- Is Owen liable to Nora for battery?
Answer: Yes, because the contacts would offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity, and a plaintiff need not be aware of a contact when it happens.
Offensiveness in battery is measured objectively, by whether the contact would offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity, and the plaintiff need not know of the contact at the time it occurs. Kissing and stroking an anesthetized patient's hair without any medical purpose is plainly offensive, and Owen intended the contact. Nora's later discovery and humiliation go to damages. The answer relying on Nora's unconsciousness imports the awareness requirement that applies to assault, which protects against apprehension, into battery, which protects against the contact itself. The answer based on consent misreads its scope: Nora consented to medical touching by her surgical team for the purpose of the operation, not to personal touching by an observer with no role in her care, and the hospital's permission for Owen to watch is not her consent to be touched. The answer requiring bodily injury invents a rule; an unconscious plaintiff, like any other, may recover for offensive contact without physical harm.
- Is Bryce liable to Odell for intentional infliction of emotional distress?
Answer: No, because Odell's embarrassment and anger were brief, and distress of that kind is not severe, however outrageous the conduct.
Severe distress is a separate element of the tort, and the rule defines it as distress so intense or enduring that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. It excludes transitory embarrassment, anger, or worry of modest duration, however outrageous the conduct. Bryce's conduct was intentional and very likely outrageous, but Odell's distress consisted of mortification, a week of anger, and two poor nights' sleep, with no treatment, no missed work, and a return to normal within about a week. That is not severe, and Odell cannot recover in this tort, though other claims may be available. The answer presuming severity from outrageous conduct is the error the rule's final clause rejects. The answer using a more-than-trivial standard sets the bar far too low; the test is whether a reasonable person could be expected to endure the distress. The answer invoking a collection privilege misstates its scope; a creditor may pursue collection by lawful means, but falsely branding a debtor a thief facing arrest before his coworkers is outside any privilege.
- Is Grant liable to Mia for assault?
Answer: No, because Grant could carry out the threat only after retrieving the rifle, a significant delay, so he threatened a future contact.
Assault requires apprehension of an imminent contact, which the rule defines as one that will occur without significant delay; a credible threat of future contact is not enough. Grant's threat could be carried out only after he walked several minutes across the lot, retrieved the rifle, and returned, and Mia knew where the truck was. That is a threat of future harm, not of imminent contact, so Grant is not liable for assault, even though Mia's fear was real and reasonable. The answer resting on present intention and Mia's fear ignores the rule's statement that a credible threat with a present intention still is not an assault if the contact is not imminent. The answer relying on Grant's walking toward the truck misuses the overt-act idea: an act can make words threatening, but it cannot make a delayed contact imminent. The answer requiring actual possession of the means of contact reaches the right result for the wrong reason; apparent ability, not actual possession, is the test, and a threat to shoot with a rifle falsely claimed to be hidden under a coat could be an assault.
- Is Mason liable to Elena for wrongful death?
Answer: No, because Carl's release would have barred any action by him had he lived, so the statute's condition for liability is not met.
The statute makes the wrongdoer liable only if the act would have entitled the injured person, had he lived, to maintain an action and recover damages. A wrongful-death action under this kind of statute is derivative: the survivors recover their own losses, but only where the decedent could have sued at the time of death. Carl, while competent, settled and released all claims arising from the attack, so had he lived, the release would have barred his battery action. The statutory condition fails, and Elena cannot recover. The answer treating the action as wholly independent relies on the fact that the survivors' damages are their own, but it ignores the statute's express condition tying liability to the decedent's ability to sue. The answer asserting that a release cannot bar an intentional tort claim misstates the law; a victim may settle and release a battery claim after the injury, and the rule against advance waivers of intentional-tort liability does not apply to a post-injury settlement. The answer requiring Elena's presence imports the bystander rule from intentional infliction of emotional distress, which has nothing to do with wrongful death.
- If P sues D for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which of the following is the strongest argument in favor of P's claim?
Answer: D's conduct was outrageous, and P suffered severe emotional distress that manifested in a diagnosed anxiety disorder.
When you see an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, anchor yourself to the two core elements: extreme and outrageous conduct, and severe emotional distress. Here, D followed P, described in graphic detail how he would break into her home and harm her, and admitted he acted solely to frighten her. That conduct can qualify as outrageous, and P's diagnosed anxiety disorder, sleeplessness, and fear of leaving home demonstrate the required severe distress. The strongest argument, therefore, is that D's conduct was outrageous and P suffered severe emotional distress manifested in a diagnosed anxiety disorder.
The "true threat" argument is tempting but flawed: even if a statement qualifies as a true threat and loses First Amendment protection, it does not automatically satisfy the extreme-and-outrageous requirement for IIED. The "any intentionally inflicted fear is enough" argument misunderstands the tort—IIED demands more than intentional fright; the resulting distress must be severe. The "would outrage a reasonable person and distress need not be severe because D acted with purpose" option is also wrong: severe distress is an indispensable element, regardless of how deliberate the defendant's misconduct was.
Study tip: IIED questions on the bar exam often test whether the plaintiff has met the high threshold for both outrageousness and severity. If either is missing, the claim fails even where the defendant intended harm.
- Is Dana liable to Priya for battery?
Answer: Yes, because Dana intended to put Xavier in apprehension of a contact, and that intent transfers to the harmful contact her act caused Priya.
Under subsection (1), an intent to put someone in apprehension of a contact is a sufficient intent for battery; the actor need not intend the contact itself. Under subsection (2), that intent transfers when the act causes a harmful contact to a different person. Dana threw the paperweight intending to put Xavier in apprehension of being hit, and the throw caused a harmful contact to Priya, so Dana is liable to Priya as though she had intended to affect her. The answer resting on Dana's intent to miss makes the common error of treating battery intent as limited to an intent to touch; the rule expressly includes an intent to cause apprehension. The answer requiring that Dana perceive Priya adds a foreseeability or awareness condition that transferred intent does not contain. The answer requiring a completed assault on Xavier confuses the transfer of intent with the transfer of a completed tort: what transfers is the intention to affect a third person, and subsection (2) asks only whether the act was done with that intention, not whether Xavier actually experienced apprehension.
- Is Delmar's liable to Alma for false imprisonment?
Answer: Yes, because once Quinn was satisfied the scarf was Alma's, holding her to get her signature was a detention for a purpose other than investigating ownership.
The statute privileges a detention only while it is reasonable in manner and time and is for the purpose of investigating ownership. The first five minutes fit: Quinn had reasonable grounds, Alma came voluntarily, and the investigation was prompt. Once Quinn was satisfied the scarf was Alma's, the investigation was over, and holding her until she signed a ban and a release served a different purpose, which the statute expressly excludes. Delmar's is liable for that detention. The answer treating the privilege as fixed at the outset ignores that the privilege is defined by purpose and continues only while the purpose does. The answer focusing on total duration reads the statute as limiting only time, but it also limits purpose and manner, and a short detention for an improper purpose is unprivileged. The answer making innocence decisive states a rule the statute rejects; a merchant with reasonable grounds may detain a person who turns out to be innocent, so Alma's innocence alone would not have made the first five minutes actionable.
- Is V likely to prevail?
Answer: No, because D's statement threatened future harm and D lacked the present apparent ability to carry it out.
When you see an assault question, remember the core test: an intentional act that creates a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact. Imminence and apparent ability are the key concepts. Here, D was handcuffed and being led to a transport van when he shook his fist and threatened to "look for" V "after I'm released." That is a threat of future harm, not a present or imminent one. Because D lacked the present apparent ability to carry out the threat, V cannot establish assault. That is why the correct choice is the one stating D's statement threatened future harm and D lacked the present apparent ability to carry it out.
The first wrong answer—that V reasonably feared immediate harmful contact—misreads the facts: D was restrained and the threat was for after release, so no immediacy existed. The second wrong answer—that words alone constitute assault whenever they create apprehension—is overbroad; words can be assault only when they create fear of imminent contact, not merely any fear. The third wrong answer—that V cannot prevail because she suffered no physical injury—confuses assault with battery; assault requires no contact, only apprehension of imminent contact. Watch for the "future threat" trap: when a statement references a later time or the defendant lacks current ability, the claim fails. On the bar exam, always ask: is the threatened contact imminent, and does the defendant have the apparent ability to act now?
- Is Cole liable to Bria for false imprisonment?
Answer: No, because a threat to fire an employee is not the kind of duress that confines, and Bria remained free to leave the room.
Confinement may be accomplished by physical barriers, physical force, threats of force, or other duress, but the duress must be directed at the plaintiff's person or her immediate liberty, or at her family or property in a way that compels her to stay. A threat of economic consequences, such as losing a job, does not confine, because the plaintiff remains physically free to go and the choice to stay is hers. The door was unlocked, Cole did not block it, and he threatened only discharge, so Bria was not confined. The answer equating the job threat with duress states the general rule correctly but misapplies it; economic pressure is not the kind of duress the tort recognizes. The answer stressing the closed room and the false accusation describes an unpleasant experience, not a confinement. The answer invoking a business-reason privilege reaches the right result on a wrong ground: no general privilege lets an employer hold an employee for questioning, and had Cole actually confined Bria, a business reason would not have excused it.
- Is Ruiz liable to Tess for false imprisonment?
Answer: No, because Tess agreed to remain aboard until the scheduled return, and Ruiz owed no duty to release her early when she faced no danger.
A refusal to release can be a confinement, but only when the actor has a duty to release. Under the rule, a person who consented to remain on stated terms is owed no duty of release before those terms are met, unless continued confinement would expose her to danger or serious harm. Tess agreed that the boat would return only at the end of the trip absent an emergency, and boredom and irritation are not danger or serious harm. Ruiz had no duty to turn back, so his refusal was not a confinement. The answer based on withdrawal of consent overlooks that Tess consented to stated terms, and the rule addresses exactly that situation: a demand to leave early does not create a duty the terms did not impose. The answer treating every intentional refusal to release as confinement drops the duty requirement. The answer asserting that a refusal can never confine reaches the right result for the wrong reason; a refusal to release is a confinement when a duty exists, as it would have if Tess had been injured and needed medical care.
- Is Finn liable to Ari for intentional infliction of emotional distress?
Answer: Yes, because Finn's knowledge of Ari's phobia made the prank outrageous, and he acted in reckless disregard of the high risk of severe distress.
A prank is ordinarily not extreme and outrageous, but the rule makes an otherwise minor indignity outrageous when the actor knows the victim is peculiarly susceptible because of a physical or mental condition. Finn knew of Ari's diagnosed phobia, having been told after her earlier panic attack, and he targeted it directly. Given that knowledge, he acted at least in reckless disregard of the high probability of severe distress, which satisfies the intent element, and Ari's distress was severe. Finn is liable. The answer measuring outrageousness by the effect on a person of ordinary sensibilities states the default rule but ignores the susceptibility exception, which exists for exactly this case. The answer requiring a purpose to cause distress omits recklessness, which the rule expressly includes. The answer routing the claim to battery or negligence is wrong because the rule makes the actor liable for the distress and for any resulting bodily harm, so physical consequences of severe distress are recoverable in this tort.
- Is Sam liable to Eli for assault?
Answer: No, because Eli knew the revolver was empty and so did not anticipate an imminent harmful contact.
Assault requires that the plaintiff actually be put in apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact. Ability to carry out the threat is judged from the plaintiff's perspective: an unloaded gun pointed at someone who believes it is loaded can be an assault, but here Eli had watched Sam unload it and knew it was empty, so he did not anticipate being shot. Sam is not liable. The answer stressing apparent ability states the right test but misapplies it; the gun had no apparent ability to fire from Eli's point of view, because he knew it was empty. The answer resting on Sam's intent and threatening act omits the element of actual apprehension; intent plus an act without apprehension is at most an attempt. The answer relying on the gun's actual incapacity reaches the right result for the wrong reason; actual ability is not required, and the same unloaded gun would support liability against a victim who did not know it was empty.
- Will V prevail?
Answer: Yes, because players consent only to contacts reasonably expected in the sport, and D's post-whistle deliberate kick was not such a contact.
Whenever you see a battery question involving sports, focus on the scope of consent. By stepping onto the field, V did not waive all protection; he consented only to contacts reasonably expected in that sport under the circumstances. That is why the correct answer is yes: D's kick came after the whistle, while V was tying his shoe, and was deliberate retaliation, not part of the ordinary give-and-take of soccer. Such conduct falls outside the implied consent that makes hard tackles or incidental bumps non-actionable.
The choice that V impliedly consented to physical contact by choosing to participate in a contact sport is too broad; participation does not consent to every harmful contact, especially after play has stopped. Likewise, the claim that physical contact during an athletic contest is governed by the game's rules, not tort law, misunderstands the relationship: rules and customs help define what contacts are reasonable, but they do not abolish tort liability. Finally, the statement that any intentional harmful contact during an athletic event is a battery regardless of consent goes too far the other way; a player who consents to normal contact, such as a clean tackle, cannot recover for it.
For the bar, remember: sports-battery questions hinge on the scope of consent, not on the absence of all consent.
- Should V recover?
Answer: No, because V was unaware of the confinement and suffered no harm, and the employee did not intend to confine V.
Whenever you see a false imprisonment question, immediately run through the elements: (1) an act intended to confine or restrain the plaintiff;(2) actual confinement;(3) causation;(4) plaintiff's awareness of the confinement or actual harm. Here, the employee had no idea V was in the room, so there was no intent to confine—the element is missing from the start. Even if you treated the locked door as confinement, V slept through it, never realized she was trapped, and suffered no injury. False imprisonment protects against deprivation of liberty, but a plaintiff who neither knew of the confinement nor suffered harm cannot recover under the traditional rule. Therefore, V should not recover.
The trap choices test whether you conflate actual confinement with the other elements. "Yes, because V was actually confined for several hours without consent" gets the facts wrong on intent and ignores the awareness requirement; actual confinement alone is not enough. "Yes, because false imprisonment does not require the plaintiff's awareness or proof of harm" is also wrong—awareness or harm is usually required, and here the employee's lack of intent is independently fatal. "No, because V had a reasonable means of escape" is an incorrect reason:the door was locked from the outside, so no reasonable escape existed;hat would not be the basis for denying recovery. The correct reason is the employee did not intend to confine V and V lacked awareness or injury.
Study tip: on bar exam torts, always check the intent element first. If the defendant did not know the plaintiff was there, there is no intentional tort—and an unintentional lock-in with no harm is negligence at best, not false imprisonment.
- Is D liable to X?
Answer: No, because D reasonably believed V was in imminent danger, and defense of others is judged by the actor's reasonable belief.
When you see a battery claim, remember that intentional torts have affirmative defenses that can excuse the contact. Here, the issue is the defense of others. The key rule is that you are privileged to use reasonable force to defend a third party if you reasonably believe that party faces imminent harm. This is judged by an objective standard of reasonableness—not by what actually happened. Because D saw X raise a chair over V's head, D's belief that V was in imminent danger was entirely reasonable, even though it later turned out to be a prank. A reasonable mistake does not defeat the defense. Therefore, D is not liable.
Now, examine the wrong choices. The first, "Yes, because X did not actually pose a threat," assumes actual danger is required, but the defense only needs a reasonable belief, not actual danger. The second, "Yes, because D used more force than was reasonably necessary," is incorrect because a shove was proportionate to the apparent threat—there was no excessive force. The third, "No, because D intended only to protect V, and the intent to protect negates the intent required for battery," is a misconception. D did intend to make a harmful contact (the shove), but the defense of others justifies that contact; it does not negate the intent. The privilege is what saves D, not a lack of intent.
For your study, remember that defenses to intentional torts often hinge on reasonableness. If you see a mistaken belief, ask whether it was objectively reasonable—if so, the defense still works. Also, don't confuse "justification" with "lack of intent."
- Should the verdict be upheld?
Answer: No, because the picketing addressed matters of public concern from a public place, and the First Amendment shields such speech from this tort.
The First Amendment limits tort liability for speech. Speech on matters of public concern, delivered in a public place in a manner that complies with law and does not disrupt, cannot be the basis of liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress, however hurtful or outrageous a jury finds it. The signs addressed national military policy and morality, the picketers stood on public land at a police-designated spot, and they did not disrupt the service. The verdict must be reversed. The answer relying on the father's private-figure status imports the defamation framework, in which a private figure need not prove actual malice; the protection here turns on whether the speech concerns a public matter, not on who the plaintiff is. The answer resting on the jury's finding of outrageousness gets the law backward; outrageousness is too subjective a standard to override protection for public-concern speech. The answer requiring the father to witness the conduct reaches the right result for the wrong reason, borrowing the bystander rule for conduct directed at others; the constitutional defense would apply even if he had read every sign at the funeral.
- Is D liable for V's death?
Answer: Yes, because a tortfeasor is liable for additional harm caused by negligent medical treatment of the injury, even if the treatment was itself negligent.
Whenever you see an injury followed by medical treatment, think about intervening causes in torts. The key rule: a negligent tortfeasor is liable for additional harm caused by negligent medical treatment of the original injury, because such treatment is a foreseeable consequence of causing harm. D negligently ran the red light and broke V's leg; V then died because Dr. M negligently gave V an allergy-inducing drug while treating that fracture. D's negligence is still a substantial factor in the death: but for D's collision, V would not have been in the hospital receiving treatment. Therefore, D is liable for wrongful death.
The suggestion that Dr. M's negligence was an independent intervening cause that superseded D's negligence is the common trap. Medical malpractice is a dependent, foreseeable intervening force, not a superseding cause. Likewise, saying D caused only the fracture and not the allergic reaction misunderstands proximate cause: D need not foresee the exact allergic reaction; it is enough that death flowed from the chain of events set in motion by the injury. Finally, the idea that D is strictly liable for all consequences without regard to causation overstates the rule—D's liability rests on actual and proximate cause, not strict liability.
Study tip: when a question has an injury followed by negligent medical care, the original tortfeasor is usually still liable. Distinguish truly unforeseeable, independent intervening causes from foreseeable responses like medical treatment.
- Should X recover?
Answer: Yes, because D's intent to cause V to apprehend immediate harmful contact is sufficient intent for battery and transfers to X.
Whenever you see an intentional tort with an unintended victim, think about transferred intent. Battery requires intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, but that intent can be satisfied by an intent to commit a different tort against a different person. Here, D threw the bottle intending to cause V to apprehend immediate harmful contact—that is the intent for assault. Because the bottle actually struck X, the law transfers D's intent to commit assault onto the battery against X. The identity of the victim does not matter; the intent follows the act.
The correct answer is the one saying D's intent to cause V apprehension is sufficient and transfers to X. That is exactly the rule: intent to commit assault transfers to the completed battery on an unintended victim.
Now the wrong choices. "No, because D intended only to frighten V" misunderstands that assault intent is a valid basis for battery via transfer. "No, because D was unaware of X" also fails—transferred intent specifically covers unknown victims. Finally, "Yes, because D acted with reckless disregard" is tempting but wrong: recklessness does not satisfy the intent requirement for battery. Battery needs purpose or knowledge to a substantial certainty, not mere recklessness, even in a crowded bar.
Study tip: Memorize that transferred intent applies among assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels—and it transfers both across torts and across victims. When you see a tort intent aimed at one person but harm hitting another, immediately check for transferred intent.
- Is Victor liable to Hana for false imprisonment?
Answer: Yes, because Hana did not know of the back door, and a means of escape the plaintiff does not know about does not prevent confinement.
False imprisonment requires an intentional, complete confinement within fixed boundaries. Under the rule, a reasonable means of escape defeats completeness only if the plaintiff knows of it. Victor locked the only visible door, pocketed the key, and told Hana she was staying. The back door was hidden behind a cabinet, Hana did not know of it, and Victor did not tell her, so the confinement was complete and Victor is liable. The answer relying on the unlocked back door applies the escape rule without its knowledge requirement, which is the specific error the rule is written to prevent. The answer requiring force or a threat of force against the person overlooks that physical barriers such as a locked door are a classic means of confinement. The answer conditioning liability on whether a reasonable person would have found the door adds a discoverability test the rule does not contain; the question is what the plaintiff knew.
- Is Marcus liable to Lena for battery?
Answer: Yes, because forcibly taking an object Lena was holding is a contact with her person, and the contact was offensive to a reasonable sense of dignity.
Battery protects against harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff's person, and the person includes things so closely connected to the body that they are customarily regarded as part of it, such as an object held in the hand. Snatching an object out of someone's hands in anger, in front of colleagues, offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity. Marcus intended the contact, and it was offensive, so he is liable. The answer requiring contact with the body or worn clothing states the contact element too narrowly and ignores objects intimately connected with the person. The answer relying on the absence of injury overlooks that offensive battery is a dignitary tort that requires no physical harm; nominal and dignitary damages are available. The answer resting on Marcus's purpose misstates the intent element: Marcus intended to make the contact, and he knew that yanking a laptop from an employee's hands in front of her coworkers to silence her would offend her, so even a requirement of intent to offend would be met.
