- O owned two adjacent parcels: Parcel A, which had no access to a public road, and Parcel B, which bordered a public road. In 1985, O sold Parcel A to X. The deed did not mention access, and Parcel A was landlocked; after the sale, X and her successors crossed Parcel B to reach the public road. In 2022, the county opened a new public road along the back boundary of Parcel A, giving Parcel A direct public access. Y, who now owns Parcel A, continues to cross Parcel B. Z, who now owns Parcel B, objects. Does Y have the right to continue crossing Parcel B?
Answer: No, because an easement by necessity lasts only as long as the necessity that created it, and Parcel A now has direct public access.
When you see an easement by necessity, ask yourself: does the necessity still exist? This easement arises when a common owner splits a tract, leaving a parcel landlocked. Its life is tied to the necessity that created it—once that necessity disappears, the easement disappears too. Here, Y's parcel originally had no road access, so crossing Z's parcel was necessary. But in 2022, the county opened a new public road along Y's back boundary, giving Parcel A direct access. Because Y now has direct public access, the necessity has ended, so the easement by necessity terminates automatically, and Z can object.
Why are the others wrong? The choice saying it is "an appurtenant easement that runs with the land until the parties expressly release it" misstates the rule—appurtenant easements do run with the land, but a necessity easement is not permanent and does not require express release to end. The choice that it is "implied from the circumstances at severance and is not affected by later changes" is a trap—while it is indeed implied at severance, later changes do affect it, because the necessity is its lifeblood (distinct from an implied easement from prior use, which is permanent). The choice that it is "personal to the original grantee" is wrong—necessity easements are appurtenant and pass to successors like Y; they just terminate when necessity ends.
Strategy: On the exam, a new road or alternative access is a red flag that the necessity has ceased, extinguishing the easement. Remember: necessity is a condition, not a permanent right.
- Should B prevail on that claim?
Answer: No, because the path was not apparent at severance, although B may have a separate easement by necessity.
Whenever you see a severed tract with no access to a public road, think of two distinct doctrines: an easement implied from prior use (a quasi-easement) and an easement by necessity. For an implied prior-use easement, you must prove common ownership, a prior use that was both apparent and continuous, and reasonable necessity. Here, ownership and continuity are satisfied, but the path ran through tall grass with no visible worn surface—so it was not "apparent" at severance. Because apparentness is an absolute requirement, B's implied prior-use claim fails. However, B has no access to a public road whatsoever, so B may have a separate easement by necessity, which requires strict necessity but does not require apparentness.
Now examine the wrong choices. The first says "Yes, because A's use was continuous and reasonably necessary"—this ignores the missing apparentness element; continuity and necessity alone are insufficient. The second says "Yes, because severance automatically created an easement appurtenant"—this is a trap; severance alone does not create an easement unless the elements of an implied easement are met. The last says "No, because a landowner's pre-severance use can never create an easement"—that is false; pre-severance use can create a quasi-easement if the elements are satisfied. So the correct answer is the one that correctly identifies the lack of apparentness while flagging the possibility of necessity. For your study, remember "ACN" for implied prior use: Apparent, Continuous, and Necessity. If apparentness fails, always check for strict necessity as a fallback.
- B owned two adjacent lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2. Both lots had frontage on a public road, but a paved driveway across Lot 2 provided Lot 1 with a shorter route to a second public road. In 2010, B sold Lot 1 to A, and the deed expressly granted A an appurtenant right-of-way over the driveway on Lot 2. In 2015, A bought Lot 2 from B. In 2020, A sold Lot 2 to C; the deed did not mention any right-of-way in favor of Lot 1. In 2021, A sold Lot 1 to D. C has refused to let D use the driveway. Does D have a right to use the driveway?
Answer: No, because the 2010 easement was extinguished by merger when A bought Lot 2, and the later sale of Lot 2 did not revive it.
Whenever you see a sequence of conveyances involving an easement, trace the ownership of both the dominant and servient estates at each step. Here, the 2010 grant expressly created an appurtenant right-of-way for Lot 1 (dominant) over Lot 2 (servient). In 2015, A bought Lot 2 while already owning Lot 1. At that moment, A held both estates in common ownership, which extinguished the easement by merger. The easement ceased to exist as a legal interest. When A sold Lot 2 to C in 2020, the deed was silent, but that silence didn't revive the old easement—A simply conveyed Lot 2 free of the prior easement. When A later sold Lot 1 to D in 2021, there was no easement left to pass along. Thus, D has no right to use the driveway.
The answer choice stating that the right-of-way was appurtenant and passed automatically to D is tempting, but it ignores the fact that the easement was already extinguished before the sale to D. The choice suggesting an easement by necessity is wrong because Lot 1 still has frontage on a public road, so there is no strict necessity—necessity requires a lack of access, not a shorter route. The choice claiming the 2010 grant created a personal right in A is incorrect because the grant was expressly "appurtenant," meaning it attached to the land, not to A personally.
Study tip: Remember that merger extinguishes an easement permanently—it does not spring back to life upon later severance unless a new easement is expressly granted or implied by necessity at that exact moment. Always check for common ownership first.
- O owned a parcel abutting a lake. A, whose adjacent parcel did not touch the lake, asked O for access. O orally told A that A and A's family could use O's lakeshore path and dock forever. With O's knowledge and encouragement, A spent $40,000 building a boat dock on O's lakeshore and paving a path from A's parcel to the dock. Seven years later, after a disagreement, O revoked permission and barred A from the lakeshore. Does A have a right to continue using the lakeshore?
Answer: Yes, because O's promise, combined with A's substantial reliance on it, created an easement by estoppel that O cannot revoke.
Whenever you see a landowner grant permission and the other party then spends significant money in reliance on that permission, you are dealing with the tension between a revocable license and an easement by estoppel. The critical question is whether the licensor encouraged that reliance.
Here, O's oral statement initially created only a license. However, A's $40,000 expenditure on the dock and path, made with O's knowledge and encouragement, triggers the doctrine of easement by estoppel. When a licensee substantially relies on a license, the landowner is estopped from revoking it, converting the license into an irrevocable easement. This is why the answer is yes.
Now examine the wrong choices. The first wrong choice says the oral statement created only a revocable license that can be terminated at will. That is the classic trap: a license is generally revocable, but this general rule is defeated when substantial reliance makes revocation inequitable. The second wrong choice cites the Statute of Frauds. While easements normally require a writing, easement by estoppel is an equitable exception; the reliance takes the case out of the Statute of Frauds to prevent injustice. The final wrong choice claims a prescriptive easement. That fails for two reasons: prescriptive use must be adverse, but A's use was permissive, and the statutory period (typically 10–20 years) is longer than the seven years here.
Your study tip: when you see "orally allowed" plus "spent money to improve" and "knowledge and encouragement," look for easement by estoppel. Also remember that permissive use never ripens into a prescriptive easement.
- Does A still have the easement?
Answer: No, because the easement was extinguished by merger when A acquired Lot 2 and did not revive when A conveyed Lot 2 to C.
Whenever you see an easement question, ask first: who owns the dominant and servient estates? If they ever come under common ownership, the easement is extinguished by merger — you cannot hold an easement over your own land. Here, A owned Lot 1 (dominant) and then acquired Lot 2 (servient). At that moment, the easement merged into A's fee ownership and ceased to exist. When A later conveyed Lot 2 to C, the easement did not automatically revive; A could have expressly reserved it in the deed, but the deed was silent. So A has no easement now.
That is why the answer "No, because the easement was extinguished by merger when A acquired Lot 2 and did not revive when A conveyed Lot 2 to C" is correct.
The choice "Yes, because the easement was appurtenant to Lot 1 and has never been expressly released" misses the merger rule — an express release is not the only way to extinguish an appurtenant easement. "Yes, because C took Lot 2 with constructive notice of the recorded easement" also fails: recording protects existing rights, but here the easement had already been extinguished before C took title, so there was nothing to take subject to. The choice "No, because an appurtenant easement is extinguished whenever the servient estate is conveyed to a third party" is wrong because conveyance alone does not extinguish; only a recognized event like merger, release, or abandonment does.
For the bar, remember: common ownership extinguishes easements, and a later conveyance does not revive them unless the deed expressly says so.
- Which statement is most accurate?
Answer: N has no prescriptive easement because a use that begins with permission remains permissive unless N asserted a claim of right and O had notice of it.
Whenever you see a prescriptive easement question, start with the core requirement: the use must be adverse—not merely open, continuous, and long-lasting. If the use began with permission, it is presumed permissive, and that presumption continues unless the user does something to assert a claim of right and the owner has notice.
Here, O expressly invited N to cut across the backyard, so N's use began permissively. N used the path daily for 21 years, but there is no evidence N ever told O, "I'm using this as of right," or took any action that would put O on notice that N's use had become hostile. The 20-year prescriptive period matters only for an adverse use; it does not automatically turn a permissive use into an adverse one. Therefore, N has no prescriptive easement.
The tempting answer that says N prevails because the use was open, notorious, continuous, and without force misses the key element of adversity. Openness and continuity are necessary, but they are not enough when the use started with permission. The answer claiming O's oral permission did not make the use permissive is backwards—permission need not be in writing. And the answer that the statutory period plus O's failure to object converted the use is also wrong: O's silence does not create adversity when the original use was invited; N had to change the nature of the use and give notice.
Study tip: on easement questions, always ask "did the use begin with permission?" If yes, look for a clear act of adverse claim—otherwise, no prescriptive easement.
- O owns Whiteacre, a farm. P owned Blackacre, an adjacent parcel. For 18 years, P used a dirt road across a corner of Whiteacre to reach a state highway. P's use was open, continuous, and without O's permission. The jurisdiction's prescriptive period for easements is 20 years. P then sold Blackacre to B by warranty deed that said nothing about the road. B continued to use the road for the next three years, still openly and without permission. O then told B to stop and blocked the road. Does B have a prescriptive easement?
Answer: Yes, because B may tack P's 18 years of adverse use onto B's own three years, giving more than the 20-year prescriptive period.
Whenever you see a prescriptive easement question, start by counting the adverse-use years and asking whether a successor can tack. A prescriptive easement arises when use is open, notorious, continuous, and without permission for the statutory period. Here P used the road for 18 years, satisfying all those elements, then B continued the same open, unpermissioned use for 3 more years. Because B and P were in privity — P conveyed Blackacre to B by deed — B may tack P's use to his own. The combined 21 years exceeds the 20-year period, so B prevails. The fact that the deed said nothing about the road does not block tacking; privity comes from the transfer of the dominant estate, not from describing the easement. The choice saying B may tack is therefore correct. The choice claiming P's adverse use ended at the sale is wrong: B's use continued the same adverse possession without interruption. The claim that the silent deed made B's use a "new use" is also wrong, because a successor's use can continue the predecessor's. Finally, the implied-easement-by-prior-use theory fails because O and P were never under common ownership; implied prior use requires a severance from a common owner. On the bar, when a successor is involved, check for privity and continuity first — tacking often bridges the gap to the prescriptive period.
- Is O correct?
Answer: No, because the grant expressly permitted successors and assigns, and commercial easements in gross are transferable.
When you see a grant of a right to use land with no mention of a benefiting parcel, think "easement in gross." The key question is whether that easement is transferable. The answer turns on whether it is commercial and whether the grant says it runs to successors and assigns.
Here, the deed expressly grants the pipeline right "to A, its successors and assigns." That language, plus the fact that the easement is commercial—held by a pipeline company for business purposes—makes it transferable. So O is wrong. The merger into B carries the easement because commercial easements in gross are assignable unless the grant says otherwise.
Now the wrong choices. The claim that the easement is "in gross and therefore personal to A and cannot be transferred" confuses personal, noncommercial easements in gross with commercial ones. The "license that cannot be assigned" choice is also wrong: this is not a license, because it was created by deed as a permanent right to lay, maintain, and operate, not a mere revocable privilege. The "appurtenant to the pipeline" choice fails because an appurtenant easement requires a dominant estate in land; a pipeline is not land, and no dominant parcel was identified. Finally, the fact that the grant said "successors and assigns" is not an afterthought—it is exactly what makes the commercial easement transferable.
Study tip: whenever you see an easement in gross, immediately classify it as commercial or personal. Commercial ones transfer; personal ones die with the holder unless the grant says otherwise.
- Does B retain the right to use the original route?
Answer: No, because an easement by necessity exists only while the necessity continues, and the new access ended it.
When you see an easement by necessity, remember that its name is its rule: it exists because of necessity, and it lasts only as long as that necessity continues. The court's initial finding at severance is just the starting point—the necessity is a continuing condition. Here, B's purchase of the connecting strip from the adjoining owner eliminated the landlocked status. Since the original route is no longer needed, the reason for the easement vanishes, and the easement automatically terminates. G can block it.
The wrong answers each miss this core principle. The choice saying "yes, because it is appurtenant to B's parcel and continues until the servient owner obtains a release" confuses appurtenance with permanence—an easement by necessity is indeed appurtenant, but it does not require a formal release; it extinguishes automatically when the need ends. The choice saying "yes, because the necessity is measured at the time of severance" correctly identifies the initial test but incorrectly assumes it is frozen forever—that is a trap for those who confuse the creation of the easement with its continued existence. Finally, the choice saying "no, because it is a mere license that can be revoked when the servient owner's need changes" is wrong on two counts: it's a true easement (an interest in land, not a revocable license), and the termination depends on the dominant owner's need (B's), not the servient owner's (G's).
Study tip: On the bar exam, always ask yourself whether the reason for an easement still exists. For easements by necessity, a change in the dominant parcel's access is a classic termination trigger.
- Who is likely to prevail?
Answer: The Lot 1 owner, because a purchaser who buys with reference to a recorded plat acquires an easement in streets shown on the plat.
When you see a question involving a recorded plat and a deed that references it, you're dealing with the doctrine of implied easements from a plat. The central rule is that when a grantor conveys a lot with reference to a recorded plat showing streets, the grantee automatically acquires a perpetual easement in those streets, even if the deed is silent about them.
Here, the developer recorded the plat showing "Park Road," and the deed for Lot 1 explicitly referred to that plat. That reference incorporates the plat into the deed. Therefore, the Lot 1 owner acquired an easement in the Park Road strip, and the developer's subsequent building on it is an unlawful interference. The Lot 1 owner prevails.
Now, the incorrect choices: The developer's argument that the deed lacked an express grant is wrong because a reference to the recorded plat is itself the grant—no separate wording is needed. The claim that the buyer only has a revocable license is also false; an easement created by plat is an irrevocable property right, not a mere personal permission. Finally, the idea that the owner only prevails if Park Road is the sole means of access confuses this with an easement by necessity. An easement by plat arises from the intent shown in the recorded plat, not from a lack of alternative access.
For the bar, remember: "Deed references plat? Streets are easements." Don't be tricked into requiring express language or a necessity—just look for the plat reference.
- Does A have an implied easement over B's land?
Answer: No, because A is the grantor and must show strict necessity, and the alternative route defeats that showing.
Whenever you see an implied easement question on the bar exam, your first move is to identify the claimant's role: is the claimant the grantor or the grantee? This distinction is the entire ballgame. Here, A sold the north half to B but kept the south half, making A the grantor. The law is asymmetrical: grantees get a relatively friendly standard, but grantors must show strict necessity. A has an existing, albeit longer, route over his own land, so the south half is not landlocked. That alternative route completely defeats any claim of strict necessity, meaning A cannot force an easement over B's land.
The choice saying "Yes, because the road was used before severance and is reasonably necessary" misses this critical point — reasonable necessity is the standard for a grantee claiming an implied easement, not for a grantor. Likewise, the choice citing "apparent, continuous, and long-standing use" with B's notice describes the elements that would help a grantee establish an implied easement from prior use; those elements do not rescue a grantor from the strict necessity requirement. Finally, the choice stating "a grantor can never claim an easement by implication" is an overstatement — grantors can claim one, but they face a much higher hurdle than grantees.
Your study tip: when a property question involves an easement by implication, immediately ask "grantor or grantee?" Grantees rely on prior use, apparentness, and reasonable necessity; grantors must prove strict necessity. If you see an alternative route mentioned in the facts, a grantor's claim is almost certainly dead.
- Can B tack A's use to her own?
Answer: Yes, because successive adverse users in privity may tack their periods of use to satisfy the statutory period.
When you see a prescriptive easement question with a change in the user, your first move should be to think about tacking. Tacking allows successive adverse users to combine their periods of use to satisfy the statutory period, but only if they are in privity—meaning the later user's interest comes from the earlier user, typically through a conveyance. Here, A used the path for 12 years, then conveyed her land to B, and B used it for 9 more years. Because B acquired her interest through that deed, A and B are in privity. Their combined 21 years exceeds the 20-year prescriptive period, so B can tack A's use and claim the easement.
The choice saying a prescriptive easement is personal to the adverse user and cannot be transferred is wrong: prescriptive easements are often appurtenant to land and are transferable; the real question is whether the statutory period has been satisfied. The choice limiting tacking to adverse possession of land is wrong because tacking applies equally to prescriptive easements. The choice claiming the easement "runs with the land and vests automatically in each successor without a tacking analysis" is also wrong—succession alone is not enough; privity must exist between the successive users.
Study tip: whenever you see multiple users in a prescriptive easement or adverse possession fact pattern, check for privity and add the periods. If the combined time meets the statutory period, tacking works.
