- Which of the following is the most significant legal issue raised by Drake's motion?
Answer: Whether State B may exercise criminal jurisdiction over Drake because the murder he allegedly procured was committed in State B, even though Drake was never present in State B.
When Drake moves to dismiss because he never entered State B and no act of his occurred there, the key is to separate criminal jurisdiction from the merits of guilt. A state may prosecute a defendant when the offense has a sufficient territorial connection to that state. Here, the crime Drake allegedly procured—the murder of Owen—was completed in State B. Because an accomplice is liable for the offense the principal commits, the murder occurred in State B, and State B has territorial jurisdiction over Drake even though he was never physically present. So the central issue is whether State B can exercise criminal jurisdiction based on the result in its territory.
The payment's legal sufficiency to make Drake an accomplice is a merits question about proof of intent and causation, not a jurisdictional challenge. The Extradition Clause issue concerns how Drake was brought to State B, not whether State B may try him once he is there. And Drake's interstate travel does not make federal jurisdiction exclusive; state and federal prosecutions can coexist, and a mere interstate trip does not bar state murder charges. Because Drake's motion attacks the court's power over him based on where he acted, the real question is jurisdiction over the offense. On questions like this, ask whether the crime's conduct or result occurred in the forum state—presence is often beside the point.
- Which issue is most important in deciding whether the State B federal district is a proper place for the prosecution?
Answer: Whether the threatening letter was received by the judge in State B.
Whenever you see a venue objection in a federal criminal case, ask where the offense was begun, continued, or completed. Mailing offenses are special: because the letter physically travels through the mail, venue may lie both in the district where it was sent and in the district where it was received. Here, the prosecutor chose the federal district in State B, so the decisive fact is whether the threatening letter was received by the judge in State B. If it was, the offense continued into and was completed in State B, making venue proper there. The defendant's claim that only State A can prosecute is therefore wrong for a mailing offense.
The judge's actual intimidation is not required—threat statutes generally use an objective standard, so the recipient's subjective fear is irrelevant. The defendant's motive to influence the judge's ruling is also not an element of the crime or a basis for venue; motive might be evidence, but it does not tell you where the crime occurred. Finally, the defendant used the U.S. mail does supply federal jurisdiction, but it is only a jurisdictional hook; without receipt in State B, mailing alone would not make State B a place where the offense was completed.
Study tip: always separate jurisdiction from venue. A federal interest can make the crime prosecutable in federal court, but venue requires a geographic connection through the elements of the offense—especially where the crime was completed.
- Should the court grant Rina's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction?
Answer: No, because Paul presented the check in State B,and Rina caused Paul's innocent act with the intent to defraud; Paul's act is deemed Rina's act for jurisdictional purposes.
When a defendant did not personally act in the forum state, the key is whether a statute attributes another person's in-state conduct to her. State B's accountability statute does exactly that for causing an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in conduct, and its territorial-jurisdiction provision then deems that conduct to be the defendant's own.
Here, Rina forged the check in State A, but the crime charged can also be based on the utterance or presentation of the forged instrument. Paul presented the check in State B, and he was innocent—he believed it was genuine. Rina caused his presentation by giving him the check and asking him to deposit it, and she acted with the intent to defraud. Therefore, Paul's presentation is legally Rina's act for jurisdictional purposes. The court should deny dismissal.
The first wrong answer claims the making in State A and Paul's presentation are separate acts for which Rina is not accountable. That ignores the statute making her accountable for causing an innocent person's conduct. The second wrong answer argues forgery is complete upon making, so later presentation cannot create jurisdiction. But forgery also covers uttering, and jurisdiction may rest on the in-state utterance caused by Rina. The third wrong answer says any State B bank presentment gives jurisdiction over everyone who later benefits. That is overbroad: mere benefit is not enough; the statute requires causing an innocent agent's in-state conduct with the required culpability.
On exam day, when you see an out-of-state defendant and an in-state innocent actor, check for an accountability statute—it often converts the actor's location into the defendant's jurisdiction.
- Does State B have jurisdiction over the attempted-murder prosecution?
Answer: Yes, because the murder Dina intended would have been committed in State B had the bomb detonated there,and Dina intended that result; subsection (b) permits jurisdiction despite the State A substantial step.
Whenever you see a jurisdiction statute with a special attempt subsection, don't stop at the general "element occurred here" rule—read the attempt provision carefully. State B's subsection (b) is designed exactly for this situation: it gives jurisdiction over attempt when the completed offense would have occurred in State B and the defendant intended that result, even if the substantial step happened entirely outside the state. Here, Dina intended the bomb to detonate at Vera's State B residence, so the completed murder would have occurred in State B. The fact that the package was intercepted in State A is irrelevant under subsection (b).
The first wrong answer, saying no jurisdiction because the attempt was complete when Dina mailed the package in State A, confuses the timing of the attempt with jurisdiction; the statute explicitly overrides that concern. The second wrong answer, saying no attempt element occurred in State B, also ignores subsection (b), which applies precisely when no attempt element occurred in the forum. The remaining wrong answer, saying intent to kill a State B resident is enough without regard to where the completed murder would have occurred, is too broad: victim residency alone isn't the test—the statute requires the intended completed crime would have been committed in State B, which is true here because Vera and the bomb's destination were in State B.
On the exam, treat statutory jurisdiction questions as close-reading exercises: check whether an attempt-specific provision displaces the default elements-based rule, and don't assume interception outside the forum defeats jurisdiction.
- Which issue is the most significant in evaluating the driver's argument?
Answer: Whether the driver's negligent act had a sufficient effect within State B to support the exercise of State B's jurisdiction.
Whenever a criminal case crosses state lines, stop and ask which state has territorial jurisdiction. This isn't about which event happened "first" or "last"; it's about whether the crime had a sufficient connection to the prosecuting state. Here, the driver's key factual claim is that his negligence and the death both happened in State A. But the homicide is more than those two moments: the truck collided with the motorcyclist on a State B road, causing the injury in State B. That collision is the harmful effect of the driver's conduct and is a sufficient basis for State B's jurisdiction. A state may punish conduct that occurs outside its borders if that conduct produces a harmful result within the state. State B's interest in protecting people on its roads makes its homicide statute applicable even though death later occurred in State A.
The answer suggesting that the death in State A makes State B's statute inapplicable mistakes the timing of death for the only jurisdictional fact; the injury and collision in State B are enough. The answer about the driver's custody in State A confuses territorial jurisdiction with procedural matters like extradition or venue. And the answer about the airlift is a causation trap—medical transport to a hospital does not ordinarily interrupt the causal chain, and causation is not the central jurisdictional question here.
Study tip: in multi-state crime questions, map where the conduct, injury, and death occurred. If either the conduct or the harmful result occurred in the state, that state likely has jurisdiction.
- Which issue must be resolved first in deciding whether the federal court can hear the case?
Answer: Whether the casino is within Indian country.
Whenever a federal criminal case involves an Indian defendant and a reservation, the threshold question is always jurisdiction: did the crime occur in "Indian country"? Federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is defined by statute, so you should start by mapping the location of the offense.
Here, that threshold issue is whether the casino is within Indian country. If it is—and a tribal casino on land held in trust by the United States for the tribe almost certainly is—then the federal district court may have jurisdiction over an assault by an enrolled tribal member. The land's status as Indian country is what makes federal jurisdiction possible in the first place.
The other choices are premature or irrelevant. Whether the assault occurred during a tribal ceremony does not affect the location-based jurisdictional analysis. Whether the tribe has consented to federal prosecution is also not the first question; tribes generally do not have a veto over federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. And whether the victim suffered serious bodily injury might affect the particular federal statute or charge, but it is not a jurisdictional prerequisite—it cannot tell you whether the federal court has authority to hear the case at all.
On questions like this, remember the gatekeeping step: establish "Indian country" before considering anything else. The location of the crime is the jurisdictional key, not the ceremony, not consent, and not the injury.
- Should the court grant Dana's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction?
Answer: No, because Paul's scouting was an overt act in State A in furtherance of the conspiracy, and the act is attributable to Dana.
When you see a conspiracy jurisdiction question, look first to the statute: it defines jurisdiction by either an in-state agreement or an in-state overt act by any co-conspirator. Here, the agreement occurred in State B, so the first basis fails. But the second basis succeeds. Paul drove into State A, rented a motel room, and scouted security-camera locations. Although those actions were preparatory, the statute expressly defines an overt act to include preparation undertaken to accomplish the conspiracy's objective. Paul's scouting was undertaken to facilitate the planned burglary, so it is an overt act in State A. Under conspiracy law, Paul's act is attributable to Dana as a co-conspirator, even though Dana never entered State A. Therefore, State A has jurisdiction.
The choice saying dismissal is required because the agreement was made in State B and Dana personally took no act in State A ignores the statute's overt-act prong and the rule that co-conspirators' acts count. The choice arguing scouting is mere preparation misreads the statute, which explicitly allows preparatory acts as overt acts. The choice asserting object-offense jurisdiction is sufficient is also wrong: this statute does not create jurisdiction simply because the target burglary would occur in State A; the required nexus is agreement or an overt act in the state.
Remember: on conspiracy jurisdiction questions, check the statute's wording and remember that one co-conspirator's overt act can create jurisdiction over all.
- Marcus moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Should the court grant the motion?
Answer: No, becauseuber?
Whenever you see a territorial-jurisdiction question under a criminal nonsupport statute, focus on the statute's elements, not on where the defendant currently lives. Here, the statute allows prosecution in State A if the child resides there, the defendant knew or should have known that, and the defendant failed to comply while the child so resided. All three elements are satisfied: Nina and the child stayed in State A, Marcus knew the child remained there, and he made no payments after moving. The statute also expressly says that absence from State A is not a defense to jurisdiction. So the court should deny the motion.
The correct "No" answer is the one that identifies Marcus's knowledge, the child's continued residence in State A, and Marcus's failure to pay while the child lived there. A "No" answer based only on the fact that State A issued the original support order is incomplete—the order alone is not enough; the statutory jurisdictional test must be met. Any "Yes" answer based on Marcus having moved to State B, being physically absent from State A, or no longer being domiciled in State A misunderstands the law: the defendant's location is irrelevant because the statute keys jurisdiction to the child's residence and the defendant's knowledge. A "Yes" answer claiming that the court order cannot be enforced outside State A would also be wrong, because the statute explicitly contemplates prosecution in State A despite the defendant's absence.
On exam day, when a statute defines jurisdiction, apply it element by element. If the facts match each element, the defendant's presence is not required.
- Should the charge be dismissed?
Answer: Yes, becauseughe shove is already punishable under the federal simple-assault statute,and the Act assimilates only conduct not made punishable by an Act of Congress.
Whenever you see the Assimilative Crimes Act, think "gap-filler": it lets a federal prosecutor borrow state criminal law only for conduct that Congress has not already made punishable inside federal enclaves. Here, Dana shoved Parker, causing offensive physical contact. Under 18 U.S.C. §113(b), "assault" includes a completed battery, and offensive physical contact is a completed battery. So Dana's conduct is already punishable under the federal simple-assault statute. That means the prosecutor cannot use the ACA to import State O's simple-assault statute solely to get a higher maximum penalty; the Act applies only to acts "not made punishable by an Act of Congress."
The jurisdiction objection is not a way out: Fort Ames is under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the United States, so it falls squarely within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction under §7(3). Similarly, the claim that "all state criminal laws in force at the fort" are incorporated is too broad—state law is incorporated only when it fills a gap in federal law, not as a wholesale replacement. And the argument that the ACA authorizes assimilation whenever the state penalty is higher is backwards: a higher penalty cannot create authority to prosecute when the same conduct is already covered by a federal statute.
On exam day, when you see the ACA, first ask: Is this exact conduct already punishable by federal law? If yes, the analysis stops—no assimilation, no matter how attractive the state penalty.
- Does State B have jurisdiction?
Answer: Yes, because Leo deliberately aimed his false statementat Nina in State B and knew that any resulting loss would occur in State B.
Whenever you see a criminal-jurisdiction question built on out-of-state conduct, the central issue is due process and the defendant's connection to the forum state—not physical presence. The rule from Ellison: a state may prosecute if the defendant deliberately aimed conduct at that state and knew harmful results would occur there.
Here, that test is satisfied. Leo telephoned Nina in State B, knowingly aimed his false sales pitch at her home state, and knew that if the deception worked, the loss would hit her bank account in State B. Nina's reliance and the wiring of funds from her State B account took place in State B, so the state has jurisdiction.
The choice saying "no element occurred in State B" is wrong because the false representation was received and relied upon in State B, and the victim's loss occurred there. The choice requiring "physical presence in the forum" is also wrong: due process is based on minimum contacts, not physical presence. And the choice claiming a state "always has jurisdiction to protect its residents" is overbroad—residence alone is not enough; the defendant must deliberately aim his conduct at the state.
For strategy, remember: ask who aimed the conduct, and where did the harm hit? Physical presence is not required; deliberate targeting plus foreseeable in-state harm is enough.
