- Which source is dispositive of Defendant's impossibility argument?
Answer: State v. Blair, because the victim's absence was a circumstance unknown to Defendant and is therefore factual impossibility, not a defense.
When you see an attempted-crime question involving a missing victim or a failed plan, the central issue is usually impossibility. Distinguish factual impossibility (the result is impossible only because of unknown circumstances) from legal impossibility (the intended conduct, if completed, would not be a crime). Factual impossibility is not a defense; legal impossibility is.
Here, the dispositive authority is State v. Blair. Defendant intended to kill Victim and fired into the bed, but Victim was absent. That absence is a circumstance unknown to Defendant — the crime was impossible only because Victim happened not to be there. Under Blair, that is classic factual impossibility, so it does not defeat attempted murder. The statute alone is not dispositive because it doesn't address impossibility; shooting at an empty bed can still be a substantial step toward killing the person you believe is there. State v. Chen does not apply: if Defendant's intended conduct had succeeded in killing the person in the bed, that would have been murder, so this is not legal impossibility. The law review article is merely persuasive, not binding precedent, and it directly conflicts with controlling case law.
Your takeaway: on exam questions involving impossibility, first ask why the crime failed. If the actor's goal was illegal but thwarted by hidden facts — a missing victim, an unloaded gun — that's factual impossibility and no defense. Only when the actor's completed goal would be lawful does legal impossibility apply.
- Which source is dispositive of whether D&N is bound on the note?
Answer: State Partnership Act § 301, because Bank knew Day lacked the required consent, so the exception to ordinary-course authority applies and the partnership is not bound.
Whenever you see a partnership-liability question, focus on apparent authority and what the third party actually knew. State Partnership Act §301 supplies the rule: a partner's act binds the partnership if it appears to carry on the partnership business in the ordinary course, unless the partner lacked authority and the third party knew or had notice of that lack. Day's purchase of a dump truck for D&N Landscaping was arguably in the ordinary course, and no statement of authority was filed. But Bank knew before the loan that Day had not obtained Night's written consent. That actual knowledge triggers the "unless" clause, so Day's act does not bind the partnership. Thus the dispositive source is §301, and the result is no liability.
The answer claiming §301 binds the partnership because buying a dump truck is apparently within the ordinary course ignores the knowledge exception. The answer relying on §302 is tempting but misses the point: §302 only addresses constructive notice from a filed statement; it cannot cure a third party's actual knowledge. The answer citing First Bank v. Lyle incorrectly treats an appellate decision as controlling over a statute; a court of appeals case is persuasive at most, and here it actually agrees with §301's exception. The treatise also does not change the result, because apparent authority is assessed by the business and circumstances—and Bank's knowledge of the consent requirement is a key circumstance.
Study tip: when a statute contains an "unless" clause, always test whether the fact pattern satisfies it before choosing apparent authority.
- Which source is most directly dispositive of whether Jana's motion to dismiss should be denied?
Answer: Price v. Kasdan, because Jana is alleged to have directed the tortious conduct, which is outside the 'solely by reason of being a member' protection.
Whenever you see a question about LLC member liability, separate two distinct theories: statutory limited liability for membership alone versus direct liability for personal misconduct. Here, the LLC Act protects a member from liability "solely by reason of being a member," but it does not immunize a member who personally directs a tort. The complaint alleges Jana told the driver to continue despite knowing the brakes were faulty, so the key is whether she personally participated in tortious conduct.
That makes Price v. Kasdan most directly dispositive. Price holds that a member may be liable for torts she personally participates in or directs, regardless of owner status. Because Jana is alleged to have directed the driver under those circumstances, the statute's "solely by reason of being a member" shield does not apply, and her motion should be denied.
The LLC Act is not the best answer because it ignores the complaint's specific allegation of direction — it would apply only if Jana were sued merely as a member. Wellington v. Sand is also beside the point: veil-piercing applies to corporate separateness and fraud, while this is a claim of direct personal wrongdoing; no veil-piercing theory is needed. The operating agreement is not dispositive either: giving Jana authority to manage and supervise employees explains her role, but managerial authority alone does not automatically make her liable for all employee negligence.
Study tip: when a member is sued, ask whether the plaintiff alleges personal involvement or only status. Direct participation bypasses the statute; veil-piercing is for separate cases.
- Which source is dispositive of whether the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied?
Answer: St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., because it establishes the legal-certainty test, and the cap shows the claim is really for less than $75,000.
When you see an amount-in-controversy challenge, focus on the legal-certainty test, not just the complaint's number. The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), sets the $75,000 threshold, but it does not define how to measure the value of a claim. St. Paul Mercury supplies that rule: the plaintiff's good-faith allegation controls unless a legal certainty shows the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.
Here, the enforceable contract clause caps the plaintiff's exclusive remedy at $45,000. Even though the plaintiff pleaded $80,000, the court can be legally certain the recovery cannot reach $75,000. So St. Paul Mercury is dispositive because it directs the court to look past the pleading when a contractual cap makes a larger recovery impossible.
The statute alone is not dispositive because it only announces the threshold and says nothing about caps or how to treat them. The contract clause is relevant, but it is not itself a jurisdictional rule—it matters only because St. Paul Mercury makes legally certain recovery the touchstone. The district court opinion may be on point, but it is from another circuit and is not binding; at most it is persuasive. And the plaintiff's good-faith allegation of $80,000 does not control, because the cap demonstrates that the claim cannot actually reach the jurisdictional floor.
Remember: a valid contractual cap can destroy diversity jurisdiction even when the complaint demands more, because the court asks what the plaintiff could really recover.
- Which authority is dispositive of whether the court should grant the alternative request to transfer the case?
Answer: Atlantic Marine Construction Co., because it supplies the controlling rule that a valid forum-selection clause governs the § 1404(a) transfer analysis.
Whenever you see a forum-selection clause combined with a motion to dismiss or transfer, separate two questions: ordinary venue under § 1391 and transfer under § 1404(a). A valid clause does not automatically make the original forum "improper" under § 1391; it is enforced through the transfer statute. Here, the clause is valid and undisputed, so the dispositive authority is Atlantic Marine Construction Co. That case supplies the controlling rule: when a valid forum-selection clause exists, the plaintiff's forum choice gets no weight, and the clause must be given controlling weight in all but the most extraordinary circumstances. That rule directly resolves WorldCraft's alternative request to transfer to the District of Maryland.
The general venue statute, § 1391(b), is not dispositive because it defines ordinary venue but does not answer whether a forum-selection clause should override the plaintiff's chosen forum. Likewise, § 1404(a) alone is incomplete: it authorizes discretionary transfer for convenience, but Atlantic Marine replaces that open-ended balancing with a presumption in favor of the contractually chosen forum. The Maryland trial court decision is also not controlling; it is a state trial court opinion, and federal venue and transfer procedure are governed by federal law, especially where the parties do not dispute the clause's validity.
Study tip: on bar questions, when a valid forum-selection clause appears, immediately think "Atlantic Marine — clause controls; plaintiff's choice gets no weight."
- Which authority is dispositive of Carl's priority over Alice?
Answer: Hall v. Reed, because Carl steps into Beth's protected position even though Carl himself had notice.
Whenever a prior unrecorded deed conflicts with a later purchaser, ask two questions: did the later purchaser qualify directly under the recording act, and if not, can the purchaser claim the shelter rule? Here, State Recording Act §1 protects only a subsequent purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration whose conveyance is first duly recorded. Carl bought for value and recorded, but he knew about Alice's earlier deed, so he was not in good faith. Thus the Act does not directly void Alice's deed against him.
. But Beth, Carl's grantor, was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of Alice's deed and recorded promptly. Under Hall v. Reed, a State Supreme Court decision, a grantee who takes from a BFP acquires the same protection as the grantor even if the grantee himself had notice of the prior unrecorded interest. Applying that shelter rule, Carl steps into Beth's protected position, so he prevails despite his own knowledge. That makes Hall dispositive. The State Recording Act alone is not enough because Carl fails the good-faith requirement. Dunn v. Ferry, though it addresses a later purchaser with notice, is only a Court of Appeals decision from a neighboring state, so it is persuasive, not binding, and it conflicts with binding State Supreme Court precedent. The treatise similarly is secondary authority; it speaks of a donee from a BFP, not specifically a purchaser with notice, and cannot override a controlling state Supreme Court case. Remember: a buyer from a BFP is sheltered even with notice; the shelter rule transfers the grantor's priority.
- Which source is dispositive of whether Buyer's proposed testimony is admissible?
Answer: State A UCC § 2-202, because the writing is a complete and exclusive statement, so evidence of consistent additional terms is excluded.
Whenever you see a parol evidence question, your first move is to identify which law governs. Here, the sale of goods is governed by State A's enactment of UCC § 2-202, which is binding statutory authority in the forum.
Under that statute, a written term in a final agreement cannot be contradicted by prior or contemporaneous oral evidence. Even consistent additional terms are excluded if the court finds the writing was intended as a "complete and exclusive statement" of the agreement. The clause in the contract does exactly that—it is a merger clause. Because Buyer's proposed testimony about freight being included is an additional term, and because the writing is complete and exclusive, the testimony is barred. State A UCC § 2-202 is therefore dispositive.
The Restatement is not dispositive because State A has enacted the UCC, and the Restatement is only persuasive authority. The State B decision, while directly on point, is not binding in State A and cannot override State A's statute. The law review article is not law at all, and it misreads the UCC: consistent additional terms are barred when the writing is complete and exclusive, not only contradictions.
On exam day, remember the hierarchy: enacted statutes control over Restatements, out-of-state cases, and articles. And under UCC § 2-202, a merger clause is the key that closes the door to consistent additional terms.
- Which source is dispositive of whether Lee may be sued under § 1983?
Answer: West v. Atkins, because the state delegated its constitutional duty to provide prison medical care to Nexus and Lee performed that duty.
Whenever you see a §1983 question, the real issue is state action: did the private party's conduct become attributable to the state? The key is whether the state delegated a constitutional duty to the private party, not simply whether it funded or regulated the party.
Here, West v. Atkins controls. The state has a constitutional duty to provide adequate medical care to prisoners. By contracting with Nexus to run prison medical care, the state delegated that duty to Nexus, and Dr. Lee performed it. That makes Lee a state actor under color of law, regardless of his private employment.
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn is not dispositive because a private school receiving public funds was not performing a state constitutional duty; it made its own decisions. The State Contract Immunity Act also cannot control: a state statute cannot define the meaning of "state action" for federal §1983 purposes, so it cannot immunize Lee from federal liability. Finally, the contract's statement that Nexus is "solely responsible" for diagnosis and treatment does not prove state non-involvement—it proves exactly the opposite: the state delegated its duty entirely to Nexus and Lee.
Strategy tip: In state-action questions, ask whether the private actor is performing a function the state itself is constitutionally required to perform. If yes, private status does not matter.
- Which source is dispositive of whether Owner's promise must be in writing?
Answer: Reed v. Moore, because Owner's main purpose was to get his restaurant open, a direct economic benefit, so the promise is not within § 4.
Whenever you see a Statute of Frauds question involving a promise to pay someone else's debt, first identify whether the "main purpose" exception applies: if the promisor's primary goal is their own economic benefit, the suretyship writing requirement is removed. Here, Owner promised to pay Supplier if Builder did not, which looks like a classic guarantee. But Owner's actual purpose was to get his restaurant open—a direct economic benefit to himself. Reed v. Moore, as a State Supreme Court decision, controls and adopts exactly that main-purpose exception. Therefore, Owner's oral promise is enforceable despite § 4's writing requirement.
The State Statute of Frauds § 4 is not dispositive on its own because Reed interprets it to exclude promises made for the promisor's direct economic benefit; the statute must be read together with binding precedent. Adams v. Bell, though factually similar, is from a neighboring state and is merely persuasive, not controlling, so its contrary view—that motive is irrelevant—cannot decide the case. Finally, UCC § 2-201 is a trap: it applies to contracts for the sale of goods, but Owner did not contract to buy goods; he guaranteed Builder's debt. The suretyship issue is governed by state statute and case law, not the UCC.
Your study tip: when a question asks which source is "dispositive," focus on hierarchy of authority—binding supreme court precedent beats a neighboring state's court of appeals decision and an irrelevant code provision.
- Which source is dispositive of whether Plaintiff's printout is admissible?
Answer: State Evidence Code § 910, because it imposes a custodian-affidavit condition that Plaintiff has not satisfied.
Whenever you see competing legal authorities on evidence admissibility, rank them: a later-enacted specific statute ordinarily controls over a general statute and over prior case law. That hierarchy resolves this question.
Here, the State Evidence Code §910 custodian-affidavit ruleis dispositive. Plaintiff's printout falls squarely within it: a civil action, a printout of an electronic message, admissible only if a custodian of records affidavit first establishes that the printout accurately reflects the provider's records. Plaintiff offers no such affidavit, so the item fails the statute's explicit condition. The general authentication standard in Section 901 — including distinctive content — does not rescue the printout, because §910 is a more specific rule enacted for exactly this kind of evidence; a later specific statute prevails overageneral one. State v. Pence did permit circumstantial authentication of text messages without a custodian affidavit, but that decision came before the legislature enacted §910. However "controlling" state supreme court decisions can be displaced by a later statute; legislative override is exactly what happened here. The forensic manual also misses the point: showing that text messages can be retrieved from a cell phone is a technical fact, not a rule of law, and retrievalility says nothing about authentication — especially the identity od the sender. So the obstacle is not technical, it's the specific statutory prerequisite. When a modern evidence question involves an electronic message printout, check first for a specific admissibility statute; only if none exists do you fall back on general authentication doctrines like distinctive content or common-law case precedent.
- Which source is dispositive of whether the action is time-barred?
Answer: Tort Reform Act § 6, because the action was filed more than twelve years after first sale and no intentional concealment is alleged.
Whenever you see a product-liability fact pattern with both a limitations period and a repose period, remember the key distinction: a statute of limitations governs when a claim must be filed after it accrues, while a statute of repose absolutely bars claims after a fixed time from the product's sale—unless a statutory exception applies. Here, that distinction resolves the case.
The dispositive source is Tort Reform Act § 6. The solvent was first sold in 2008, and suit was filed in 2026—eighteen years later, beyond the twelve-year repose period. The exception for intentional concealment is not alleged, so the repose bar applies no matter when the plaintiff discovered the injury.
Tort Reform Act § 5 is not dispositive because the two-year discovery rule only limits the time after the claim accrues; it cannot override a separate repose period. Norton v. CRC says exactly that: the discovery rule delays accrual but does not extend a statute of repose. Thus, even though the plaintiff's claim may have accrued in 2025, the action is still barred by § 6. The public health study is also irrelevant—it may support causation or scientific plausibility, but it does not address the timing bar or any statutory exception.
Your takeaway: when a question presents both a limitations period and a repose period, check the repose period first—it is an outside deadline that can bar an otherwise timely-filed claim.
- Which source is dispositive of whether the insurance policy is admissible?
Answer: State Rule of Evidence 411, because the policy is offered to prove that Defendant acted wrongfully, and no exception applies on these facts.
When you see an evidence question about liability insurance, start with Rule 411's default: insurance evidence cannot be used to show negligence or wrongdoing. Here, Plaintiff offers the policy to show that Defendant's insurer believed the sidewalk was dangerous—in other words, to prove the sidewalk's dangerousness and thus Defendant's negligence. That is exactly the inference Rule 411 forbids. The State Supreme Court's exception for ownership or control does not apply because Defendant admitted ownership and control, so those facts are not genuinely disputed. Nor is there any witness-bias purpose. Therefore, State Rule of Evidence 411 is dispositive and the policy is inadmissible. The policy itself is not relevant to whether the sidewalk was dangerous—liability coverage only reflects risk spreading, not an admission about conditions. The adjuster's report is a separate item, not a source that makes the policy admissible; even if the report might be admissible on its own, it cannot launder the policy into evidence. The answer invoking Dowd v. Lane misses the "genuinely disputed" requirement. On the exam, when insurance evidence is offered, identify the purpose: if it targets negligence or wrongdoing, exclude unless a recognized exception—ownership/control dispute, bias, impeachment—is actually triggered. Don't let an interesting fact like an adjuster's report distract you from the rule's categorical bar.
