has no other contacts with the state, so the court should not dismiss.
The answer choice saying "Nadia lacks minimum contacts apart from the contract" misses the point: minimum contacts are not required when the defendant has consented. Similarly, the claim that "a forum selection clause cannot waive the constitutional requirement" is backwards — parties may waive personal-jurisdiction objections by agreement, and courts enforce such clauses. Finally, "the California company's execution of the contract in California establishes specific jurisdiction" confuses the plaintiff's conduct with the defendant's contacts; the company's own acts cannot create jurisdiction over Nadia, and the real basis for jurisdiction is her consent, not the company's signing location.
Your study tip: when you see a forum selection clause in a contract, immediately recognize it as consent to jurisdiction. Distinguish consent cases from "minimum contacts" cases, and remember that a valid contractual clause can override what would otherwise be a lack of personal jurisdiction.
- Is Nevada's exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Payne proper?
Answer: Yes, because Payne personally directed business activity at Nevada and the claim arises from that activity.
A corporate officer does not enjoy a blanket shield merely because he acted for the corporation. If the officer personally directed conduct at the forum and the claim arises from that conduct, specific jurisdiction may be exercised. Payne emailed a Nevada retailer and approved shipment of the allegedly defective machine, and the worker's injury arises from that sale. Corporate jurisdiction over MineCo does not automatically give jurisdiction over Payne.
- Which of the following statements best supports Acme's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction?
Answer: Knowledge that valves might reach Texas is not enough without additional conduct by Acme purposefully directed at Texas.
Whenever you see a personal jurisdiction question, ask whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum state. In the products context, the stream-of-commerce theory says a defendant may be haled into a forum if it deliberately has placed goods into that stream and has purposefully directed conduct at the forum — not merely because it knows its product might eventually arrive there. That is exactly why the statement that knowledge valves might reach Texas is not enough without additional conduct purposefully directed at Texas supports Acme's motion. Acme's passive awareness of downstream Texas sales does not establish minimum contacts.
The first wrong choice, that the sale occurred outside Texas so Acme made no contact, confuses the location of the sale with the defendant's purposeful reach into the forum. A sale outside Texas can still produce contacts if Acme intentionally served the Texas market through distributors. The second wrong choice, that the injury did not arise from any contact because the sale occurred outside Texas, similarly overemphasizes geography; specific jurisdiction requires an injury arising from the defendant's forum-related contacts, and Acme's deliberate distribution network could satisfy that if proven. The third wrong choice, that a German corporation cannot be sued in a U.S. court without consent, ignores that foreign corporations are subject to jurisdiction when they have sufficient contacts with the forum.
Your takeaway: on personal jurisdiction questions, separate mere awareness from purposeful availment — courts require the defendant to intentionally target or benefit from the forum market.
