- Under Alvarez, which of the following is Medix's best argument that it owes no duty to Aria?
Answer: Aria was not conceived at the time of Medix's negligent act, so she was not within the class of persons to whom a foreseeable risk of harm existed when the act occurred.
This question tests the scope of a defendant's duty in negligence, specifically whether foreseeability of the plaintiff is measured at the time of the negligent act. When you see a duty question, focus on the relationship between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's status at the moment of that conduct.
Here, Alvarez controls: a defendant owes a duty only to a plaintiff who was within the foreseeable class of persons at the time of the negligent act. Aria was conceived in 2012, three years after Vera ingested the contaminated medication in 2009. So Medix's best argument is that Aria was not conceived at the time of Medix's negligent act and therefore was not within the class of persons to whom a foreseeable risk of harm existed then. The expert proof that the contaminant caused Aria's defects cannot create a duty that Alvarez says never existed.
The statement that Aria cannot show actual cause is wrong because expert proof can establish causation, and the issue here is duty, not causation. The argument that Medix owed no duty to Vera because Vera suffered no physical injury is beside the point: Aria's claim is derivative only in the sense that the injury happened before conception; Vera's lack of damages does not determine whether Medix owed Aria a duty. Finally, the argument that Aria's injuries were "too remote" because they appeared after birth misreads Alvarez—the court grounded duty in whether the child was conceived at the time of the act, not in when symptoms manifested.
Study tip: separate duty from causation. In duty questions, ask who was foreseeable at the negligent act, not what injuries later resulted.
- Which fact, if true, would be most important in determining whether the delivery company owed a duty to the baby?
Answer: Mira's pregnancy was apparent to an ordinary observer at the time of the collision.
Whenever you see a negligence question involving an unborn child, remember the core principle: a child born alive can sue for prenatal injuries, but the defendant's duty hinges on foreseeability—whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have anticipated that a fetus was present and at risk. The court applies an objective standard, not a subjective one.
Here, the fact that Mira's pregnancy was apparent to an ordinary observer at the time of the collision is decisive. It establishes that the delivery driver, exercising reasonable care, should have foreseen that a pregnant woman—and therefore a vulnerable unborn child—was in the car. This foreseeability creates the legal duty to the baby. Without this observable condition, the driver could not reasonably have anticipated the harm to the fetus, and no duty would attach.
The fact that the injury would not have occurred if Mira had not been pregnant speaks to causation, not duty. It proves the pregnancy was a necessary link in the chain of events, but it does not tell you whether the driver had a legal obligation to protect the fetus. The driver's personal knowledge of Mira's pregnancy is a tempting distractor because it suggests awareness, but the standard for duty is objective, not subjective. A driver who personally knew is no more liable than one who should have noticed; the law uses the "ordinary observer" test to avoid rewarding willful ignorance. Finally, the permanency of the injury and the need for continuing medical care relates to damages, which is a separate element of negligence. It makes the harm more costly, but it has no bearing on whether a duty existed in the first place.
Strategy tip: When a question asks "which fact is most important," immediately classify each option into the four elements of negligence—duty, breach, causation, and damages. Anything that doesn't bear on the element in dispute (here, duty) is almost certainly a distractor.
- Under Washington v. Price, which of the following is the best reason Lucia's claim fails?
Answer: Thomas did not identify Lucia or any other specific victim, and the threat was not sufficiently imminent.
This question tests the "duty to protect" exception to the usual rule that a person has no duty to control another's conduct. When you see facts about a therapist, a threat, and an injured third party, focus on the jurisdiction's standard: here, Washington v. Price requires a specific and imminent threat directed at an identifiable victim.
Dr. Rao did have a special relationship with Thomas, but the threat was expressly general—"come back to the warehouse and open fire"—with no named victim. It also was not imminent in the required sense: Dr. Rao believed Thomas was too medicated to act and did not expect him to be discharged. Therefore, no duty to Lucia arose.
The claim that Dr. Rao "did not know Thomas would be discharged" misses the point: the duty analysis focuses on the threat at the time Dr. Rao learned of it, not on later events she could not foresee. The statement that her relationship was with Thomas, not Lucia, is also a trap: a special relationship can create a duty to a third person, but only if the threat satisfies the specific-victim requirement. Finally, the idea that the state is never liable for intentional criminal acts is too broad; under Price, liability would be possible if the threat had been specific and imminent.
Remember: general danger to the public is not enough. Look for named victims and a concrete, immediate threat—those are the triggers for a duty to protect.
- Is Pell liable to Odum?
Answer: Yes, because Pell's negligence made rescue foreseeable, and Odum, off duty and with no official duty to act, is treated as a volunteer rescuer.
Whenever you see a rescue doctrine or firefighter's rule question, separate the rescuer's status from the risk. The rescue doctrine makes a negligent tortfeasor liable to rescuers because rescue is a foreseeable consequence of creating danger. The firefighter's rule is an exception: on-duty public safety officers cannot recover for injuries from the same risk that caused them to respond. But an off-duty officer with no official duty to act who intervenes as a private person is treated as a volunteer.
Here Odum was off duty and under no official duty; he stopped and acted as a volunteer rescuer. Pell's negligent running of the stop sign caused the accident, and the rescue of the trapped driver was foreseeable. The transformer explosion was not an independent hazard—it arose from the live-wire emergency Pell created. So Pell is liable.
The "No" answer claiming the transformer explosion was unforeseeable mistakes foreseeability of rescue for foreseeability of the exact injury mechanism; the precise manner of injury need not be foreseeable. The other "No" answer invoking the professional firefighter rule ignores the off-duty volunteer exception and overstates the rule as a blanket bar. The "Yes" answer saying the firefighter's rule applies only to hazards unrelated to the emergency is backwards—the rule bars same-risk injuries, not unrelated ones, and Odum was not acting as an officer anyway.
Study tip: classify the rescuer first—on-duty professional versus off-duty volunteer—then apply foreseeability. The firefighter's rule is a narrow same-risk bar, not immunity for all firefighters.
- Is Nadia likely to recover?
Answer: No, because Nadia was outside the zone of physical danger, and the statutory exception for bystander emotional-distress claims does not list a fiancé as an immediate family member.
This question tests negligent infliction of emotional distress under a statute that narrows the common-law bystander rules. The key move is to check the statutory text before applying general foreseeability principles.
The statute allows recovery only if the plaintiff suffered physical injury or was within the zone of physical danger—and Nadia was on her balcony across the street, so she fails both. The only exception lets a plaintiff recover without those elements if she was physically present and personally observed negligence cause injury or death to a spouse, domestic partner, parent, child, or sibling. Nadia and Mateo were engaged and living together, but the statute expressly says a relationship of engagement or cohabitation does not qualify. Therefore Nadia is unlikely to recover.
Choice B says she should recover because she personally observed the death and suffered severe emotional distress. That ignores the statute's limiting list: observation alone is insufficient unless the victim was an immediate family member. Choice C invokes foreseeability and substantial factor causation, but the statute displaces ordinary foreseeability analysis for bystander NIED—the test is statutory, not general proximate cause. Choice D blames an unforeseeable intervening force, butt the issue is not the causaation chain; Sellers's negligent driving caused the series of events, and even if this argument addressed duty, it would not explain why the statutory bystander exception fails for a fiancé.
On an exam, when a statute supplies the elements, apply it mechanically—do not stretch common-law doctrines like foreseeability to expand recovery. Watch for civil codes that define exactly which family relationships count; engagement and cohabitation are conspicuous omissions.
- Which fact is most important in determining whether the transit authority owed a duty to the asthmatic passenger?
Answer: Whether the loss of control created a foreseeable risk that a standing passenger would fall and drop a package.
In negligence, duty is fundamentally about foreseeability: whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would recognize a risk of harm to this type of plaintiff. Here, the transit authority does owe a heightened duty as a common carrier, but the key question is whether the harm was within the foreseeable scope of the accident.
The most important fact is whether the loss of control created a foreseeable risk that a standing passenger would fall and drop a package. That fact links the bus's dangerous maneuver directly to the escape of the cement dust and the passenger's injury. If a reasonable bus operator would foresee a standing passenger falling and dropping a bag during a sharp turn, then the chain of harm is foreseeable and a duty exists.
The choice about whether the driver knew the bag contained dry cement mix is less important because knowledge of the exact contents is not required if the risk of a dropped package causing injury is foreseeable. The sitting-versus-standing choice is irrelevant; the transit authority owes a duty to all passengers regardless of position. The choice about prior asthma attacks and carrying an inhaler is a classic "eggshell plaintiff" trap — the defendant takes the victim as found, and a preexisting condition does not negate duty; it may affect damages but not the existence of a duty.
On duty questions, anchor yourself to foreseeability of the general risk, not the precise injury or the plaintiff's particular vulnerability.
- Which of the following facts, if established, would be most important in determining whether the courier van driver owed a duty to the pedestrian?
Answer: The sedan's driver appeared dazed and unable to get out of the car after the collision.
When you see a negligence question focusing on duty, ask whether the plaintiff's injury was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct. Here, the van driver's negligence (running the red light) caused the sedan to stall. The critical fact is that the sedan's driver appeared dazed and unable to get out. This transforms the pedestrian from a mere bystander into a rescuer. Under the "danger invites rescue" doctrine, a tortfeasor who negligently places another in peril owes a duty to any third party who reasonably attempts to rescue that person. Because the dazed driver is incapacitated in a live traffic lane, it is entirely foreseeable that a passerby would push the car, making the pedestrian a foreseeable plaintiff. The fact that the pedestrian had not been asked to help is irrelevant—the rescue doctrine protects volunteers who act reasonably, and an invitation is not a prerequisite for duty. Seeing the other vehicle approaching speaks only to the pedestrian's own comparative fault (did she act negligently?) and not to whether the van driver owed a duty to her. The other vehicle's sudden medical emergency could break causation as a superseding cause, but the question specifically asks about the existence of duty, which is established by the foreseeable rescue. For duty questions, look for facts that link the defendant's negligence to a foreseeable class of plaintiffs—rescuers are always in that class.
- Which issue is most central to the trucking company's motion to dismiss?
Answer: Whether a child who was in utero at the time of a negligent collision can be owed a duty of care if the child is born alive after the collision.
Whenever you see a motion to dismiss based on "no duty," isolate the element of duty from breach, causation, and damages. The trucking company's argument is purely about duty: it claims the son was not a legal person at the time of the collision and therefore no duty was owed to him. The central issue is therefore whether a child in utero can be owed a duty of care if the child is born alive after the collision. Under the prevailing born-alive rule, a child born alive may maintain an action for prenatal injuries caused by negligence, because the injury becomes legally actionable once the child is born with that injury. Here, the son's lung condition allegedly resulted from the premature birth caused by the collision, so the duty question controls.
The other choices misidentify the issue. Whether Rhea's bruises were sufficient physical impact to support emotional distress damages concerns Rhea's own claim, not the son's duty question. Whether running the red light was a substantial factor in causing the premature birth addresses causation, which the trucking company's motion does not truly contest. And whether the company can be held liable for the driver's conduct during a delivery raises vicarious liability, a separate issue from whether a duty ran to the unborn child.
On exam day, when a defendant moves to dismiss on duty grounds, keep your focus on duty. Remember "born alive" as the key answer to the no-duty-to-an-unborn-plaintiff argument.
- Which fact, if true, would most support Amara's argument that Paolo owed her a duty of care?
Answer: A reasonable driver in Paolo's position would have foreseen that a rear-end collision could injure the driver of the car ahead.
Whenever you see a negligence question involving a plaintiff's preexisting condition, think about the eggshell plaintiff rule and the distinction between duty and scope of harm. Duty is determined by the foreseeability of harm to an ordinary person, not to this specific plaintiff's vulnerabilities.
The fact that most supports Amara is that a reasonable driver in Paolo's position would have foreseen that a rear-end collision could injure the driver of the car ahead. That is exactly the duty question: a driver owes a duty to avoid rear-ending another car, because it foreseeably causes injury. Once Paolo breached that duty, the eggshell plaintiff rule makes him liable for the full extent of Amara's injuries, including her ruptured disc, even though he could not have foreseen her spinal condition or the severity of harm. The law takes the victim as you find them, so the unforeseeability of the extent of injury does not erase the duty.
The other choices miss the point. The fact that Paolo followed Amara for several miles without observing signs of her condition does not matter——nonexpert drivers are not expected to detect hidden medical conditions, and it says nothing about whether his conduct created a foreseeable risk. The diagnosis ordocumentation of Amara's spinal condition is also irrelevant, because duty is not premised on the defendant's actual knowledge of the plaintiff's condition. Finalmente, the forecast rainstorm and following distance might support breach of duty (negligence per se or unreasonable conduct,) but it does not address the duty to Amara specifically——the duty exists regardless of weather conditions.
Your study tip: distinguish duty from breach and from proximate cause. The eggshell plaintiff rule applies to damages——once tortious conduct causes physical impact, the defendant takes the plaintiff as is. Duty, however, is measured by what a reasonable person would foresee happening to an ordinary person—not by knowledge of special vulnerabilities.
- Under Ortiz, which of the following is Superior's best argument that it owed no duty to Milo?
Answer: Milo acted imprudently by ignoring the caution tape and crossing a gasoline-covered intersection to help a driver who was already safe, so he was not a foreseeable plaintiff.
Whenever a torts question involves a rescuer, your job is to apply the stated rule element by element. Under Ortiz, a rescuer is owed a duty only if there was an apparent risk, the rescuer reasonably believed emergency help was needed, and the attempt was not imprudent. Here, Superior's best argument is that Milo acted imprudently: he ignored police caution tape, walked across a gasoline-covered intersection, and went to "check on" a driver he could see was already safe beside an officer. That conduct falls squarely outside the rule's protection, because no reasonable person would think emergency intervention was necessary once Dan was safe and firefighters were on scene.
The choice that says firefighters had already arrived so Milo could not reasonably believe intervention was necessary is too absolute; arrival of firefighters is important evidence, but the rule does not make it a categorical bar. The "zone of danger" argument misunderstands the rescuer doctrine, which can extend duty to rescuers outside the original danger zone if the rule is satisfied. And Paula's skid was not an independent superseding cause — a car skidding on spilled gasoline is a foreseeable outcome of the defendant's negligence, not a break in causation.
Study tip: when a rescuer ignores official warnings or helps someone already safe, those facts are red flags for "imprudent" and "no reasonable belief." Apply the Ortiz elements mechanically, and let those facts carry the answer.
- Which of the following best describes Brody's liability?
Answer: Brody is liable to Torres for her physical injuries and emotional distress, and to the surviving twin for her brain damage; no claim lies for the stillborn twin's wrongful death.
When you see a prenatal-injury tort question, focus on the legal rule governing duty to unborn children. The key is that a child born alive can sue for injuries suffered before birth, even if the defendant did not know about the pregnancy and even if the child was not yet viable. By contrast, a child not born alive has no cause of action, and no wrongful-death claim can be brought on its behalf.
Here, the holding in Nunez controls. Torres may recover for her own physical injuries and for emotional distress from the stillbirth because that distress was a foreseeable result of Brody's negligence. The surviving twin was born alive and suffered permanent brain damage caused by the collision, so she may recover for that harm. The stillborn twin's estate cannot recover wrongful-death damages because the child was not born alive, so no claim lies.
The wrong answers reveal common traps. Any answer allowing the stillborn twin's estate to recover—such as one saying Brody is liable to the estate, or one saying the estate recovers while the surviving twin gets only medical expenses—misreads the born-alive rule. The surviving twin has her own claim for her injuries, including pain and suffering, not just expenses paid by Torres. An answer denying both twins recovery because Brody did not know Torres was pregnant also fails: knowledge of the pregnancy is irrelevant to the duty owed to a child later born alive.
Remember: born alive means the child can recover regardless of viability or knowledge; stillborn means no claim, but the mother's emotional distress may still be compensable.
- Under the Act, is the bus company liable to Ortega?
Answer: No, because Ortega was outside the immediate area of physical risk created by the employee's negligent act, and her injury came about through a chain reaction rather than direct exposure to that risk.
This question tests whether you apply a special statute precisely rather than general tort foreseeability. The Act limits liability to persons in the "immediate area" where the negligent act posed a foreseeable risk of physical impact. Here, the employee jostled a passenger near the boarding gates, causing the passenger to drop a bag that exploded. That explosion knocked over a cart 100 feet away, and the cart injured Ortega. Because Ortega was 100 feet away and was hurt only through a chain reaction after the explosion, she was outside the immediate area and not directly exposed to the risk from the employee's act. Thus the bus company is not liable, even if the chain reaction was foreseeable.
The "not a passenger" answer misreads the Act, which protects "other persons lawfully in its terminal." The "proximately caused and foreseeable duty" answer ignores the Act's stricter immediate-area requirement. The "warning label made the explosion foreseeable" answer likewise misses the point: foreseeability alone is not enough under the statute.
On exam day, when a statute supplies an element, apply that element exactly. Ask: was the plaintiff in the immediate risk area, or injured by a later chain reaction?
- Which issue is most likely to determine whether the city owed Jordan a duty of care?
Answer: Whether the bus driver's negligent operation created the peril to Lena that prompted Jordan to intervene.
Whenever you see an injured rescuer, think "danger invites rescue." A defendant who negligently creates a peril that endangers another owes a duty not only to that victim but also to a rescuer who comes to help — because the rescue is a foreseeable consequence of the negligence. Here, Jordan's claim against the city rises or falls on whether the bus driver's negligent operation created the peril to Lena that prompted Jordan to intervene. If that peril existed, Jordan was a foreseeable plaintiff even though he was a stranger; if the driver created no peril, the city owed him no duty.
The other choices miss the duty question. Jordan's decision to run alongside a moving bus goes to the reasonableness of his rescue — relevant to comparative negligence, not whether a duty existed; in an emergency, a rescuer need not choose the perfect course. Whether Lena would have suffered death or serious injury if Jordan had not acted might show the seriousness of the peril, but it does not establish that the city caused it; a duty arises from the defendant's creation of danger, not just from howbad the outcome would have been. And whether the bus driver saw Jordan before he came alongside asks about actual foresight; the law uses objective foreseeability, not subjective observation, and the driver need not anticipate the specific rescuer's identity — only the general risk that someone would attempt a rescue. When you see a rescuer on the bar exam, anchor your analysis there: did the defendant's negligence create the victim's peril? If yes, the rescuer is foreseeable; reasonableness of the rescue and the rescuer's identity are secondary.
- Under Section 34-2-301, does Ned owe Yuki a duty?
Answer: No, because Yuki was not herself exposed to a substantial risk of physical injury from Ned's negligent driving.
Whenever you see a statutory cause of action with a list of requirements, treat them as conjunctive—every element must be satisfied. This bystander negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim is gated by Section 34-2-301, and the final element is the key: the plaintiff must have been "within the zone of danger," meaning exposed to a substantial risk of physical injury from the defendant's conduct.
Yuki easily meets the first three statutory elements—she is Kenji's mother, was present at the scene, and contemporaneously perceived the van strike him. But those alone are insufficient. The evidence shows Yuki stood on the opposite corner and the van stayed in the southbound lane; she was never in danger of being hit. Thus she was not exposed to a substantial risk of physical injury to herself, so Ned owes her no duty under the statute.
The "Yes, because Yuki is Kenji's mother…saw the van strike him"distractor ignores the zone-of-danger element;it lists only three of the four requirements. The"Yes, because Yuki was near enough to the accident…" distractor misreads the zone of danger as mere physical proximityor as reasonable fear for Kenji's safety;but the statute demands exposure to risk of injury to herself, not emotional concern for her son. The"No, because Yuki was on the opposite corner and did not contemporaneously perceive…" distractor misstates the facts—she did contemporaneously perceive the injury, since she saw the impact from across the street. Thecorrect no answer rests on her lack of personal physical exposure, not on any failure of perception. On exam day, when a statute lists elements, checklist them all; don't let emotional sympathy—or satisfaction of only some prongs—tempt you into ignoring the final requirement.
- Which fact is most important in determining whether the railroad owed a duty to the injured passenger?
Answer: Whether the employee knew or should have known that the bag contained a gun or other dangerous object.
When you see a negligence question, first identify which element is at issue. Here, the question asks about duty—specifically, whether the railroad owed a duty to the passenger. Duty in a case of affirmative conduct depends on whether the injury was foreseeable: was the passenger a foreseeable plaintiff, and was the risk of harm foreseeable? The most important fact is whether the employee knew or should have known that the bag contained a gun or other dangerous object. If he had that knowledge (or reasonably should have had it), then grabbing the man's arm and causing the bag to drop would foreseeably risk a gun discharging and injuring someone. If he had no reason to know the bag was dangerous, the injury would be unforeseeable, and no duty would arise.
The other choices miss the mark. "Whether the injured passenger was standing in a crowded area" goes to the standard of care or breach—how a reasonable person would act—but it doesn't establish whether the employee owed a duty in the first place. "Whether the man was lawfully carrying the gun and had a permit" is irrelevant to foreseeability; the lawfulness of the gun's possession doesn't affect whether the employee should have anticipated the risk. "Whether the employee grabbed the man to prevent a fall or to stop him from boarding" might affect whether the employee's conduct was negligent (breach), but the existence of duty is determined by foreseeability, not the motive behind the act.
On the bar, when duty is contested, zero in on what the defendant knew or should have known about the risk. Foreseeability is the key—ignore facts about the plaintiff's location or the legality of the item, which distract from that core inquiry.
- Under Section 5-2-102, which of the following is Golden Gate's best argument that it owed no duty to Devon?
Answer: Devon discovered the trench and realized the risk it posed, so the statutory condition based on youth is not satisfied.
When you see a statute-based tort question, your job is to match the facts to each element. Here, the statute sets out the attractive nuisance doctrine. The key is element (3): the child, because of youth, must have failed to discover the condition or realize the risk. Devon saw the deep, water-filled trench and knew it was dangerous. He waded in anyway. Because he fully appreciated the risk, the statutory condition based on youth is not satisfied, so Golden Gate owes no duty. That is why the correct answer is that Devon discovered the trench and realized the risk. The wrong answers each miss this. The claim that Devon, at 13, is no longer a "child" fails because the statute has no bright-line age cutoff; youth is a factor in whether the child understood the risk, but here he did. The claim that the trench was open and obvious is a trap: open and obvious is relevant to whether the child realized the danger, but the statute focuses on the child's actual realization, not the condition's visibility—and Devon did realize it. The claim that the burden of filling the trench was greater than the risk ignores that the risk is drowning, which is enormous, and fixing a fence or filling a trench is slight in comparison. Remember: for attractive nuisance, the child's subjective appreciation of the risk is the pivotal element. Don't get distracted by age or obviousness; ask, "Did this specific child know the danger?"
- Under Simmons, does the railroad owe Rosa a duty?
Answer: No, because Rosa was at the other end of the platform and was not within the reasonably foreseeable zone of danger created by the conductor's push.
This question tests the scope of a negligence duty: a defendant owes care only to plaintiffs within the reasonably foreseeable zone of danger created by the negligent act. Here, the conductor negligently pushed a passenger, but the passenger's wrapped package—unbeknownst to anyone—contained fireworks. The explosion occurred at the other end of the platform and caused scales to fall on Rosa. Under Simmons, the relevant inquiry is whether Rosa, or her class, was foreseeably endangered by the conductor's push. She was not: she was far away, and the harm arose through an extraordinary chain from a concealed package. Thus, no duty was owed to Rosa.
The answer claiming that the explosion was a foreseeable consequence of pushing a passenger carrying a package is wrong because negligence is judged by what was apparent or foreseeable; a wrapped package does not signal fireworks. The answer saying all passengers on the platform are foreseeable plaintiffs for any negligent act overstates duty—being on the platform does not put every passenger within every zone of danger. The answer saying Rosa was outside the class because she was not the passenger being helped is closer but misstates the rule: the conductor's duty is not limited only to the person he was helping; it extends to anyone within the foreseeable zone of danger, which Rosa was not.
On exam day, when you see an injury caused by a bizarre chain of events, ask: was this plaintiff within the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's act? If not, no duty exists.
- Which additional fact, if true, would most help the delivery person establish that the company owed a duty of care?
Answer: The company's project manager had regularly seen delivery workers and residents use the alley while preparing the demolition plan.
Whenever a negligence question turns on duty, your focus should be on foreseeability: would a reasonable company have anticipated someone in the delivery person's position being near the blast? The key fact is that the company's project manager had regularly seen delivery workers and residents use the alley while preparing the demolition plan. That prior knowledge makes the delivery person a foreseeable user of the alley, so the company owed a duty to take reasonable precautions for his safety—even though the alley was private and not one of the posted public streets.
The other choices attack different elements rather than duty. The concrete coming from the warehouse wall the company was hired to demolish helps prove causation, but it does nothing to show the company should have anticipated this plaintiff; it is just the physical source of the injury. The lookouts leaving their posts relates to breach—whether the company failed to exercise reasonable care—but duty is a separate threshold question the company already moved on. And the delivery person having been instructed by a tenant to use the alley explains why he was there, but the company's duty depends on what the company knew or reasonably should have known, not on the plaintiff's private instructions. Since the project manager's regular observations gave the company notice that people used the alley, the delivery person was a foreseeable victim, and duty exists.
Study tip: on duty questions, ask "Did the defendant have reason to know this class of plaintiffs might be in the zone of danger?" Actual knowledge is often decisive.
